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INTRODUCTION:  
HOW THIS RESEARCH FITS INTO THE 
DEBATES IN REFUGEE STUDIES AND 
POLICY 
 
When I first developed the plan to do research on Burmese refugees, I was in 
Rangoon and a gentleman’s agreement had just been agreed upon between the 
junta and the Karen rebels. It was a historic moment. After all, the Karen insurgents 
had been fighting the Burmese regime since the 1940s and now there was a 
possibility that this civil war would come to an end in the near future. The 
atmosphere was optimistic, which encouraged the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to 
start consultations with all the stakeholders on possible repatriation of the 
numerous Burmese refugees in Thailand. This event caught my attention and I 
decided to investigate the consequences of the worldwide preference for 
repatriation as a durable solution on the quality of reception in a host country, on 
the compliance with the necessary conditions for repatriation and on the follow-up 
of refugees after repatriation. However, just two months into the research 
(November 2005), the informal ceasefire broke down and the armed conflict 
reached new heights, leading to additional waves of internal and external 
displacement. This event acted as an eye opener. Only at that point did I realise 
how optimistic my views had been and how often this kind of relapse was to occur 
all over the world. Refugees’ hopes are raised because of a ceasefire and they start 
making preparations to go back, but then the arrangement breaks down and the 
period of refuge in the host country is once again extended. The longest period in 
the lives of refugees is thus the intermediate period in which they are living in exile 
without a durable solution in sight. It was this awareness that made me decide to 
shift my focus to protracted exile. 
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If the situation in their country of origin remains unstable, as is the case in Burma, 
refugees are likely to remain in the host country for a long period of time. The 
emergency phase evolves into what is called a protracted refugee situation: 
“Refugees can be regarded as being in a protracted refugee situation when they 
have lived in exile for more than five years, and when they still have no immediate 
prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight” (Crisp 2003: 1). Their lives may 
not be at risk, but their basic economic and social rights remain unfulfilled after 
years in exile. In 2008, 5.2 million refugees were trapped in a protracted refugee 
situation, or 46 % of the 11.4 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate (UNHCR 
2007b, 2008). As this figure excludes unregistered self-settled refugees, the real 
amount of refugees in protracted refugee situations is likely to be even higher. 
Moreover, the amount of time that refugees are trapped in protracted refugee 
situations is rising: from nine years in 1993 to an incredible 17 years at the end of 
2003 (Loescher and Milner 2006: 3). Why do these situations endure?: 
“These chronic and seemingly unresolvable problems occur because 
of ongoing political, ethnic and religious conflict in the countries of 
refugee origin, stagnate and become protracted as a consequence of 
restrictions, intolerance and confinement to camps in host countries, 
and are exacerbated and prolonged by the combined effect of 
inaction or unsustained international action both in the country of 
origin or the country of asylum”. 
(Loescher and Milner 2007: 13) 
At its most fundamental level, this study seeks to assess how refugees cope with 
and adapt to life in exile in a protracted refugee situation. 
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1.1 Two settlement options: Refugee camps or self-
settlement 
 
Of particular importance in protracted refugee situations is how refugees are 
treated in the intermediate term, while waiting for a durable solution: are refugees 
permitted to freely settle in the host country (self-settlement), or will they be 
asked to stay in camps or organised settlements? Usually, host countries prefer to 
gather refugees in closed refugee camps, mainly to ensure control and prevent 
potential frictions with the local population, and also because it is presumed that 
this will entail quicker repatriation at a later stage. Another explanation is that 
UNHCR considers camps a more efficient means for both protection and assistance 
in the context of a mass refugee influx (Black 1998; Kuhlman 2002; Banki 2004)1
As refugee camps are extraordinary newly created ‘spaces’, they attract academic 
attention. Scholars working on situations of mass refugee influx (usually in the 
South) have indeed largely focused on the life in refugee camps. One group of 
studies looks at issues such as formal and informal institutions, parallel legal 
mechanisms, identity formation and power politics within camps (e.g. Malkki 
1995a,1995b; Stepputat 1999; Agier 2002). But most studies present a critique on 
encampment because these camps prevent integration of refugees and hosts, 
increase dependency on aid, and neglect the impact of the refugees’ presence on a 
host region (Schmidt 2003). Certainly the social problems related to long term 
. As 
a result, refugee camps are used all over the world. 87.6 % of the refugees assisted 
by UNHCR are contained in officially designated camps, the remainder being in 
agricultural settlements or in urban areas (Agier 2002: 320). Even if these camps 
are supposed to be temporary, they often become permanent in the absence of 
other viable solutions, which is why Napier-Moore (2005) argues that refugee 
camps have de facto become a fourth durable solution, next to repatriation, local 
integration and resettlement. 
                                                             
1 In 1997, UNHCR even adopted an official policy of reducing its assistance in urban areas to a minimum 
and discouraging any settlement in urban areas (Dryden-Peterson 2006: 383-384). Although the 
inadequacies of this policy were recognised, a more effective policy with a protection focus, as proposed 
by its Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, has yet to supersede it ten years later.  
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‘warehousing’2
In contrast to the large amount of research on camp refugees, few studies look at 
the alternative to encampment: self-settlement. This is a remarkable finding as it is 
an accepted fact that the majority of refugees do not stay in camps. Moreover, 
proponents of self-settlement (e.g. Kibreab 2001) argue that this option is 
beneficial for all stakeholders, which makes the dearth of information on the 
matter all the more surprising. There are several reasons for the small amount of 
studies on this phenomenon. An important explanation is that refugee scholars 
often seek to inform policy makers and aid agencies, looking into situations where 
policies are having an effect (for better or for worse), which is the case for 
(supposedly) closed and controlled refugee camps (Bakewell 2008a: 443-444). 
 of refugees in camps has received a lot of attention, leading to a 
debate on the existence of the ‘aid dependency syndrome’ (e.g. Harrell-Bond 1986; 
Kibreab 1993; Malkki 1995; Black 1998): “This refugee dependency syndrome is 
characterised by the acceptance of handouts without taking any initiatives to attain 
self-sufficiency, accompanied by symptoms of excessive and unreasonable 
demands, frequent complaints, passivity and lethargy” (Horst 2006c: 92). While it is 
often said that warehousing creates this syndrome, other scholars contradict this 
image of ‘the passive refugee’ and stress that refugees, as other marginalised 
groups, survive in a very creative manner by using a wide variety of coping 
strategies (Kuhlman 1991; Wilson 1992; Kibreab 1993; Dolan 1999; Hyndman 2000; 
Jacobsen 2005; Horst 2006c). De Vriese (2006: 13) for example reasons that the aid 
dependency syndrome is a deliberate response of refugees to the system: “Does 
this not rather illustrate that humanitarian assistance has become part of the 
livelihood strategies developed by refugees? (...) If provision is based on need, 
people will present themselves as needy”.  
                                                             
2 Definition of ‘warehousing’: “This is a term (...) used to describe the denial of human rights found in 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and other instruments to live lives as normal as 
possible while in exile, especially the right to earn a livelihood and freedom of movement. Warehoused 
refugees are typically, but not always, confined to camps or segregated settlements where they are 
virtually dependent on humanitarian assistance. But even refugees who are free to move are still 
warehoused, in effect, if they are not allowed their rights to work, practice professions, run businesses, 
and own property” (USCRI 2008a). 
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While there is some basic agreement among policy makers, NGOs3
 The small amount of refugee scholars that have looked into self-settlement have 
tended to centre on urban refugee livelihoods, often to denounce the idea that 
these refugees are burdens to their host countries (Kok 1989; Machiavello 2003; Al-
Sharmani 2004; Campbell 2005; Clarck 2006; De Vriese 2006; Dryden-Peterson 
2006; Grabkska 2006; Jacobsen 2006). Urban refugees are a particularly fascinating 
population for research, as they are more autonomous and mobile than camp 
 and academics 
that refugee camps are undesirable, the alternatives to encampment are 
considered politically and financially unfeasible (Schmidt 2003: 7). Therefore, 
alternatives are being disposed of as unrealistic and as such they receive much less 
attention. Moreover, governments may actively discourage research on self-settled 
refugee populations, seeing them as (unwanted) migrants who can take care of 
themselves and instead stressing that all refugees are living in camps: “There is 
considerable ambiguity surrounding the status of self-settled refugees: indeed the 
government and UNHCR see the very notion of ‘self-settled refugee’ as a 
contradiction in terms, having redefined ‘refugee’ as someone receiving assistance 
and living in a camp. Such a definition, however, makes little sense in a context in 
which thousands of refugees have opted out of the settlement structure and have 
sought to make a living on their own” (Hovil 2007: 601). A third reason for the small 
number of studies is that self-settled refugees are a much more difficult population 
to conduct research on. After all, they are spread out over the country (so it is 
difficult to get representative data) (Jacobsen and Landau 2003), are often in 
hiding, and even if identified, might very well be unwilling to disclose any 
information to a researcher because of their illegality and the understandable 
suspicion resulting from that. Therefore, many research gaps remain, 
notwithstanding that research on self-settled refugees is important to demonstrate 
the fluidity and contradictions in both theoretical and legal constructions of 
refugees (Al-Sharmani 2004: 2).  
                                                             
3 A well-publicised campaign in this regard was the ‘anti-warehousing campaign’ initiated by the US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI 2004; 2008a). More information on this campaign can 
be found at: 
 http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1109&rid=1179&subm=33&area=About%20Refugees. 
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refugees, but on the other hand they have to fend for themselves and try to be (or 
are made) ‘invisible’ (Polzer and Hammond 2008)4
Only a handful of researchers have taken it one step further to compare the two 
settlement options within a single area, which is bound to lead to more holistic 
insights. Notable examples are the work of Bulcha (1988), Wijbrandi (1990), Malkki 
(1995), Bakewell (2000a), Kibreab (2001), Kuhlman (2002), Hovil (2002, 2007), 
Jacobsen (2005) and Kaiser (2006), all of whom have focused on refugee settings in 
Africa. Comparing refugee camps and self-settlement is vital, as we need to learn 
more on why refugees ‘choose’ one or the other (Napier-Moore 2005), and what 
the impact of this settlement decision is on the human security and livelihoods of 
the refugees. After all, there is not only a vast difference between camp refugees 
and self-settled refugees in terms of recognition and protection, but also in regard 
to freedom of movement, access to humanitarian aid, access to work, refugee 
identity, etc. This research wants to show what the consequences of a particular 
settlement choice are for the livelihoods of refugees: how does their selection have 
an impact on the available assets, which strategies are applied to secure access to 
assets, what is the impact of their settlement choice and subsequent strategies on 
social adaptation and how does the institutional context influence their decisions 
and opportunities. These findings will help to inform the way that each group can 
. Due to this focus on the coping 
and adapting strategies of urban refugees, these livelihoods studies generally have 
a different line of approach than studies on refugee camps, which tend to focus on 
policies and interventions. Their actor-oriented perspective is very useful, as it 
offers a richer understanding of the dynamic aspects of the experiences of 
refugees, their relations with the host society, humanitarian agencies and other 
refugee groups (Al-Sharmani 2004: 2). Therefore, this study inscribes itself in this 
research tradition, while extending the research focus beyond urban refugees, as 
will be made clear further on. 
                                                             
4 Invisibility can occur both because the population in question considers it the best survival strategy 
(e.g. failed asylum seekers in Europe) or because a certain population is ignored by researchers 
(disciplinary invisibility) and/or policy makers: “Invisibility is a relationship between those who have the 
power to see or to choose not to see, and, on the other hand, those who lack the power to demand to 
be seen or to protect themselves from the negative effects of imposed visibility” (Polzer and Hammond 
2008: 421). 
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best be supported. This is significant to improve the current condition that the 
refugees find themselves in, and is indispensable to prepare the refugees in the 
best possible way for any durable solution in the future. Moreover, looking into 
different settlement options in a certain area can reveal links between the people 
in the different settings and the various populations can function as control groups 
for each other on the methodological level. Hence, this study will compare the 
options of refugee camps and self-settlement in a specific geographical area, 
namely Tak province in Thailand (the selection of which will be explained in 
Chapter 2). 
 
1.2 The livelihoods approach 
 
The focus of the research will be on the agency of refugees. This is a deliberate 
choice, as there has been an enormous amount of studies on improving refugee 
policy in Africa, but there is far less understanding about what people actually do 
when they flee violence and end up in a host country (Bakewell 2008a: 450). Due to 
the focus on the problems with regard to state, protection or aid policy, there is a 
dearth of information on what does work for refugees, on how they manage in 
practice to cope with exile regardless of policy. It is important to understand what 
kind of initiatives refugees are undertaking to stabilise and improve their situation. 
Therefore, this research focuses on refugees’ agency, which has a large influence 
on ‘the truth’ discovered:  
“The focus on what works in the midst of crisis, desperation, and 
uncertainty is a deliberate attempt to promote research and policy-
setting that is forward-looking and productive rather than reactionary 
and regressive” (Dryden-Peterson 2006: 381).  
The livelihoods approach is particularly well suited for this kind of research due to 
its actor-oriented and participative approach, and as such it had a large influence 
on this study. It was used as a thinking method, as a way to put together a diverse 
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picture of refugees’ strategies: “Rather than starting from the perspective of a 
grand economic theory, a livelihood approach looks at where people are, what they 
have, what their needs and interests are, and it evaluates the strategies they use 
within the broader political and economic framework to achieve their desired 
outcomes” (Vlassenroot 2005: 195). Livelihoods research is also a relatively safe 
way of investigating sensitive issues in insecure environments (Collinson 2003: 12). 
However, a frequent problem with livelihoods studies is that the balance shifts too 
much to the ‘creative capacity of refugees’, overlooking the impact of legal and 
non-legal barriers to livelihoods as well as the power relations and politics that are 
at play. It is this structural context that determines whether the potential of assets 
can be realised, hence livelihoods research necessitates an appraisal of the 
enabling or constricting environment. The institutional context is thus considered a 
vital part of the analysis, but the relevant unit of analysis for this research is the 
household, as is usually the case in livelihoods studies: “As King et al. put it, the 
‘real experts on migration’ are the migrants themselves and qualitative analysis of 
interviews may help us to ‘capture the full richness of the human experience of 
migration’. By analysing the migrants’ own experiences and perceptions on the 
basis of the structural and institutional context of the locality where they live we 
can conceptualise their ‘lifeworld’; that is, the dynamic process through which 
individual migrants and households ‘build’ their lives in the destination place” 
(Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1034). While I have borrowed various elements of the 
sustainable livelihoods approach, the traditional framework was adapted, as it 
stresses too little the particularities of the lives of refugees who were forced to flee 
their home country and now live in a host region that may not be able or willing to 
cope with their presence. This adapted livelihoods framework will be thoroughly 
expounded in Chapter 4.  
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1.3 Transnationalism and its impact 
 
This livelihoods study will make it possible to look into the links that may exist in 
between members of the two settlement options (described as an important 
research gap in Landau 2004), but also between them and family members in other 
domains of the refugee diaspora, namely the country of origin or a third country. 
These transnational links can consist of purely keeping contact up to financial 
support and diaspora engagement on a political level. As such, the study will fill a 
research gap by not only looking into movements of people but also into 
connections between and within the different diaspora domains. It is not the 
researcher’s intention to quantify these flows of information and goods, but it is 
about revealing which kind of transnational activities exist in this case of mass 
refugee influx, and what the impact of these transnational activities is on the 
country of origin and the host country. If both the financial and social flows are 
considered, this viewpoint allows understanding migration as a social process in 
which migrants and refugees are potent agents for economic, social and political 
change (Nyberg-Sorensen 2004: 5). By assessing whether and which kind of 
transnational connections exist, this study will seek to verify the findings of current 
transnationalism research, which is predominantly focused on the West. Several 
studies found that durable integration in the host country and stability in the 
country of origin are necessary pre-conditions for individuals to be transnational 
actors (Al-Ali et al. 2001; Guarnizo et al. 2003), but both forms of stability tend to 
be lacking for Burmese refugees in Thailand, which makes it an interesting case for 
comparison. In addition, the importance of economic transnational activities, and 
in particular of remittances, will be studied. While the number of studies looking 
into remittance flows to refugees is growing (Dick 2002; Horst 2002, 2008; Horst 
and Van Hear 2002; Lindley 2007a), these studies usually select on the dependent 
variable, which may lead to an exaggeration of the number of refugee recipients. 
Authors such as Jacobsen (2005: 29) question the importance of remittances for 
the common refugee, saying that the number of recipients remains very small, 
while simultaneously adding that the people who do receive remittances are 
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usually the best off in camp. Therefore, this study will analyse the importance of 
remittances in this particular case by incorporating questions on remittances in all 
the livelihoods interviews, without selecting respondents on that basis. Moreover, 
the impact of remittances on Burma will be assessed. This is important as 
remittances are the new ‘development mantra’. Many studies see remittances as a 
factor seriously influencing the development of a country of origin and, particularly 
in neoliberal circles, remittances are viewed as an alternative bottom-up 
mechanism to fund development in the Global South (de Haas 2005: 1277). Other 
authors seek to balance this euphoria, not in the least because of the burden it 
imposes on the senders (Datta et al. 2006; Lindley 2007b), but also because of the 
selectivity of international migration (the poorest do not migrate and thus their 
families do not benefit from remittances), and because remittances can also be 
used for the support of armed movements, prolonging conflict instead of 
contributing to development (Van Hear 2003, 2004). Also political forms of 
transnationalism can have an influence on (armed) conflict. When activists in cases 
of mass refugee influx are studied, the ‘refugee warrior’ phenomenon is usually the 
only point of interest (see for example Lischer 2000; Terry 2002; Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006). But given the wider variety of social and political transnationalism 
found in refugee communities in the West (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Adamson 
2002; Guarnizo 2003; Waldinger et al. 2008), it will be verified in this study whether 
these non-violent forms can also be found in cases of mass refugee influx, and if so, 
what the influence of these activities is on conflict, peace-building and 
development. 
 
1.4 Integration 
 
While refugees can be transnational actors, at the same time they undergo some 
level of integration in the host society: “The deployment of transnational networks 
as a resource is predicated on reasonably secure attachment to the place of exile, 
for it is from such attachment that resources and entitlements come: it is hard to 
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imagine how resources can be raised — whether for a household in distress at 
home, or to procure arms for a guerrilla group — from a footloose, transient 
population without such attachment to place” (Van Hear 2006: 12). Indeed, social 
capital can be established with co-nationals but also with the host population. A 
minimum level of integration is necessary for survival, certainly for self-settled 
refugees who do not have a relief system to fall back upon. In this study, 
integration has therefore deliberately been lifted out of the general livelihoods 
analysis and is discussed separately as a phenomenon. As such, it constitutes the 
third major theme in this research. While there is a large amount of research on 
the integration of immigrants and refugees, these studies almost invariably focus 
on their integration in Western countries and the implications for migration policy. 
Very little information is available on integration in countries in the South, albeit 
that relative differences in wealth between countries in the South most certainly 
cause regional economic migration as well. Furthermore, the largest number of 
refugees originate in the South and do not ‘go West’, but remain in their area of 
origin. Even if some literature already exists on the topic of self-settlement and 
integration of refugees (Bulcha 1988; Kuhlman 1991; Bakewell 2000a; Hovil 2002; 
Crisp 2004; Kaiser 2006), the issue remains greatly underresearched. It is 
nonetheless an important research subject as integration is a vital element for the 
lives of refugees in a host country. Moreover, integration in situations of mass 
refugee influx is bound to be vastly different than for Convention refugees and 
legal migrants in the West. The host state often does not have the means to ensure 
access to services for its own population, let alone for the refugees. In these 
situations, refugee integration is usually not state-controlled or even discouraged 
by requiring refugees to stay in camps. This study hopes to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of integration of self-settled refugees in cases of mass influx in the 
South, by thoroughly analysing the issue in this and other case studies worldwide, 
distilling common factors of success. It will describe how integration works, what 
the influential factors are and if and to what extent Burmese refugees integrate on 
an economic, social and structural level. Lastly, it will be assessed what the 
outcome of these integration, livelihood and transnational strategies is for the host 
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population, since they too need to learn to cope with a changed situation after the 
refugee influx. The impact of the Burmese refugees on the security, politics, 
environment and economy of Thailand will be analysed. 
 
While these are the most important themes that this research will go into, the 
study also touches upon two debates ongoing in policy circles. While the 
questions, methods or findings of this study were not shaped by any particular 
political interests or institutions, due to my background as a political scientist, I do 
have a special interest in policy. This interest in policy is very common in refugee 
studies, which has both benefits and detriments, as Castles (2003: 22) has argued: 
“The practical orientation (of refugee studies, ed.) is a strength, since it ensures 
concern for the human consequences of the phenomenon and prevents any flight 
into abstract theorizing. But it is also a weakness because it can lead to reactive and 
narrow research that does not bring about the accumulation of knowledge”. By 
focusing on the everyday experiences of refugees, on ‘what works’ in a situation of 
exile, and then working towards more theoretical insights (induction), I hope to 
have circumvented the caveat of producing reactive research. The interest in 
refugee and migration policy had an influence on my work, both in the sense that 
their impact on the lives of refugees is a red line through-out this book, and that I 
wanted my work to be relevant and useful for policy, without letting this determine 
the questions asked. On the contrary, many locally established ideas are 
challenged, for example by adopting the insights of the migration-asylum nexus 
debate (explained further on in this chapter) into the setup of this research, much 
to the irritation of local policy makers, UN and NGO staff and Thai academics. In 
contrast to the frequent unreflective adoption by refugee researchers of policy 
labels such as ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘trafficked victim’ etc. (Bakewell 2007: 7-8), this 
research challenges these policy labels and considers all the Burmese in Tak 
province (Thailand) as its research population. The policy category may very well 
not be the most important determinant of a person’s livelihood in exile, which is 
what this research tries to comprehend, and may not truly reflect the causes of a 
I n t r o d u c t i o n | 13 
 
person’s flight if bureaucratic labels are attributed in a political way. Therefore, 
focusing on the different forms of migration and settlement as well as the 
connections between them in a certain area is bound to lead to more holistic 
insights. At the same time, this disputing of policy labels did not impede translating 
the research findings into useful material for policy makers in the policy chapter on 
durable solutions at the end of the book. 
The remainder of this chapter will make clear how this research fits into two 
debates that are related to policy. The first section will briefly describe the 
transformations in refugee policy that have occurred in the 20th century, and 
reveals the changing preferences of policy makers in terms of durable solutions. 
While these durable solutions are not the core of this research, it is still important 
to go into the subject as I will argue that the worldwide preference for repatriation 
has obscured other options that may ease the way for progress in protracted 
refugee situations. In the last chapter of this book, this debate will re-surface in the 
durable solutions framework developed for Burmese refugees in Thailand. The next 
debate that will be set forth is the migration-asylum nexus, which is an idea that 
strongly influenced the setup and thinking of this research. Only these two debates 
will be discussed because of their importance for this research on life in exile, while 
other interesting issues such as, for example, the migration patterns and their 
determinants, or the different legal regimes of refugees and Internally Displaced 
People (IDPs), were not discussed in detail because they were considered less 
relevant for this study. 
 
1.5 Repatriation as the best durable solution?  
 
Refugee movements are as old as human history but the idea that the international 
community should take responsibility for refugees is relatively new. Only in 1921, 
the League of Nations appointed Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to be the first High 
Commissioner for Russian refugees. His mandate was subsequently extended to 
other groups, until the foundation of the International Refugee Organisation in 
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1947, which was assigned to deal with refugees in the aftermath of the Second 
World War (Feller 2001: 584). When the extent of this task became clear, it was 
decided in 1951 to establish a more permanent organisation, the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The basis of their work 
at that time was of legal nature, ensuring the entry of refugees in accordance with 
the Geneva Convention. This Convention was approved at a UN Special Conference 
in 1951, where states decided upon a common definition of a refugee and the 
status of refugees once recognised as such:  
“A refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons 
other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country” (UNHCR 2007a).  
If a person could no longer receive protection in his/her country of origin, then 
he/she was entitled to legal protection in a host country. The core principle of 
protection was (and still is) ‘non- refoulement’, which is the obligation of host 
countries to refrain from forcibly returning refugees to their country of origin if 
their lives or freedoms could be threatened in that case (Terry 2002: 28-29), as well 
as to not reject them at the frontier (Goodwin-Gill 2001: 14). This Convention is a 
landmark, being the only binding and universal refugee protection instrument to 
date (Feller 2001: 585)5
In the first years after its establishment, UNHCR was mostly concerned with 
refugees in Europe who were fleeing the Nazi regime and afterwards the 
communist regimes (Feller 2001: 585- 589). Only in the 1960s and 1970s the 
organisation started working outside Europe, and specifically in Africa that was 
. 
                                                             
5 Another important treaty is the 1967 Protocol, which removed the restrictions in time and space from 
the 1951 Convention, in order to be able to recognise refugees who fled after 1951 and who were 
outside European territory. Apart from these important treaties, the protection regime draws on 
principles and standards that are brought forward by other international instruments or jurisprudential 
development, as well as ‘soft law’, meaning the directives of authoritative international and regional 
bodies (such as UN General Assembly resolutions) (Jacquemet 2001). 
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going through the difficult decolonisation process. From that time on, a dual 
refugee regime emerged (Chimni 1998; Keely 2004). While Cold War refugee flows 
in the North were largely handled by states themselves, UNHCR became a 
humanitarian agency working in the South. They gave emergency assistance to 
refugees hosted in camps or by the local host population, and the objective was to 
repatriate the refugees as soon as possible since these were seen as a threat to 
security and scarce resources. UNHCR’s role thus shifted from being a guardian of 
refugee rights to being a manager of refugees. In contrast, in the Northern refugee 
regime, refugees were accepted on the mere basis of nationality of a communist 
country (Kibreab 1999b: 388) despite the principle of individual determination. In 
that context, repatriation was not seen as an option: “The goal was (…) to induce 
instability or at least embarrassment and encourage migration. The refugee flows 
had the domestic political function in Western countries of reinforcing anti-
communist containment policy. The costs of resettlement were a small price to 
maintain political support for a cornerstone foreign policy” (Keely 2004). It was also 
a period of unprecedented economic expansion in which the refugees could 
constitute a labour force replacing the workers lost by war. As a consequence local 
integration, naturalisation and resettlement were the preferred options in the 
North at that time.  
Since the 1980s considerable changes have occurred. The amount of refugees grew 
exponentially due to internal conflicts in the South, fuelled by strategies of 
neighbouring countries or super powers, and because of changes in military 
strategies. As explained by Erika Feller, Director of the Department of International 
Protection of UNHCR: “Human rights abuses and breaches of humanitarian law 
were no longer by-products of war, but often a conscious objective of military 
strategy, so that even low levels of military conflict generated a disproportionately 
high degree of suffering among civilians and massive displacement” (Feller 2001: 
587). As a result of these dynamics, by 1993, 23 million refugees were displaced 
(UNHCR 1995). Most of these refugees have never travelled further then their 
neighbouring countries to look for protection, and so the main part of the displaced 
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civilians was and still is to be found in Africa and Asia6
“Overall, the climate for the admission, processing and treatment of 
asylum-seekers is less benevolent today. Refugee issues are often 
heavily politicized, even sensationalized, for a variety of domestic or 
political purposes.” (Feller 2001: 590) 
. The focus on a combination 
of refugee camps and repatriation remained, both because host states were 
unwilling to let these large numbers of refugees integrate, which for various 
reasons could lead to conflicts, and because there was a lack of sufficient 
international burden-sharing. In fact, as Betts and Durieux (2007: 517) argue, “this 
disjuncture between the normative scope of the two principles governing the 
existing refugee regime (asylum and burden-sharing, ed.) has meant that proximity 
to refugees’ regions of origin has historically been the principal determinant of state 
responsibility for protection”. Burden-sharing decreased even more due to the 
changed geopolitical situation after the Cold War, which entailed that refugees no 
longer had ideological or geopolitical value to the US and the former Soviet-Union 
(Chimni 1998). In addition, from the mid-1980s on, there was a decreasing 
eagerness in Western-Europe to attract foreign workers since the economic 
expansion of the preceding decades had come to a standstill. Hence, the options of 
resettlement and local integration were also questioned in the Northern refugee 
regime, in favour of repatriation and restrictive measures such as visa 
requirements, carrier sanctions, temporary protection systems, etc. Ideas like ‘the 
safe third country rule’, offshore processing, ‘internal flight alternative’, temporary 
protection and restrictive interpretations of the Geneva Convention have been 
gaining momentum ever since. 
 As a result of this restrictive climate in both North and South, ‘the repatriation 
turn in refugee policy’ became a world trend and the refugee situation was 
                                                             
6 In 1991, the number of refugees hosted in Sudan alone, was larger than the number of asylum 
applications received by Western Europe and North America (Chimni 1998: 359). In 2008, the majority 
of the world’s refugees are still hosted by developing countries, even if most of the funding to assist 
refugees is given by developed countries. Combined, nations with per capita GDPs of less than $2,000 
hosted almost two-thirds of all refugees, while nations with per capita GDPs over $10,000 hosted only 
five percent of the world’s refugees (USCRI 2008b). 
I n t r o d u c t i o n | 17 
 
increasingly seen as a cycle, in which the state decided that ‘repatriation to the 
homeland where the causes of the flight were removed’ was the ideal outcome.  
What is more, repatriation came to be presented as ‘the most humane solution’, 
since it gives refugees the opportunity to go ‘home’ instead of the ‘separation and 
alienation’ in exile (Chimni 1998: 364). As a result, it has been pursued even when 
it was not appropriate and when the four conditions (UNHCR 1996) were not 
fulfilled: 
o voluntariness, thus return free of pressure, based on an informed 
opinion, 
o fundamental change in the root causes of the flight,  
o safety (legal, physical and material),  
o dignity.  
As Chimni (1999: 5-8) notes, in practice there has been a reinterpretation of the 
concept since 1993, in which ‘safe return’ was thought to be sufficient for a 
movement to be called ‘voluntary repatriation’. Host states would decide when the 
situation was ‘objectively’ safe to return, to the detriment of the subjective 
interpretation of the refugee: “Is it not strange that whereas the element of 
subjectivity is celebrated when it translates into the spontaneous return of the 
refugee, it is ignored when it involves a decision to stay?” (Chimni 1999: 8). There 
have been numerous premature repatriation moves in which people were not 
adequately informed on the conditions in their ‘home’ area or were forced to 
repatriate by the host country (refoulement), such as the Burmese Rohingya 
refugees who were expelled from Bangladesh (Amnesty International 2004: 6) or 
the Rwandese refugees who were forced to repatriate from Eastern-Zaire (Pottier 
1999: 142-170) and Tanzania (Hathaway 2006: 6). The problem with premature 
repatriation is that the refugees concerned will very likely be transformed into 
Internally Displaced People (IDPs). What to make for example of the fact that 
ethnic Mon refugees who were repatriated from Thailand to Burma over a decade 
ago, are still dependent on rations in ‘Mon resettlement sites’? After the ceasefire 
agreement between the Mon rebels (the New Mon State Party (NMSP)) and the 
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Burmese junta in 1995, it was decided that all Mon refugees had to return to this 
pocket of relative peace (Lang 2002: 101-124). Thailand was unwilling to further 
provide refuge to the growing number of Mon refugees, thus these were forced to 
return, not to their original villages, but to sites controlled by the NMSP. The 
primary emphasis was thus on repatriation as the goal in itself rather than as a 
substantive step towards a durable solution. In August 2008, 9407 people still live 
in five of these sites, less than one km from the border (TBBC 2008a). This 
premature and forced repatriation thus turned the Mon refugees into IDPs. 
Another important caveat with this predilection for repatriation is that it is based 
on a questionable premise: it is taken for granted that refugees desire to go home. 
But is this premise correct? For some refugees, their country of asylum might be 
more of a ‘home’, or they might prefer to stay because they have more civil rights 
there. And what about the children of refugees, who were born abroad and have 
never seen their so-called ‘homeland’?  
“My parents fled Burma a long time ago. They always had to give 
cows to the soldiers, and had to do portering. There is no justice, you 
could not protest against it. I was born here (in Thailand, ed.). Now, if 
someone would compel me to go back, I would kill myself. I want to 
stay here, even if there were democracy in Burma. I have my own 
house and land, my own work. I don’t have any reason to return”. 
(Interview with young Karen man, Mae Tan, November 14, 2007). 
Refugees do not stay in a ‘state of immutable dependency’ when they are in exile, 
but actively try to cope with their situation and seek linkages with their new 
environment: “It is a mistake to assume that becoming a refugee is necessarily 
experienced as deculturing, deterritorialising, or dehistoricising, or that the 
connection is necessarily between person and nation, rather than person and area 
(region, village etc.). Links may be recreated or shaped in new ways” (Hammond 
1999: 232). Refugees reap opportunities to make a living, might learn new skills and 
develop new social frameworks. Therefore, some refugees might not see 
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repatriation as upward mobility at all, if they could enjoy better aid and income 
generating opportunities abroad, better health care and education than they had 
ever known before, and learned new skills, considering themselves as more 
‘modern’ than stayees (Hammond 1999; Stepputat 1999). And even if within a 
certain refugee group many prefer repatriation, a minority, the ‘residual caseloads’, 
might want to stay behind for other reasons, such as continued fear of persecution, 
severe trauma, age, lack of money and these more (Crisp 2003: 5). Refugees may 
thus face a difficult choice when having to decide on repatriation, which are 
concerns that are currently sidelined due to the uncritical acceptance of the 
presumed general desire to return to the country of origin (Dolan 1999: 89-91).  
I would go even further and argue that it is exactly this focus on repatriation that, 
together of course with the enduring conflict in their countries of origin, has led to 
the lack of progress in protracted refugee situations. After all, the widespread 
existence of protracted refugee situations all over the world demonstrates that 
repatriation is not a short term option. Still, this repatriation turn has led to a 
situation in which the two other durable solutions are neglected: “Repatriation not 
only has become the preferred durable solution, it is the only available durable 
solution. Less than 1 percent of the world's refugees are resettled in third countries 
and almost none of the countries of asylum are prepared to offer permanent status 
to their refugees. By default, if the number of refugees is to be reduced it will be by 
means of repatriation” (Stein 1997: 5). As local integration and resettlement do not 
require a solution to the conflict in the country of origin, these are the two 
additional options that need to be looked into in order to achieve progress. Indeed, 
subgroups within a certain refugee population might be able to benefit from 
different kinds of durable solutions, so it is essential to do away with the ‘one-size-
fits-it-all’ policy, and enhance choices for refugees. In that vein, it has been 
interesting to follow up the recent changes in discussion on durable solutions. Since 
the beginning of the 21st century, the interest in protracted refugee situations has 
been rising, and the Global Consultations on International Protection led to the 
establishment of a new ambitious initiative by UNHCR, titled ‘Convention Plus’. As a 
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result, resettlement and integration were reassessed to again become full blown 
options, next to repatriation. A more comprehensive explanation of this initiative 
can be found in Chapter 7. Another option for progress in protracted refugee 
situations is to consider a wider range of intermediate options other than 
warehousing, such as local settlement (Crisp 2004), assisted self-settlement or 
generally a more rights-based approach (De Vriese 2006). These options do not 
necessarily lead to a durable solution, but they allow a certain level of dignity, 
security and self-reliance for the refugees. It is widely acknowledged that by letting 
the refugees lead a more productive life, they are better prepared for any durable 
solution in the future, but this knowledge has yet to be translated in policy. 
In sum, the changed global conditions in the 1980s, and certainly since the end of 
the Cold War, have led to a repatriation turn in refugee policy. As a result, 
repatriation was represented as the most humane, and increasingly the only 
durable solution for refugees. However, this is based on a questionable premise 
that every refugee has a desire to return to its country of origin and has resulted 
into premature repatriation moves. Moreover, due to the long duration of many 
(mostly internal) conflicts, this focus has promoted long-term warehousing, to the 
detriment of more creative and humane intermediate options for refugees as well 
as other durable solutions that could lead to progress for subgroups of the refugee 
population. 
 
1.6 The migration- asylum nexus 
 
While up until now I have always talked about refugees, they are of course part of a 
broader category of migrants, from which they are distinguished based on the 
causes of their emigration. Migrants are seen as people who are leaving their 
country voluntarily, mainly for economic reasons, while people who are forced to 
flee discriminatory persecution or war are called ‘refugees’. Simple models tend to 
explain the difference between refugees and migrants by referring to push and pull 
factors, of which the first dominate in the case of refugees, while the pull factors 
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prevail in decisions of migrants to leave their country. Kunz (1973: 131-137) 
elaborates further on this, explaining how refugee movements may be not only 
acute (mass flight), but also anticipatory. Anticipatory flights may superficially 
resemble voluntary migration, as refugees made rational decisions on whether to 
leave someone at home to look after the family house, whether to split up and 
reunite in the host country, bring several assets, etc. (see also Van Hear 2003a: 1). 
However, closer examination will nonetheless reveal that the push factors are far 
more important: “It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive 
original motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterises all refugee decisions 
and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrants” (Kunz 1973: 130). Even 
for political refugees, the causes of the flight may not be sudden changes but very 
incremental ones, until the political climate becomes insupportable. This point, 
where the radicalisation of political and economic life becomes unbearable, will be 
different for each individual in society.  
In terms of policy, migrants and refugees are treated very differently, with refugees 
benefiting from an internationally agreed framework of rights and responsibilities 
that is lacking for migrants (Feller 2005: 28). In principle, “irregular migrants are 
entitled to human rights both qua human beings (under international human rights 
law) and qua migrants (under the existing treaties designed to guarantee rights to 
migrants)” (Betts 2008: 7). In practice though, the rights of migrants are less well 
protected and often transgressed, often without consequences for the state or 
party concerned. Due to these different frameworks and as the matter is very 
sensitive, the policy labels are often attributed in a political way. More people will 
be called ‘migrants’ if the host country wants to limit the number of refugees, to 
diminish its own responsibilities and/or to make sure that the bilateral relations 
with the sending country do not deteriorate. The opposite might happen as well, as 
was the case in both the Western and communist ‘camp’ during the Cold War 
(explained above). In addition, UNHCR and NGOs may yet have other reasons to 
call someone a refugee or not, which is aptly described in Daniel Kronenfeld’s 
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article ‘Afghan refugees in Pakistan: not always refugees, not always in Pakistan, 
not necessarily Afghan?’: 
“The decision whether to call someone a refugee depends to a certain 
extent on the goals and perspective of the observer. Is the purpose to 
allocate food or to chart refugee returns? Is it to reduce host country 
grievances or to support source country claims? Is it to minimize 
expenditures or to maximize donations? There is nothing inherently 
sinister or manipulative about the notion that who is counted will 
depend in part on the goals of the counter. After all, we count for 
different reasons. Yet when our figures differ so dramatically from 
one another, all the while purporting to measure the same category, 
it is time to acknowledge that the category itself is too restrictive 
(Kronenfeld 2008: 58).  
Notwithstanding the large differences in international frameworks between the 
two categories, who is included and excluded in practice when the policy is 
implemented is thus dependent on a large number of factors. 
Despite the analytical distinction that can be made between refugees and migrants 
and the resulting neat categories that bureaucracies seek to impose (Castles 2003: 
17), the differences are not that clear in the field. Since weak economies and weak 
states tend to go together, people move to escape both poverty and human rights 
abuses, which makes it very hard to draw a line between ‘economic’ migrants and 
‘political’ refugees. Consider the following questions: Are all people fleeing 
dictatorships refugees? What about people fleeing natural disasters or more 
gradual climate change? If people do not have any livelihood options left, how 
voluntary is their migration? Do stranded migrants (who cannot move on, stay or 
return) need protection? The following respondent is called a migrant in Thailand, 
but is she really? 
“Why did you leave Burma? We could not find a proper job. Why not? 
Because my mother could not speak Burmese, so we never received 
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an identity card, we were discriminated. Without that identity card, 
no one wanted to give us a job. So I came to Thailand 14 years ago, 
but it is very hard. I was involved in student’s work (euphemism for 
political activism in this context, ed.), and my husband didn’t approve 
so he divorced me, and now none of my relatives wants to help me 
anymore. Sometimes me and my four children have to share one can 
of rice, because I didn’t sell enough fruit that day.”  
(Interview with a Muslim woman from Burma, Mae Sot, December 1, 
2006) 
In practice it is very difficult to separate forced and economic (voluntary) migration, 
which is a complexity that is termed the ‘migration- asylum nexus’7. Zetter (2007) 
argues that as a response to these complex reasons for migration as well as new 
patterns of migration and mixed migration flows, the refugee label has been 
transformed and politicised through institutional fractioning. A variety of terms 
have come into existence, such as environmental refugee, development refugee, 
spontaneous asylum seeker, overstayer, trafficked migrant, irregular mover, illegal 
or bogus asylum seeker/migrant, etc. While these terms are presented as a 
bureaucratic answer to the contemporary complex forms of and reasons for 
migration that cannot be caught in a binary categorisation (refugee-migrant), in 
reality they have served the purpose of states to legitimise the wider political 
discourse of resistance to refugees and migrants8, and limit the number of people 
who receive the more privileged label ‘refugee’9
                                                             
7 In research circles, the term ‘migration-asylum nexus’ actually has a broader meaning. It signifies not 
only the complexity of related causes of refugee and migrant migration, but also the similarity of the 
migratory processes and lives in exile, and the lack of differentiation in national policy responses 
towards refugees and migrants (Castles et al. 2005: 32; Betts 2006a: 60). 
 (Black and Koser 1999: 4; Zetter 
2007; Polzer and Hammond 2008).  
8 Instead of the past focus in political discourse on rights and entitlements, the discourse is now 
preoccupied by notions of belonging, identity and citizenship, resulting into exclusion of ‘the other’. 
9 From a refugee point of view, the difference between the 1951 Convention refugee status or a 
temporary or subsidiary form of protection is a very important one, since only Convention refugees 
enjoy the full amount of rights, such as the right of movement and the right to work. In the European 
Union (EU) for example, the level of minimum rights for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection is very low 
and Member States have a wide margin of discretion in their recognition (ECRE 2004). 
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These labels are important at the policy level because of their different places in 
(international) law, and they have important consequences for the human security 
of the persons concerned. But are these categories also that important for 
research? Even if most refugee scholars are quick to admit that these policy labels 
overlap, the tendency remains to focus on either refugees or migrants or 
‘overstayers’ or any other category, often to inform policy on these issues, to the 
detriment of a more complete picture of migration phenomena. A related reason 
for this selectivity is that funding is often attributed to evaluate a particular policy, 
instead of accepting that also non-policy driven research may reveal interesting 
insights, and ... may in fact lead to better policy (Castles 2003: 26; Bakewell 2008a: 
433). Therefore, Bakewell (2008a: 450) poses this relevant question: “When we 
turn away from UNHCR and others’ policy agenda, do we need to identify (label) 
particular people as refugees or migrants in order to understand the process of 
movement, integration and so forth?”. As the objective of my research is to 
understand how Burmese people cope with life in exile in Thailand and how their 
environment responds to their strategies, I argue that the (already implied) answer 
to Bakewell’s question is indeed ‘no’. In order to understand how life in exile, 
integration and transnationalism occur in practice, it is not necessary for a 
researcher to restrict oneself to people labelled as ‘refugees’. Moreover, in a 
context such as the one in Thailand, in which all people in camp are called 
‘refugees’ and everyone outside camp is called and treated as ‘a migrant’ 
irrespective of their reasons for leaving Burma, I would argue that the policy labels 
are attributed in an indiscriminate way based on settlement choice. The fact that 
members of the same household have frequently been found in different policy 
categories is indicative of this point of view, but the argument will be substantiated 
further in Section 3.4. Because of these two reasons, other researchers and myself 
have used the term ‘refugee’ (and/or ‘forced migrant’) to refer to the forced nature 
of exile of a certain research population, while explicitly saying that the term is not 
used to refer to the Convention, legal or policy category. This does not mean that 
the policy category does not have an influence on these people’s lives, since it 
certainly does, but simply that the bureaucratic label may not truly reflect the 
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causes of a person’s migration and that this label may not be the most defining 
element in the experience of exile. 
 
1.7 Structure thesis 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  
Chapter two will explain the choice of case study as well as the methodology used 
for this research and the dilemmas that were encountered during the research 
period.  
Chapter three will describe the various strings of conflict in Burma and thus the 
causes of the flight, as well as the resulting migration patterns. Subsequently, 
Thailand’s refugee and migration policy will be set out as well as the consequences 
of these policies for the Burmese refugees in both settlement options.  
In Chapter four, the adapted livelihoods framework will be explained, after which 
the livelihood strategies of the refugees to improve protection, subsistence, access 
to property, goods and services, as well as civic strategies will be depicted. 
The importance of social capital for refugees will be revealed in Chapter five 
through a detailed discussion of both integration and transnationalism in various 
forms. 
Chapter six is titled ‘Refugees as agents of change’, as refugees can have both an 
influence on their country of origin, through transnational activities, and on their 
host country. Both types of impact will be analysed. 
In Chapter seven, a policy framework on durable solutions for Burmese refugees in 
Thailand will be developed. This framework will be based on the insights of this 
study, but is also influenced by a comparison with other cases of local integration 
worldwide as well as by contemporary thinking about migration, protection and 
durable solutions such as Convention Plus, the asylum-migration nexus and Karen 
Jacobsen’s idea of a ‘Designated Zone of Residence’ (Jacobsen 2005). 
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In the last and final chapter, some general conclusions will be formulated as well as 
suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: SELECTION OF CASE STUDY AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Case study: Burmese refugees in Thailand 
 
To answer these research questions, the Burmese 
refugees in Thailand will be studied. Several ethnic 
minority groups in Burma have been fighting the 
central, Burman-dominated government since the 
country’s independence in 194810
This case study is particularly interesting in view of 
the research objectives, since it concerns one of the 
most protracted refugee situations in the world, yet 
a very little known one compared to the bulk of 
research on refugee settings in Africa. Although 
refugees continue to arrive every day, the first 
refugees entered Thailand already in 1984. One 
. The result has 
been a protracted war in which the ethnic minority 
civilians are the primary victims. Due to the civil war 
and the decennia of misrule by the military junta, 
hundreds of thousands of Burmese people have fled 
across the border, with the largest diaspora being 
located in Thailand. As over two million Burmese 
reside in Thailand, it can rightfully be called a 
situation of mass refugee influx, which is bound to 
have a substantial impact on the host country.  
                                                             
10 Many of these ethnic leaders, in both military and political circles, call themselves ‘ethnic 
nationalities’, to emphasise that they are nations and equal members of the Union of Burma, not 
subordinate to the Burmans. In practical terms though, they are minorities within the existing state 
(Pedersen 2008: 46). 
BURMA OR MYANMAR? 
 
 In 1989, the junta re-named the 
country Myanmar Naing-nga, 
along name changes of cities, 
rivers, populations etc. In some 
cases, they wanted to ‘burmanise’ 
the colonial names, while in other 
cases the new word resembled 
more closely the local 
pronunciation (South 2008: xv).  
However, the opposition and 
several Western countries refused 
to recognise the name change, 
which means the use of a 
particular term is sensitive and 
supposedly immediately puts 
someone on the side of the 
opposition or the junta. The name 
change is enforced inside the 
country, where most people I 
spoke to used ‘Myanmar’, but all 
the refugees, without exception, 
used the name ‘Burma’. Therefore 
the term used by the refugee 
respondents was also used here: 
‘Burma’. The term ‘Burmese’ is 
used for any person born into an 
ethnic group from/in Burma, 
while the word ‘Burman’ is used 
to describe the people from the 
largest ethnic group in the 
country. 
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would imagine that those refugees who arrived decades ago would be self-reliant 
by now, but the opposite seems to be the case. Whereas until 1995 the refugees 
were mostly self-sufficient, with only minimal NGO-support, due to the 
deteriorating security situation in 1995-1998 an encampment policy was enforced 
and these refugees became increasingly aid dependent. However, the majority of 
the refugees have never lived in the camps, which makes it intriguing to look at the 
differences in assets, livelihood strategies, and vulnerabilities. Also the mere fact 
that the refugee situation is protracted is bound to lead to a high extent of 
diversification within the refugee population in terms of levels of integration and 
transnationalism. Moreover, studying transnationalism within this diaspora 
community that still lives in close proximity of their country of origin can serve to 
complement transnationalism research in the West, which is important given that 
conflict-affected refugees more commonly stay in the region. 
Studying this case will fill a research gap since up until now surprisingly little 
primary academic research concerning these refugees has been conducted, one 
reason for which is that the Thai government is very taken aback to allow research 
on the refugees (explained in Section 2.2.2). Nonetheless, some scholars from 
various academic backgrounds have conducted research on the Thai-Burmese 
border, focusing on issues ranging from identity and culture in some of the camps 
and the border region, over ethnic politics, to Thai refugee and migrant policies and 
politics (Sandra Dudley, Hazel Lang, Ashley South, Christina Fink, Alison Vicary, 
Supang Chantanavich, Premjai Vuhngsiriphisal, Carl Grundy-Warr, Nancy Eberhardt, 
Lisa Brooten, Pia Vogler). However, none of these academic studies or other 
studies by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or Community-Based 
Organisations (CBOs) have sought to compare the livelihood strategies of refugees 
in the different settlement options, or have looked into integration issues or the 
transnational connections instigated by the refugees. Usually, studies carried out 
by CBOs or human rights organisations focus on the causes of the flight and human 
rights abuses, and to a lesser extent on the Thai restrictions on foreign labour, to 
serve advocacy purposes, but they often fail to make a thorough analysis of the 
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interests at stake. Moreover, also in this context, there is a tendency to only focus 
on one particular policy category (such as IDPs, migrants, refugees or hill tribes), or 
on one ethnic group (for example the Karen, the Karenni, the Shan or the 
Rohingya), to inform policymakers or because of funding or advocacy for that 
particular group. However, given the fact that households can be split up across 
different policy categories and the importance of ethnicity for various reasons, it is 
deemed more appropriate to conduct research across the various groups, as was 
argued before. This can lead to more holistic insights into how these groups 
function, how they are related and how different solutions may apply to different 
subsets within these groups. 
A practical reason why this case study was selected, was the background I already 
had in this region. My master’s thesis was an analysis of the strategies of the 
military regime in Burma and the use of sanctions to influence this regime (Brees 
2004), after which I received the opportunity to do an internship in the Press and 
Analysis Unit of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 
Rangoon, Burma (October 2004 – April 2005). As a result, I already spoke some 
Burmese, was somewhat familiar with the (Burman) culture and its sensitivities, 
understood the causes of the flight, and had contacts on both sides of the border, 
all of which was bound to help in setting up and carrying out the research.  
 
2.2 Methodology and personal experience field work 
2.2.1 Methodology 
 
After an extensive literature review, an initial field study was conducted from June 
15 through July 14, 2006, for stakeholder consultation and networking on the Thai-
Burma border. Some preliminary field work was conducted to assess the following 
issues (Westley and Michalev 2002): 
o What are potential access problems? 
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o What are the best ways to approach communities and households? 
o Which questions are appropriate given the current sensitivities?  
o How can I find reliable interpreters? 
o What are the security considerations for the people I work with, the 
respondents and myself? 
Additionally, the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) in Mae Sot and the Karen 
Women’s Organisation (KWO) in Mae Sariang were informed about the research 
project. 
 
This short-term visit led to further analysis of secondary data obtained from 
partners in the field, followed by a more extensive field study from November 12, 
2006 through February 16, 2007. During this period, a baseline survey on 
livelihoods was conducted. The preliminary questionnaire was first presented to 
several key informants to assess the sensitivity of the subjects11, and subsequently 
tested in one refugee community, each time leading to minor adjustments. 
Subsequently, sampling sites were selected purposefully, meaning that they were 
not selected to be representative of the whole population, but to capture the 
diversity of livelihoods of refugees12. Certainly self-settled refugees were difficult to 
sample for reasons that are not particular to this case: they are widely distributed 
within the general population, there are no registers to facilitate systematic 
sampling and they may be reluctant to divulge personal information13
                                                             
11 In a case study where even the name of the country of origin is sensitive and puts you in the junta or 
opposition camp, it was vital to ask other people to read the questionnaire and predict potential 
problems. 
. The various 
groups of refugees were supposed to function as control groups for each other, 
since one can only draw conclusions on, for example, the safety in the camp, if this 
is compared to the safety of the refugees or the local population outside camp 
12 This is common in livelihood studies, see e.g. Dfid (2000) or Westley and Mikhalev (2002). 
13 When I was doing research on self-settled refugees in the Umphang area in Thailand for example, my 
interpreter and I went up to a house of which neighbours said it was inhabited by refugees. Asking the 
woman in the garden though, she denied being a refugee and said she was Thai Karen. Later that 
evening, she came knocking on our guesthouse door, in the company of her husband, asking whether 
we would like to come for an interview the next day. They had heard from other people in town that 
‘the interview was nice’. Hence we were lucky that they felt like talking after all, but this is obviously not 
always the case. 
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(Jacobsen and Landau 2003: 11). Within each site, I spoke mostly to ‘normal’ 
refugees, in order to reveal ‘non-elite’ strategies to cope with life in exile 
(Vlassenroot 2005: 194), but of course also key people were interviewed, such as 
community leaders, refugee committee members or camp leaders. In addition, 
open and semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff from CBOs, 
humanitarian personnel, academics, consultants and diplomats. To obtain 
information on the importance of remittances, questions on remittances were 
incorporated into the livelihoods interviews if relevant, meaning if the person had 
family or friends in other locations of Thailand (internal remittances) and/or 
outside Thailand (international remittances). Both remittance senders and 
remittance receivers were considered as having relevant information. The reason 
that remittance senders and recipients were not selected purposefully is simply 
because there are no lists nor official offices to meet them (in contrast to cases 
such as Somalia or Afghanistan), as well as because sampling on the dependent 
variable, in this case remittance senders and receivers, tends to lead to a biased 
view on the importance of remittances in terms of volume. Additionally, interviews 
were held with remittance carriers in Mae Sot.  
The last field research period (September 11 – December 16, 2007) focused more 
thoroughly on integration as well as transnational activities. I specifically tried to 
keep my eyes open for ‘success cases’, for what worked in the sometimes dire 
conditions both inside and outside the camps. This implied that I needed to identify 
and select refugees who were doing well, in terms of access to financial capital but 
also in terms of social and structural integration. Therefore additional sites were 
selected in areas inhabited by people ethnically related to the refugees and as such 
more prone to successful integration cases (Fielden 2008). In addition, some 
interviews with Thai people were held to assess the view of the local population 
concerning the impact of refugees on the region.  
During both research periods, a small number of deep interviews were also 
conducted with political activists and former political prisoners in Mae Sot, Mae 
Sariang and Nu Poh camp. As such, the researcher could get a clearer view on  their 
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protection and livelihoods issues both inside and outside camp and on the variety 
of political transnational activities.  
 
Map 3: Tak province 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.thailex.info.jpg 
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Map 4: Refugee camps on the Thai- Burmese border 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNHCR (July 2008) 
Camps were selected based on remoteness and ethnic diversity in camp, while 
areas for self-settled refugees were chosen on the basis of urbanisation and 
presumed integration level, as these characteristics were assumed to have a lot of 
influence on livelihood strategies and options. Given the diversity of the migration 
waves and the particular circumstances for each ethnic group and in each Thai 
province, it was decided after the second period of fieldwork to focus on the camps 
and communities in the five border districts of Tak Province and close 
surroundings.  
Tak province is a large border province of Thailand (16,406 km²) and is very 
mountainous. In 2006, 490,486 people lived in Tak, of which 163,000 from an 
ethnic minority group (NESDB 2007). The area is one of the least densely populated 
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of Thailand (UNDP 2007: 108). It shares a long boundary with Karen state in Burma, 
which has been in a state of civil war since 1948. As a result, the majority of the war 
refugees cross the border into Tak. The area is host to three refugee camps. One of 
these camps is Mae La, the largest camp on the border, the other ones are Umpiem 
camp and Nu Poh camp. Of these three, Mae La is closest to the regional town of 
Mae Sot and easily reachable due to its location along a provincial highway. Nu Poh 
on the other hand is located in a remote rural area in the far south of the province, 
locked in by a National Forest Reserve in the south. The closest regional town there 
is Umphang. Nu Poh is an interesting camp because of its remote location and 
because in 2006 all of the urban political activists remaining in Mae Sot were 
ordered to move to this camp. These are people from different ethnic origins, who 
know the life outside camp very well, hence they are in a privileged position to 
compare the two settings. Another camp, Mae Ra Ma Luang, was selected before 
the decision was taken to focus solely on Tak province, because it is very remote (it 
cannot be reached by trucks in the rainy season and it can take up to six hours to 
get there by 4-wheel drives), which was bound to have a large influence on 
livelihoods. It is very close to the border, and is on the verge of Tak province and 
Mae Hong Son province, a bit of a ‘no man’s land’ as a local NGO staff member 
called it. Moreover, it is nicknamed the ‘5-star camp’ because the camp houses 
many rebel leaders and their families, and as such it supposedly functions more 
smoothly and receives more attention than other camps. It is also overwhelmingly 
ethnically S’ghaw Karen as opposed to Mae La that has large minorities of Burmans 
and Muslims and as such has more ethnic tensions. Therefore, the findings from 
this camp were considered an interesting case for comparison, despite the fact that 
only one section of the camp is located in Tak province. These three camps were 
the ones looked into, and details about the camps can be found in Appendix C.  
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Mae La camp 
 
 
Communities with self-settled refugees were selected with the help of interpreters, 
CBOs and NGOs who were working with ‘migrant’ communities, or shopkeepers 
trading with mixed communities. They merely helped with locating the sites, and 
did not in any way facilitate access to the sites, as this might have influenced the 
respondents’ view of the research14
                                                             
14 The only exception to this rule were Phop Phra village and Sam Sip Sam village, when I joined a 
‘community liaison worker’ of an international NGO on her day tour. 
. The selected sites with self-settled refugees 
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selected were: Mae Sot (city), Kyaw Taw (rural), Ba San Khwe (semi-urban), Mae Pa 
(urban), Phop Phra (rural), Sam Sip Sam (rural), Umphang (city), Ban Pa La Tha 
(rural), Mi Klo Khi (rural), Nusipo (rural), Umpiem village (rural), Kijuhan (rural), 
Tipla (rural), Mae Ramat (semi-urban), Nong Luang (rural), Tha Son Yang (semi-
urban) and Ban Mae Ou-su (rural). Some of these villages consisted only of 20 
households while other villages were larger, with over 200 households. This 
obviously had an effect on the number of people interviewed and the time spent in 
the village. In some villages such as Mae Pa, where a lot of people worked in 
factories, there was only a short time frame during which people could be 
interviewed, namely between normal working hours and overtime work, and on 
Sundays when they were not in church nor in the monastery. Therefore it often 
took several visits before enough interviews were conducted (‘enough’ meaning 
that no additional information came up).  
Within the sites, respondents were randomly selected, and semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the help of a carefully selected interpreter15. Time 
was taken to learn how each refugee came to be living where they were, when 
they arrived, why they chose that particular settlement place and whether or not 
they were considering alternatives. Subsequently, the different forms of capital 
were assessed: financial capital, but also physical, natural, human and social 
capital. This baseline survey was used to get a good picture of livelihoods of 
Burmese refugee households16
                                                             
15 The questionnaires can be found in Appendix A and B. 
 in different settings, as well as to gain a better view 
on their perception on issues such as ‘the best durable solution’, who they 
considered to be refugees etc. In total, 153 refugees were interviewed in these 
sites. Specific care was taken in order to have a balanced sample in terms of 
gender, age, ethnicity and religion. Unlike other researchers (e.g. Mulumba 2007), I 
16 While thus only one person per household was interviewed, it was always asked how many family 
members they had, who the main income winner was and what that person did, what the other sources 
of income were, if there were family members in other locations in Thailand or still in Burma or in third 
countries, etc. That way a more complete picture of ‘the household’ could be formed, which in this case 
was usually the co-residents (all those living in the homestead on a daily basis) and the people in other 
areas or countries who may remit money. These two groups together can also called ‘the mutual 
support unit’ (Ellis 2000: 20), but the term ‘household’ was kept in this paper to describe the unit of 
analysis. 
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did not encounter problems when trying to interview women and even when the 
husband was present and I offered them the choice in who would respond to the 
questions, they frequently decided together that the woman would answer the 
questions. A profile of the refugee respondents can be found in Appendix D. 
The focus on Tak Province did in practice lead to a focus on Karen camps, and 
mixed Thai-Karen-Burman communities outside camp, as the two Karenni camps 
are located in Mae Hong Son Province and Shan refugees tend to live in Mae Hong 
Son and Chiang Mai Province. The narrowing down of the geographical focus in 
practice thus led to an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities and in particular of 
the Karen in the sample, compared to their percentage in Burma. However, this is 
not problematic, as the ethnic minority groups are more prone to fleeing due to 
the protracted civil war in the border zones where they live, with some of the 
heaviest fighting in Karen State. Still, care was taken to ensure that issues that were 
prevalent to minority groups in the context of exile (e.g. Muslims) received 
particular attention. Moreover, the limits of the research are clearly indicated for 
each subject. 
Triangulation of the obtained information was considered essential during the 
whole research period and occurred in several ways:  
o through the use of divergent research techniques such as focus groups (in 
total five were conducted, usually not pre-arranged but when the occasion 
arose), Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques (transect walk, map 
drawing) and participant observation17
                                                             
17 Participant observation is a form of ethnographic research that aims to get a closer familiarity with a 
certain group through intensive involvement with the people in their natural environment. Participant 
observation adds the dimension of personally experiencing the same everyday life as those under study 
(Brewer 2000: 58-63). Due to the long presence in the field, I was able to spend a lot of time with 
refugees both inside and outside camp, also outside the more formal framework of interviews. During 
that leisure time, I participated in the celebration of national holidays, religious events, and birthdays as 
well as in ‘ordinary’ events such as lunch or dinner. Spending time in homes of refugee friends, I was 
able both to participate in their life and to be an observer, noticing what family members were actually 
present in the camp or what kind of food they could afford and suchlike, which served to triangulate the 
information of the interviews. 
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o conducting interviews with employees from Community-Based 
Organisations (CBOs), humanitarian personnel, academics, consultants 
and diplomats 
o informal conversations during the several months of presence in the field 
o comparing the results with other studies and data in reports produced by 
Burmese diaspora groups 
o regularly asking key informants in the region for feedback on written 
papers  
 
The emphasis of this research was thus on qualitative data. These qualitative data 
and the longer time spent in these communities increased the construct validity of 
the research (Jacobsen and Landau 2003: 8): “While there are potential problems 
with the reliability of the data, including whether refugees are telling the researcher 
what they think s/he expects or wants to hear, it is likely that over time 
inconsistencies will be revealed”. Additionally, some questions were posed to every 
refugee, which provided quantitative data of the small sample. These data were 
tabulated with the SPSS programme, using a code sheet developed by the 
researcher. While the quantitative data were obviously not representative for the 
whole refugee population, they did inform the researcher on the balance of the 
sample and were useful to help verify analyses made.  
 
2.2.2 Difficulties encountered at different stages during the research 
period 
Evolution in the field 
This study has undergone several changes during the four years of research. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the initial research subject was to investigate 
repatriation possibilities of refugees, which could not be further pursued due to the 
breakdown of the ceasefire agreement. Also the context on the Thai side of the 
border has changed considerably on some important points. The largest impact 
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came from the decision of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in 2005 to allow 
resettlement of all camp refugees. This had a large influence on the views of the 
camp refugees with regard to preferable durable solutions, and acted as a pull 
factor, which in turn had a large influence on new asylum requests. A second major 
change was the continuous shifting of governments in Bangkok, due to the ousting 
of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the subsequent years of turmoil, which 
each time led to uncertainties about policies. While the Thaksin government for 
example gave permission to the NGOs to start exploring options for refugee work 
outside the camps, the subsequent military government reversed this idea and said 
that Thailand was not ready for this kind of border development. Thirdly, 
international and donor attention also altered during these years. The ‘Saffron 
revolution’ in September 2007 and the passing of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 again 
put Burma (and its refugees) at the centre of international attention. 
Simultaneously, the anti- warehousing campaign of USCRI  raised attention 
worldwide to the negative consequences of long term encampment. These events 
together with increasing donor fatigue led to a pressuring of the NGOs in Thailand 
to improve the self-reliance of the camp refugees, instead of the care and 
maintenance programmes. As a result, the number of livelihoods (and other) 
consultants multiplied quickly from 2006 onwards, and pilot projects to improve 
refugees’ access to work and financial capital were set up, which was a large 
transformation compared to the situation in 2005 when I first visited the border 
area. While changes like these must occur in every long-term research, they are 
rarely made explicit and it is often portrayed as if every aspect of the research went 
according to the original plan. However, I am certain this is rarely the case and 
therefore I chose to explicitly mention the major changes this research had to deal 
with throughout the study period. 
 
Evolution as a researcher 
Not only were there some important changes in the policies towards refugees 
during the research period, I also evolved in my thinking as a researcher in the 
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process. Apart from the basic idea of comparing livelihoods of refugees in two 
settings, I did not have a general theoretical framework at the start of the research. 
Instead, questions and hypotheses were constantly developed and re-shaped 
throughout the fieldwork (induction). The integration factor came to the forefront 
due to the contacts with refugees, not the other way around. Of course, the 
material read also affected the thinking process, which resulted in an additional 
interest in the transnationalism debate and the need to shed more light on the 
dynamic transnational aspects of refugees’ activities. This completely fitted in with 
the decision to focus on ‘what works’. I had heard in psychology class about the 
danger of being dragged into the pessimistic stories of a patient, thereby losing the 
objective, more positive perspective. Afterwards, when I started reading about 
refugees, one of the first debates encountered was the dependency syndrome 
debate. Despite this knowledge, during the first field research I merely recorded 
what refugees told me. When typing these interviews out, it struck me how 
negative they were, and how many problems they had to endure. Only then did it 
occur to me that it was in their interest to portray it like that, and that I had to look 
differently upon these interviews. Even if livelihoods data already focus on agency, 
It took a change in my perspective to re-evaluate the previous data and not see 
them in the light of how they were told, namely as problems, but rather as 
strategies. I also realised that I actively had to probe for more successful strategies, 
and in that sense it was very helpful that I was not associated with an NGO who 
could potentially withdraw rations based on the answers of respondents. The 
explanation of the purpose of the research before asking for consent18
                                                             
18 Definition of informed consent: “The concept of informed consent refers to a person’s ability to agree 
freely to participate in an activity in which (s)he adequately understands both what is required of 
him/her and the ‘cost’ or risk to him/her” (Wolfensberger, as cited in Mulumba 2007: 67). 
 with the 
interview (face-to-face consent since many refugees are illiterate), and the 
confidentiality of the interview as no names were recorded, also helped in 
generating trust and more truthful answers. 
While I have explained the purpose of my research before each interview, it is not certain that people 
have always fully understood: “We claim to have obtained informed consent. However, that is not 
possible for every bit of information we collect. Nor, communication being difficult at best, can we be 
assured that, despite our strongest efforts, people really understand what we are going to do with the 
information they entrust to us when we ourselves do not always know this at the time we begin our 
fieldwork and obtain ‘informed consent” (Krulfeld, as quoted in Bakewell 2008a: 448). 
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Practical problems 
Several practical problems were encountered during field research, many of which 
were foreseen yet difficult to resolve. The most important difficulty was the 
impossibility to obtain a research visa. The literature review clearly revealed the 
unwillingness of the RTG to disclose information on refugees (for example Lang 
2002), and the stubbornness with which researchers and journalists were treated 
when they wanted to write about the refugees: “These security spaces (camps, ed.) 
have been off-limits areas for unauthorized activities, including the production of 
knowledge. (...) Only certain appropriate subjects are qualified to look, to judge, 
and to decide about them” (Tangseefa 2007: 243). During the explorative first field 
research, I passed by at Chulalongkorn university in Bangkok, to assess the 
possibility of working with one of their researchers, and to get their opinion on 
whether and how to get a research visa. Unfortunately, they told me that even Thai 
researchers did not receive an official permit for the camps but had to work 
through international NGOs and they actively discouraged me to apply for a 
research visa because ‘it would never work’ and put me in the spotlight of the 
authorities. Furthermore, none of the researchers spoken to wanted to even 
consider thinking about the people outside the camp as refugees, which of course 
was problematic if one of them was ever to work with me on the proposed subject. 
Therefore there was no other possibility than working with a tourist visa, which 
allows  a maximum of three months to be spent in Thailand in a six-month period. 
It was possible to get minor extensions for this period. In retrospect, the 
experience of returning several times instead of staying for one long research 
period was considered very positive and potentially more rewarding. It meant that I 
could go in several seasons, which is important for livelihoods studies, and it helped 
in establishing trust with both NGO staff and refugees whom I had visited before. 
They apparently saw it as a sign of devotion to the research and were more eager 
to come up with new information and help with logistical problems and the like. 
From my side, it was good to withdraw from the field, to analyse the current data 
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instead of constantly getting new data, read more academic articles on subjects 
that came up, discuss findings or problems with my supervisor and identify gaps 
that needed to be addressed in the next field research. As Fog Olwig and Hastrup 
(cited in Horst 2006c: 10) argue: “If the world is seen as a place where moving and 
dwelling are in constant interplay, sites are not only experienced by merely being 
present in them, but also by leaving them behind”. Later on, it also became clear 
that I had made the right choice of not getting a research visa, when at a certain 
time a Thai district officer facilitated an official interview for me with the Palat (the 
Thai Director) of Mae La refugee camp. During the few hours spent in camp that 
day, a soldier accompanied me the whole way, which would have severely 
jeopardised answers of respondents on a sensitive subject such as illegally working 
outside camp. 
The second problem was to get access to the refugee camps by obtaining a camp 
pass. I was told that the only possibility to get such a camp pass was through 
international NGOs, who then have to pull strings to get an approval from Bangkok. 
The first contacts made at the CCSDPT (Committee for the Co-ordination of 
Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand; monthly co-ordination meeting for all 
NGOs working in the refugee camps) meeting in Bangkok were not promising as no 
one appeared even closely interested in facilitating my entry. Later it became clear 
that NGOs preferred not to be associated with potentially critical reporters because 
of specific guidelines from the Ministry of Interior: “The NGO must be a small 
agency whose objectives and activities are in line with Thai government policies. 
There is to be no publicity about the provision of assistance” (statement by 
Phromlert, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the MOI, May 23, 1994, quoted in Lang 
2002: 92). Thompson (2008) confirms this, saying that the Thai government has 
only allowed NGOs to start working with Burmese refugees if they would do 
nothing to raise the refugees’ profile or which would encourage more refugees to 
pour into the country. If critical reports do appear, the RTG actively seeks out who 
facilitated entry for that journalist, which usually results into severe problems for 
the NGO concerned, as for example Shoklo Malaria Research Unit has experienced 
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in the past19
Once I was in Mae Sot however, my contact network grew exponentially and one 
befriended high-level NGO staff member believed in the research proposal and 
facilitated a camp pass without strings attached. I am still very thankful to him and 
his organisation, but will not mention their names as I do not want to jeopardise 
their project in any way. Apart from the camp passes, I also needed the 
cooperation of NGOs for transport to some of the camps, in particular for Mae Ra 
Ma Luang and Nu Poh, as these were very difficult or impossible to reach with 
public transport. Luckily this worked out through the established network. But even 
then, I would leave the vehicle immediately after entry in the camp. I thus made a 
different choice than colleague Pia Vogler (Oxford University), who chose to be 
affiliated with an NGO but encountered numerous problems because of that 
(Vogler 2007), and in the end decided to focus on Thai Karen people in her 
research. The difficulty in getting access to these camps with the mandatory camp 
passes and imposed curfew, next to the difficult geography of the border, results 
.  Therefore, none of the NGOs were eager to help a young 
independent researcher with access to the camps. Even if tying myself to a 
particular NGO and becoming a kind of intern might have helped, I did not want to 
be associated with one NGO as it would increase the refugees’ discomfort and fear 
to make evident their own individual and collective efforts to sustain and plan for 
themselves: “They believe that the UNHCR will mistake their resourcefulness and 
hard work for lacking the need and the eligibility for protection and support” (Al-
Sharmani 2004: 30). Moreover, I did not wish for the research results to be 
somehow restricted; while the CCSDPT meetings are organised to facilitate the 
exchange of information, in practice a lot of information is held purposefully within 
the different organisations. Indeed, this was yet another problem encountered 
when trying to obtain the results of research carried out by the NGOs and UN 
agencies themselves (for example the Age Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming 
results).  
                                                             
19For the same reason, even most NGO staff members asked not to reveal their names in my work, as 
they were afraid of problems with the RTG or to end up on Burma’s blacklist of ‘external destructive 
elements’, endangering any work for which they needed to travel inside Burma (see also Brooten 2003: 
86-90). 
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into an under-researched situation in comparison to other camps such as the ones 
in Kenya. To counter this, I agree with Vogler’s conclusion that difficult access 
should not hold researchers back: “I propose that research should not depend on 
smooth access if the objective is portraying the diversity of living conditions in 
protracted refugee situations. As refugees are finding their ‘way out’ of camps, we 
have to be similarly innovative in finding our ‘way in’ by manoeuvring skilfully 
through bureaucratic jungles” (Vogler 2007: 59). 
Once access to a certain site was established and respondents were selected, the 
interview was be facilitated by an interpreter. However, interpreters were not easy 
to come by, as a lot of factors had to be taken into account. The interpreter needed 
to be able to speak at least S’ghaw Karen, Burmese and English, and if possible also 
Pwo Karen and Thai. Obviously, people who have these skills are heavily counted 
upon by their community and international organisations alike. Moreover, many of 
these skilled people were somehow linked to the ethnic power structures, so I had 
to be careful not to employ someone with too much authority, who would scare 
respondents. In addition, there are tensions in between the different ethnic groups 
and between the refugees and the Thai people, thus the selected interpreter could 
very easily have a large influence on the answers (reactivity). And apart from those 
hazards, most interpreters were somehow part of the refugee community and thus 
lacking Thai identity cards, which made travel difficult and risky (this is one of the 
ethical problems discussed further on). In hindsight, there was one theme that 
would unite most of my interpreters: they were Karen, young (thus having less 
their own agendas and being considered less threatening in combination with 
myself: a young, female, white researcher), had been in Thailand for ten years or 
longer and had followed the post-10 Special Education Programme (SEP) and/or 
the English Immersion Programme (EIP) of NGO World Education. Several of them 
indicated afterwards how their view had changed because of the interviews, as 
beforehand they had no idea that there were so many refugees – fleeing for the 
same reasons as the interpreters or their parents had – living outside camp. Long 
discussions also arose with Thai interpreter Sofia, who struggled between the idea 
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of refugees as victims and the local perception of refugees as perpetrators of crime 
and people spreading diseases. These discussions with interpreters proved very 
useful in verifying the information obtained from the formal interviews. But of 
course, some issues get ‘lost in translation’. The word ‘refugee’ for example does 
not exist in Karen or Burmese. When I was assessing the perception of the 
respondents themselves about who ‘the refugees’ were, very strange answers 
were sometimes given, like: “Yes, we are refugees because my son broke his arm 
and back and it doesn’t get better and in Burma we can’t afford to go to hospital” 
or “All the Burmese people in Thailand are refugees. Well, except for the students, 
the political activists in camp. They are not” or “All Burmese people inside and 
outside camp are refugees. But some people have lots of money, they are not 
refugees”. Therefore, I asked my interpreter to translate the word she had used, 
back into English: the word ‘Bwar Bah Gho Bah Kay’ is used in Karen for ‘refugee’ 
(‘Dukkha-the’ in Burmese), meaning ‘person with problems’ or ‘person in trouble’. 
Of course, many people would qualify as a refugee then.  
Another issue was that I wanted my work to be relevant:  
“Social scientists whose research focuses on humanitarian or forced 
migration issues are both plagued and attracted to the idea that our 
work be relevant. (...) Compared with non-humanitarian fields, there 
are relatively few studies that do not conclude with policy 
recommendations for NGOs, the UN or national governments. In part, 
this policy orientation stems from our subjects, whose experience of 
violent conflict, displacement and human rights violations inhibits us 
from treating them simply as objects for research. Many of us take 
seriously David Turton’s admonishment that research into other’s 
suffering can only be justified if alleviating that suffering is an explicit 
objective” (Jacobsen and Landau 2003: 1).  
This is the dual imperative of refugee research, as Jacobsen and Landau call it, and 
while not every forced migration researcher agrees with this statement of needed 
duality, I did feel the need to conclude with a policy options chapter, while 
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simultaneously challenging policy labels. Even more, I wondered if there was 
nothing that could be done in the shorter term, something ‘practical’ instead of 
only asking questions for a paper that respondents would most likely never read. 
This contradicts with the detachment usually asked of academics; detachment 
which supposedly leads to more objectivity. However, like Cindy Horst (2006c), I 
consider it impossible to be detached or to remain indifferent to stories of fleeing 
in Burma and then having to hide again in Thailand – especially when at the same 
time one, as a researcher, shares the experience of crossing national and cultural 
boundaries, but with the large difference that one is safe. Being involved entails 
learning and understanding why some events occurred as they did, how 
communities function, who the powerholders in a certain locality are, etc. 
Therefore I was an active participant at times, organising a Christmas celebration 
for over 200 orphans and self-settled refugee children, celebrating Karen Christmas 
and New Year, collecting money with speeches and lectures in Belgium for a 
hospital on the border, etc. Only once did a difficult occasion arise, when I was 
asked by a desperate owner of a safe house to show up at a police raid to prevent 
unlawful seizure of goods and arrest of underage refugee boys in the safe house 
(who might not survive conditions in the immigration detention centre). It was a 
difficult decision that had to be made in a matter of minutes as the trucks to load 
up the unregistered refugees were already on the spot. I had to weigh up the 
practical help I could offer at that particular moment to this respondent and his 
admirable project (the simple presence of a foreigner was bound to lead to  more 
appreciation for the law) and the fear that I would be put in the spotlight and 
thereby potentially jeopardise the research. I decided to go along. The two boys 
were already in the truck however, thus only the seizing of material goods was 
prevented by my presence. Later that day the safe house owner paid his entire 
month’s wages, 5000 Thai Baht (THB)20
                                                             
20 In January 2009, one $US was worth about 35.5 THB (
, to bribe the police in releasing the two 
minors. With this episode, I want to demonstrate the difficult emotional decisions 
one has to make during field research, which is often kept quiet in research papers. 
The occasional participation did not lead to the other extreme end however: at no 
www.oanda.com, January 12, 2009). 
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point did I become an ‘activist researcher’ whose research wants to prove what 
advocacy is aiming for – unlike much of the research on this border. This is the real 
imperative for academic researchers, being engaged instead of detached if 
preferred, but without letting this influence your research in one particular 
direction.   
 
Ethical dilemmas 
This episode brings me to ethical issues encountered during the course of the 
research, many of which are related to the problems mentioned above. One issue 
that I have been questioned on at conferences is the lack of a research visa, the 
reason for which is explained already. As a result, I did not have the consent of the 
authorities to do this research, and sometimes I entered Mae La camp through the 
same paths the refugees left as I did not want to over-demand my NGO contacts if 
unnecessary. As the research would not have been possible otherwise, and I did 
not jeopardise anyone but myself in acting as I did, I personally do not consider this 
an ethical problem. It is the only way the research could be conducted in such a 
‘sensible terrain’, which is permeated by social injustice and/or violence and is 
instable and therefore does not allow for orthodox ethnographic research (Bouillon 
et al., as cited in Vogler 2007: 52). The presence of third-party institutions in these 
sensible terrains may impact considerably on the dynamics of the field research, 
thus I decided to avoid both humanitarian agencies as well as state and non-state 
actors as much as possible.  
The largest ethical issue was that of raising the expectations of respondents, by 
asking refugees which strategies they applied and what their biggest problems 
were, and subsequently not responding to particular requests. Therefore it was 
made clear at the beginning of each interview what the purpose of the research 
was and that there would be no immediate support for participating in the 
interview. They were told that the intention was instead to give them the 
opportunity to talk freely about their problems and potential solutions that they 
envisaged. As a result, when asked at the end of the interview whether there was 
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any other issue they wanted to talk about, many refugees mentioned the relief of 
being able to talk. When being asked then if there was anything they wanted to ask 
me, many were happy to get some answers on fact questions they had been 
struggling with for an extended period of time (for example on resettlement 
procedures). Based on the advice of Eh Soe, my initial interpreter, I did give some 
soap or candy for the children to the respondents at the end of the interview, but 
this was not really a reward for the long time spent in their house but rather to 
show gratitude, and they were not pre- informed of this. 
A second problem foreseen was that the questions would make them revive hard 
moments during the flight. Therefore, I tried to limit detailed questions regarding 
their lives in Burma and the actual flight since this was less relevant for a research 
focused on life in exile anyway. In hindsight, this did result in a shortage of 
complete life histories.  
Thirdly, there was a problem due to the fact that self-settled refugees are for the 
most part considered an illegal population, and that my presence would reveal 
their location. However, in Tak province the refugees are very numerous and 
people know exactly who is originally Thai and who is not. Therefore the police was 
bound to know about their existence and location without my presence as well. 
Still, the precaution was taken not to record the respondents’ names, in case that 
files would be seized (by Thai police or Burmese intelligence), and I tried to use 
local transport to draw as little attention as possible. In addition, there was a 
problem with travelling with interpreters, as they were part of the refugee 
population and in principle were not allowed to travel. Passing fixed or mobile 
checkpoints could thus result into arrest and deportation. As a solution to this 
hazard, multiple interpreters were used depending on the location. Only when they 
spoke Thai and had a coloured identity card, was it decided together if and when 
they could travel along. For the same security reason (and for budget reasons), it 
was decided early on that no risk could be taken to hire research assistants who 
would need to travel alone.  
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A final ethical issue was the possibility that the information provided by my 
research would be misused, for example to diminish rations, to enhance curfews 
over camp, and these more: “Studying and documenting these ‘weapons of the 
weak’, on the one hand, illustrates the limitations and false bases of the 
institutional restrictions and recognizes the migrants’ ‘agency’; on the other hand, it 
might provide the same restrictive institutions with ammunition for tightening their 
systems even more” (Polzer and Hammond 2008: 429).  However, everyone 
working with refugees, whether that is a UN official, NGO staff member or a Thai 
soldier, knows that the refugees cannot survive on rations alone and see them 
leave camp every day. There is a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude, as every stakeholder knows 
the risks and benefits related to this practice. Furthermore, to minimise the risk 
that any of the people who were kind enough to participate in this study come to 
any harm because of their cooperation, no names were recorded, thus the 
information collected cannot be traced back to individuals. As the NGOs are looking 
to improve the self-reliance of camp refugees on donors’ demands, I hope that the 
findings of this research can lead to more informed action. There is no doubt that 
the life for refugees is extremely harsh in the various locations, and that they need 
help, despite their inventive strategies. Therefore, I hope that this research will 
help improve refugees’ lives and not be misused to make the conditions even 
harder. 
 
Limitations of study 
The limited amount of academic work in this case made it very difficult to prepare 
this research beforehand. Everything had to be arranged and decided on the spot, 
through networking, without a team or assistant-researcher as a back-up. The 
difficult access to the camp refugees (for administrative reasons) and to the self-
settled refugees (due to dispersal, fear etc.) proved very challenging, and a lot of 
time was consumed in trying to secure access to the sites, to the detriment of time 
that should have been spent with the refugees themselves.  
S e l e c t i o n  o f  c a s e  s t u d y  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g y | 50 
 
As a result of time and budget constraints, together with other aforementioned 
constraints, the sample remained rather small, and can therefore not be 
generalised to the whole population of Burmese refugees in Thailand. The results 
might have been different when focusing on Shan people in Chiang Mai, or Burman 
people in Bangkok, who are further away from the border and do not have the 
strong transnational Karen network to fall back upon. Nonetheless, CBO reports 
and informal conversations with NGO personnel in other areas of Thailand suggest 
that the general threads will be the same in terms of livelihoods, integration and 
some of the transnational strategies. After all, the legal restrictions that refugees 
face in Thailand are the same for all of them: they are not allowed to work, can be 
arrested and deported at any time, have to bribe officials and police, worry for 
their children’s education and fear having to return to Burma in the current 
conditions. Still, more academic research will be needed to confirm potential 
similarities and differences, by conducting livelihoods and other studies in other 
areas of Thailand. 
The ethical consideration of not unnecessarily making the refugees revive their 
flight led to a shortage of complete life histories. As a result, it was not possible to 
thoroughly compare current livelihood strategies of the refugees with the ones 
prior to their flight (Horst 2006c), as cross-border research is impossible for security 
reasons. Where possible, this information was obtained from reports assembled by 
CBOs working across the border with IDPs, such as Karen Human Rights Group 
(KHRG 2008). But of course, the life of IDPs is already a change from the ‘normal’ 
lives of people (whatever ‘normal’ is when living in a protracted civil war), and 
there is no information available on the livelihoods of non-displaced Karen people 
across the border. More in-depth study will thus be required to look into the level 
of adaptation that the strategies of these (mostly rural) refugees have undergone 
in Thailand, by interviewing people on their livelihoods strategies at different 
points in their lives. 
While this study had a clear research question to start with, many subjects came up 
during the research, which at a certain point made the study too broad. Several 
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colleagues and contacts struggled with the same problem: “The process of turning 
my experiences in Kenya and the knowledge I gained there into this book has been 
particularly challenging. On a number of occasions, I doubted whether I had the 
capacity to deal with such a large amount of information and it took a  long time 
before I had a sense of direction” (Horst 2006c: ix). As a result, the number of 
subjects and the geographical area covered had to be limited, thus not all the 
obtained information (e.g. on the camps as humanitarian sanctuaries, the specific 
features of nation state formation in the borderland and its impact on both 
refugees and hill tribe minorities, etc.) could be used. Other issues could not be 
researched because of time constraints, e.g. the subjective aspects of integration 
(identity, internalisation, satisfaction) or the differences between the first and the 
second generation of refugees in terms of livelihoods, integration and transnational 
activities. While all these subjects are very interesting, it was too ambitious to 
include these various elements into one research project, so hopefully other 
researchers will take on this task. 
 It has to be kept in mind however that this is a pioneering research, with little 
previous academic research on this border, and in particular hardly any research on 
the subject of livelihoods in different settings, integration and transnationalism. It 
therefore aims to give an impetus to further research that can enhance and refine 
insights found. 
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CHAPTER 3: BURMESE REFUGEES IN THAILAND 
 
“My name is Sylvia. I am S’ghaw Karen and Christian and I am 46 
years old. I left Burma with my family a long time ago. The SPDC 
(military regime in Burma, ed.) had burnt our village and my parents 
lost everything, so we moved. We arrived in Thailand in 1965 and 
built a house in the jungle, next to some other refugees. At that time, 
the camps did not exist yet, so we just tried to forage for food and 
traditional medicine. But word got out that the SPDC was coming and 
would attack, so we ran again, this time to Tuwaloo village, a KNU- 
base (Karen National Union- rebels, ed.) inside Thailand. There were 
no NGOs there but at least there was a hospital. But we could not 
stay there, so we went to Kabaloo village, another KNU- base. 
However, after Manerplaw fell (KNU headquarters, ed.), that base 
was burnt, so we came to Mae Ra Ma Luang refugee camp, which 
had been established by then, and we lived in Section 1. But then the 
SPDC came to this camp and attacked, and our house was burnt. I 
was very afraid for my children. Thus then we moved to another 
section in the camp. I really hope we will only have to move once 
more, to Canada. So we were never tortured or never did any forced 
portering, but only because we always ran fast enough. My heart is 
not normal, I have always been running since I was four, sometimes 
nearly starving under the way, and I got damaged due to that 
experience. 
 I have to take care of my husband, my four children and 
grandmother-in-law, so I work for an NGO. But I have been doing this 
for over ten years, and I am so bored of this job. I am so bored of this 
life. I applied for resettlement to Australia but I did not get any news 
for the last two years, so now I applied for Canada- even if my uncle 
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wanted me to come to Australia, since they had already bought a 
piece of land for me.  Luckily for me, my family here agrees to it that I 
will leave for resettlement; that is important in Karen culture. So I 
cannot wait to leave and find peace again. If there would be peace in 
Burma in the future, I might go to visit, but I will never really go back. 
I would return just to help people on the border.” (Interview in Mae 
Ra Ma Luang camp, January 25, 2007) 
Later that day, Sylvia heard that she was selected for a second 
resettlement interview and excitedly pulled me along to go to church 
and pray. During mass, she wrote in her bible: “A miracle happened 
today. Maybe my new life will start”. 
 
3.1. Conflict in Burma: a historical overview21
 
 
Most reports on Burma explain that the conflict started in 1988 when the Burmese 
junta cracked down on nationwide demonstrations. But is that really when it all 
started? How about the moment when the army seized power in 1962? Or before 
that, after independence from the British in 1948, when some of the ethnic 
minorities were granted autonomy while the plight of others was ignored? Conflict 
has indeed always existed in Burma, and the roots of this conflict can be found in 
the era before and during the colonisation period. This will be made clear in a short 
account on the history of Burma. 
Prior to the colonisation by the United Kingdom, the area that nowadays 
constitutes Burma was made up of several kingdoms. In these pre-colonial political 
realities, ethnicity was important but less so than today: “Ethnic affiliation informed 
many aspects of peoples’ lives but tributary ties and patron-client relations were 
                                                             
21 This section is loosely based on my master’s thesis (Brees 2004), titled ‘De overlevingsstrategie van 
het militaire regime in Birma/Myanmar’. (translation : The survival strategy of the military regime in 
Burma/Myanmar). 
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generally not circumscribed by ethnic boundaries” (Fink 2003: 4). These kingdoms 
were fighting each other over power and land, which sometimes affected 
neighbouring British India, severely annoying and worrying the British. What’s 
more, the Burmese territory was very tempting for the colonial strategists, as it had 
large amounts of raw materials (such as teak) and could become a buffer state 
between them and the French territory. Between 1824 and 1885 there were three 
Anglo-Burman wars. Mandalay fell in 1885, with the expulsion of the Burman King 
Thibaw22
Similar to other British colonies, a ‘Divide and Rule’ strategy was conceived to 
colonise the country (Fink 2001: 17-22; Steinberg 2001: 181-183). A dual system 
was set up, in which the central, fertile plains, predominantly inhabited by ethnic 
Burmans, were called ‘Ministerial Burma’, whereas the mountainous areas in the 
border zones where ethnic minorities lived were termed the ‘Frontier Areas’ or 
‘Scheduled Areas’. The British wanted to ensure regional safety as well as trade, 
and stimulated massive immigration of Chinese and Indian people to this purpose. 
This was very much against the Burmans’ wishes as these newcomers had more 
privileges than the original population had. By 1920 Ministerial Burma became the 
world’s largest exporter of rice, with a very strong economy, but the political 
demands of the Burmans were kept at bay. In contrast, the frontier areas were only 
used as suppliers of raw materials and there were hardly any investments in these 
areas. The ethnic minorities to a large extent did keep their political autonomy 
(Grundy Warr and Wong 2002: 98) and were often recruited in the colonial army. 
With the help of the missionaries, an important minority was converted to 
Christianity, and the missionaries promoted the development of a school system 
for the Karen. In these schools, the Karen were taught in their own language, by 
, and areas around it were annexed in order to create a ‘state with 
borders’. The result was a country with eight main ethnic groups, but over one 
hundred different subgroups with particular dialects or languages, some of which 
were split up by the new international border. 
                                                             
22 This history is beautifully described in a book by Amitav Ghosh (2001), titled ‘the Glass Palace’. For an 
academic political perspective on the period leading up to colonisation, see: Thant Myint-U (2001) ‘The 
making of modern Burma’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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way of a Burman script adapted to Karen (Keyes, cited in Sang Kook 2001: 81). The 
construction of a printing press for education and religious (bible) reasons led to 
the emergence of a Karen press. As a result, a stronger feeling of ethnic identity 
arose, followed by the emergence of cultural and political ethnic organisations such 
as the ‘Karen National Union’ (KNU) in 1881. The large dichotomy in the policy 
towards Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas led to an increasing antipathy 
between the Burmans and the ethnic minorities (Thawnghmung 2008: 3-6) 23
It is thus not surprising that both groups chose a different party in the battle of 
World War II. The Burmans, part of which had been trained in Japan, fought with 
Japan against the British and the ethnic minorities. After the retreat of the British, 
thousands of Karen and other ethnic minority people were harassed and killed as 
collaborators. During that period however, Japan increasingly acted as if they had 
conquered a new territory, instead of leaving the ‘liberated country’ to their 
Burman partners. Consequently the Burmans switched sides and cooperated with 
the Allied troops to defeat Japan. 
. 
After the defeat of Japan, it became clear to both the Burmese and the British that 
Burma would soon gain its independence. Discussions were thus held about the 
future of Burma from 1946 onwards, with the largest dilemma being whether and 
how the Frontier Areas would be associated with Ministerial Burma. At the 
‘Panglong conference’ in 1947, it was decided to establish a federal state, the 
Union of Burma (Walton 2008). Burma became independent on January 4, 1948. 
However, several of the ethnic groups did not receive the autonomy they 
demanded (and/or had been promised), and the in-country boundaries of the 
different states were contested (Smith 2001: 77-10). As a result, these minorities 
started a civil war, and also the communist party went underground, supported by 
Thailand and China respectively. Moreover, the state of the economy was 
                                                             
23 For detailed information on the entire period of ethnic warfare from British rule until 1990, see: 
Smith, M. (1991) ‘Burma, insurgency and the politics of ethnicity’. London and New Jersey: Zed Books. 
Also Bertil Lintner is a well-known author on the insurgencies: Lintner, B. (1994) ‘Burma in revolt. Opium 
and insurgency since 1948’. Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press. 
 For information on state formation from the pre-colonial period until 1987, see: Taylor, R. (1987) ‘The 
state in Burma’. Honolulu: Hawaii press. 
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disastrous due to the armed conflict with Japan and there were still arm supplies all 
over the country in the aftermath of the war, which were eagerly used by the 
militias of politicians and others. The result was an explosive cocktail that brought 
the country into a state of complete civil war and lawlessness. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that General Ne Win met with little opposition of the population when 
he seized power at the end of the 1950s to re-establish law and order (Callahan 
2003: 184-188). But when the military seized power again in 1962 to ensure order 
but also ‘to prevent federalism from destroying the Union’ (Smith 1991: 196), they 
would never release power again. The ‘Burmese way to socialism’ was installed, 
and the country retreated in isolationism until the 1980s. Assimilationist policies, 
already initiated after independence, were increasingly pursued to ‘Burmanise’ the 
minority populations and political and military power was removed from minority 
hands (Fink 2003: 1). At the same time, in the mid-1960s, the ‘Four Cuts Strategy’ 
(‘Pya ley pya’) was set up to conquer the rebel armies, by trying to cut the strings 
between the rebels, their families and the local villagers in terms of food, finance, 
communication and manpower (Smith 1991: 259). At first this strategy hardly 
seemed to work though, as the rebels controlled 20 to 30 % of Burma’s territory in 
the 1970s (Fink 2001: 23-26). The most important victims of the ‘Four Cuts’ were 
(and still are) the civilians who were suspected by both the junta and the rebels of 
collaborating with the other side. 
When in 1987 a sudden currency devaluation was effected, riots broke out in 
Rangoon, which soon spread all over Central Burma (Fink 2001: 51-63; Steinberg 
2001: 3-11). This was the first time that not only the frontier areas were openly 
questioning the regime. On ‘8-8-1988’ hundreds of thousands of people were 
protesting in the streets, led by students, but the protests were violently 
suppressed. In just four days, hundreds of protesters were killed in the capital 
Rangoon alone. Burma thus created its own version of the Tiananmen square 
drama in this period, but due to the absence of international media at that point, 
very little was known about this in the outside world. Due to a lack of coordination 
both in-between the protesters and between this urban-based, Burman, ’88 
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Students Movement and the rebels, the regime managed to re-gain control. 
However, the situation had changed now that Central Burma had also revolted, 
thus General Ne Win resigned and the generals promised that elections would soon 
be organised. In 1990, elections indeed took place and they were relatively free – 
or at least the results indicate that they were on the day itself, not in the weeks 
leading up to the election day. The elections were overwhelmingly won by the 
opposition, despite their internal discord and the intimidation attempts by the 
junta – Aung San Suu Kyi, the symbol of the opposition and secretary-general of the 
largest party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was put under house 
arrest even before the actual election day (Fink 2001: 66-72). Still, her party won 
over 80% of the votes. Unsurprisingly, the generals refused to recognise the results 
of this election, announced a state of emergency (which endured until May 2008) 
and put all the important leaders under house arrest. They declared that a new 
forum, the ‘National Convention’, would be formed to write a new Constitution, 
which would then lead to a new government (Fink 2001: 82-86).  
Until 1988, the ethnic minorities were hardly engaged with political movements in 
Central Burma, but after the violent suppression, the Burman students fled en 
masse from the cities to the border areas, where they sought to access the camps 
of the ethnic armies (Smith 1999: 27). In reply, the regime started to fight them in 
the ethnic areas, while simultaneously setting up a campaign in which the ethnic 
army leaders were promised economic concessions in return for a ceasefire. The 
generals could not afford a well-working union between the Burmans and the 
ethnic rebellion, whom had just formed the ‘Democratic Alliance of Burma’ (DAB). 
However, such a ceasefire agreement did not involve any disarmament or 
demobilisation, nor a peace agreement with a solution for what lies at the root of 
all these problems: the request of autonomy of the ethnic minorities. Still, the 
pressure of the Four Cuts campaign and the suspension of aid by China and 
Thailand by the end of the 1980s made this offer increasingly attractive. The 
communist fraction imploded at the end of the 1980s and all the factions made a 
deal with the junta in 1989. Many other rebel armies followed their example in the 
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1990s (Smith 1999: 27-37; Sherman 2003: 230-233). Today, various insurgent 
armies are still fighting, some on the Indian border, but most are located on the 
Thai border. The three most significant groups that are left are the Karen National 
Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Shan State 
Army-South (SSA-S). These armies hardly control significant territory any longer, 
and use guerrilla tactics to fight ‘the tatmadaw’, the junta army. Despite their loss 
of territory and relatively small number of soldiers, they remain important due to 
their symbolic importance: “These groups keep the flames of insurgency alive and, 
as such, have significance far beyond their numbers and the threat they pose to the 
military government. The KNU insurgency, in particular, has major symbolic 
importance due to its duration and the prominent role the organization plays within 
the broader antigovernment alliances on the Thai border” (Pedersen 2008: 48). 
While up until now I have always talked about the civil war between the junta and 
the insurgents, the picture is unfortunately more opaque than this. In addition to 
these conflicts between the tatmadaw and the insurgents, disagreements within 
various rebel groups in the 1990s have resulted in the splintering of these groups 
(South 2008: 54-70) and as such to additional fighting and burdens for the 
population. For example, the Buddhist fraction of the KNU was fed up with the 
inconsiderate Christian leadership and decided to start their own army, the 
‘Democratic Karen Buddhist Army’ (DKBA). They closed a deal with the junta and 
together they stroke the KNU a heavy blow they have never recovered from, by 
taking in the KNU headquarters, Manerplaw, in 1995. This great loss of territory 
next to the Thai border effectively wiped out the somewhat safer area behind the 
combat zone, resulting into additional population waves. On top of this complexity, 
dozens of coalition groups have been formed and transformed, between armed 
groups and political groups, between armed groups and ceasefire groups, with 
civilian ‘youth’ and ‘women’ groups etc., making it increasingly difficult to 
understand who is cooperating with whom. 
 Internationally, Burma was isolated after 1988. Despite the fact that the generals 
were increasingly trying to attract international investments, predominantly in the 
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oil and gas sector, Burma remained an international pariah. The turning point came 
in 1997, when the country became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (Steinberg 2001: 237-240). Consequently, the relations with China 
and India also improved quickly, both for geostrategic reasons as well as because of 
the large amount of raw materials in Burma (oil, gas, teak wood, jade etc.). Apart 
from these bilateral and multilateral changes, the name of the regime changed as 
well in 1997, from ‘State Law and Order Restoration Council’ (SLORC) to ‘State 
Peace and Development Council’ (SPDC), but in practice little changed, and the grip 
of the generals on power remained firm24. The only event that caught the attention 
of the international press in the following years was the ‘Saffron revolution’ in 
September 2007 and the passing of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which killed more 
people in Burma than the tsunami did in any country 2.5 years before. The 
international community was astonished by the lack of sympathy the generals had 
for their affected population by refusing to let international aid in – admittedly, 
suggesting that Western war ships would deliver the aid was a diplomatic blunder 
when dealing with such as xenophobic regime. The fact that this cyclone passed 
only a week before the population had to vote on the new constitution certainly 
also influenced the stubbornness of the junta. Only weeks later, when the 
international press was already gone, the access to the cyclone-affected area 
became much less restricted, and in fact even more open than any other area in 
the country25
This overview demonstrates that there are two types of conflict: a political conflict 
versus an armed conflict (with political roots). The first conflict is centred around 
the tensions between the military regime and political opposition forces, 
. 
                                                             
24 Duffield (2008: 8) argues that they have accomplished this by inheriting and adapting a design of 
power, which he calls a ‘colonial bureaucracy’. A colonial bureaucracy is concerned with the question: 
how do you govern populations acquired through conquest that are independent of the state in terms 
of their welfare and social survival? Answer: by keeping them on the threshold of emergency. The 
Burmese junta adapted this design of power and deepened it into a classic totalitarian dual state. 
Because the arbitrary power generates uncertainty, there is a ‘follow the leader’-culture which 
disciplines subordinates, but that self-discipline is not widely internalised. Therefore, a permanent 
enemy has to be found and every sign of opposition is presented as a threat to society as a whole. 
25 Detailed analyses on the internal political situation, the international strategy towards this regime and 
the aftermath of the cyclone, can be found on the website of International Crisis Group: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2958&l=1.  
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symbolised by the battle between General Than Shwe and the Burman opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi (‘The Lady’). From the viewpoint of the SPDC, this is at the 
same time a battle between Burma and the West, who strongly support Suu Kyi 
and have imposed increasingly restrictive sanctions (economic and other). A 
second, less well-known conflict is the protracted civil war between the ethnic 
armies and the junta. The military regime wants to crush all rebel armies whatever 
it takes, due to an enormous fear of ‘disintegration of the country’, which 
supposedly could only be prevented by the army. A third (potential) conflict is in 
between the different armed groups, but also in between political members of the 
opposition. Even if the Burman and ethnic minority politicians agree on the need of 
a civil government, the opinions on eventual power divisions are very divergent. 
Will there still be common ground if the common enemy disappears? There are 
calls to return to ‘the spirit of Panglong’, but was there even unity then (what 
Walton (2008) calls ‘the myth of Panglong’)? The West focuses on the Burman 
Aung San Suu Kyi, but will she be accepted by all people as a leader?26
 
 And how will 
the power be divided between the political diaspora and politicians inside the 
country when the time comes? Many questions thus remain. What is clear is that 
there are multiple sources of conflict in Burma, all of which result into migration 
waves, which will be discussed in the next section. 
3.2. Root causes of flight and migration patterns 
 
 “The Burmese military actions have helped to create a climate of 
constant fear among the population and have forced thousands of 
people to join the ranks of the internally displaced, or to flee abroad”. 
                                                             
26 As Morten Pedersen (2008: 46 ) states, “The ethnic minorities have not forgotten that the civil war 
started during the democratic period in the 1950s and do not necessarily trust Burman leaders of any 
persuasion to genuinely have their welfare at heart. Some feel it is better to try to work with the military, 
which has the power to change their situation, than to side with parties that do not. Mostly, they want to 
make sure that they are on the inside of any political transition process that may unfold, so that they do 
not remain marginalized for another half a century”. 
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Unusual public accusation by Jakob Kellenberger, President of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, June 29, 200727
 
 
A combination of economic and political factors, related to these protracted 
conflicts, forces people to migrate. On an economic level, the country remains one 
of the ‘Least Developed Countries’, despite the fertile soil and the large amount of 
commodities. The economic mismanagement of the junta, combined with a lack of 
investments in the education and health sectors, severely affects the development 
of the country. Two thirds of the population is still employed in the primary sector. 
In addition, there are forced relocations for reasons varying from urban 
development and poppy eradication to enforced assimilation (Grundy-War and Yin 
2002: 100). Moreover, economic sanctions imposed by Western countries 
negatively influence, amongst others, the labour intensive textile sectors and 
prohibit development aid by international financial institutions28
Table 1: Factual sheet Burma 
. As a result, the 
situation continues to deteriorate. Migration is often seen as the best solution 
then, either to the cities, but increasingly abroad, to Thailand, Malaysia, 
Bangladesh or the Middle East.  
 
- (Administrative) capital: Naypyidaw 
- Economic capital: Rangoon/Yangon 
- Population: 48 million 
                                                             
27 More information can be found in the official press release: ICRC (2007) ‘Myanmar: ICRC denounces 
major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law’, Press Release June 29, 2007, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/myanmar-news-290607?opendocument, consulted: 
June 30, 2009. 
28 Burma receives $2.88 humanitarian aid per person, which is the smallest amount of all 50 Least 
Developed Countries. In comparison, Sudan receives $55 and Lao $63 per person (Parameswaran 2008). 
Given their 164th place in terms of GDP per capita, on 177 countries (UNDP 2008a), this is unacceptably 
low. 
B u r m e s e  r e f u g e e s  i n  T h a i l a n d | 62 
 
- Ethnic groups: Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (4%), 
Chinese (3%), Indian(2%), Mon (2%), other (5%) (source: Burma 
Campaign UK) 
- Religion: Buddhism, Christianity , Islam, animism 
- Languages: Burmese, while all the ethnic minority groups have their 
own languages 
- Life Expectancy at birth: 60.8 
- GDP per capita (PPP US$): 1027 (164th out of 177 countries) 
- Public expenditure on health (%of GDP): 0.3 
- Public expenditure on education (%of GDP): 1.3 
- Human development index: 0,583 (132nd place on 177 countries) 
- Official Development Assistance received (million US $): 144.7 
     Source: UNDP Human Development Index 2007/2008, http://hdrstats.undp.org.  
 
But the most important causes of decreasing human security and subsequent 
migration flows are the so-called ‘political factors’ that can give access to asylum, 
namely armed conflict and discriminatory persecution (Brees 2008f). Several of the 
ethnic minority groups in Burma, such as the Karen and the Karenni, are affected 
by the protracted civil war. Usually, a local tatmadaw officer selects ‘brown’ and 
‘black’ rebel zones that then become security zones that are prohibited to civilians. 
The villagers in the zone are ordered to move to strategic relocation sites under the 
control of the SPDC, in order to reduce potential support for the insurgents 
(Grundy-War and Wong 2002: 100). However, SPDC relocation sites often foresee 
no services for the arrival of these people and can be located in the middle of 
nowhere, or close to another village that is not equipped for this additional strain 
on CPRs. Relocated villagers thus often have to re-start their lives from scratch. 
Moreover, as many of the ethnic minorities in these rural borderlands are very 
attached to their farmland, they often refuse to relocate and instead prefer to hide 
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in the jungle whenever the army is nearby, effectively becoming IDPs (KHRG 2008: 
6). Villagers who fail to comply with these relocation orders can be seen as rebels 
and may be shot on sight: “The cycle of fear and running has generated its own 
consequences for civilian displacement: (...) The very act of running in fear served to 
reinforce the suspicions of the counterinsurgency troops from whom the civilians 
were fleeing” (Lang 2002: 78). Food stores and homes in the (temporarily) 
abandoned area are sometimes burnt, or mines are placed within and around the 
village to prevent the villagers from returning. Apart from the direct fighting, other 
factors also generate fear, such as the coercive financial demands or demands for 
food, but certainly also the constant threat of forced labour, for anything from the 
construction of a road, to the carrying of military equipment, till the functioning as 
a living mine sweeper. In addition to these problems, the splintering of the rebel 
armies also resulted into additional warfare, as mentioned above. The combination 
of insurgency and counter-insurgency measures have thus led to an oppressive 
dynamic of fear and a cycle of violence embedded in low-intensity warfare (Lang 
2002: 61). 
In response, the villages in these active conflict zones have developed a system to 
warn each other when enemy troops are approaching (KHRG 2008: 110-114)29
“Burmese soldiers came often. But in 1997 SPDC and KNU fought in 
our village. After that, the SPDC set up a camp just next to our village, 
so we had to help them with construction, clean their compound, etc. 
And my father always had to do portering, more than four times. 
Each time he was beaten up if he didn’t work as they wanted him to. 
Then six villagers were killed as ‘KNU spies’. So we fled. Travelling was 
very difficult. It wasn’t easy to cross the border because there were 
. 
After a warning, the whole village temporary leaves for the mountains to only try 
to return to their houses after several hours, days or weeks as IDPs. Others travel 
to safer areas or heavily controlled relocation sites, or they travel for weeks or 
months to be able to cross the international border and become asylum seekers:  
                                                             
29 This report also reveals other ‘resistance’ strategies of IDPs such as the ignoring or negotiating of calls 
for financial and labour support, the hiding of rice, the attending of hidden jungle markets etc. 
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many SPDC soldiers. So we had to ask help from KNU soldiers to help 
us across, we didn’t know the way. We had no food under the way, 
we had to eat wild vegetables. If there would not have been any 
soldiers, the travel would have taken us about 1 or 2 weeks, but 
because of the insecurity it took us 3 or 4 months”  
(Interview with Karen refugee, Nu Poh camp, November 28, 2008). 
Even if the Karen traditionally move periodically to access agricultural land, the 
scale of displacement in Karen and other areas over the past 50 years has been out 
of all proportion to any traditional patterns of migration (South 2008: 85). 
Another set of political factors that instigate forced migration is discriminatory 
persecution based on race, ethnicity/nationality, religion, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion. Discriminatory persecution as a result 
of political activities (in the very broad sense) is ‘business as usual’ in Burma: “I 
took a picture of soldiers that were arresting a student, but I didn’t mean to, it was 
an accident. So I was accused by the soldiers of being an activist and put in jail for 
five days. After that arrest, whenever there was a problem, they would accuse me 
of political activism and interrogated me, so I always had to go underground. So in 
the end I left” (Interview with Burman woman, Nu Poh camp, November 27, 2007). 
The opposition is sabotaged in every possible way and every fallacy suffices for 
arrest and years of confinement. Amnesty International (2009) estimates that 2100 
political prisoners were still in detention in 2008. Many activists or former political 
prisoners flee abroad, fearing for their lives and that of their families, and/or to 
continue the battle in exile.  
“I was arrested 3 times: in 1990, 1991 and 1999 until 2004. The 
reason is that I participated in ABSDF (All Burma Students Democratic 
Front, ed.) demonstrations, and SPDC watches demonstrations and 
arrests people afterwards. In a move by Khin Nyunt (former top 
General, ed.) I was released but then I couldn’t continue my study 
anymore and I had to sign in into the local section office twice a week, 
B u r m e s e  r e f u g e e s  i n  T h a i l a n d | 65 
 
to show that I was still there. I was questioned by intelligence every 
time after I had visitors. If I wanted to travel, I had to report to the 
section leader again. If I wanted to set up a business, they would 
come and tell me they could give me the funding if I gave them 
information. I was watched all the time.  
The flight itself was very difficult. I told the section leader in 
Mandalay that I was going to visit my aunt in Rangoon. She called 
him and said I had arrived, but I went underground in Rangoon. Then 
I decided to flee to Thailand through Myawaddy. Burmese soldiers 
stopped our car though and reported it to the authorities. The other 
people in the car were merchants thus the soldiers wanted 30,000 
kyat per person to let us go. In the end we paid 60,000 kyat and we 
could continue on a motorcycle. Then we crossed to Mae Sot and I 
lived in hiding there from February 2005 until September 2006, when I 
could go to camp”. 
(Interview with Burman refugee, Nu Poh camp, November 29, 
2008)30
Next to discriminatory persecution practices on an individual level, they can also 
occur on a group level (Goris et al. 2009). An example of the latter is the racial 
discrimination of the Rohingya, a Muslim population in Arakan State, bordering 
Bangladesh (Lewa 2009). They are not considered an ‘original’ people of Burma and 
are therefore denied citizenship. They are severely limited in their basic freedoms, 
such as freedom of movement, choice of work, etc. Even marriage is often not 
allowed and clandestine marriages can lead to severe penalties or imprisonment. 
These insidious forms of social, political and economic exclusion over protracted 
periods of time continuously generate new asylum seekers, because socio-
economic inequalities grow while basic human rights recede (Zetter 2007: 177). 
 
                                                             
30 In January 2009, one $US was worth about 1,000 kyat (Yeni 2009). This is the real rate, the black 
market rate. The official rate stands at six kyat per $US, but is unrealistic. An average low-skilled worker 
makes about 400 to 500 kyat a day in Burma, while educated professionals earn 2,000 to 3,000 kyat a 
day (Arnold and Hewison 2005: 320). 
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However, as Zetter (2007: 177-178) argues, minority groups fleeing these more 
subtle forms of persecution have often found it difficult to receive a refugee status. 
This is indeed the case in Bangladesh and Thailand, where the Rohingya are seen as 
unwanted guests as well. The result is statelessness for this entire ethnic group.  
Other factors are on the verge of being political, which again makes it difficult for 
the people fleeing these issues to receive protection: “In Burma much 
impoverishment and forced migration are due to state-led land confiscation, asset 
stripping, forced procurement policies, agricultural production quotas, forced 
labour, arbitrary taxation, extortion and restrictions on access to fields and 
markets. The compulsory and unavoidable nature of these factors is distinct from 
the voluntary, profit-oriented ‘pull factors’ more commonly associated with 
economic migration” (TBBC 2008c: 14). 
All these factors have led to enormous population waves. Exact national figures do 
not exist, but even only in the east of the country more than half a million people 
have been internally displaced in the last ten years (TBBC 2007: 3)31. On top of that 
number, millions of Burmese decided to leave the country altogether. The largest 
diaspora can be found in Thailand, but also other countries in the region, such as 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and China have to deal with influxes of Burmese 
refugees on their territory32
Since 1980, the number of Burmese arrivals in Thailand has been increasing 
steadily, due to both push and pull factors. As explained in the previous section, 
push factors are the Burmese government’s disastrous economic policy, the violent 
. From there, a small minority of refugees have been 
resettled to the US, Canada, Australia and Europe. The decennia-long conflict 
situation in Burma has thus led to a worldwide Burmese diaspora. This study 
focuses on the largest group in this network: the Burmese diaspora in Thailand. 
                                                             
31 As the border area between Thailand and Burma is very porous, quite a lot of organisations work 
cross- border, illegally, to help the IDP population, and can therefore assemble more detailed 
information about this part of the country. The information on displacement in the rest of the country is 
only sketchy. The information that is available (albeit based on a weak methodology) can be found in a 
report by Bosson, A. (2007) ‘Forced Migration/Internal Displacement in Burma with an emphasis on 
government controlled areas’. 
32 All of these countries were part of the list of the ten ‘worst places for refugees’ in the 2008 ‘World 
Refugee Survey’ (USCRI 2008b). 
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events of the popular rising in 1988, the human rights abuses and the civil war. Pull 
factors that favour Thailand over other neighbouring countries are multiple: 
“Compared to most of its neighbours, Thailand is an example of economic success 
and political stability, religious tolerance and ethnic pluralism, freedom of 
expression and of movement. Because of this, over the past quarter-century, 
Thailand has played host to hundreds of thousands of Myanmar, Cambodian, 
Laotian, Vietnamese and other nationals, many seeking temporary refuge” 
(Robinson 2004: 1). Moreover, Thailand has a dual economy, consisting of a capital-
intensive section with highly-educated workers and a large labour-intensive low 
skilled section. The latter section, which is often informal33
The journey itself can be a difficult one though, depending on what the starting 
point is: “Deterrents include the fear of being caught by the tatmadaw, landmines, 
harsh terrain, rumours about poor living conditions in Thailand and fear of the 
unknown” (Grundy-War and Wong 2002: 108). Also other hazards may make travel 
difficult such as lack of food and water, malaria, child birth under the way, etc. On 
the other hand, people travelling from Rangoon can reach Mae Sot easily in two 
days. Contrary to this potential hardship of internal travel, crossing the physical 
border is not a major challenge, as the border is too long (2,400 km) to effectively 
control it: “Since the border is so porous and the border town itself is also porous, 
the practice of border patrol (especially immigration) moved from the actual 
, presents opportunities 
for foreign labour (Rukumnuyakit 2009: 3-4). This has been accompanied by 
changing bilateral policies between Thailand and Burma since the end of the 1980s, 
geared towards increasing linkages on an economic level, ensuring greater flows of 
capital and goods, but also of labour, across the border. Also the fact that people 
on both sides of the border share ethnicity is a factor easing migration, and so are 
the established trading patterns across the border, as these result into readily 
available contacts for informal support upon arrival. For people who left more 
recently, contacts with family members or friends who already were refugees were 
important as well. 
                                                             
33 The informal economy in Thailand accounts for about 50% of the labour work force and 45% of the 
GDP (Tajgman 2006: foreword). 
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physical/geographical border into the check points that are set up on the highway 
by the police when land vehicles leave the town to Bangkok” (Pongsawat 2003: 9). 
In practice, there is thus a more fluid sense of borderland, and brokering/smuggling 
services are commonly only used to travel inside Thailand, rather than to come to 
Thailand in the first place (Vicary 2004: 31-32; Caouette et al. 2006: 27-28). 
The borderline can be crossed at permanent international checkpoints (getting a 
one-day or seven-day pass and then overstaying this visa) or trade check-points, 
but unofficial entry points are used as well, by simply crossing the river, using local 
piers, mountainous borders, etc. Most people cross into one of the following four 
zones: Tachilek-Mae Sai, Myawaddy-Mae Sot, the Three Pagodas Pass and 
Kawthaung- Ranong, and may then move on to Bangkok (Mahachai-Samut 
Prakhan) (Chantanavich et al. 2007: 13-14; Lubeigt 2008: 169; Lawi Weng 2008a). 
These are the zones where large numbers of cheap labour are needed, which 
confirms that even if people do not leave for economic reasons, they may 
nonetheless chose to go to places where there are economic opportunities. In Tak, 
where I did research, Burmese people come for nearly every part of Burma but the 
majority are Karen or Burman, while those in Chiang Mai are mostly Shan and 
those in the south are mostly from the south of Burma (Mon, Tavoy or Karen) 
(Arnold 2004: 3). The Burmese in Bangkok are also from various areas and are the 
people with readily available networks that brought them there.  
The place of settlement and subsequent ‘category’ in which refugees end up has 
large consequences for their human security and livelihoods for various reasons, an 
important one of which is the Thai refugee and migration policy, which will be 
explained in the next section. 
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The international border at Tha Son Yang, Burmese side and Thai side respectively 
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Myanmar-Thailand Friendship bridge 
 
 
3.3. The formal legal framework: the Thai refugee and 
foreign labour policy 
3.3.1 The Thai refugee policy 
 
Thailand has a long history of providing refugee sanctuary. Surrounded by conflict-
ridden countries, it has had to deal with huge refugee influxes, with at its height 
over one million Indochinese refugees on its territory, later followed by arrivals of 
Burmese. Because of these massive refugee inflows, Thailand considers itself to be 
a special case and refuses to sign the Geneva Convention of 1951. The government 
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prefers to have a large margin of discretion to manage these refugee flows, and 
fears that adherence to international regulation might force them to receive even 
more refugees, thereby restricting their national sovereignty and security (Loescher 
and Milner 2005). In addition, Thailand has had a bad experience with the 
International Court of Justice: “Added to this is Thailand’s mistrust of Article 38 of 
the 1951 Convention, which confers upon the International Court of Justice the 
power to settle disputes relating to the interpretation of the Convention. Thailand’s 
own experience with the Court has not been a happy one. In the famous Temple 
case, the International Court of Justice held that a temple which was the bone of 
contention between Thailand and Cambodia belonged to Cambodia” (Muntarbhorn 
2004: 14). Furthermore, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have not signed 
the Convention, and even if they have, this does not ensure that the rights of 
refugees are respected34
On the other hand, Thailand is a member of the Executive Committee of UNHCR, 
which means that they do follow up on world refugee trends and ways to handle 
refugees (Muntharbhorn 2004). The country has abided to a considerable extent to 
international law interrelated with refugees and their protection, but since they are 
followers of the dualism principle in legal matters, they only apply international 
conventions once these have been incorporated into national laws. Thailand is also 
party to several human rights treaties, in which the key principle is ‘non-
discrimination’: human rights apply to all persons, irrespective of their origins. 
However, in some treaties, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has asked some 
restrictions or given interpretations. In signing the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child for example, Thailand made a reservation on the right to birth registration 
and the rights of refugee children. This is based on the misunderstanding that 
granting a birth certificate will automatically give these children Thai nationality, 
which is not the case according to Thai law professor Vitit Muntarbhorn (2004: 22): 
“The mere grant of an official birth certificate does not automatically imply the 
grant of Thai nationality to anyone. However, the grant of an official birth 
.  
                                                             
34 Interview with Songsit Charuparn, Protection Officer UNHCR, July 12, 2006. 
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certificate is an important guarantee for the identity of the child; it ensures that 
s/he is officially recognised as a person”. Except for these restrictions, the national 
response has been to act in conformity with the country’s moral obligation at the 
international level. 
At the national level, there is no specific law on refugees or refugee status 
determination (RSD) (Muntharbhorn 2004). The law with the greatest impact on 
asylum seekers is the 1979 Immigration Act, which explicitly deals with immigrants 
and states that all those who enter without papers are illegal and subject to 
deportation. Penalties for illegal immigration in breach of the 1979 Act include 
repatriation, imprisonment and fines. In reality though, some Burmese minority 
groups can seek refuge on a prima facie basis35
This situation changed when several of these camps were attacked from across the 
border in the 1995-1998 period. There had been a large scale offensive of the 
 in the refugee camps without being 
fined. The first of these semi-permanent camps were established in 1984, when 
some 9,000 Karen and 6,000 Mon refugees fled across the border (Lang 2002: 84-
85). These were informal village-like camps, managed by local refugee committees 
and NGOs and until the mid-1990s they had low-key security arrangements. This 
minimal relief structure was the only acceptable arrangement for the Thai Ministry 
of Interior (MOI), as they were pre-occupied with the massive presence of 
Indochinese refugees on the other border; Indochinese refugees who in contrast 
were very much part of Cold War affiliations (Lang 2002; Thompson 2008). Refugee 
community leaders negotiated with the local Thai landowners, army commanders 
and district administrators to select sites for the camps, which was facilitated by 
the fact that to a large extent the same ethnic groups live on both sides of the 
border.  
                                                             
35 Definition of refugee recognition on a prima facie basis: “This means that each individual member of a 
particular group is presumed to qualify for refugee status. This presumption is based on objective 
information on the circumstances causing their flight. Prima facie recognition is appropriate where there 
are grounds for considering that the large majority of those in the group would meet the eligibility 
criteria set out in the applicable refugee definition” (UNCR 2006b: 3-4). It is often applied in cases of 
mass influx, where it is practically unworkable to conduct individual refugee status determination 
procedures. Its purpose is to ensure admission to safety, protection from refoulement and basic 
humanitarian treatment to those patently in need of it (Rutinwa 2002: 1). 
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tatmadaw against the KNU, who in turn attacked DKBA camps (their breakaway 
faction) (Lang 2002: 154-160). The latter then retaliated by destroying the Karen 
refugee camps, which were/are seen as permanent safe havens for the KNU: “Since 
early 1995, the DKBA, with SLORC support, has carried out dozens of attacks on the 
refugee camps, roads, and Thai villages. Dozens of refugees and Thai villagers have 
been killed or kidnapped, five camps have been completely burned down and a 
number of others partially destroyed. Millions of Baht in cash or property belonging 
to Thai villagers or refugees has been stolen. (…) The DKBA has frequently 
threatened to kidnap refugee medics and doctors or expatriate NGO staff” (Bowles 
1997: 15).  
“I was born here in Thailand. Now my family lives in Umpiem 
camp, but we used to live in another refugee camp, in Mokola, 
close to the border. It was dangerous there. At night, if the 
Thai military would ring the bell, we had to flee the camp and 
sleep in a hole we had dug outside the camp. The bell meant 
that the SPDC and DKBA might attack. Thus everybody had to 
dug holes beforehand, in case we had to run in the middle of 
the night. We spent weeks in those holes. I was really 
scared.”36
The Karenni and Mon camps were also attacked by troops from across the border, 
although to a lesser extent than the Karen camps.  
 
The Thai government came under strong pressure from its population because of 
their portrayal of these attacks as an internal Karen issue and for not stopping the 
incursions (Bowles 1997: 16). In practice though, the attacks were not only a 
blatant violation of the Thai sovereignty but they also severely affected the local 
Thais. Therefore, the RTG decided to impose a policy of camp consolidation and 
unite the refugees in a smaller number of larger camps that would be easier to 
both protect and control. The number of camps, called ‘temporary shelters’, went 
from over 30 at the beginning of 1995, over 12 in 2000 to 9 since 2003. Village 
                                                             
36 Interview with Karen refugee, Umphang, February 8, 2007. 
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communities turned into urban centres as camps expanded from a maximum of 
6,000 people then to an average of 17,000 today (Thompson 2008: 26). All of the 
camps are located within a few kilometres of the border, as the Thai government 
was afraid that locating camps further inland would encourage the refugees to 
stay. With the camp consolidation and the increased control over the security of 
the camp by Thai (para)military groups and barbed wire, the freedom of movement 
of refugees was increasingly curtailed and the rations had to be increased year by 
year37
Table 2: Evolution of number of refugees in camp and level of 
rations 
.  
 
Source: TBBC 2008: 58 
                                                             
37 This growing amount of rations caused additional problems for the humanitarian agencies, as the 
donors asked for more transparency, accountability and standardisation, which challenged the former 
community-based management system: “The camps’ supply management, while in many respects 
perfectly adequate, no longer met procedures required by donors for tendering, quality control and 
monitoring. Thus began a long process of re-design, training and implementing new systems to fit with 
the global humanitarian community’s expectations. The systems had functioned on trust and informal 
agreements. Rejection of these systems implied a breakdown in trust which then had to be re-
established” (Thompson 2008: 27).  
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Distribution of rations in Mae Ra Ma Luang camp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The humanitarian agencies were increasingly restricted after the attacks as well, 
with the introduction of a camp pass system, more reporting duties, increasing 
bureaucratic hurdles to send supplies to camps, and later the introduction of a 
curfew for NGO staff, forcing them to leave camp by 4 p.m.  
Another change that was introduced after the attacks was the formal involvement 
of UNHCR in 1998, as the RTG felt that the situation became too difficult to deal 
with informally due to the deteriorating security and protractedness of the growing 
refugee problem (Lang 2001: 8-9). In contrast to many other refugee situations, 
UNHCR thus does not act as an umbrella organisation, given the fact that they only 
started working on this border more than ten years after the first NGOs arrived. 
UNHCR undertook a major registration exercise in the camps and worked with the 
Thai authorities to formalise refugee admission procedures. These were then 
applied in newly established Provincial Admission Boards (PABs), in which UNHCR 
B u r m e s e  r e f u g e e s  i n  T h a i l a n d | 76 
 
has a monitoring presence38
Thai officials do not use the term ‘refugees’ for the camp population but 
‘temporarily displaced persons’: “A ‘displaced person’ (phu opphayop) is someone 
who escapes from dangers due to an uprising, fighting or war, and enters in breach 
of the Immigration Act” (Muntharbhorn, as cited in Lang 2002: 92). This term is 
used to emphasise that their stay in Thailand will come to an end as soon as 
conditions in Burma are conducive to return. The ‘temporarily displaced persons 
fleeing fighting’ (or camp refugees) are entitled to protection and services in camp, 
as long as the conditions in Burma do not allow for repatriation. In the mean time, 
no permanent structures can be built in camp, the environmental impact must be 
minimised, and people are not allowed to leave the camp: “I just hope that the 
Karen people remaining in Burma do not have to become refugees too. We are like 
chickens, kept in a cage under the house, fenced in and being fed”
. However, these PABs regularly stop registering 
people if the provincial governor decides that no more new arrivals will be 
accepted, which results in a continuous backlog of tens of thousands of asylum 
seekers. The Foreign Affairs Division Office stated that the numbers of displaced 
Burmese arriving in the camps had to be kept at a minimum in order to adhere to 
national security concerns and to discourage any pull factors to the camps (FAD in 
JRS 2009: 18). It is thus foremost the implementation of the policy that prevents 
the realisation of protection for asylum seekers. 
39
                                                             
38 While individual cases are thus reviewed by a designated body, this is still ‘prima facie’ recognition, as 
it is not the individual circumstances of each asylum-seeker that are looked into, but the objective 
circumstances in the country or area of origin (Rutinwa 2002: 9-10). 
. Anyone caught 
outside camp is considered an illegal migrant and is subject to (often unofficial) 
deportation, regardless of whether or not they carry a UNHCR registration card. 
People who are not fleeing armed conflict but forced relocation or human rights 
abuses such as forced labour, cannot be recognised as refugees. These people 
Such a PAB consists of the following members: the governor, the deputy governor, the provincial 
military commander in chief, the provincial immigration police superintendent, the provincial border 
police superintendent, the provincial team leaders of national intelligence agency, a UNHCR 
representative, the provincial defence officer and his assistant (internal document UNHCR, April 22, 
2005). On the appeal board, there is no one from UNHCR. 
39 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae Ra Ma Luang camp, January 23, 2007. 
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(including all the Shan refugees) are thus obliged to self-settle and are simply called 
‘migrants’ (Caouette 2002; SWAN 2003; HRW 2004: 11).  
Until 2003, there was a special arrangement for urban asylum seekers, including 
Burmese political activists. They could apply to UNHCR in Bangkok or Mae Sot, who 
would then assess whether they were refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, meaning 
under the 1951 Convention. Once recognised, they were called ‘Persons of 
Concern’ (POCs) and carried UNHCR papers40. However, the RTG intensely 
pressured UNHCR to stop the RSD procedures for the Burmese from January 1, 
2004 onwards (HRW 2004) – even if UNHCR has a universal mandate to conduct 
this screening. Moreover, the RTG decided to only continue to offer protection to 
already recognised Burmese POCs if they moved to the refugee camps. The POCs 
and asylum seekers who registered with UNHCR but did not move to the camps 
were in principle considered illegal migrants from March 2005 on41. The move was 
presented as a ‘harmonisation process’, in which ‘all the Burmese refugees would 
be living together and treated the same’ (HRW 2004: 5). This suspension of RSD 
procedures presented UNHCR with a severe problem though, since new asylum 
seekers kept on arriving. As an intermediate solution, UNHCR provided them with a 
kind of slips, after which they had to wait for the Thai PABs to reconvene, as these 
provincial bodies would now decide which urban asylum seekers needed 
protection. The asylum seekers who arrived in this intermediate period – which in 
practice was between January 1, 2004 and October 15, 2005 for Tak province42
                                                             
40 All non-Burmese nationals who apply for a status with UNHCR are also called ‘POCs’, as they are not 
allowed in the refugee camps. For this caseload, UNHCR is still responsible for RSD procedures. 
 – 
were thus called ‘PAB Slip Holders’, but the slip did not protect them in any way. 
However, in 2006 it was decided that a part of the Mae Sot Slip holders also had to 
move to the camps by November 2006 (by themselves), after which they too were 
41 This was communicated very clearly but at very short notice in a ‘Notice to all Myanmar POCs’, on 
March 11, 2005. This letter is available in a press release of Human Rights Watch (2005) ‘Burmese 
democracy activists targeted by Thai government’, March 29, 2005, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/03/28/thailand-burmese-democracy-activists-targeted-thai-
government, consulted: June 30, 2009. 
42 Interview with Elizabeth Kirton, Head of UNHCR Field Office Mae Sot, January 3, 2007. These dates are 
the ones enforced in Tak province, but the exact dates will have been different in other provinces. The 
provincial governor has quite a lot of decision power in refugee matters, which explains the differences 
across provinces. 
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recognised through the PAB system. The remaining Slip holders, as well as the new 
arrivals (who again received slips from September 2007 onwards) remained 
without protection, indicating the ineffectiveness of the system (Chen Lee and 
Glaister 2008: 33). 
Another policy change in 2005 was the agreement of the Thai government with 
resettlement programmes as a form of burden-sharing by the West, which is 
currently the only durable solution available for the Burmese camp refugees. As 
this could (and does) present a pull factor, the Thai Government has in practice 
closed the gates, by refusing to register new arrivals and as such denying them 
protection. On top of that, uninformed repatriation from the camps has been 
promoted by groups affiliated with the high-level National Security Council by 
offering money to return (THB 300-600) and making returnees sign a document to 
never to flee to Thailand again43
The key agencies in the Thai refugee policy are the National Security Council ((NSC), 
highest and most powerful civilian decision-making body directly concerned with 
refugee policy), the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Border Patrol Police ((BPP), 
policing element of the MOI) and to a much lesser extent the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Lang 2002: 95-96). On the ground though, the most important actors are 
the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and special paramilitary forces (e.g. the Orsor). This large 
influence of armed forces is not so surprising in a border context which is 
constantly in a high state of security, not only due to the influxes of thousands of 
people, but also due to boundary disputes, large-scale drugs trafficking (mostly 
methamphetamines), the civil war across the border and the periodic military 
incursions resulting from that, retaliatory border closures from the Burmese side 
 – a flagrant violation of the non-refoulement 
principle. In addition, asylum seekers and even refugees have been and are 
frequently pushed back by the Thai army to the other side of the border (see for 
example USCRI 2009). All these decisions have led to a severely worsening asylum 
climate, though UNHCR is negotiating with government agencies on this matter.  
                                                             
43 Several respondents from various circles mentioned this independently from each other (NGO staff, 
CBO staff, camp management staff and refugees). I also personally met one of the NSC men in a camp 
on various occasions, but of course I was never present when a bribing move was made. 
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and these more. Thus while the official refugee policy is to a large extent decided 
by the NSC, the army’s Commander in Chief and other senior army officers usually 
have the largest authority on border issues and security, such as when decisions 
have to be made on relocations of refugee camps. Also the implementation of the 
national policies on the local level can differ greatly from the official policy, since 
regional authorities such as the Provincial Governors determine a lot in practice 
(e.g. which kind of projects humanitarian agencies can test-pilot etc.). Whatever 
has been decided at the national level is thus not necessarily carried out as such 
(for better or for worse), but is always open to local negotiation and flexibility. 
 
3.3.2 The Thai foreign labour policy and its impact on access to work for 
refugees 
 
Generally speaking, illegal entrants are not allowed to seek employment in the 
country, but for economic reasons illegal migrant workers have periodically been 
‘regularised’ through registration processes. A series of Cabinet decisions have 
allowed an increasing number of migrants from Burma, Cambodia and Lao PDR to 
work in the country. The first of these regularisation processes occurred in 1996, 
when illegal migrants could register for certain jobs in some provinces until quotas 
were filled. Yet in 1997, the economic crisis in Asia led to a conservative reaction by 
the Thai Government, resulting in mass deportations. An acute labour shortage in 
industries on the border was the consequence, as employers could not find Thai 
replacements for the Burmese workers (MAP 2007). This led to a cabinet resolution 
in 2001 which paved the way for another round of migrant registrations, this time 
without quotas, stating that: “owing to the lack of Thai workers’ willingness and 
ability to work in some hazardous jobs, (employers have been permitted) to employ 
illegal foreign workers temporarily prior to deportation” (cited in Martin 2004: 23). 
Registration thus became possible for low-skilled jobs in various sectors and 
employers were eager to register at least a part of their illegal work force in order 
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not to lose them through deportations. The (until very recently) last amnesty round 
for the registration of new migrant workers occurred in 2004, when 610,106 
Burmese people received work permits that were valid for one year (Huguet and 
Punpuing 2005: 31). Recognised refugees could not take part in this process 
though. As Muntarbhorn (2004: 24) rightly points out, there is an irony to this 
situation: “While those seeking refuge for reasons of persecution or warfare are not 
allowed to work, those who enter illegally for economic reasons are increasingly 
allowed to work. Would asylum seekers not be better off by claiming (illegal) 
migrant worker status?”.  
In December 2005, the RTG decided that registered workers could extend their 
permit, at a cost of THB 50,000 – an enormous amount, which generated a lot of 
protest from employers all over Thailand (as they, and not the people concerned, 
need to start the registration process by indicating how many foreign labourers 
they expect to need for their company). This resulted in the adaptation of the 
requested amount to the usual THB 3,800, leaving the people who had already paid 
frustrated and the others without trust in a system that keeps on changing rules. 
This led a local Thai businessman to say:  
“There is an urgent need for a clear new registration round. I paid for 
my workers and then suddenly after a few months they said we 
needed to re-register because policy changed, but I could not get any 
refund. And now for the new workers, you simply cannot register 
them. It has also a lot to do with political issues. So if the police go to 
any factory now, they can arrest people. Any factory in town”44
The consequence is that the number of registered workers went down again, not 
reflecting the actual number of foreign labourers present in Thailand: “In many 
respects the distinction between regular and irregular status is not especially 
important. In fact, both labels would apply to many of the migrants, depending on 
. 
                                                             
44 Interview with a factory owner in Mae Sot, 3 October 2007. 
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the time reference” (Huguet and Punpuing 2005: 53)45
The biggest employers of migrant workers (in terms of numbers) are the rice and 
fruit farms in the north and the rubber plantations in the south of Thailand 
(Revenga 2006: 34). In general, within their sector of employment, migrants are 
working in some of the least attractive jobs. The Burmese usually work in 
agriculture or construction or in export-oriented sectors such as processing fish 
products and textile. Certainly these sectors need cheap, foreign labour to retain 
their competitive position in the international market. The wages earned by 
migrant workers are thus usually below the minimum wages in Thailand, but there 
is hardly any control on these wages, as the Ministry of Labour (MOL) is 
understaffed and has a restricted mandate (Huguet and Punpuing 2005: 48). 
Moreover, even these low wages are still considerably higher than what these 
people would earn in their own country, which is why they accept this low 
remuneration anyway: “In Burma you can get soup for the whole family for 1,000 
kyat (about one US$, ed.). So even if you earn only THB 60 here, you can feed your 
whole family with that in Burma. There you can’t even earn 2,000 kyat per day, so it 
is difficult to feed your family. More and more people will come”
. It is thus problematic to 
look solely at the number of registered workers to indicate the real numbers of 
Burmese people outside the camps. 
46
If workers get registered, on average they tend to earn more than their non-
registered counterparts (Revenga 2006: 53). Other employee-benefits of the 
registration is that it gives them a certain legal status, as well as access to health 
services, access to the justice system and access to Thai schools for their children. 
Still, many problems remain, one of which is that their legal status remains 
ambiguous:  
. 
                                                             
45 As the (until very recently) last round of amnesty was in 2004, only workers that already had a work 
permit could re-register in 2005 and 2006. Their work permit is only valid for one year, which requires a 
re-registration, when and if this is organised. But it often happens that the re-registration only opens for 
example in May, while the old permits expire in March, pushing the employees and their employers 
again into illegality in the meantime. 
46 Interview with Karen community worker, Phop Phra village, October 2, 2007. 
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“Despite being registered with the Ministry of Interior and having 
obtained a work permit, registered migrants are still considered 
‘illegal’ according to the immigration law because they have usually 
either entered without permission or overstayed their temporary 
border passes. This leaves them open to possible harassment by 
employers, the police or other officials. Following the 2004 tsunami, 
for example, scores of migrants were deported to their native 
countries even in those cases where they had registered (many had 
lost registration papers in the wake of the disaster). Others fled 
because of fear of deportation” (Revenga 2006: 30).  
Furthermore, the registration ties the worker to the employer. If they want to 
change jobs, they only have seven days to find a new job or else they lose their 
legal status. The registration also brings the person into debt with the employer, 
and the employers will often deduct the costs of the documents from the wages. 
The registration is also only valid for one year (not longer and not seasonally), and 
is not possible in self-employment or agriculture, which is the sector in which most 
Burmese people are employed. Burmese workers cannot easily improve this 
situation as they are not allowed to form labour unions and often work in areas 
where Thai unions are hardly present. While the Labour Protection Act of 1998 
supposedly applies to all workers, including the non-registered ones, in practice the 
enforcement of this law is very weak: “It is likely that most migrant workers and the 
NGOs that assist them would claim that there is essentially no enforcement of these 
provisions of the Act for migrant workers. (…) Thailand has not signed several key 
ILO Conventions that would guarantee protection of migrant workers” (Huguet and 
Punpuing 2005: 64-65). Even if these amnesty rounds were a large step forward in 
trying to regularise the situation of thousands of needed illegal workers, at a scale 
unprecedented anywhere else in the world, many problems thus remain for the 
employees and employers alike.  
In September 2006, internal Thai politics once again led to a change in the 
migration policy. Prime Minister Thaksin was overthrown by the military, leading to 
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a caretaker government headed by General Sonthi. This interim government put a 
strong focus on national security, with Sonthi himself encouraging provinces to 
declare martial law for legal and illegal Burmese outside camp, curbing their right 
to movement, public gatherings, use of mobile phones, right to give birth inside 
Thailand and the imposition of a curfew (Bangkok Post 2007: 2)47
Of course people could try to enter Thailand legally, which would do away with 
some of the problems but the cost of obtaining a passport is prohibitively high for 
most workers due to corruption in Burma (Chantanavich et al. 2007: 13). Burmese 
ID cards on the other hand are not considered by the Thai government as a 
sufficient proof of identity for labour registration purposes (Rukumnuyakit 2009: 5). 
Also obtaining a visa is usually not possible for unskilled aliens (Lay Lee 2005: 166). 
These conditions will change in the future though, as Thailand, Burma, Cambodia 
and Lao PDR are trying to improve legal migration between their countries. 
Thailand has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with these three 
countries to match supply and demand of labour. While the MoU with Burma has 
not been implemented yet, it was said in January 2009 that it would come into 
effect in February 2010. Every Burmese migrant worker would then need to go to 
the border to register legally with Burmese officials (‘the national verification 
process’) and get a passport, instead of the current system of registrations (Hseng 
Khio Fah 2009a; CCSDPT January 21, 2009, internal document). The worker would 
also need to pay 15% of his/her wages to a repatriation fund, which will be used to 
send migrants back after their work permit expires (Rukumnuyakit 2009: 11). 
However, migrant organisations are afraid of the impact of this new system on the 
human security of the people involved and are negotiating with the MOL on the 
procedure, thus it is not yet certain how this process will be executed in practice. In 
the mean time, it was suddenly announced at the beginning of June 2009 that 
there would be a 7th and final new registration round for 19 sectors in July (the first 
.  
                                                             
47 This last aspect was added to avoid citizenship claims of children born of foreign women on Thai soil, 
but has led to a disturbing rise in unsafe abortions, as women do not have any intention to return to 
Burma to give birth and prefer to abort the unborn child instead. The prohibition regarding the use of 
mobile phones has to do with a concern that mobile phones could be used by foreigners for terrorist 
activities. 
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one since 2004) (IOM 2009). This came as a surprise, given the downturn of the 
global economy that also affects Thailand. While a few hundred Burmese workers 
had been fired at the end of 2008 and all experts feared a further downturn like in 
1997 (Lawi Weng 2009b), apparently the need for foreign employment remained 
high. As a compromise, it was decided that employers would be compelled to give 
Thai citizens priority for jobs until seven days after the vacancy announcement, 
before foreign labourers can be hired and registered (Hseng Khio Fah 2009b). 
During this registration period, border checkpoints are to be strongly tightened by 
increased patrols of police, army and navy. 
This overview makes clear that the Thai policy on foreign labour is very confusing. 
Policies on labour, migration and security constantly contradict each other. While 
illegal entrants are not allowed to work, at the employers’ request, periodical but 
unpredictable registrations of illegal workers have been organised. Moreover, 
regional economic policies encourage labour flows and the use of foreign labour is 
actively promoted in Thailand’s border zones, but the movement of workers is 
strongly discouraged, as registered workers are tied to the employer and restricted 
to a certain area, to the detriment of people’s fundamental rights. These policies 
totally contradict each other:  
“Thailand has struggled with the management of its migrant 
workforce because it lacks clear and coherent labour migration policy 
and little regular dialogue has taken place among the agencies 
involved. Moreover, there is very limited involvement of the social 
partners, i.e. workers’ and employers’ organizations, in the social 
dialogue. Even though Thailand has successfully registered a large 
number of low-skilled migrants, the policies that relate to these 
workers are inconsistent with the country’s national development 
objectives” (Rukumnuaykit 2009: 12). 
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Depending on the time of crossing and the destination in Thailand, several 
‘categories’ of Burmese can be distinguished (Huguet and Punpuing 2005: xiii; IOM 
2007; UNHCR 2007c): 
1. ‘Displaced persons fleeing fighting’ and people fleeing 
discriminatory persecution, registered with UNHCR and de facto 
treated as refugees: 117,000 (November 2008).  
2. Legally present migrants: 1,284,920 in July 2004, large majority 
Burmese (data provided by Ministry of Labour, September 2006). 
3. Legally working migrants: in the group of legally present 
migrants, 849,552 have work permits, great majority Burmese 
(data provided by IOM, August 2007). The reason for this 
discrepancy with the former category, is that the procedure to get 
a legal work permit is long, difficult and costly, which entails that 
not all registered migrants continue this process. 
4. Illegal migrant workers: totalling up to 816,000 in 2001 
according to the Ministry of Labour, but real number unknown. 
5. Burmese people who hold (coloured48
Since the statistics on the ‘migrant workers’ do not account for their families and 
the numbers of illegal people and people with Thai identity cards are unknown, it 
can reasonably be estimated that there are at least two million Burmese people in 
Thailand
) Thai identity cards. 
Number unknown.  
49
                                                             
48 Depending on the colour of the card, the holder has the right to temporarily or permanently reside in 
a village, or travel in a district or province. In exceptional cases, the holder has the right to move all over 
the country. These coloured cards are normally intended for Thai hill tribe people, such as the Karen, 
Lisu and Lahu, who have lived in Thailand for generations. 
. The Burmese diaspora thus makes up a significant minority in a country 
with a total population of 65 million (NESDB 2006). About 135,000 people from this 
49 In fact, UNHCR admits that there are 3.5 million persons of concern in Thailand of which they do not 
know the location, which is the figure of stateless persons in Thailand (consisting of Thai hill tribe 
populations, ‘immigrants’ and their descendants) (UNHCR 2009). 
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group are residing in one of the nine official refugee camps50
 
. All the others are 
living outside camp, either legally (categories 2, 3 and 5 above), or more likely 
illegally. People can quickly find themselves in the illegal group if they violate 
travel- or employer-related restrictions of their permit, or if policy changes without 
their knowing. 
3.4. Refugees in camp and migrants outside camp? The 
migration-asylum nexus on the Thai- Burmese border. 
 
Although both the Thai Government and the NGOs keep a clear distinction 
between ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’, the division is less clear in the field: both groups 
work, despite the fact that refugees are supposed to be confined to the camp, and 
the term ‘migrants’ disguises the fact that the great majority of them had no option 
of staying in their home country. The following quotes are fractions from life 
histories of so-called ‘migrants’ in Thailand, living outside the camps. 
 
“I arrived in Thailand 17 years ago. I used to be a farmer in Burma, 
but during the war, the SPDC forced me to do portering. My land was 
taken away by the DKBA. I came to this village and ever since my 
arrival I earn some money by selling snacks. I can’t go to camp 
because my children go to the Thai school here. I can’t get an identity 
card, so I have been deported to Myawaddy six times since I arrived. I 
just come back every time. Life is simple for us. We are illegal, thus 
                                                             
50 According to UNHCR’s figures at the end of 2008, there were close to 117,000 officially registered 
refugees while the Thai Burma Border Consortium’s feeding figure at that time (November 2008) for the 
nine main camps was around 135,000. The reason for the discrepancy is that the population is 
constantly in flux, with people moving in and out of camp for work or resettlement, while new arrivals 
keep flowing in. Also not all residents, for one reason or another, register in camp, while the UNHCR 
statistics count everyone registered with them and falling under the ‘person fleeing fighting’ and 
Convention definition, regardless of place of settlement. The feeding figures on the other hand correct 
for flows inside and outside camp monthly and are thus the most accurate indication of actual camp 
populations. 
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that is how it works. At least here we don’t have to flee soldiers all the 
time or do portering”. 
(Interview with Karen Muslim man (sic), Tha Son Yang, November 14, 
2007) 
“I was a kind of medic for the KNU. I did not want to but our village 
had to give them four people and my family did not have enough 
money to pay them off. So I had to go. I worked for them from 1980 
until 1994. But they did not give enough food to my wife and family, 
so every time I came home I had to cut wood and find vegetables for 
them. After all those years, I had done my duty. They still wanted me 
to come back but I refused. (...) We try to work on our land across the 
border, but only when it is safe. If we would not go once in a while, 
the soldiers would seize our land. We do contract labour for a firm in 
Mae Sot now. It is very hard though; some years we don’t have profit 
at all, and can’t buy salt or chillies”. 
(Interview with Karen man, Mi Klo Khi, February 7, 2007) 
 “I was a trader, so I travelled a lot across the border, but the SPDC 
accused me of connections with a rebel group, so I had to flee. I tried 
to stay in the refugee camp but we did not receive rations and after 
we had spent all our money, we had to leave. Why didn’t you receive 
rations? Because you need connections; relatives who can introduce 
you to the section leader. If they don’t care about you, you don’t 
receive rations”. 
 (Interview with Muslim man, Mae Sot, 2 December 2006) 
 
Push factors almost always stem from interlinked political and economic root 
causes in Burma (migration-asylum nexus). Although the final trigger may be a form 
of extreme poverty, the root causes of the displacement are political and military. 
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They are all fleeing a pervasive climate of insecurity, human rights abuses, loss of 
livelihood options51 and often a lack of protection from the military government52
Furthermore, the law in Burma permits the junta to strip citizens from their 
nationality if they have been away for one year or even shorter, regardless of the 
reason they left the country (Lay Lee 2005: 158). Burmese people can also cease to 
be citizens “for trading or communicating with an enemy organisation or member 
of an organisation hostile to the state; committing an act likely to endanger the 
sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquillity; showing 
disaffection or disloyalty to the state by act or speech” (Lay Lee 2005: 158). Many of 
the Burmese in Thailand are thus bound to be stateless
. 
53
Also at destination sites the distinction between migrants and refugees is often 
difficult to make. Regardless of the original reason or the level of preparation for 
their flight, people tend to go to places with economic opportunities. Even the 
people who fled because of the war would need a job in the host country, to take 
, either because they have 
not been in the country for a long time, or because they are seen as rebel 
sympathizers if they reside in camp. In addition, any person can be facing lengthy 
jail sentences upon deportation to Burma (penalisation for re-entry), which makes 
return dangerous for many: “A Rohingya youth was sentenced to five and-a-half 
years in prison by a Maungdaw court on June 13, on the orders of Burma’s border 
security force, on allegation of crossing the Burma-Bangladesh border” (Kaladan 
News 2008). This sentence is based on SPDC regulation 367/120-(b) (1) which 
states that illegal emigration carries a sentence of up to seven years’ imprisonment 
(HRW 2004: 13). 
                                                             
51 If people are faced with a complete loss of livelihood opportunities, they have no option to remain, 
which is why this kind of migration can be called ‘distress or survival migration’ (South 2006). 
52 The UNHCR makes the difference between a migrant and a refugee as follows: “A migrant usually 
leaves his/her country voluntarily, to seek a better life. To a refugee, the economic conditions of the 
country of asylum are less important than its safety. In practice, the distinction may be sometimes 
difficult to establish, but it is fundamental: a migrant enjoys the protection of his/her home government; 
a refugee doesn’t” (UNHCR 2001: 120). 
53 This refers to de jure statelessness as the person finds itself to be without a nationality (Lay Lee 2005: 
112-113). The refugees are also de facto stateless as they can no longer count on their state of origin for 
protection, even in the case that they did retain their nationality. 
It is therefore not surprising that Thailand hosted the largest number of stateless persons in the world in 
2008, consisting of both hill tribe populations and ‘immigrants’ and their descendants, mostly Burmese: 
3.5 million out of 6.5 million stateless persons worldwide (UNHCR 2009: table 7). 
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care of themselves and family members left behind. Also refugees will thus try to 
maximise their welfare within the opportunities presented by the immigration and 
refugee regime (Lindley 2008: 7). Both refugees and migrants might thus live in a 
town, work in factories, send remittances to family members, etc. Therefore not 
only the causes of the flight are intermingled, but also the lives in exile tend to be 
very similar. 
Why would refugees decide to bypass refugee camps and self-settle, if they could 
receive protection and assistance inside camp? On what basis do they make that 
decision (mentioned as a research gap in Napier-Moore (2005))? The most 
important reasons mentioned in interviews were the desire to work and to remain 
the master of one’s own life. This is the freedom that self-settlement and local 
integration give to a refugee, in contrast to refugee camps: “The ‘enjoyment of 
rights’ is often touted as a measure, assessed through welfare indicators – access to 
food, health, education, employment, etc. But this may be missing much of the 
point of how refugees experience local integration. The freedom to act politically 
and strategically, i.e. the ‘freedom to pursue normal lives’ (Smith 2004: 38), may be 
the much more important criterion. The main tragedy of warehousing is the 
constraint of this freedom” (Polzer 2008: 17). Other explanations that were given 
for living outside camp were the desire to trace family back home and keep in 
contact with them (which is very difficult from inside the remote camps) or having 
family in a Thai village prior to arrival. Some people also chose to live in town 
because they originated from cities and knew how to survive there, or had social 
networks that connected them to Thai cities rather than camps, which partly 
explains the low percentage of urban people in the rural-based refugee camps: 4% 
(Oh et al. 2006: 49).  
Refugee camps may also be by-passed because there is simply a lack of knowledge 
on the existence of the camps (and in several cases the current camps did not exist 
yet upon entry of respondents in Thailand) or of the procedure of entrance into the 
refugee camps:  
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“People who objectively qualify for refugee status under domestic or 
international law may have no direct exposure to anyone who can 
inform them of their rights and guide them through the asylum 
process. As a result, many would-be (or should-be) refugees simply do 
not apply for asylum. Secondly, even those who know their rights may 
have difficulty in finding the appropriate individual or office to file a 
claim. The absence of immigration offices in areas where someone 
lives may make it too expensive (in time and transport) to apply. For 
those without proper documentation, travelling also exposes them to 
the risk of discovery by immigration officials or other problems with 
the local police” (Landau 2004: 8).  
Other refugees feared entering the camps because they belong to a different 
ethnic, religious or rebel group, as seven out of nine camps are under the influence 
of the Karen rebels and their Christian leaders, while the remaining two are under 
the influence of the Karenni rebels (the KNPP). For example, for people associated 
with the breakaway factions of the KNU (the DKBA and the 7th battalion/Peace 
Council) life in the camps can be really hard and even dangerous54, with tatmadaw 
deserters being in the most precarious position of all: “My biggest concern is for 
the SPDC deserters. They are not black or white, they don’t fit in anywhere, fall 
between all groups. In camp they can get killed”55
                                                             
54 When Huay Kalok camp was burnt down by the DKBA in 1998, the camp was relocated to the current 
Umpiem camp. However, many of the DKBA-related refugees feared the high presence of the KNU in 
Umpiem and the political tensions that would come with it. Therefore, they started working as daily 
labourers in the surroundings of the old camp (Email conversation with NGO staff member in Mae Sot, 
June 25, 2008).  
. Religion is an influential factor 
as well. While about 15 to 20% of the Karen are estimated to be Christian 
(Thawnghmung 2008: 3), they are overrepresented in camp, where they consist 
about half of the population. As neither the SPDC nor the DKBA targets populations 
A more recent example of the KNU influence on the camps is an assassination in Mae La camp in 2008. 
The KNU had to endure a breakaway faction in 2007, namely the 7th Brigade/Peace Council, which led to 
severe attacks of the KNU on this faction. Moreover, one of the leaders of the Peace Council was killed 
by a bomb blast, believed to be carried out by the KNU (Mc Cartan 2008; Saw Yan Naing 2008a). Even if 
it has not been proven, it is widely believed that members of the Peace Council have in revenge killed 
Mahn Sha, the General Secretary of the KNU, in his home close to Mae Sot. As a reaction to that high-
level assassination, another member of the Peace Council who lived in Mae La camp was killed. 
55 Interview with NGO staff member, Mae Sot, December 9, 2007. 
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on the sole basis of religion, the only reasonable explanation for this finding is that 
connections with Christian powerholders are important in getting access to the 
camp. Also money can be an obstacle. Even to get in camp, people need sufficient 
cash for transport and to bribe at checkpoints on the road, or to pay traffickers or 
the KNU to get through the checkpoints (THB 4000 with KNU)56
An external factor influencing the choice of residence is the changing policy of the 
RTG. At the end of 2005, the RTG decided to end all processing of asylum requests, 
as they (rightly) feared that the establishment of resettlement programmes for 
camp refugees would create an additional pull factor. As a result, all new arrivals 
(registered with UNHCR after October 15, 2005 or not registered) are obliged to 
self-settle as well. 
.  
“I come from Mon State. I was an SPDC soldier. After ten years in the 
army you are allowed to leave, so I did, and I went to work in 
Thailand. When I saved enough money, I went back but I was accused 
of desertion by the SPDC and put in prison for seven years. The 
moment I got out, I fled to Thailand and I applied to UNHCR in 
November 2005, but apparently that was too late. Can you help me? I 
have a UNHCR slip, but they have not even interviewed me yet. I am a 
real refugee, I really cannot go back. They told me I would be able to 
go to Nu Poh camp next time, but I don’t know when that is. And I do 
not have the contacts to go to camp now”. 
(Interview with Muslim political refugee, Mae Sot, December 2, 2006) 
This touches upon an important problem of the process of refugee recognition. 
While people can pre-register as asylum seekers, it can take years before the 
Provincial Admission Boards meet up to recognise them as refugees (as explained 
in Section 3.3.1). In the mean time, even if they get in camp, there is a problem 
with assistance for asylum seekers. They need to register with the section leader in 
camp to get rations, who then reports the figure of new arrivals to the camp 
                                                             
56 Interview with NGO staff member, Mae Sot, December 9, 2007. 
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committee. These figures are then verified by local NGO staff, before rations are 
given. But if there are too many new arrivals (the backlog for Tak province alone 
stands at 45,000 people in October 2008), only the most vulnerable people get 
assistance57
Last but not least, some ethnic groups, notably the Shan, are not allowed in the 
camps because they are ethnically related to the local population and thus 
supposed to be able to take care of themselves. Unofficially, it is common 
knowledge that the RTG is counting the Shan as illegal migrants because their 
numerousness would make Thailand’s number of refugees explode
. If an asylum seeker does not belong to that group, he/she needs 
either connections or bribe money to survive in camp.  
58
Given all these different causes that lead to self-settlement, it is not surprising that 
a study by International Rescue Committee (IRC) (1,704 respondents) revealed that 
30 to 50 % of the self-settled population (depending on location) fled for the exact 
same reasons as the camp population did and were therefore eligible for refugee 
status (Green et al. 2008). However, I would argue that the actual percentage of 
Burmese ‘migrants’ in need of international protection and recognition is likely to 
be even higher than 50%. After all, this IRC study did not take into account that a 
number of populations, such as the Rohingya Muslims and all the children born in 
Thailand, are de jure stateless. Secondly, they did not include mixed (Burmese and 
Thai) Karen villages into the sample, where people might be better integrated into 
Thai society but nonetheless fled because of the war. And thirdly, the 
questionnaire did not probe for additional information when people said they left 
Burma because they were poor. In contrast, more open interviews would often 
have revealed that the reasons for that poverty were precisely the war, 
discrimination, forced labour, arbitrary taxes, etc. (as was the case in my own 
interviews).  
. 
                                                             
57 Email conversation with NGO staff member based in Mae Sot, November 2, 2008. 
58 Apparently, a registration process had started for the Shan before 2005, with funding from the 
Japanese government, but the process was abandoned when the number reached over 700,000 (Email 
conversation with NGO staff member based in Bangkok, June 23, 2009). 
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According to international refugee law, the causes of the flight determine who is a 
refugee, and not the choice of residence in the host country. The analysis above 
makes clear that the strict dichotomy between ‘refugees in camp’ and ‘economic 
migrants outside camp’ can seriously be questioned. The camps are simply not 
always able to perform their key function, namely providing an asylum space for 
everyone who needs it. Therefore, it was decided to use the term ‘self-settled 
refugees’ in this study for the substantial number of Burmese citizens outside the 
refugee camps, even if it is acknowledged that different subgroups within this 
population have divergent protection needs (highest for political refugees). The 
Burmese people have actually developed their own term for Burmese refugees in 
need of protection outside camp, namely ‘Externally Displaced People’, in analogy 
to ‘Internally Displaced People’. However, I decided to use the term ‘self-settled 
refugee’, as is common in academic refugee literature. This entails that all Burmese 
people in Thailand are called ‘refugees’ in this study, in contrast with the legal 
categorisation. The only exception to this rule is when policy is discussed, as self-
settled refugees are affected by the Thai government’s migration policy that 
defines them as (illegal) ‘migrants’ and ‘migrant workers’.  
In the following sections, the specific conditions and power structures within and 
outside refugee camps will be compared. 
 
3.5 Being a refugee on the Thai- Burmese border: setting 
the scene 
3.5.1 Refugee camps 
 
The refugee camps are spread all along the border and are roughly divided by 
ethnic groups. The four Mon camps (‘resettlement sites’) are on the Burma side of 
the border across Kanchanaburi province (9,367 refugees), the two Karenni camps 
are in Mae Hong Son province (23,426 refugees), and the other seven camps are 
Karen camps, one in Ratchaburi province (7,564 refugees), one in Kanchanaburi 
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province (4,437 refugees), three in Tak province (70,410 refugees) and two in Mae 
Hong Son province, right on the border with Tak (32,484 refugees) (TBBC 2008b: 5).  
The terrain is generally mountainous and heavily forested. Some of the camps are 
surrounded by barbed wire, and most are located in very remote regions, just a few 
kilometres from the border. They are divided in zones, sections and blocks of ten 
households, each with their own leaders. The houses of the refugees are built in 
bamboo with a leaf roof (non-permanent material), purchased of local suppliers. 
On the positive side, these local materials give a village-like feel to the camps, but 
the bamboo houses are often located very close to each other, which makes 
privacy an impossible luxury.  
 
Mae La Oon camp 
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The coordination between the different camps is done by ethnic refugee 
committees (RC), who are responsible for relief assistance coordination and liaising 
with NGOs, UN agencies, the RTG and security personnel (TBBC 2008: 56). They are 
the overall representatives of the people from their ethnic group living in the 
refugee camps. Each refugee committee maintains an office in the nearest Thai 
town to the refugee camps. The Mon National Relief Committee (MNRC) maintains 
an office in Sangklaburi, the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) in Mae Sot and the 
Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) in Mae Hong Son.  
Within each camp, an elected camp committee is responsible for the 
administration and management of the camp. They oversee the distribution of 
rations and the maintenance of the camp as well as ensure law and order, together 
with civilian security guards. The security around the camp and the control of the 
entry gates to the camp is provided by Thai military forces. Of course, all of these 
people (elected or appointed) and the ethnic army leaders are in a relative power 
position vis-a-vis ‘common’ refugees and corruption is widespread, which the 
following fragment illustrates: “If you have a problem, who would you go to? To no 
one. Even if you tell the leader, they do not do anything, unless you pay them. And 
then like yesterday, I got a visit from a camp friend, and the security guard arrested 
him, and we had to pay THB 200 to get him out. Nor we, nor our friend know why 
he was arrested. They have the power, they do what they want”59
                                                             
59 Interview with Karen refugee in Mae La camp, December 21, 2006. 
. Access to justice 
is thus not always assured. In spite of the formal judicial structures, the most 
common method for dispute resolution is a hearing, in which all the parties are 
listened to and the section leader or a member of the camp committee then tries 
to mediate and negotiate (IRC 2006). In contrast to common findings in other 
refugee situations, the elders thus lost their conflict-mediating role in exile to 
people connected to the camp management system (who are very powerful as 
they distribute rations). Social positions have thus been renegotiated in exile. Cases 
only very rarely go to Thai courts, even if this is normally required for severe crimes 
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such as rape or murder, and there is generally a lack of legal knowledge and 
capacity of all stakeholders (IRC 2006). In response to these findings, a ‘Legal 
Assistance Project’ has been set up in several camps to improve access to justice 
for camp refugees, but the process is very difficult as it challenges the traditional 
authority of the rebel organisations and their law and order. This is also seen in 
other areas of development that would entail cultural, social and perhaps political 
change: “This is best illustrated by the fact that there are no Karenni NGOs within 
the refugee community. There are government departments, women’s groups, 
youth groups and church groups (all affiliated with the government) (…) but NGOs 
are not yet present, perhaps because it is feared that they may call the reigning 
political authority into question” (Demusz 1998: 238).  
Next to this issue, people living in refugee camps have livelihood problems, which 
are not unique to this case: “The attempts that refugees themselves undertake to 
develop sustainable livelihoods are often obstructed in these camps by the fact that 
they have limited freedom of movement, no access to land or capital, or are obliged 
to work for exploitative wages. In general, refugees have very limited livelihoods-
related rights. (...) Furthermore, a hand-out approach is common in most of these 
camps, where in the absence of sound and sustainable economic alternatives 
refugees are forced to live on food rations, though these rations do not provide 
them with sufficient means to make a living” (Horst 2006a: 6). Camp refugees in 
protracted refugee situations also have limited civil and political rights, limited legal 
rights and limited freedom of choice. In the words of Jeff Crisp, Director of the 
UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service (2003: 11): “The right to life has 
been bought at the cost of almost every other right”. Thailand is no exception to 
this picture. While camp refugees receive rations and have access to services such 
as education and health care, they have little rights and are not allowed to leave 
the camp to supplement their rations. In practice they do leave to find daily work 
though, as will be explained in Chapter 4 on livelihoods.  
A side-effect of the concentration of large numbers of Karen(ni) people in the 
camps is the rise in Karen(ni) nationalism (see also Thawnghmung 2008):  
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“For most ordinary citizens in the border zones, ‘national’ political 
aspirations remain far from their day-to-day livelihood struggles. (...) 
But the very act of becoming a ‘refugee’ immediately exposes 
distinctive ethnic subgroups and cultures to others who also live in the 
territory called ‘Kayah/Karenni State’ but with whom they had limited 
contact prior to entering the camps. (...) The shared experiences (...) 
have helped to create a new historical sense of collective 
uprootedness that makes people more receptive to notions of 
‘togetherness’ such as ‘common identity’ and ‘homeland’”(Grundy-
War and Wong 2002: 109).  
This nationalism is also clear in the curriculum of the Karen camp schools, through 
which children are taught about an idealised Karen homeland, ‘Kawthoolei’. This 
Karen curriculum in camp, established with foreign help, diverges so much from the 
Burmese government one, that it is impossible to re-integrate these Karen refugee 
children into the Burmese system, but on the other hand it is not adapted to the 
Thai system either (separatist education system (South 2008: 96))60
                                                             
60 Various authors mention how education becomes even more important after displacement because it 
is a movable asset (Vincent and Sorensen 2001: 273-274; Dryden-Peterson, as cited in Horst 2006a: 8), 
but as Horst (2006a) mentions, whether education is really of value depends on the curriculum, the 
language of instruction, the certification and the quality of the education. Education needs to prepare 
the pupils for a life in either the country of origin, the host country or a third country. Neither of these 
options is currently aimed for. On the other hand, the fact that Karen children even come from inside 
Burma to follow education in the camps indicates that the quality is considered better than across the 
border. 
. Refugee 
children are pushed to learn S’ghaw Karen language, to the detriment of Burmese 
and Pwo Karen. The reason for that is that the official education in Burma is 
compulsory in Burmese, which is an important grievance of the ethnic politicians, 
but by strongly focusing on Karen language and history in the camps, “ethnic 
nationalist education policies mirror the regime’s discouragement of the teaching of 
minority languages and histories from minority perspectives in central Burma” (Fink 
2003: 4). In addition, children are obliged to wear Karen traditional clothing in 
school to re-stress their roots (as witnessed in Nu Poh camp), and whenever 
festivals are held, the Karen national anthem is sung. Even children who have never 
been in Burma thus dream of return and constantly draw Karen flags, visualising 
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their lost land and mimicking the nostalgia of their parents and teachers. As a 
result, the idea of many ethnic nationalist leaders that one’s ethnicity is the most 
fundamental form of political identification is reproduced in exile, posing a serious 
challenge to people of ‘mixed blood’ and to any kind of cooperation in which 
ethnicity does not play a role (Fink 2003). Such as rise in ethnic nationalism is not 
exceptional in cases of mass influx, certainly if the ethnic element played a major 
role in the conflict, potential trauma and subsequent displacement (see for 
example Durieux (2000: 7) on Hutu nationalism of Burundian refugees in Tanzania). 
Certainly the Karen, but also most of the other ethnic minorities from Burma in 
Thailand, are thus ‘a diaspora’, as they satisfy the four criteria put forward in the 
diaspora definition by Bakewell (2008b: 5):  
o movement from an original homeland to more than one country, either 
forced or voluntary 
o a collective myth of an ideal ancestral homeland 
o a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time 
o a sustained network of social relationships with members living in other 
settlement countries. 
Another important element in Karen nationalism is Christianity, as all the KNU 
leaders and most camp committee leaders are Christian, which leads to tensions 
with non-Christians (e.g. Muslims in Mae La camp). This is not surprising of course 
as refugees carry a particular baggage with them from Burma, characterised by 
inter-ethnic but also inter-religious (e.g. KNU-DKBA) tensions as well as certain 
racist feelings towards Chinese and Indians; Muslim people are often called 
‘Indians’ or ‘Bengali’, because their skin is more black, even if they have lived in 
Burma for generations. This baggage is often ignored as the complex identities of a 
person are reduced to one: that of a refugee (Horst 2006c: 14). These tensions and 
the distrust nonetheless exist at all levels, as the following extract from an 
interview with the KRC vice-chairman demonstrates: “Burmese (Burman, ed.) 
people tend to feel better than ethnic minority people, it is not just the SPDC. If they 
do not feel the same level as us, then we cannot negotiate with them. (...) 
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Foreigners came to talk to us about resettlement and I warned them: ‘Be careful. 
You accept all these people but all young Muslim people are extremists!’”61. The 
result of these tensions is a differential access to goods and services for non-
Christians. While better representation of the minority groups in this context would 
do away with this differential access (but not with the root causes), the prevalent 
feeling is that this venue is blocked: “Yes, there are tensions between different 
religious groups and between Karen and non-Karen. That is why we applied for 
resettlement. We cannot do anything to improve our situation as the camp leader 
doesn’t do anything if we come to him with problems. He is Karen and Christian. 
There is religious discrimination. We cannot propose candidates for elections, only 
Karen people can. (...) The section leaders are Karen too. They don’t speak Burmese 
and I don’t speak Karen. And that also means that we never understand it if there is 
any news, we never know what is going on. There are not many Burmans here, so if 
we have a problem, we just talk to each other”62
The KNU and KNPP thus do have quite some presence and leverage in the camps, 
which is both a tactical and practical choice. On the tactics side, the contact with 
outsiders through the refugee camps can increase the rebels’ legitimacy: “The 
elicitation of outsiders’ understanding, support, assistance and, ultimately, 
legitimation, is crucial to the KNPP. In forging relationships with outsiders, be they 
NGOs, governmental representatives, or interested individuals, the KNPP attempts 
simultaneously to secure international assistance for humanitarian, educational 
and political purposes, and to raise international awareness of the Karenni situation 
and political aspirations. In pursuing the second objective, the KNPP manages to 
raise with outsiders its own general profile, and in pursuing both, but especially the 
first objective, to strengthen its own authority and legitimacy amongst the insider 
refugee population” (Dudley 2003: 26). Having a strong presence in the camps is 
. These tensions with the Christian 
power holders do not mean that there is no freedom of religion in the camps. 
There is, which is demonstrated by the existence of mosques and temples, next to 
numerous churches. 
                                                             
61 Interview with Saw Tahma Weh, KRC vice-chairman, KRC office, Mae Sot, December 14, 2006. 
62 Interview with Buddhist Burman refugee, Mae La camp, December 22, 2006. 
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also a practical choice, as it safeguards resting soldiers, and ensures that soldiers do 
not have to worry about their families, as these are taken care of. Refugee camps 
are thus humanitarian sanctuaries, but there is no large-scale ‘refugee warrior’ 
phenomenon and manipulation of humanitarian aid as was the case for example in 
the refugee situation on the Thai- Lao and Thai-Cambodian borders in the past. 
Even if the combatants move in and out of the camps, recruitment has 
undoubtedly occasionally taken place, and some of the aid items make their way to 
insurgents’ bases, “there was neither the scale nor the opportunity for major 
corruption in the distributions of relief in the Burmese camps, and the refugee 
camps in themselves were not critical bases to the war” (Lang 2002: 92). 
In sum, registered camp refugees are relatively well-off in terms of protection and 
access to services, but are limited in terms of freedom of choice and livelihoods 
rights. They encounter a vast network of power relations upon entry in the camp as 
well as increasing nationalism as encampment becomes more protracted. 
 
3.5.2 Self-settlement 
 
The context in which self-settled refugees find themselves is substantially different 
than the one of camp refugees. Self-settled refugees live all over the country, but 
the largest concentrations can be found in the provinces close to the border with 
Burma, both in cities and in rural areas. In the rural areas of Tak province, the 
Burmese live in between the Thai/hill tribe populations. They tend to integrate 
quite well if their hosts are ethnically related, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
In contrast, refugees in cities such as Mae Sot tend to live centred in certain areas, 
with only occasional intermixing at work or when accessing services. 
Another contrast with the camp refugees, is that there are hardly any 
(international) NGOs targeting aid for self-settled refugees. Therefore, the power 
structures that self-settled refugees encounter are vastly different than the ones in 
camp: there is no effect of any kind of camp management with power over rations, 
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no controlling power of rebels or security guards, etc.: “Camps are like a kingdom 
with its own government. Migrants on the other hand are more independent and 
can form their own networks. They debate in their community on issues such as 
whether or not to integrate, they have the choice. The power structures outside 
camp are healthier”63
Within Tak province, an important exception to this picture would be Mae Sot, 
where the KNU and DKBA have quite a presence, and where plenty of CBOs have 
been formed. In areas in the close surroundings of Mae Sot, the KYO (youth wing of 
KNU) for example organises elections for community leaders, and people feel 
obliged to pay ‘voluntary donations’/taxes. On the positive side, refugees can 
appeal to these community leaders or the KYO/KNU in case of severe problems, 
who can then ensure some kind of law and order by negotiating and/or punishing 
the perpetrators. Here, the ethnic power structures are thus still felt. Also for ‘civil’ 
activists (who usually have close contacts with political groups), ethnic power 
structures remain important.  
. In general, there tends to be less nationalism, which can be 
attributed both to the non-concentration and to the fact that schooling is very 
different outside the camps: either in Thai schools or in mixed ethnic schools which 
are taught in Burmese. The power holders in their context would rather be newly 
elected village headmen, Thai local leaders and local law enforcement personnel, 
as well as their employers in case of wage labour. For Muslims, imams play a large 
role as well. Compared to inside the camp, there are less channels for self-settled 
refugees to participate in decision-making, due to their illegality and the absence of 
structures to involve them. 
Power structures from inside Burma may also endure in another way, namely if 
communities left together and still live together in Thailand, with the former 
leaders still performing their function. However, very few of these examples exist. 
During this research, only one was encountered in a factory in Mae Sot: “TK factory 
here in Mae Sot has 5,000 employees. One of the worker’s mothers became a 
broker, and convinced her whole village to come here. They are easy to control, 
                                                             
63 Interview with staff member of MAP Foundation, Chiang Mai, July 10, 2006. 
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since the community controls itself. They have to work from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. and if 
there are big orders sometimes until 3 a.m. And this 6 days on 7. Normally people 
don’t do this, but then the broker says: ‘Remember how you didn’t have a good 
place to stay in Burma, no work, etc. So you should do well here’. So there is a lot of 
pressure from the community to obey. We received complaints from pretty much 
any factory in town, but not from any employee there, strange no?” (Interview with 
Moe Swe, Director of Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association, Mae Sot, October 7, 
2007). 
Most of the self-settled refugees are entirely dependent upon their own skills and 
networks to survive. Their access to services is limited, due to a lack of targeted 
NGO assistance and UNHCR protection, and a discontinuous access to Thai services. 
The livelihood strategies that they develop to cope with this situation are obviously 
very different in rural areas than in urban areas, and will be discussed in detail in 
the following chapter. Despite their inventive strategies, the lives of self-settled 
refugees can be very hard. Indeed, the consequences of a ‘choice’ for self-
settlement are extensive. There is the constant threat of arrest and deportation, as 
well as harassment by both Thai civilians and police. Deportation is seen as a way 
to deter people from coming to Thailand, but the reality is that repatriation is 
neither a safe nor a viable option for most Burmese in Thailand, and many will 
return to Thailand as soon as possible. Deportations occur regardless of UNHCR 
registration as everyone outside camp is considered an illegal migrant. Even if the 
great majority of these deportations are informal, they do harm the people 
involved:  
“The person is at risk of being detected by the Burmese authorities 
and also is at risk of abuses such as trafficking if they attempt to re-
cross the border back into Thailand. (...) UNHCR reported that 
occasionally its office hears of reports of the Burmese military 
committing atrocities against returnees” (WCRWC 2006a: 14).  
“The returns to Myanmar are usually ‘informal’ in the sense that the 
deportees are taken to unofficial border crossings and permitted 
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simply to walk across the border in areas controlled by friendly ethnic 
factions. In fact, many of the migrants who are returned this way 
make their way back into Thailand within a few days. Because of 
these facts, UNHCR considers that the deportations do not constitute 
de facto refoulement, although they could be de jure refoulement” 
(Huguet and Punpuing 2005: 14).  
It is an odd argument though, not to see this as de facto deportation and 
refoulement, only because officials on both sides are corrupt enough to allow 
refugees with sufficient money to re-cross into Thailand. Often the person returns 
to Thailand burdened with greater debt, from having to bribe officials on both sides 
on the border, they might lose their job for not showing up at work in time, and it 
bolsters corruption at the local level.  
As a result of this continuous fear of arrest64
 
, self-settled refugees cannot get any 
redress for injustice done to them. At one occasion, a refugee was shot in the 
stomach by a bored Thai youngster in front of the guesthouse where I was staying. 
He survived the attack but going to the police was not an option for this 
unregistered man and he lost his job due to the long recovery process. Atrocities 
like these are not exceptional (Hamilton 2003), and impossible to fight against by 
the victims because they are illegal: “Those who do not fit the criteria are just 
irregular migrants who, because they lack a legal status, have no rights at all” 
(Essed and Wesenbeek 2004: 54). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
64 This fear is very real. To give an idea, in 2000 alone, 444,636 illegal foreign workers were arrested in 
Thailand, according to statistics of the NSC (Toyota 2006: 2). 
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Table 3: Comparison of refugees inside and outside of camps 
 
 CAMP REFUGEES SELF-SETTLED 
REFUGEES 
Legal Status  ‘Temporarily displaced 
person’/’Person of 
Concern’. 
Illegal (undocumented) 
migrant. 
Location Concentration in 9 camps, 
spread along the border. 
Concentration in several 
urban centres, but 
widely spread in rural 
areas. 
Protection Protection and recognition 
by UNHCR. 
No protection or 
recognition (with the 
exception of a small 
urban caseload). 
Assistance Receive assistance in the 
form of food rations and 
services, provided by 
NGOs and funded by 
UNHCR and donors. 
Receive hardly any NGO 
assistance. Some 
support in areas 
surrounding Mae Sot 
and Chiang Mai. 
Security Relative security inside 
camp but warehoused. 
Constant insecurity but 
more autonomy. 
Freedom of 
movement 
No freedom of movement, 
although in practice this is 
condoned as long as local 
military and police can 
benefit from it. Once 
outside, subject to arrest 
No freedom of 
movement (although a 
bit better if registered 
as migrant worker or hill 
tribe person) although 
in practice this is 
condoned as long as 
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and deportation. 
 
local military and police 
can benefit from it.  
Subject to arrest (at 
checkpoints and 
targeted raids at 
factories and areas 
where they tend to live) 
and deportation. 
Economic activity No official access to 
remunerated 
employment, except for 
NGO and camp 
management jobs. 
Access to (illegal) 
employment, albeit 
dependent on location, 
skills and contacts. 
Justice system Combination of traditional 
and Thai justice system 
(for serious crimes).  
Legal Aid Centres. 
In and around Mae Sot 
large influence of ethnic 
Karen network. No such 
influence further away. 
Only access to Thai 
justice system if 
registered. 
Durable solutions Access to resettlement 
programmes.  
No official access to 
durable solutions. 
Social remittances Most do not have contact 
with family members (if 
contact, by oral message 
or phone).  
More contact with 
family members 
(sporadic travel, phone, 
oral message).  
Financial remittances Usually only influential 
refugees send and receive 
Sending of remittances 
depends on age, 
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remittances, but the 
situation is changing due 
to resettlement 
programmes.  
condition of parents, 
other senders to 
parents and whether or 
not respondent has a 
family of his own to 
support. Very few 
receive remittances. 
 
While in these sections I have described the ‘Ideal Type’ of households living in one 
settlement option, in practice families can split up permanently or occasionally (e.g. 
seasonally). Family-splitting is the most efficient risk diversification strategy for 
displaced people (Lubkemann 2000a): “Refugee households and communities are 
often only able to survive by strategically placing members inside and outside 
camps, with the most vulnerable ones inside in order to minimise risks and profit 
from food and non food rations” (Horst 2006a: 7)65
The next chapter will analyse in detail the livelihood strategies of refugees in both 
settlement options, and it will be made clear how the structural context influences 
their options. 
. Thus even if the idea of this 
study was to compare refugees in and outside camp, and have these function as 
control groups for each other, this only worked to a certain extent because of the 
continuous inter-mixing of these two populations. These two categories may exist 
on paper, but the reality is very much blurred. 
 
                                                             
65 The term ‘family- splitting’ has also been used in other cases to denote refugee families who split up 
within the camp to maximise rations (Crisp 2003: 21), but that is not what is meant by it in this book. 
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CHAPTER 4:  DISPLACED LIVELIHOODS: 
A STORY OF VULNERABILITY, 
ADAPTATION & AGENCY 
 
 “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, 
claims and access) and activities required for a means of living. A 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, 
and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next 
generation” (Chambers and Conway 1991: 6).  
This definition by Chambers and Conway is the classic definition of sustainable 
livelihoods. The resources or assets mentioned include not only financial resources, 
but also natural, physical, human and social capital (DFID 2000; Jaspars and 
Shoham 2002; Jacobsen 2005):  
o Natural capital: land, water, forests, fish, etc. 
o Physical capital: equipment, safe housing, infrastructure, communication 
opportunities, energy, etc. 
o Financial capital (stocks and flows): money, savings, credit 
o Human capital: education and skills, life experience, health 
o Social capital: community trust and knowledge, networks, political assets, 
etc. 
These assets are mobilised by particular livelihood strategies66
                                                             
66 These strategies can be categorised in various ways. Ellis (2000: 30) for example divides them into 
natural resource- and non-natural resource based activities, whereas de Haan and Zoomers  (2005: 39-
, which help to 
realise the potential of the assets: “While assets focus on the potential to achieve 
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sustainable livelihoods, activities focus on the realisation of that potential in the 
shape of a viable portfolio of income-generating activities. If that potential cannot 
be realised, then assets remain unemployed or underemployed” (Ellis 2000: 50). 
However, not all strategies are available to everyone. There are clearly different 
levels of agency in the choice of strategies and tactics in the process of negotiating 
for resources and power (Polzer 2008: 12). The desired outcome of strategies can 
be more income or better food security, but also increased well-being (e.g. self-
esteem) and reduced vulnerability67
While livelihoods studies often focus on the agency of a particular group of people, 
these people do not build their lives in a vacuum but they are influenced by 
structural features. Access to resources and the feasibility of livelihood options is 
modified by demographic variables (gender, caste, class, age, ethnicity and 
religion), institutions (formal and informal rules, traditions, codes of behaviour
 (Dfid 2000: section 2).  
68
                                                                                                                                               
40) make a distinction depending on what the effect of a strategy is on the resource base of the 
household (compensating, stabilising, expanding, diversifying). 
) 
and organisations (state agencies, local administration, NGOs, associations), in the 
context of trends (seasonality, economic trends, population and migration trends) 
and shocks (personal misfortune, environmental or man-made shocks) (Ellis 2000: 
30). All these factors together are sometimes called ‘PIPs’: Policies, Institutions and 
Processes. In sum:  yes, people do make their own livelihoods and have their own 
preferences, but not under the conditions of their own choosing- what Giddens 
calls ‘bounded agency’ (cited in Meyer 2006: 32). Agency should thus be 
understood as ever-present, and limitations on refugees’ ability to achieve their 
livelihood goals should not be interpreted as a lack of agency (Meyer 2006: 29). The 
67 Vulnerability is “the exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficulties coping with them” 
(Chambers, quoted in: Schütte 2004: 4). It has thus both an ‘internal dimension’, which can be 
contrasted to resilience (being able to cope with shocks), but it also has an external side, namely being 
affected by risks, shocks and stress. 
68 Informal institutional arrangements indeed shape human interactions and certainly in collective 
societies these customs and traditions are very important: “(In collective-oriented societies, ed.) where 
individual interests are to a considerable degree subordinate to collective communal interests, pursuing 
self-interest without regarding one’s neighbours’, relatives’, friends’ and villagers’ interests has 
considerable social and economic consequences. (…) In such communities where life depends on a wide 
series of personal relationships in the social, political and economic spheres, the costs of a breach of 
what is considered honourable and appropriate behaviour are too high” (Kibreab 2004: 18-19). 
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‘Sustainable Livelihoods Framework’ developed by Dfid (2000: section 2) combines 
these elements and is the framework most often cited in livelihoods studies. 
 
Figure 1: Sustainable livelihoods framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DFID 2000: Section 2 
While there are many studies that are based on (variants of) this framework, some 
elements consistently tend to be underdeveloped, such as the dynamic nature of 
the structural context. For example, informal institutions are not static: they can be 
reshaped. This happens for instance when refugee women start working in wage 
employment to increase the family’s options, even if this was not a habit in the 
country of origin. There are constantly processes of transformation and 
negotiation, which are often insufficiently elucidated in livelihoods studies due to 
the focus on the household level. Another common shortcoming is that the mobile 
and transnational dimension of livelihoods is ignored, because of the focus on a 
particular locality (Horst 2006a: 9). Thirdly, power relations in this institutional 
D i s p l a c e d  L i v e l i h o o d s | 110 
 
context are not often made apparent in field studies, even if power relations not 
only have a large influence on the obtainment of certain assets, but also determine 
whether the potential of assets can be realised. Not just the assets are thus 
important, but also the relative (economic and political) power of an individual, 
household or community (Collinson 2003: 13; Vlassenroot et al. 2007: 5). 
Therefore, livelihoods research requires an  appraisal of the enabling or constricting 
environment. In that case, the livelihoods study will find a good balance by bridging 
two empowerment paradigms, avoiding a sole focus on either people’s agency 
outside of structures (the ‘advocacy perspective’), or on poor people as powerless 
entities to be empowered through policy processes (‘the institutional paradigm’) 
(Meyer 2006: 30). Lastly, another element to add to the framework is preference. 
People are assumed to be a ‘homo economicus’, but in practice not all decisions 
are rational and based on information. Individual preferences and group 
habits/styles (de Haan and Zoomers 2005) as well as emotions play an important 
role too. 
While these are elements to add to an analysis of sustainable livelihoods, 
livelihoods in conflict zones are all but sustainable and require a different kind of 
study approach. After all, ‘classic’ livelihoods studies compare the relative 
importance of the different food and income sources in a normal year and after a 
particular shock for each livelihood group, but this normative analysis becomes 
problematic in ‘situations of chronic conflict and political instability’ (SCCPI) since 
one cannot determine a ‘normal’ year. In those conflict zones, people are 
constantly exposed to threats of violence and displacement. Moreover, assets in 
peace time (e.g. identity, power, political relations or goods such as diamonds) can 
become life-threatening liabilities in war time (Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006: 
395-396)69
                                                             
69 In this case for example, good relations with the DKBA or the tatmadaw may help people to survive in 
a certain area, but can become liabilities when the KNU takes over this area, or when these people try to 
enter refugee camps (as explained in Section 3.4). 
. The sustainable livelihoods approach thus needs to be adapted to 
emphasize the constant vulnerability of these people: a ‘livelihoods-in-conflict’- 
approach (Jacobsen 2002: 99). The body of research on livelihoods in zones of 
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chronic conflict and political instability includes frameworks to understand the 
context, policy analysis to inform humanitarian organisations, the role of 
humanitarian assistance in influencing the conflict (positively or negatively) as well 
as anthropological accounts of conflict- affected diasporas and their networks 
(Jacobsen 2005: 9-10). This study can be located in the last section. 
However, I would argue that ‘displaced livelihoods’ are a particular kind of 
‘livelihoods-in-conflict’, as livelihoods are affected by the insecurity and limitations 
placed on spatial mobility, first due to conflict but certainly also once abroad due to 
the restrictive measures imposed by the host government and host community. 
The concept of ‘displaced livelihoods’ can thus also be used in case of 
immobilization due to the securitisation and curtailment of spatial movement, for 
example if refugees are confined to a camp (Stepputat 2002: 219-220). While 
refugees are usually outside the zone of armed conflict, they encounter new 
vulnerabilities due to their flight (e.g. trauma) and the life in exile.  
“We were always running and hiding from the Burmese soldiers, so in 
2000 we decided to come to Thailand. We registered in camp, but we 
didn’t have any money, so my husband and I both left camp in search 
for work. It was a very hard life though as we were illegal outside 
camp. We were always afraid of the police and we didn’t earn enough 
money to pay our rent and the new baby. So we came back to Mae La 
camp after eight months. But apparently we missed the UNHCR re-
registration in the meantime, and now we are treated as new 
arrivals. We can’t get a house and have to live with my sister. My 
husband crossed the border to cut some wood for the house, but 
three weeks ago he walked on a landmine there and he lost one leg. 
Now he can’t work anymore. Maybe he will get a new leg, but he 
doesn’t dare to leave camp anymore. I now try to sell some fried 
bananas to buy milk for the children”. 
 (Interview with Karen refugee, Mae La camp, December 27, 2006) 
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While the traditional sustainable livelihoods approach and the livelihoods-in-
conflict- approach obviously had a large influence on this research, neither are 
sufficient to elucidate the particular conditions of refugees who were forced to flee 
their home country and now live in a host region that may not be able or willing to 
cope with their presence. Several additional elements need to be looked into and 
were all added to the ‘livelihoods and integration framework for refugees’ designed 
for this research (figure 2). Firstly, the policies of the host government and 
humanitarian agencies are particularly influential for refugee livelihoods, as these 
institutions have a certain vision on who ‘the refugees’ are, and as such determine 
who qualifies for particular rights and entitlements. Secondly, the factor time is 
very important since refugees need to learn about the formal and informal rules in 
the RHA and adapt to them (or find ways to circumvent them). Indeed, while there 
are bound to be some elements of continuity in people’s livelihoods, many other 
factors will have changed due to the flight, such as the composition of the 
community and/or household, loss of various assets as well as potential additional 
psychological trauma. Also power relations, informal arrangements and institutions 
may transform due to conflict70
                                                             
70 For example, Harvey  argues that primary groupings that are more traditional and informal, like 
kinship networks, traditional political institutions and ethnic groups, are often reinforced by conflict (in 
Schafer 2002: 28). Clark (2006: 5) on the other hand has found that among Congolese refugees in 
Uganda, the importance of kinship networks had diminished, whereas the number of households with 
only young people rose. Social capital is thus not necessarily destroyed by conflict or displacement, but 
may be transformed. 
, displacement and livelihood strategies, and so can 
of course policies or trends, thus the context is very dynamic. The shock of exile is 
thus likely to be extraordinarily great, and it will take time to cope with all these 
changes. As time passes and refugees become familiar with their environment, 
they become integrated to a certain extent and adapt their strategies, which is why 
I will argue that the level of adaptation/integration of a refugee in the RHA is a vital 
intermediary livelihood outcome. Moreover, what is looked at in this study in terms 
of outcome, is not first and foremost the desired outcome (as in sustainable 
livelihoods studies), but the actual outcome, which certainly in zones of chronic 
conflict and displacement can be quite a difference (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 
2006: 397). 
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Apart from those factors, relevant aspects for other stakeholders have to be 
assessed as well. After all, in pursuing certain livelihood strategies, people will 
inevitably compete with others for resources, which can make this a discordant 
process. In the case of displaced livelihoods, an analysis of the impact of refugees 
on the RHA and the level of competition with the locals is an essential component 
since the (sudden) influx can also be a shock for the local population. Furthermore, 
refugees can be transnational actors who still have an influence on their country of 
origin, which is another aspect of influence to insert in the scheme. If these diverse 
elements are added to the framework, it is bound to lead to a more holistic 
portrayal of influences on and of refugees’ assets, livelihoods strategies and 
outcomes. 
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Figure 2: Livelihoods and integration scheme 
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(adapted from Kuhlman 1991; Dfid 2000; Vincent and Sorensen 2001)71
 
.  
Parts of this refugee livelihoods framework will occur across several chapters of 
this paper. While the root causes and the policies of organisations and the host 
country have already been discussed in the previous chapter, the next chapters will 
look into integration and transnationalism, as well as the impact on the country of 
origin and the host population and country. This chapter will focus on the middle 
part of the scheme, the livelihoods assets and strategies. The reason for discussing 
this framework across several chapters is that livelihoods research is very broad 
and requires an assessment of many different factors, which can be divided into 
interrelated themes. For example, strategies aimed at obtaining legal papers are 
very much livelihood strategies, but at the same time they constitute legal 
integration.  Vice-versa, to understand the process of integration, there is a need to 
assess how refugees actually gain access to resources locally by negotiating with a 
variety of actors (Polzer 2008: 9). While this chapter will mainly focus on the 
refugees themselves, the next chapter will add the dimension of their interaction 
with other actors both inside and outside Thailand, by thoroughly discussing both 
integration and transnationalism. Despite this distribution over the different 
chapters, the various parts of the framework are evidently connected, which will 
become clear through-out the text. 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the livelihood strategies developed by 
refugees, which is the core of the livelihoods analysis. The deliberate focus is on 
agency, on which livelihood strategies work on the Thai-Burma border, without 
losing sight of the structural context (first column of Figure 2). In conformity with 
the research frame, as much information as possible was collected on livelihood 
                                                             
71 Aspects from diverse models were combined in this framework. While Dfid’ s framework (Dfid 2000) 
provided the ‘classic’ view on sustainable livelihoods, Vincent’s categorisation of livelihood strategies of 
IDPs was a useful addition (Vincent and Sorensen 2001: 11-12). The main reason for choosing his 
classification is that it is also valuable to describe non-economic strategies, unlike many other 
categorisations (e.g. Ellis 2000; de Haan and Zoomers 2005), while at the same time it puts the focus on 
‘what works’ instead of on the problems and needs of the refugees.  In addition, Kuhlman’s ideas  (1991) 
were used to complete the picture concerning aspects that are particular to refugees, such as 
adaptation to the host country, characteristics of the RHA and the impact of livelihood strategies and 
integration on the host community. 
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strategies in different seasons to capture the wide variety of employed tactics. This 
information was then categorised into different themes: 
o protection strategies: strategies that protect the right to life, personal 
security and liberty, and freedom of movement. 
o subsistence strategies: strategies to improve economic self-reliance.  
o property strategies. 
o strategies to improve access to goods and services. 
o civic strategies: strategies to improve public participation and access to 
documentation. 
Of course, some strategies may have different goals, thus there is some overlap. 
For example, applying for UNHCR recognition is both a protection strategy, a 
strategy to improve access to goods and services, and a civic strategy.  
This analysis will demonstrate what the importance is of the settlement choice for 
refugees’ assets,  livelihood strategies and actual outcomes, as well as for the 
desired outcomes in terms of durable solutions. The strategies found lead to a 
questioning of the aid dependency syndrome of camp refugees, and point to the 
importance of integration as an intermediate outcome in the livelihoods of 
refugees. It will also be argued that livelihoods research needs to go beyond a 
discussion of economic agency, which is commonly the only element looked at in 
field studies. Even if subsistence strategies are an essential element of livelihoods, 
the four other kinds of strategies are very important as well, without which 
important insights are lost. Furthermore, a basic analysis of elements of continuity 
and change between before and after flight will be developed, but more life 
histories will have to be collected to provide a fuller picture of the level of 
adaptation. More longitudinal research in a particular location would also be useful 
to track particular changes in livelihoods over time within Thailand, which requires 
recurring interviews with the same households.  
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4.1 Protection strategies 
 
While refugees are usually outside the zones of armed conflict and coercive power 
of their state of origin, living in exile engenders new vulnerabilities and protection 
necessities. As Burmese refugees are an illegal population in Thailand, they are 
extremely vulnerable to labour exploitation, arrest and deportation. Therefore 
refugees have developed strategies to improve their protection within Thailand. 
They share information on upcoming raids (most frequent in cool season, 
November-February) as well as on registration policies in camp and for migrant 
work. Another, more invasive, protection strategy is to decide on either ‘blending 
in’ or living in predominantly Burmese neighbourhoods. While contradictory, both 
ideas make sense. Trying to blend in and denying to be a Burmese refugee can 
work in urban contexts, since cities usually allow living a more anonymous life 
(Jacobsen 2006: 276). Certainly when the refugee is able to speak Thai, he/she may 
wish to deceive the new neighbours by claiming to be Thai, thereby avoiding 
problems of racism and detection by police (similar to conduct found in other 
refugee situations, see e.g. Malkki 1995b). However, in smaller towns and villages 
close to the border, where I did research, this strategy does not work. People know 
very well who is originally Thai and who is not, up to decades after arrival. 
Therefore, refugees may choose to avoid confrontation with Thai people altogether 
by settling into a Burmese dominated neighbourhood. In Mae Sot, for example, 
Burmese and Thai people tend to live in separate neighbourhoods. They do meet at 
work (usually in different positions), but apart from that, Burmese people stay in 
their own area and have their own meeting places, usually a nearby monastery or 
teashop. The danger of this ‘chosen isolation’ is of course that the police knows 
exactly where to go when raids are planned.  
Other protection strategies are related to travelling, as moving always increases the 
risk of arrest at one of the numerous checkpoints. Some refugees just try their luck 
and hope to be left alone. Others use smugglers to travel. If a refugee is arrested 
after all, then several possibilities are open. Usually it is possible to negotiate and 
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bribe the police or soldiers, either with the money refugees have on them, or with 
the help of a family member. At a later stage, when the person is already in the 
police station, bribes have to be higher or more influential persons in the 
community have to be called to intervene- such as members of the KYO, KNU or 
KRC. Surprisingly, none of the camp refugees mentioned they would call UNHCR in 
case of arrest outside camp. On the contrary, as confirmed by other research (HRW 
2004: 12), arrested Burmese usually deny being a refugee, because deportation 
procedures tend to be much longer for registered refugees, leading to an extended 
stay in the hazardous conditions of the detention centres. Instead, refugees 
realistically speculate that fast deportation is preferable, as officers on both sides 
of the border are easy to bribe, leading to a quicker return to Thailand. Thus, while 
applying to UNHCR does improve protection, the refugees feel that this is only for 
protection in camp- even if a local UNHCR officer said that they do try to prevent 
deportation of arrested camp refugees, if they know about the arrest72. Of course, 
the safest strategy would be to get access to the camp and not to leave the camp 
any more after that, which some refugees find very comforting: “We are refugees 
but there is not so much to worry about. I have never lived as peaceful as in the 
camp”73. Certainly for refugees who do not have a network to fall back upon, this 
would be the safest option74
A supplementary protection strategy would be to bargain collectively to improve 
human rights: “The fact that the refugees have organised themselves and are able 
to claim their rights as a community makes it more difficult for the authorities to 
. However, whether or not they can live in camp, 
depends on various factors such as the causes of their flight, their connections and 
the convening dates of the PABs and these more, as was explained in the previous 
chapter. 
                                                             
72 Interview with Elizabeth Kirton, Head of UNHCR Field Office Mae Sot, January 3, 2007. 
73 Interview with elderly Karen refugee in Mae La camp, December 22, 2006. 
74 Living in camp is also for political refugees the safest strategy, but as was mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter, not all strategies are based on ratio. For example, a political refugee who 
managed to make her way to Nu Poh camp, was located by her Burma-based parents after more than 
five years without contact. Therefore, she was now considering to ask them to come to Mae Sot so they 
could meet there. Even if that was dangerous for her, emotions were more important at this stage, since 
it might be the last time she can see them before leaving for resettlement (Email conversation, political 
activist, Nu Poh camp, July 15, 2009). These kinds of emotions and preferences play a role for all 
refugees, but are of course very individual, which is why not many examples are given in the text. 
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disregard them” (Grabska 2006: 300). There is some collective bargaining in 
Thailand through the formation of diaspora CBOs to improve workers’ rights. The 
two most important organisations in this regard are ‘Migrant Assistance 
Programme Foundation’ (MAP) based in Chiang Mai but with field offices all along 
the border, and ‘Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association’ (YCOWA), based in Mae Sot. As 
Burmese workers are not allowed to form trade unions, they are entirely 
dependent on the capacity of these organisations, and their liaisons with Thai 
groups such as the Law Society of Thailand, to improve the exploitative conditions 
in the factories. However, it is debatable whether this can really be called 
‘collective’ bargaining, because they only advocate for a particular section of the 
Burmese refugees in Thailand, namely the ones working in wage labour in urban 
areas. Indeed, the advocacy strategy is clearly determined by choice of settlement, 
with migrant organisations pursuing more freedom and fair treatment of migrant 
workers in urban centres, camp refugee leaders and international agencies 
pursuing more refugee rights e.g. in terms of access to work, and rural ethnically 
related refugees pursuing the ‘common ethnicity’ strategy on an individual basis. 
While this split in advocacy strategies according to settlement choice may seem 
odd, it is comprehensible given that the Thai government sees these three 
populations as entirely different, regardless of the fact that people who fled 
because of the war in Burma live in all three options. This can be contrasted with 
other cases such as South Africa, where refugees collectively advocate at the same 
time for ‘refugee rights’ at the national level and for local rights on the basis of 
common ancestry and traditions (Polzer 2008: 14). 
In the longer term, resettlement is the best protection strategy, as it provides 
direct protection from both the SPDC and the Thai police, while at the same time it 
is a long term livelihood strategy: parents hope to improve their children’s 
education and as such their access to skilled work, as well as obtain citizenship. It is 
currently the only durable solution available for Burmese camp refugees. However, 
the access to resettlement programmes has tended to split up camp families 
between the elderly, who often want to stay in camp, and younger adults who 
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want to leave. These tensions within families are very hard for the individuals 
concerned, as traditions, family and community are vitally important in this 
collective culture. As a result of the disagreements, the number of suicides in camp 
is rising (CCSDPT December 17, 2008, internal document).  
 
4.2 Subsistence strategies 
  
Overall, one large economic transformation has occurred for the refugees, who are 
overwhelmingly from rural areas in Burma (Bradford and Vicary 2005: 7; Oh et al. 
2006; UNHCR in Duffy 2007: 38): they are not allowed to own land or other large 
possessions in Thailand. Access to land is blocked because Thailand has enforced a 
ban on logging since 1989 to protect the environment (Toyota 2007). This affects 
both refugees and local poor Thais, as both groups are now unable to cut hill fields 
from local forest areas, where non- irrigated rice used to be grown (Eberhardt 
2007: 6). If one does not own land and is not allowed or does not have the money 
to buy land, then the only options left are wage labour or self-employment (which 
requires more capacity). Refugees, both men and women of any class, have thus 
shifted from subsistence farming (owner-cultivators) to wage labour at an 
enormous rate due to displacement in Thailand. The food production economy has 
to a large extent been replaced by a monetary economy, with every refugee trying 
to get access to financial capital. Due to the general switch to wage labour, more 
women currently earn money, which is quite a change from the usual social 
practice in Burma, where they carried out unremunerated labour, such as 
‘reproductive labour’, household tasks, animal husbandry and searching firewood 
(Brezovich 2005: 21). Still, even in exile, household and upbringing tasks continue 
to be carried out by women, preserving the tradition.  
But apart from these general trends, subsistence strategies are thoroughly 
different depending on the settlement option: refugee camp, self-settled in a rural 
area or self-settled in an urban area.  
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Camp refugees75
Camp refugees receive rations that contain staple goods such as rice, flour and oil, 
as well as some fish paste, chillies and non-food items (cooking stoves, clothes, 
mosquito nets, etc.). While these rations are up to international nutritional 
standards, they do not contain fresh fruit, vegetables and meat, or non-food items 
that the refugees might need. Therefore, refugees need to supplement their 
rations, which 83% of this study’s respondents did. For a limited number of people, 
there are opportunities to work in wage employment in camp for one of the 
international NGOs, certainly if they have acquired post-secondary education and 
have the necessary connections (human capital and/or social capital which results 
into financial capital). Wages for employees of NGOs vary depending on the 
profession and the working experience of the person involved. Teachers for 
example earn, on average, THB 500 a month, teacher trainers THB 1200, social 
workers from THB 0 to THB 700 and medical personnel in hospitals from THB 1620 
to THB 3000. People working for camp management, such as a section leader or a 
security guard, make between THB 400 and THB 800, while people in CBOs, such as 
the Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO), are often unpaid. As these paid jobs are 
not numerous, the access to them is often restricted to people with (family and 
political) connections. As a result, I encountered a frustrated Burman doctor in Nu 
Poh camp who was willing to work in the camp hospital, but was constantly palmed 
off. Being Burman, there was some suspicion among the Karen staff that he would 
be a spy, and there was also a problem because he couldn’t speak Karen in contrast 
to many of the patients. In response, he started doing consultations in his own hut. 
Moreover, the whole ‘PAB-section’ of Nu Poh camp (former urban Slipholders, 
political activists) was filled with notices like ‘Here you can learn English’ and ‘I give 
class in mathematics’, indicating the high level of education and unemployment of 
these people. 
 
                                                             
75 This section is loosely based on a policy paper I wrote for education NGO ZOA on camp refugee 
livelihoods and vocational training: Brees, I. (2008b) ‘Towards sustainable livelihoods: Vocational 
training and access to work on the Thai-Burmese border’.  ZOA Issue Paper No.1. Mae Sot, Thailand: 
ZOA Refugee Care Thailand. 
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Most people do not have the opportunity to work for NGOs, and have to find other 
ways of supplementing their income. Some hold a noodle restaurant or grocery 
shop  (THB 50-120 profit a day), and I even encountered a cd- and dvd-shop with 
cinema attached (THB 200-400 a day). These people are the relatively well-off 
refugees as they have a regular income. Others simply sell some dried fish, fried 
bananas or samosas in front of their house (petty trade with minute profit 
margins). Some people combine several jobs: 
“I buy t-shirts from the Thai people that come to the gates of the 
camp early in the morning. When we sell some t-shirts in our shop, we 
need to give most of the money back to those Thai people. We can 
only keep THB 30 to 50 a day for ourselves. Additionally, my family 
collects garbage, which we can sell for THB 1 or 2 per kilo to Thai 
women. And my wife is a tailor, so she makes about THB 10 to 15 per 
day by making shirts. I used to do daily work outside camp, but it was 
far away and you had to bring your own food. And they don’t have 
work for you every day, so sometimes you were away for 8 days and 
only worked for 3 days. Then you hardly had any money to bring 
back. Thus I stopped doing that.”76
The raw materials for all products are bought from Thai vendors, but the power 
figures who control this trade differ across camps. In Mae La, the Muslim 
community controls most of the market through their networks with Thai Muslims 
in Mae Sot, which causes a lot of envy by other refugees. These networks also 
support them in non-trade businesses if necessary: “Muslims had illegally cut wood 
in the forest, to decorate the lower part of the wall of the mosque. The camp leader 
removed that new wood as refugees are not allowed to log. But as these Muslim 
refugees are well connected, there were large demonstrations by other Muslims in 
Mae Sot and even Bangkok, saying that the mosque in the camp had been 
‘destroyed’. The camp commander thus got a reprimand”
 
77
                                                             
76 Interview with Muslim refugee, Mae La camp, December 27, 2006. 
. In Mae Ra Ma Luang 
camp on the other hand, Karen people control the networks, which for a remote 
77 Interview with Loytee Taluang, ZOA Refugee Care, Mae Sot office, June 29, 2006. 
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camp like this one requires quite some organisation: “There are three or four big 
rich shops in the camp, of which the owners have a car. So they assemble money 
from about ten shops to pay the Thai authorities to be able to drive in and out of 
the camp. Then they buy huge amounts of products in Mae Sariang, which are 
subsequently divided between those ten shops. There is however very little 
difference between the prices in town and in the camp, so refugees are not making 
much money out of it”78
Market Nu Poh camp 
.  
 
Income can also be earned through weaving, as a form of domestic work paid by 
the income generation programme. KWO provides the thread and buys the finished 
materials (THB 220 for a blanket, THB 200 for a lungyi79
                                                             
78 Interview with NGO field staff, Mae Sariang, January 19, 2007. 
, THB 80 for a Shan bag, THB 
63 for a Karen shirt), who are then sold in shops or to an NGO. As a result of this 
business, even men started weaving (as witnessed in Mae La camp), while this is 
79 A lungyi is a garment worn around the waist in South Asia and Southeast Asia. It is commonly known 
as a sarong. 
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traditionally very much a female practice. Occasionally, refugees manage to find 
niches, such as selling hydropower electricity after the purchase of the necessary 
equipment with several investors’ cash, or setting up a telecommunication centre 
to contact family in Thailand or the wider world. The latter has become more 
important since the establishment of resettlement programmes, as more refugees 
have family in third countries now whom they wish to contact for both information 
and remittances (transnational livelihood strategy)80
However, most refugees have to leave the camp to find some additional income. 
The male members of the family often leave the camp in search of work, leading to 
internal remittances from urban or rural Thai areas to camp (family-splitting 
technique). This is a typical pattern in refugee situations which is for instance also 
seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Levron, quoted in De Vriese 2006: 11) and 
presents a form of livelihoods diversification. While no camp respondents 
mentioned how they used migration as a survival strategy in response to non-
conflict related shocks inside Burma, many do use the splitting technique once in 
Thailand and migrate to other areas in search of work, which demonstrates their 
adaptation capacity. Some families opted for long term family splitting, with both 
parents working outside the camp, leaving the children with the grandparents in 
return for continued financial support (strong influence of extended family). Others 
only occasionally went out for daily labour in the neighbourhood of the camp, 
leading to a more irregular income. Usually they leave the camp secretly, but some 
ask permission of their section leader, who then cuts rations for that family for the 
time the worker is gone. If they are discovered when sneaking out of camp and lack 
connections and/or negotiation skills, refugees need to pay power holders (section 
leaders, security guards, Thai soldiers) when leaving for daily work: “Camp is not so 
different from Burma. You still need to pay money to powerful people, and you still 
need connections to get things done”
.  
81
                                                             
80 Interview with son of phone shop owner, Nu Poh camp, November 26, 2007. 
. Outside camp, they face the same 
conditions as self-settled refugees.  
81 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae La camp, December 22, 2006. 
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A study by the IRC in Ban Kwai refugee camp revealed that over 40% of camp 
residents were engaged in wage employment outside camp (IRC 2005). Even if this 
percentage varies according to the local conditions of each camp, it nonetheless 
gives an idea of how widespread this practice is. It is not surprising then that no 
less than 25.4% of the camp respondents in my sample identified the lack of 
security and safe travel as the largest problem they faced in Thailand, which is the 
highest percentage of all (higher than food needs, health, education etc.). There 
are indeed risks associated with this practice of working outside camp, but if it 
leads to survival of family members in camp, the obtainment of a house, land or 
Thai identity card, or further outmigration of kin in Burma, the returns are equally 
high, which is why the refugees engage in it anyway. The most common (daily) job 
outside camp is wage employment in farming. Payment varies according to 
demand and supply: remote camps, such as Mae Ra Ma Luang, are located in areas 
where there is less demand, while large camps like Mae La have an over-supply of 
labourers (high level of competition), both leading to low wages, namely THB 50 a 
day in the environs of Mae Ra Ma Luang, and THB 60-80 around Mae La camp 
(Brees 2008b). Given the fact that refugees are treated as ‘illegal migrants’ once 
they are outside camp, they are highly vulnerable to exploitation and are in no 
position to demand the minimum wage. This minimum wage is decided per 
province and the lowest rate per day in Thailand is THB 145 (TDRI 2006).  
The income from these jobs is supplemented by vegetables grown around the 
house if there is some space (e.g. chillies, beans or spices) or by animal-raising. 
Chickens and pigs are the most common animals found, and some wealthier 
households manage to raise cattle. For hygiene reasons, these bigger animals have 
to be kept at a small number though. But in Mae La camp even all the chickens 
were culled, after a false bird flu alert (environmental/man-made shock): “This is 
discrimination! They killed all our chickens, all our savings, while outside the camp 
they were still allowed to raise chickens”82
                                                             
82 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae La camp, December 22, 2006. 
. The culling of the chickens indeed 
meant a huge blow for the camp economy, but the chickens were quickly smuggled 
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back in (as witnessed in the local bus passing by Mae La camp). This kind of control 
over the camp is of course something that self-settled refugees are spared of- 
which is exactly why the Thai government is so afraid that ‘migrants’ will spread 
diseases. Another way to supplement their diet is to trade or sell a part of the 
rations, or to (illegally) forage outside camp, collecting roots, bamboo shoots, 
edible plants and mushrooms (natural capital). Also bamboo for the house and 
leaves for the roof are collected. Some refugees reportedly also hunt or fish outside 
camp, but few respondents mentioned these practices. In case of an acute need for 
money, refugees try to borrow money from family, friends or neighbours (41.5%), 
but if that is not possible, assets are depleted. For example, a wooden pillar of their 
house may be sold to get by, which is of course an unsustainable strategy (negative 
coping strategy- see infra).  
A further possible strategy is to follow training to improve one’s skills (human 
capital). Adults in camp indeed have access to vocational training (VT) programmes. 
The most popular courses by far are the computer, sewing, bakery, auto-mechanic 
and agriculture training (Brees 2008b). Other courses are the setting up of kitchen 
gardens, training in soap and candle making, animal raising, radio mechanic 
training, etc. The most important problem for the current VT programmes is the 
fact that there are no legal employment options in Thailand for camp refugees, nor 
is the training adapted to the requirements of the local labour market. Therefore 
the newly acquired skills are hardly ever put into practice once the training is 
completed, thus this strategy does not yet lead to access to skilled jobs. The VT 
programmes do, nevertheless, serve certain social goals such as providing people 
with educational goals, distraction and promoting community cohesion. Regardless 
of the traditional preservation of household tasks to women, even men thus follow 
cooking training to keep busy. 
While camp refugees have thus developed numerous strategies to supplement 
their rations, for most people wage labour outside camp is the only way to ensure a 
more or less regular income flow, which entails potential arrest and deportation. 
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Many are thus afraid to leave the camp, certainly if they have been arrested 
before:  
“I did daily work in the beginning but I was captured by Thai military, 
and they sent me to jail for seven days, then to Mae Sot for four days 
and then I was deported to Myawaddy. I stayed there for three days 
and then I secretly escaped at night. I never paid any bribe. I walked 
all the way back here, it took me eight days. Since then I do not dare 
to leave camp any more”83
For people like the person quoted above, the obliged dependency on rations and 
the protracted encampment in general has led to a sense of loss of self-
determination and boredom: “All we do is drink, eat, sleep, wash, talk, sleep again, 
eat…”
.  
84. Typical problems thus arise, such as depression and other mental 
problems (Cardozo et al. 2004), alcoholism and drug abuse (UNHCR and WHO 
2006), gambling, crime, youth gangs (Mae La camp, Tham Hin, Umpiem Mai, Site 
1)85
 
 and domestic violence. Typically in this and other refugee situations, it is first 
and foremost the men who are demonstrating this destructive behaviour, since 
they feel disempowered because they have lost their traditional bread winner and 
protector role of the family to humanitarian agencies (‘UNHCR is a better husband’ 
(Turner 1999)). 
 Self-settled rural refugees 
Of the three categories of settlement, rural refugees demonstrate the least variety 
in subsistence strategies. The economic life of self-settled refugees in rural areas is 
built around wage labour, farming on rented or donated land and craft production. 
They are usually an (abundant) reservoir of cheap labour for the local agriculture, 
small-scale village businesses or area construction projects. Refugees who arrived a 
long time ago sometimes manage to obtain access to land, for which they either 
                                                             
83 Interview with Karen man, Mae Ra Ma Luang camp, January 24, 2007. 
84 Interview with Burman refugee, Mae La camp, June 30, 2006. 
85 Email conversation with Miles Jury, Community Liaison Officer TBBC, December 28, 2007. 
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pay rent or a part of the yield. Social capital can thus be transformed in physical 
capital. If there is an abundance of land, they can get it for free- land that becomes 
re-forested can after all be lost for the local community for ever. The crops 
cultivated are mostly rice but also for example beans, corn, onions, garlic and 
flowers are grown. In very remote rural communities, the food production 
economy remains far more important than the monetary economy: “People here 
don’t really have an income. We just live of our land, plant and eat. They have food, 
thus they can stay”86
Rural self-settled refugees also forage in the forest, just like camp refugees, to 
collect edible vegetables, pig food, firewood or roots that can be used to colour 
textile. Many also try to raise chickens and pigs for sale, and occasionally goats or 
dogs are raised (to eat or sell). If there is little work, such as during the agricultural 
off-season (Winter), refugees and poor locals gather leafs in the forest, which they 
bind together with bamboo strips and then sell as roof cover. Households may also 
engage in other kinds of craft production, such as broom making, basket weaving 
or weaving traditional Karen shirts. In general, there is very little livelihood 
diversification in these rural households, which makes them very vulnerable to 
shocks such as crop failure. Moreover, due to the seasonal nature of agricultural 
labour, there is substantial unemployment and under-employment. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
86 Interview with Christian pastor, Nusipo village, February 6, 2007. 
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Making roof cover- Mi Klo Khi 
 
 
Self-settled urban refugees 
 
“I work at the market eight months a year. The other four months, I 
assist new arrivals by helping them to track family down in Thailand, 
as they often only have a phone number to rely on. Or I help families 
around here with the construction of houses and receive some money 
for that. My wife was working in a sewing factory, but now our first 
child is born, so she stays at home to take care of him. Maybe one day 
I will go back to Burma. But I would prefer to start up a business here. 
I know many people, I also speak some Thai, and I have been here for 
18 years now. But I am not sure if that dream will come true, since I 
am still illegal”.  
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(Interview with Burman refugee, Mae Pa, November 23, 2006) 
Self-settled urban refugees are engaged in the widest variety of jobs, which is a 
common finding in refugee livelihoods studies. Jobs are usually found through 
existing networks, in which more established refugees introduce new workers to 
their Thai employers. Many women are working as wage labourers in one of the 
factories in and around Mae Sot, usually garment factories. Other factories in Tak 
reportedly produce ceramics and electronics (Duffy 2007) but none of my 
respondents worked in those factories. The men usually work in construction, with 
the exception of the rainy season (June-September) when construction halts. A 
smaller fraction of wage labourers work in restaurants, in hotels or in domestic 
work (THB 1500-3000 per month), or unload trucks for the market at night. In a 
season with little work, people tend to fall back on daily work in agriculture in the 
surroundings of the city (which is less remunerated). In general, there is thus 
livelihood specialisation per season and per individual, but household level 
diversity. In some cases, people combine various jobs at the same time (individual 
diversification), which is usually a sign of poverty (Ellis 2000: 232). Again, there is a 
lot of competition for jobs in-between the Burmese (not with the Thais, as 
explained in Chapter 6), since the supply of labour usually exceeds the demand. As 
many of the urban jobs mentioned, such as the work in garment factories, 
domestic work or laundry services, tend to be reserved for women, it tends to be 
easier for them to find work, which has increased their responsibility and relative 
power in the household87
In contrast to camp refugees, self-settled refugees tend to respond more creatively 
to demand and supply changes by (illegally) moving around in the country. Even 
within Tak province there are wage differences. In Mae Sot and surroundings for 
example, wages vary from around THB 60-80 a day for daily work in farming, to 
THB 80–105 in construction work and garment factories (including overtime). 
Closer to Umphang however, where there is less Burmese labour supply, workers 
. This is similar to findings in other urban refugee 
situations, for example in Cairo (Grabska 2006: 299). 
                                                             
87 Interview with Mar Khin Mar Gyi, Australian National University, Mae Sot, October 12, 2007. 
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make THB 100 with farming and THB 120–200 in other jobs. Regardless of this 
mobility, self-settled refugees are heavily underpaid. A study by Bradford and 
Vicary (2005: 20-25) found that 50 to 70% of the Burmese ‘migrants’ earned less 
than the monthly minimum disposable income for Thailand (THB 3500 per month), 
depending on the sector. The situation was worst for the agricultural sector and for 
the regions in Northern Thailand, where Tak province is located. 
Apart from wage labour, there is a lot of self-employment as well. Some people 
leave as early as 3 am to pick flowers in the forest, which can then be sold in the 
market, next to stalls selling fruits, vegetables, cooked food, clothes etc. In general, 
these businesses are rather small as there is a vicious cycle in which business is 
necessary to generate cash, but cash is needed to get started in the first place. 
Certainly for self-settled refugees in urban areas, cash is a bare necessity: “One 
specific feature of the urban coping economy is its almost complete immersion in 
the cash economy and the reliance on urban labour markets. Subsistence 
production is scarce, and housing, food, health care and transport require ready 
amounts of currency” (Schütte 2004: 12). Quite a lot of refugees are thus involved 
in petty trade. A good example of this are the garbage collectors which are active in 
Mae Sot, collecting metal, iron, plastic and glass, which can then be sold to 
specialised shops at a per kilo-rate (THB 80-160 per day). In the months of 
November and December, many of the rubbish collectors were also collecting 
grass, to sell at Muslims who were fattening up their cows for the upcoming 
ceremonial celebration. Even if these people can thus potentially make more 
money than people working in agriculture, they are nonetheless seen as lower class 
by Thais and other Burmese alike. Other urban refugees offer services such as 
sewing or weaving, massage, assistance of new arrivals, etc. The best off are the 
refugees with English language skills, as they can act as interpreters for NGOs, 
CBOs, journalists or researchers (THB 200-500 per day). Working for NGOs is thus 
both inside and outside camp the only possibility for educated refugees to have 
skilled work. Therefore, the relationship between household educational 
attainment and food security does not seem to be present in this case, as a refugee 
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with the necessary skills also needs the social capital to get a proper job. It is thus 
not all that surprising that I encountered political activists from urban areas, with 
university degrees, who were trying to find daily work as a farmer. 
 
Collecting and sorting out garbage on Mae Sot dump 
 
Copyright: Min Wei Ting, ‘Human Waste’, http://www.mwting.com/ 
More negative coping strategies can also be observed in all three settlement 
options, such as pawning or selling jewellery or other physical capital (depleting 
movable and fixed assets, unsustainable survival strategy), or engaging more family 
members in income earning. In Mae Sot for example, the day market is 
overwhelmed by begging children. People also tend to work until older ages if their 
family does not have enough money to sustain them (unlike the custom in Burma): 
“I am 59 years old. This week I have not been able to work, I’m not strong enough, 
I’m not well. My husband did find daily work today, since it is harvest time, but now 
he is so tired he cannot talk any more. He is too old to work. Most of my children 
are married and have to take care of their own family now. They too struggle to 
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find work as daily workers. Sometimes I get a little bit of support from them, but 
other times I have to borrow money to be able to buy food”88
Refugees are thus very creative in developing coping and adapting strategies, but 
their lives are nonetheless very hard. Gonzalez De Rocha (2007) thus warns against 
overestimating the agency of the poor and states that regular employment is 
required as a motor of reproduction (e.g. to buy starting goods for petty trade and 
production). Without that regular income, the basis for other coping strategies is 
very weak, due to which social networks will come under pressure. While Gonzalez 
De Rocha is making this point for the impoverished in general, it certainly applies to 
refugees as well, as they are often restricted to irregular and illegal employment in 
the host country.  
. If this approach does 
not work, families tend to buy food of lesser quality, or simply limit their diet to 
eating only rice (stinting). At this stage, social capital becomes increasingly 
important, as refugees will try to borrow money or food from friends, neighbours 
or moneylenders (increased indebtedness), and if possible, asking family members 
abroad for remittances (transnational strategy, assessed in detail in the next 
chapter). When the situation continues to deteriorate, refugees may decide to 
adopt high risk- high return strategies, potentially in the longer term (adapting 
strategy). Indeed, clandestine, illegal and criminal practices can be found, such as 
commercial sex work, cross-border logging, brewing alcohol, stealing, smuggling 
drugs and human trafficking. These negative coping strategies are very common for 
refugees in hazardous conditions (see e.g. Dick 2002; Jaspars and Shoham 2002; 
Crisp 2003; Schütte 2004), and may actually be the same strategies that people 
already applied to crisis situations before their flight. 
 
 
 
                                                             
88 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae Pa, November 21, 2006. 
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4.3 Property strategies 
 
Many refugees mentioned how they used to own their own farmland in Burma, 
and how that land was seized by the SPDC or DKBA before or after their flight 
(asset-stripping (Longley and Maxwell 2003: 13)). Other refugees tried to decrease 
this risk of seizure while being in exile, by asking members of the extended family 
(cousins, uncles, etc.) to work on their abandoned land once in a while 
(transnational dimension). I even encountered some refugees with land close to 
the border who still crossed the border daily if the situation was calm and safe:  
“I am a farmer. We grow rice and some corn. I still try to go back to 
my farm every day, but I come back here to sleep. Only in the rainy 
season, travel is too difficult, so then I build a small hut to stay and 
sleep there. It is a very tough life though. Depending on the size of 
your plot, you need to pay taxes to SPDC, KNU and DKBA. If it gets 
dangerous because they start fighting again, we quickly leave the 
plantation and come back here”89
While Vincent (2001: 12) also includes “mechanisms that provide for the restitution 
of property or the compensation for the loss of property” in the section on property 
issues, these mechanisms unsurprisingly do not exist in military- ruled Burma, as 
the military and its allies are the main perpetrators of unlawful land and property 
seizures. 
. 
But, of course, refugees also need goods and property in the host country. 
Problematically, refugees are not allowed to buy large movable or non-movable 
goods in Thailand (Brees 2008c). This has led to the widespread practice of 
‘borrowing’ a Thai name for anything from the purchase of a motorcycle to the set-
up of a restaurant. However, this implies a high risk of expropriation. This was 
proven again recently by the eviction of 1000 Shan refugees from land they had 
purchased from Thai people who erroneously had presented themselves as the 
                                                             
89 Interview with Karen refugee, Mi Klo Khi, February 7, 2007. 
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owners (Slip 2008).  As a result, refugees are not inclined to invest in capital-
intensive businesses, or to invest the large sums needed to prepare agricultural 
land. These legal restrictions thus not only limit the economic opportunities for 
Burmese relative to Thai citizens, but also have harmful effects on the 
accumulation of capital and on the local economy (Vicary 2006: 81).  
While most Burmese refugees thus do not really own large property such as a 
house, I will nonetheless discuss their housing since this constitutes an important 
part of the depiction of refugees’ living conditions. In camp, the material for the 
bamboo houses is provided by NGOs, but refugees build the houses themselves. 
For self-settled refugees, the housing quality depends on their connections and 
financial resources, the amount of time spent in Thailand and the location, more 
than on legal status (unlike what was expected). Upon arrival, refugees often share 
accommodation, or go to informal safe houses (in Mae Sot). Several respondents 
who arrived over a decade ago mentioned how Thai people helped them out when 
they just arrived by offering them temporary residence, but newer arrivals have not 
mentioned this at all. This is a typical pattern, as hospitality tends to decrease when 
a refugee situation becomes protracted. Other households prepare their flight by 
sending one member ahead, to make arrangements for the rest of the family to 
arrive, such as finding a house. People without such preparations or without 
connections have a very hard time in the beginning: “If you don’t have any 
connections, then you fall outside. Those people have the worst time here in 
Thailand. They are the ones sleeping in the fields, not finding a job etc.”90
                                                             
90 Interview with NGO staff member, Mae Sot, December 9, 2007. 
. When 
they have spent a longer time in Thailand, refugees usually manage to rent a house 
from Thai landlords. Sometimes these Thai owners ask services in return, instead of 
rent, such as taking care of the field, the garden or the chickens. Other refugees 
build houses on wasteland (for which sometimes they afterwards need to pay as 
well). A last factor influencing the type of housing is of course the location. In rural 
areas, the houses look very much like the ones in camp but larger, in wood and 
bamboo, with a roof of leafs or thatch. In or close to town, most refugees live in a 
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house built of wood and bamboo with a tin roof, or in a concrete house if they are 
better off. A smaller amount of wage-earning workers lives with their employer (in 
the case of domestic work) or in crowded spaces within the factory compound.  
 
4.4 Strategies to improve access to goods and services 
 
Most goods and services are delivered in the refugee camps, thus the most 
efficient strategy for refugees is to place some family members in camp, usually the 
weaker/non-productive ones such as the elderly and the children. If they manage 
to get recognised as a ‘temporarily displaced person’, shelter, rations, access to 
education and health care is provided. Other goods, such as electricity, are only 
available for people with money (THB 50-65 per month in Mae La camp, THB 70-
100 in Mae Ra Ma Luang camp) and people with connections to church (Mae Ra Ma 
Luang camp). While goods and services are thus available in the camps, access to 
them is not always assured. A groundbreaking survey by KRC in 1995 revealed that 
religion was an important factor in structuring inequality, more than was gender, 
which was subsequently ignored: “Over the following decades, however, aid 
agencies tended to downplay the significance of religious and political divisions 
amid the refugee population, focussing instead on largely donor-driven concerns 
regarding gender equity” (South 2008: 94). This situation has somewhat improved 
due to the enhanced presence of UNHCR on the border, but is still far from being 
resolved. In addition, as in any other camp situation, the distribution of rations can 
be accompanied with corruption, to the detriment of the ‘common’ refugees. In 
Mae La Oon camp for example, the camp leader and the camp committee were 
involved in extortion, which was discovered by NGOs and solved discretely91
                                                             
91 Interview with NGO staff member, Mae Sariang, July 3, 2006. 
. While 
access to goods and services is thus certainly better in camp, at least for registered 
refugees, it is not 100% assured and may to some extent still be dependent on a 
refugee’s demographic variables, assets and relative power. 
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Outside the camps, access to goods always depends on financial means since there 
is no relief system, nor are there targeted services for these refugees, which will be 
explained in the following paragraphs.  
 
Health care 
Outside camp, refugees try to treat every sickness by purchasing medicine at the 
local drugstore. While the Karen do that too, they believe that some diseases have 
been caused by health spirits, namely when the illness is very sudden (Isarabhakdi 
2004: 118-122). In that case, they believe in the positive effect of herbal medicine 
and spiritual healing, such as the use of holy water and incantations. All refugees 
will only go to a doctor or hospital when it becomes unavoidable. Even then, they 
expect everything to be solved with medicine (Banki 2006b: 341).  
In principle, everyone is allowed access to Thai hospitals and smaller health centres 
on humanitarian grounds (Isarabhakdhi 2004: 122). In practice though, the 
Burmese may fear to do so because of their lack of Thai language skills, the cost of 
the treatment, and the required travelling to the clinic which may lead to arrest 
and again costs money due to transport fees and loss of working time during the 
day. Access to health care is thus not always assured. 
Due to the high concentration of Burmese people in and around Mae Sot, health 
care is in that area not only provided by Thai hospitals, but also by health centres 
set up by refugees. Mae Tao clinic is the largest of these hospitals, and is 
established by a Karen woman named Cynthia Maung. It provides free health care 
for over 100 patients a day, in Karen and Burmese language. Many of the refugees 
in and around Mae Sot mentioned how they would go to this ‘Student’s clinic’ if it 
was really necessary, but how they feared detection by the police. The local police 
knows that the clinic is an attraction pole for Burmese people and regularly 
harasses patients for bribes: 
“Many patients get stopped on their way to the clinic, mostly early 
morning or later in the evening. They do not get arrested in the clinic, 
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but when they are arriving or leaving, and they often get their 
medicine taken from them.  
The police constantly patrols along the rice fields just next to the 
Clinic. A few weeks ago, two men were begging us at night to get into 
the clinic to wash their feet, which we are not allowed to do, so we 
didn’t. Only later it became clear that they were part of a group of 20 
people who had crossed the border into Thailand at night. The other 
18 were held at gunpoint in the field, but these two managed to 
escape. They wanted to get to Bangkok, but they thought that 
nobody would pick them up with their dirty feet. 
And then you have the extended taxi service here. Some of them are 
corrupt, so they take patients back, and then suddenly ask four times 
the cost of the ride. If the patient cannot pay, then they deliver them 
for some money to the police, who brings them to immigration and 
then they are deported”. 
(Interview with volunteer at Mae Tao Clinic, January 9, 2007). 
These problems with the police have resulted into closure of at least one of the 
smaller refugee clinics, namely the one established by YCOWA92
Moreover, even when the disease has been identified, the treatment might not be 
sufficient because the people concerned are illegal and mobile. The following 
episode painfully demonstrates this position: 
.  
“There is a pregnant woman that has been coughing for weeks. 
Antibiotics do not seem to work. She said she already coughed up 
some blood. Tuberculosis. We transfer her to a Thai hospital that 
arranges treatment for TB. The next day she comes back with a bag 
full of medicine. Antibiotics. Nothing for TB. ‘Why not?’ The patient 
didn’t know. Communicating in this border zone where people speak 
Thai, Burmese or some Karen dialect is not easy.  
                                                             
92 Interview with Moe Swe, Director of YCOWA, October 7, 2007. 
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Everything becomes clear when our Thai- speaking medic calls the 
hospital. ‘Yes, that woman probably has TB. But the treatment lasts 
six months. And she is a migrant, so she will probably not finish the 
treatment. She will probably just move somewhere else again to find 
a job or safety. So she does not get treatment. Better no treatment 
than an incomplete one and increasing resistance to the medicine. 
That is the rule.’ ‘But what if she  infects everyone in her village?’ ‘Too 
bad, that is the system’.  
Luckily every system has its small openings and as a tropical doctor 
you tend to get good in finding them. ‘Does your husband cough as 
well?’ ‘Yes, but I haven’t seen him for weeks. He is registered in a 
refugee camp up north’. ‘If he has TB, your whole family can get 
treatment in camp then’. He did have TB (luckily, I fear I have to 
add...). Solution found for this family. Providing treatment for 
migrating illegal people is even more difficult than for camp refugees. 
That is why so little organisations try to do it”. 
(News letter from a foreign doctor who works in a field hospital on the 
border, September 20, 2008) 
 
The story for HIV/AIDS treatment would be exactly the same, regardless of the 
consequences for the person concerned and his/her environment. All these factors 
combined entail that health care for self-settled refugees is still far below the level 
of treatment of camp refugees (which has also been found in other refugee 
situations (e.g. Ethiopian refugees in Guinea (Bulcha 1988: 141)). 
 
Education 
For the self-settled refugee children, education was until recently dependent on 
their legal status. Only refugees who married Thai locals had children with a legal 
status, who were consequently able to go to Thai schools. For the other children, 
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access could be negotiated, depending on the goodwill of the school in question 
and/or bribe money. But in 2005 the RTG decided that even children of illegal 
Burmese parents were allowed to attend Thai schools, which is very promising for 
the future integration of the children concerned (Mekong Migration Network and 
Asian Migrant Centre 2005: 124).  
Still, also in the case of education, some parents prefer the ‘separation approach’. 
In and around Mae Sot for example, the local Burmese network has set up multiple 
‘migrant schools’ to improve the enrolment of Burmese children. These schools, 
which will be accredited as ‘Learning Centres’, provide schooling in Burmese and 
are developing curricula to match Thai curricula93
 
. This separation strategy can be a 
consequence of continued hope to return to Burma and wish to preserve the 
cultural identity, or because of local capacity restrictions- after all, the Burmese are 
estimated to outnumber the Thais by a factor of three in Mae Sot (Myint Shwe 
2004). In other areas, enrolment in Thai schools is usually aimed for. 
4.5 Civic strategies 
 
Civic strategies are strategies that aim to improve access to or public participation 
in community, governmental and public affairs. The Burmese refugees in Thailand 
are not allowed to form associations, but as mentioned above, diaspora 
organisations are nonetheless being set up to improve worker’s related rights, 
health care and education. Usually they stay low-profile though. Voting in Thai 
elections is obviously not possible either, but occasionally Burmese organisations 
do organise elections. Within the camps, elections are held every three years for all 
the important positions in the section, zone and camp committees (TBBC 2008b: 
57). Outside the camp, there can be elections as well. In 18 villages around Mae Sot 
for example, the KYO selected several people, after which the Burmese people 
                                                             
93 Email conversation with the Fred Ligon, director of World Education/World Consortium, April 24, 
2008. 
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could vote on who they wanted as a representative for the next year. Again, a lot 
depends on the area of inhabitancy. 
Documentation and citizenship strategies are also civic strategies but these 
typically require a long, difficult and costly procedure, unless one marries a Thai 
partner. People may try to get a temporary residence or work permit, or a coloured 
identity card, all of which also serve the purpose of protection. Depending on the 
colour of the identity card, the owner enjoys more rights in terms of length of stay, 
access to work and freedom of movement. These coloured cards have only been 
issued in certain provinces, mostly those on the border with Burma (Vicary 2004: 
32). In Tak province, green and sky-blue cards have been given to the hill tribe 
Karen (largest minority group), Lahu, Akha, Hmong and Lisu, but many Burmese 
Karen have them too, as they share the ethnicity of the local Karen population. It is 
indeed very difficult for the government to prove who is Burmese and who is not, 
as some residents have dual nationality due to the fluid border situation in the 
past, while Burma cannot confirm citizenship as they have not issued identity 
documents to many of their citizens in rural areas (Martin 2004: 22). Refugees can 
thus take advantage from this confusion, by blending in into hill tribe villages and 
by cultivating good relationships with local leaders. These local authorities94 have 
after all a more appreciable presence in these remote regions than the central 
state does. Access to documentation is thus not always a question of the law and 
formal state policy, but rather of local actors that are of use for a subgroup of 
refugees (Polzer 2008: 10). In this case, that subgroup of refugees negotiates access 
to documentation on the basis of one identity element, namely shared ethnicity, 
rather than a refugee identity. The only issue that can then still inhibit a legal status 
is the cost of the document95
 
. 
                                                             
94 Whereas the fore-mentioned ‘local leaders’ need not be state-related authorities (Polzer 2008: 9), but 
can in principle also be church leaders, imams, rich landlords, and these more, all respondents only 
mentioned state authorities or brokers (explained below) when explaining how they obtained an 
identity card. 
95 Email conversation with NGO staff member based in Mae Sot, June 25, 2008. 
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Table 4: Coloured identity cards 
 
Orange or violet: temporary residential status for Burmese illegal people who 
arrived after 1976. No freedom of movement, although in practice tolerated 
in nearby villages. 
Pink: residence permit for Burmese displaced people outside camp. No 
freedom of movement, although in practice tolerated in nearby villages. 
Permanent residential status if holder can proof entry before 1976. 
Green with small red border: residence permit. Freedom of movement in the 
district. Intended for hill tribe people who never received any other status. 
Permanent residential status if holder can proof entry before October 3, 1985.  
Sky-blue: residence permit but not citizenship. Freedom of movement in the 
province, although in practice tolerated in close-by provinces as well. 
Intended for hill tribe people. Permanent residential status if holder can proof 
entry before Oct 3, 1985. Thai nationality (and thus Thai identity card) if 
holder can proof that he/she is Thai.  
Source: internal document IRC, October 12, 2005; personal interviews with refugees; Toyota 
(2005: 121-123) 
 
While in principle one should belong to only one category, in practice people seem 
to be getting a different (better) coloured identity card as time passes. The pace to 
get a different card does not seem to be pre-determined though, but depends on 
the particular village. However, many people lack evidence to proof that they 
entered before 1976 or 1985 and even ‘real’ hill tribe people often cannot proof 
that they are Thai because they lack a birth certificate (Toyota 2005: 119), thus a 
lot depends on the goodwill of the local power holders. Moreover, none of these 
coloured cards provide full citizenship, which impedes full freedom of movement, 
getting a diploma, voting and owning land. As Toyota (2005: 118) states: “They are 
subjects of the state without citizenship”.  
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As life in Thailand is so difficult without an identity card, the black market is, 
unsurprisingly, active in this business as well. They can be obtained for a cost of 
THB 70,000- 80,000, to pay off the registration office, the village headman, the 
‘parents’ and the broker. A safer and cheaper documentation strategy is applying 
for protection to UNHCR, which provides the refugee with a PAB Slip or a 
registration and identity card96
 
, depending on the phase in the procedure. Outside 
the camp, there are no rights attached to these cards though. Cards that do 
constitute a safeguard in the borderland outside camp, without being Thai, are 
papers provided by the KNU, but of course political connections are needed to 
obtain those. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Refugees cannot help but to be economic actors as they need to find a means of 
living in the host country. However, the formal legal framework in Thailand tends 
to be against refugee labour (apart from periodical registrations of ‘migrant 
workers’), and as such is a key determinant in refugees’ vulnerability and ability to 
pursue livelihoods. The constraints they face are quite typical for situations of mass 
refugee influx: they are seen as temporary ‘guests’, and have to face restrictions on 
access to work, property, movement and settlement (Jacobsen 2002: 103). This 
formal policy is circumvented by the Burmese though, to the benefit of themselves 
and the local population. As it is very difficult for this overall rural refugee 
population to obtain land or to develop a well-functioning trade business while 
being illegal, the majority is employed by Thai locals. This high level of wage labour 
is substantially different than the predominance of self-employment and small 
businesses found in many other refugee studies (e.g. Dick 2002; Machiavello 2003; 
Jacobsen 2005; Campbell 2005). This difference can be attributed to the large 
                                                             
96 These personal identity cards were given to all the camp refugees in 2007. While there are no rights 
attached yet to these cards, UNHCR and NGOs hope that these will in time lead to access to work 
outside camp since refugees can now easily be identified (TBBC 2006: 6). 
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demand for foreign labour in this case, either seasonally in agriculture or 
construction, or the whole year through in factories, services and tourism (due to 
economic, population and migration trends, as will be explained in Chapter 6). 
Foreign labour is needed because of the well-functioning economy of Thailand, 
which can be contrasted to the state of the economy in many host countries in 
Africa (where most refugee research is conducted). Moreover, Thailand’s economy 
is based on a segmented labour market, with a large-scale low skilled sector that 
provides opportunities for the Burmese. Therefore, both camp refugees and self-
settled refugees integrate on the economic level, and local authorities connive it. 
Everything depends on local negotiations, connections and power structures 
(between refugees, employers, police, local politicians, the central state, the army, 
the international humanitarian community, etc.). 
The subsistence strategies found clearly indicate that camp refugees are not that 
hopeless as is often portrayed (e.g. in Hovil 2002: 10-11), but that they too find 
multiple ways to supplement rations. This is evidence against the aid dependency 
syndrome hypothesis of camp refugees. By saying this I do not want to deny that 
most of the refugees would not be able to survive in the current camp conditions 
without the rations, but simply that most have not resigned themselves to that 
powerless position and to reaching only a very basic level of survival. But of course, 
the opportunity cost of illegal travel and work and potentially risking arrest is a lot 
higher for camp refugees. They not only risk losing rations, but they also stand a 
chance of being seen as KNU-sympathizers due to the control of the KNU over the 
camps, which can put them in danger if deported. Therefore, a number of refugees 
have opted to always stay in the camp, even in the absence of labour options, 
which often results into a feeling of loss of self-determination. It is thus not 
necessarily the gap between a certain desired livelihood outcome and the actual 
outcome which causes frustration, but whether or not the individual has been able 
to effect change in his own conditions though agency (Valtonen 1998: 57). The 
contrast in terms of agency is not as high between camp refugees and self-settled 
refugees per se, but rather between on the one hand, self-settled refugees and 
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those who regularly leave the camp or find ways to regularly supplement their 
rations in camp, and on the other hand those of working age who do not (the 
18.4% in my sample who were unemployed or had to survive on minute petty 
trade). If there would be any aid dependency with a negative impact on behaviour 
in durable solutions, I hypothesize that it would be more pervasive within this most 
vulnerable population, namely those who do not or hardly supplement rations, as 
they have lost any work ethic. Preliminary evidence in resettlement country US 
suggests that this hypothesis could be correct, with people who worked in Thailand 
being much quicker in finding and keeping jobs97
Other studies have pointed to the relationship between household educational 
attainment and food security. Bulcha (1988: 227-229) for example explains how the 
refugees with a high level of education have the best income, because they 
manage to find semi-professional and clerical jobs in urban areas. However, this 
connection is not present in this case, since the Burmese simply do not have access 
to those kinds of jobs because of their illegal status. Only those refugees with the 
necessary connections manage to get a skilled job with international NGOs. Most 
refugees are thus confined to low-skilled, low-paid labour, leading to downward 
mobility of the educated refugees (even if not necessarily in terms of payment) and 
making previous class and status differences less perceptible. This ‘levelling’ is 
similar to the findings of Vasta and Kandilige (2007) among Ghanian migrants in 
London. 
.  
A livelihoods analysis needs to go beyond a discussion of subsistence strategies 
aimed at improving food security though, unlike most field studies do. Even if the 
economic strategies are obviously an essential element, the analysis above clearly 
indicates that protection and civic strategies, as well as strategies to improve 
access to goods, property and services are very important as well. People develop 
strategies to improve their resilience against shocks in a holistic way, thus all these 
strategies are linked, which implies that a basic insight in these other strategies is 
required. Refugees actively adapt to their life in exile in a wide variety of ways: by 
                                                             
97 Informal conversation with Stephen Hull, KHRG, who visited various resettled communities (Burma 
conference, Northern Illinois University (3-5 October 2008)). 
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finding a job, but also by establishing schools and hospitals, creating diaspora 
organisations to improve their rights, applying various civic strategies and these 
more. We should not be surprised about their creativity though, as refugees 
generally have survived in very harsh conditions in their home country as well: 
“What is so often forgotten is that before they became refugees, such individuals 
lived independently in the cities, slums and villages of their home countries, and 
found ways of fending for themselves: there is no welfare state in Africa” (Hovil 
2007: 614). The same could certainly be said for Burma and its citizens. However, 
when comparing the refugees’ strategies in Thailand with the limited evidence on 
their livelihoods inside Burma, there seems to be little continuity, unlike findings by 
Horst (2006c) on Somali refugee livelihoods in Kenyan camps. There are a few 
elements of continuity, such as the large risk of expropriation on both sides of the 
border, as well as the comparable influence of power, corruption and political 
assets (positive or negative depending on context). But apart from those issues, the 
conditions before and after flight are simply too different and strategies seem to be 
adapted to life on the Thai side of the border, regardless of culture and lifestyle 
prior to displacement (similar to conclusion of Vincent and Sorensen (2001: 274)). 
Protection and various civic strategies are aimed at decreasing the risk of arrest 
and deportation, as well as at improving labour conditions and access to services. 
Subsistence strategies have changed enormously due to the switch of a food 
production economy to a monetary economy, which was necessary because of the 
lack of access to land. Another important modification is the large role of 
international actors, certainly in the field of goods and services in camp and to a 
lesser extent in urban areas. Their presence can also explain the increased interest 
of both camp and urban refugees in English language skills. Change thus seems to 
be more pervasive than continuity with the past. 
These changes due to displacement also have an influence on informal institutions, 
such as gender roles. An important modification is the increased relative power of 
women, certainly in the camps. This occurred both because of the insistence of 
NGOs on gender rights (and human rights in general), which led to a larger number 
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of women in high-level functions, and because of the agency of the KWO. The KWO 
has established safe houses for abused or divorcing women, organised courses on 
domestic violence, pushed the camp management and the KNU for more women’s 
participation (in fact, the former head of KWO is  now the General Secretary of the 
KNU), etc. As a result, the issue of gender equality has come to the forefront. Also 
the fact that both boys and girls get education in camp leads to a radically higher 
education rate of refugee girls compared to their counterparts in Burma, but also 
compared to their mothers and fathers, enlarging their influence (Brezovich 2005: 
23). This higher education of youngsters leads to changed preferences, for example 
against arranged marriages, or in favour of English language skills which can lead to 
NGO jobs, which can in turn lead to a clash with the  traditional leaders (Turner 
2006; Clark 2006), which is occurring to some extent. On the other hand, given that 
the Karen society is a collective society, these tensions seems to be eased 
somewhat because respect is not only earned through socio-economic position but 
also through what one does for the community98
Also outside camp, gender relations change, certainly in urban areas. As there are 
many jobs which are reserved for women, refugee women tend to find work 
quicker. As a result, their responsibility and relative power in the household 
enlarges. Displacement has thus generally led to increased gender equality, or at 
least awareness of gender issues. Changes to social institutions and practices thus 
resulted from the necessary adjustments to the new socio-economic conditions, 
which can also be seen in other refugee situations (Vincent and Sorensen 2001: 
271).  
. 
Returning to the basic research question of the importance of settlement choice for 
refugee livelihoods, in this chapter it has become clear that the settlement choice 
that refugees make is very important, as it influences their assets, strategies and 
social and economic outcomes. Once a person is registered, living in camp ensures 
better food security and improved personal safety due to access to protection, 
rations and a wide range of services. The income of camp refugees seemed to be 
                                                             
98 Email conversation with Miles Jury, Community Liaison Officer of TBBC, December 28, 2007. 
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more irregular than of self-settled refugees (unless there was permanent family 
splitting), but this is not necessarily problematic as they have a robust safety net to 
fall back upon, namely the relief system. As long as one does not leave the camp, 
the contact with the local population (and thus integration) is minimal though. In 
contrast, many self-settled refugees are constantly in danger of arrest, but they 
usually have a more regular income because all adults try to find work to make 
ends meet, feel more in control of their lives (resulting in a better self-esteem) and 
may be able to integrate with positive long term outcomes (e.g. access to land and 
better food security, stay permit or identity card etc.). On the other hand, they lack 
ensured access to services, and are more vulnerable to exploitation and shocks 
(e.g. increased xenophobia at the local level99
Given the large differences between the various settlement options, it should not 
come as a surprise that the durable solutions envisioned by people in these 
different places also differ considerably (see also Section 7.3.2). Even if most prefer 
repatriation if that were possible, currently camp refugees are strongly focused on 
resettlement programmes, while self-settled refugees try to integrate and obtain 
). Moreover, they are ‘invisible’ due 
to their illegal status and subsequent lack of ‘voice’, as well as the lack of attention 
to their existence, certainly outside urban ‘concentration areas’  (Castles et al. 
2005: 31; Polzer and Hammond 2008). Whereas economic integration (in the sense 
of access to work outside camp) is important for most refugee households, the 
level of social integration and local embeddedness was thus particularly for self-
settled refugees found to be an important intermediary outcome that facilitates 
their livelihoods in exile because of the different power structures outside camp. 
After all, they need to engage with the host population and local power figures for 
every need they may have. Which level of social integration they attain and which 
factors influence that level of integration will be explained in the next chapter. 
                                                             
99 For example, in February 2009, a Thai student in Chiang Mai was murdered. Several hundreds of 
Burmese workers were arrested, after which two  were thought guilty. Since that event, there has been 
an enormous increase of hostility of the local population towards all Burmese (mostly Shan in that area). 
Vigilantes took the streets in Chiang Mai, rounding up migrants and sometimes beating them or burning 
their homes, meanwhile demanding the expulsion of all migrant workers in the neighbourhood of the 
campus and an overall stricter management in Chiang Mai (Fry 2009). The local authorities have also 
obliged anyone employing Burmese workers to register informally, and in some areas curfews have 
been imposed on foreign workers (Min Lwin 2009). 
D i s p l a c e d  L i v e l i h o o d s | 149 
 
some form of legal identification. This preference for integration is a deliberate 
choice for some, particularly if they are ethnically related to Thai (hill tribe) locals, 
but it is a necessity for others who are simply not eligible for resettlement as they 
live outside camp. The preference for a certain durable solution, and thus 
expectations for the future, in turn has an influence on current strategies, as for 
example young people who will leave for resettlement tend to neglect school, 
while refugees who keep focused on repatriation tend to stress traditions 
vigorously. Generally speaking, there is thus a clear trade-off in livelihood 
outcomes and desired outcomes when ‘choosing’ a particular settlement option. In 
practice though, there is of course a lot of heterogeneity within each location, thus 
there are no vulnerable groups per se (Schütte 2004; Horst 2006c). Another point 
to make is that vulnerability and livelihood security are two ends of a continuum 
and a refugee’s place on that continuum may change quickly: 
“Vulnerability and agency are multidimensional, relative and 
fluid concepts which capture the realities of different refugees 
at different stages of their lives” (Horst 2006c: 206). 
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CHAPTER 5 : INTEGRATION AND 
TRANSNATIONALISM: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
While the previous chapter has focused on the livelihood strategies developed by 
refugees in the context of the border zone, there is a need to go deeper into how 
these options are influenced by the refugees’ social capital. Social capital is “the 
capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership 
in networks or broader social structures. (...) The resources themselves are not 
social capital; the concept refers instead to the individual’s ability to mobilize them 
on demand” (Portes, as quoted in Vertovec 2003: 648).100
Even if refugees are creative actors, they often need the cooperation of co-
nationals or locals to achieve their goals: “Social capital is a vital aspect of models 
for understanding livelihoods, and the importance of social networks for gaining 
access to other forms of capital is widely acknowledged.(…) Social networks often 
change during conflict and after flight, but their importance does not decrease. 
Before, during and after flight, social capital enables people to access resources and 
make choices they might otherwise not be able to make” (Horst 2006a: 11-12). 
Refugees need the support of fellow refugees in different forms at different stages, 
i.e. the practical arrangements of the flight itself, housing and essentials in the host 
country in the first few weeks, emotional support, advice, connections with 
employment and financial networks, to celebrate together etc. (Vertovec 2003: 
 Hence social capital is 
not only intrinsically valuable (i.e. people value friendships and social relations in 
themselves), but also instrumentally valuable (it assists in the formation of other 
types of capital) (Sen, in Schafer 2002: 38). 
                                                             
100 The definition used here is based on the vision of social capital by Pierre Bourdieu who sees social 
capital as an individual asset. This can be contrasted with the view on social capital by Robert Putnam, 
who considers it a feature of communities (Portes 1998). 
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650; Jacobsen 2006: 282; Vasta and Kandilige 2007: 20). This case is no exception. 
Meeting places (for example tea shops) in Burmese neighbourhoods in Thailand are 
the contact point for new arrivals, where they can stay temporarily and/or hear 
about asylum procedures. In addition, informal safe houses have been set up by 
individuals, political groups and CBOs (for example Association for the Assistance of 
Political Prisoners (AAPP)) to provide the new arrivals with food and housing for the 
first few weeks. Through these networks, they can be introduced to Thai employers 
and house owners. 
“When I first arrived AAPP helped me. I have a work permit since 
2004, which was paid for by a Japanese friend. A Thai businessman 
was convinced to get it for me, even if I am not actually working for 
him. We just understand each other. I got UNHCR-registration and 
was moved to Nu Poh camp just 3 months ago, in the batch of urban 
slipholders. Just five days ago I got out of the camp again, to do 
fundraising for migrant schools, a job given to me by AAPP. I am also 
still working underground, helping the people in Burma to get the 
work done”101
While initiatives for newcomers thus exist, there is still a climate of distrust that 
needs to be overcome by new arrivals without previously established connections: 
“Today I was visited by a desperate woman. She can’t find a job, has 3 children and 
doesn’t know what to do. No one wants to help her here, she doesn’t have any 
connections, and the family of her diseased husband in Burma doesn’t want to 
support her either. She was crying. I will try to find a job for her, here in Mae Tao 
clinic. But other Burmese staff said that before they will give her a job, they will 
check her story and find out whether she is not a spy”
.   
102
                                                             
101 Interview with political refugee, AAPP office, Mae Sot, December  20, 2006. 
. Coming from a country 
permeated by fear for the SPDC and its widespread informants network, the 
climate of suspicion thus persists in exile. Therefore, individuals who have 
established links with other Burmese in Thailand before their flight can more 
rapidly improve their livelihoods in exile than new arrivals lacking those 
102 Interview with expat psychological counsellor, Mae Tao Clinic, November 17, 2007. 
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transnational networks, which corresponds to research findings among 
Mozambican refugees in South-Africa (Golooba Muteebi, quoted in De Vriese 2006: 
14).  
In addition, refugees may try to develop social relations outside their ‘in-group’, 
with the host community. Investing in social relations with people in different 
localities and social groups is after all an effective risk-spreading strategy. Certainly 
outside the camps, the importance of connections with the local community is 
great, as this kind of social capital enables refugees to successfully negotiate their 
stay and their activities: “The ability of refugees to work and move around freely 
outside of camps is contingent upon the good will and cooperation of most of the 
local population, their leaders, and the local authorities. In the absence of this good 
will, refugees encounter hostility, antagonism, and even threats, and the host 
community is more likely to call on the national government to clamp down on 
refugees. When the local community accepts refugees, they are better able to hide 
from authorities, face fewer security threats, and are more able to pursue 
livelihoods” (Jacobsen 2005: 16). For access to housing, land, services and jobs, self-
settled refugees in Thailand are to a large extent dependent on the host 
population. This development of social relations with the host community can go 
up to the level of real friendship and social integration, or can be restricted to  a 
form of economic and structural integration.  
But in contrast to a common public perception in several Western European 
countries, integration does not necessarily imply a complete assimilation in the 
host country or ‘new home country’. Successful integration might very well go hand 
in hand with strong connections with the country of origin at different levels 
(social, cultural, economic, political): the relationship between integration and 
transnationalism is NOT a zero-sum game103
                                                             
103 This was the common conclusion at the 2007 COMPAS Annual conference, Oxford. For quantitative 
evidence, see Guarnizo et al. 2003. 
 , which confronts popular perceptions 
of ‘national identity’, citizenship, cohesion and migrant incorporation (Zetter 2007: 
180). I therefore disagree with Wahlbeck’ s statement (2002: 225) that the most 
significant relation of refugees is always with the society of origin through 
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transnational contacts. Refugees seek a kind of co-existence of integration and 
transnationalism, which is not necessarily easy for the person concerned. Both 
notions of home and ‘non-home’ change, and these conflicting narratives of 
identity and belonging can be painful for migrants and refugees (see e.g. Smith 
2002; Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 6; Essed et al. 2004: 12).  
Both bonding capital (with the ‘homogeneous’ ‘in’-group) and bridging capital (with 
Thai locals) are thus vitally important104
                                                             
104 The concepts ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging capital’ were coined by Robert Putnam and are used in 
numerous studies (e.g. Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006: 12; Cheong et al. 2007). 
, but social capital has its drawbacks as well. 
Time, energy and money have to be spent to maintain connections, which may 
start to become a heavy burden after a while. For example, studies have pointed 
out that the sending of remittances to family members in other countries may 
hinder a refugee’s prospect of successful integration, due to constant phone calls 
for support, higher costs in the new host country and increasing indebtedness 
(Nyberg-Sorensen and Van Hear 2003; Van Hear 2004; Akuei 2004; Jacobsen 2005: 
56-68; Lindley 2007b), while on the receiving end, constant remittance sending can 
create dependency. Excessive dependency on social capital is thus a sign of 
weakness, rather than strength. Moreover, social connections can be to the 
detriment of a person’s individual freedom and can lead to downward levelling 
norms (Portes 1998: 18). Another important note is that not all sources of social 
capital are valued highly in the host society. On the contrary, some assets during 
war time may become liabilities in exile. In this case for example, previously strong 
connections with rebel armies lead to the exclusion from resettlement 
programmes. More social capital will thus not necessarily lead to better outcomes, 
as the value depends very much on the particular context. Lastly, while bonding 
capital can lead to an improved access to assets, it can also lead to the exclusion of 
others (Portes 1998: 18) and to marginalisation as a group (Bulcha 1988: 183), thus 
it is important for an individual to obtain a healthy balance with bridging capital. 
For the sake of convenience, bonding capital was taken to mean the networks in between people from 
Burma, even if the rifts between various ethnic groups of the Thai-based Burma population may be of 
the same order as ‘inter-group’ tensions with the Thai locals. 
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In the first section of this chapter, bridging capital with Thai locals and integration 
in general will be explored, followed by an analysis of bonding capital with the ‘in-
group’, which can be either inside Thailand or across international borders 
(transnationalism).  
 
5.1 Refugee integration in a situation of mass influx 
 
Traditionally, studies on integration discuss several functional indicators: housing, 
employment, access to health services and access to education (Ager and Strang: 
2008: 185-186; Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1035). This approach stems from the fact that 
a refugee status involves the right to protection, which in turn involves access to 
shelter and services and the right to work (Korac 2003: 52; Barnes 2009: 8). 
Research on these practical aspects of integration seeks to measure the outcome 
of (a lack of) integration of a certain migrant/refugee group. Typically, these 
research papers are financed by Western government institutions and finish off 
with policy-oriented recommendations. Alarmingly few studies undertake a wider 
analysis of the issue of integration, such as the social relations of refugees with the 
host population, since this cannot easily be influenced by policy. This is a void, 
given that integration as perceived by the refugees themselves is both about its 
functional aspects and social participation in the wider society (Korac 2001: 4).  
Moreover, there are very few studies on refugee integration in non-Western 
settings, and particularly in situations of mass refugee influx. However, these 
situations are vastly different, as there are usually no individual refugee status 
determination procedures. Instead, there is prima facie recognition of refugees, 
which in practice often results into fewer rights than the Convention status does: 
“Particularly where they are confronted with situations of large-scale influx, States 
tend to seek a trade-off: in return for their acceptance of an obligation to admit 
refugees onto their territory, and to refrain from refoulement, they claim 
discretionary rights in the matter of asylum as a lasting solution, and in the 
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treatment to be accorded to those admitted” (Durieux 2005: 90). As these 
situations of mass influx usually occur in developing countries, the host state often 
does not have the means to ensure access to services for its own population, let 
alone for the refugees. Therefore, refugees are usually required to stay in camps, 
where goods and services are provided by international humanitarian agencies. 
Refugee integration is thus usually not state controlled or even discouraged while 
waiting for other durable solutions, which entails that integration occurs 
spontaneously instead. Even if some literature already exists on the topic (Bulcha 
1998; Kuhlman 1991; Bakewell 2000a; Hovil 2002; Crisp 2004; Kaiser 2006), the 
issue remains greatly underresearched. 
The following sections will look into how integration works in this case study, what 
the influential factors are and whether and to what extent Burmese refugees 
integrate on an economic, social and structural level. Both the micro (from the 
viewpoint of the refugees) and macro perspective will get a chance in the analysis. 
In Chapter 6, it will be assessed what the outcome of these integration and 
livelihood strategies is for the host population (mentioned as an important 
research gap in Landau 2004), while in Chapter 7 other case studies of integration 
worldwide will be looked into for the sake of comparison. This study hopes to 
provide a better insight into this subject, which is currently ignored in Thailand. 
Still, further research will be needed to complete this picture in other geographical 
areas than Tak province, and finer methods will need to be developed to assess 
how refugees feel about integration (identity, internalisation and satisfaction of the 
refugees), as the information collected on this subject was inconclusive.  
In terms of operationalisation, the frameworks developed by Kuhlman and Banki 
were very useful. Tom Kuhlman developed the most diverse research model on 
refugee integration as long ago as 1991, in which he draws on several theories of 
amongst others Kunz and Berry, to come up with a framework that thoroughly 
explains several aspects of refugee integration. Not only the factors that influence 
adaptation are analysed, but also the objective and subjective impact of the level of 
integration on refugees and locals. When assessing this objective impact on 
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refugees, economic, spatial, social and cultural integration are looked into, while 
the subjective impact can be assessed by looking at identity, internalisation, and 
satisfaction. The impact on locals will be discussed in chapter 6. Another source of 
inspiration was a more recent study by Susan Banki (2004). Banki sought to explain 
widely varying levels of integration within a certain refugee population by keeping 
in mind many factors that could possibly effect integration: political (tactical 
security and cross-country relations), security, legal (status of refugee in host 
country), economic and social factors, as well as individual and physical factors: 
geographic (porous border), temporal (arrival time and duration of refugee 
presence) and size-related (number and pace of arrival) factors (Banki 2004: 4-5). 
The influence of these different elements in this case study will become clear 
throughout the following sections. 
 
5.1.1 The impact of security and physical factors on refugee integration 
 
Many conflicting determinants of integration are present in this case study. While 
the porous border, the quiet pace of arrival before the end of the 1980s and the 
shared ethnicity (for the Karen and Shan ethnic minorities) facilitated crossing and 
blending in for some, other factors worked against integration, such as security 
factors and the size of the refugee population.  
Security factors influence integration in several ways, but they had most influence 
during the 1990s. Village-like camps all along the border used to be condoned until 
then, but large-scale attacks on these camps in ’95-‘98 in which Thai civilians were 
killed as well strongly changed the Thai government’s vision on these camps. Camp 
consolidations were considered the only way both to protect and control the 
refugee population. Therefore, the former village-like camps were united into a 
smaller number of larger camps, which were fenced in, obviously limiting the 
amount of contact between locals and Burmese people. However, the majority of 
the Burmese refugees have always stayed outside these spaces of exclusion. As a 
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result, when looking into local integration the self-settled refugees are the main 
research population. 
Another influential factor is the size of the refugee population. At the end of the 
1980s and in the 1990s, there were large influxes of refugees into Thailand (TBBC 
2008b: 58), due to a convergence of several factors: the worsening state of the 
economy in Burma, the ’88 revolution and the internal splits within different rebel 
armies, which resulted into additional fighting. As a result of this increase in 
numbers and ethnicities of refugees, and their spread over Thailand, a feeling of 
‘invasion’ arose in certain areas and the hospitality of the local population 
decreased: “In situations where the refugees differ from locals in significant ways, 
such as language, and where new inflows result in the number of refugees 
exceeding that of the local population, the latter can perceive themselves to be 
socially overwhelmed” (Jacobsen 2001: 20). A vision of refugees as ‘disease 
spreaders’ and criminals arose, which provided a momentum for calls for increased 
control in limited areas and through registrations (security factors). In some areas, 
martial law was even imposed on Burmese people outside camp, which severely 
affected the already weak social fabric of the illegal communities, and it obviously 
strained options for social contact between Burmese and Thai people, hindering 
prospects for social integration. Even without this martial law, the social space of 
the Burmese in Thailand is limited due to their illegal status: “Living under 
clandestine status involves much more than working informally: irregular migrants 
are trapped in a social space limited to the narrow trajectory ‘from home to work’” 
(Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1038). The following extract from an interview clearly 
demonstrates this position:  
“A few weeks ago, I saw a woman very stressed out at Mae Sot 
market. I asked her what the problem was and she said that she 
already lived here for three years but had never left the factory and 
now she did not know how to get back! In TK factory where she 
works, most employees are unregistered. The manager said that they 
would protect the workers as long as they stayed inside the factory 
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compound, but not once they were out, thus many always stay 
inside.”105
Still, in areas such as Tak province, signs of de facto integration are everywhere. 
Several respondents mentioned how many Thai people even encounter a culture 
shock when visiting border town Mae Sot, which has a strong Burmese feel to it. 
Menus are displayed in several languages, sign boards are bilingual and commercial 
activities are directed towards the Burmese customers – whose presence indeed 
greatly enhances the market in these under-populated border regions. On 
important public holidays such as the Thai King’s birthday, Thai and Burmese 
boxing are alternated. This signals that a de facto mutual recognition is present. 
Apart from these mixed happenings, Burmese CBOs also organise festivals, 
celebrations and workshops targeted at co-nationals. Yaung Chi Oo Workers 
Association (YCOWA) for example not only negotiates with Thai employers, but also 
holds political discussions, organises workshops on domestic violence, arranges 
interviews with local and national media, etc
 
106
De facto integration of an individual can entail economic, social and structural 
integration at varying levels, which will be discussed successively in the following 
sections.   
. The formation of these kinds of 
refugee community organisations are seen as a sign of de facto integration, since it 
recognises the present situation as one that is likely to be long-lived and that must 
be coped with (see e.g. Dryden-Peterson 2006; Hale, cited in Ager and Strang 2008: 
178).  
 
 
5.1.2 Economic integration 
 
                                                             
105 Interview with Moe Swe, Director YCOWA, Mae Sot, October 7, 2007. 
106 Interview with Moe Swe, Director YCOWA, Mae Sot, October 7, 2007. 
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When looking into the economic factors of refugee integration, refugees are seen 
in terms of the market: “as either a convenient pool of labor or a threat to domestic 
employment, as either a drain on resources or a boost to demand” (Banki 2004: 5). 
In this case study, an ambiguous image arises when assessing these economic 
factors, as the Thai public opinion is very divided on the issue. On the one hand, 
foreign labour is in high demand with the Thai employers, certainly in those sectors 
that are regarded as inferior by the Thai host population (the so-called ‘3D-jobs’: 
dirty, dangerous and difficult). This is clear from the official request of over one 
million Burmese labourers by Thai employers in 2006 (MAP 2007). On the other 
hand, in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, Burmese people were blamed for taking 
away Thai jobs, which resulted into large-scale deportations. In addition, Burmese 
people are said to cost too much to the local health and education systems and in 
terms of law enforcement personnel compared to the added value they bring to 
the country. However, there is no substantial evidence for this position. On the 
contrary, a recent ILO study has proven that the net economic effect of the 
Burmese workers’ presence on Thailand is positive, both due to their labour and 
consumption (Martin 2007) – which will be further explained in Chapter 6.  
Regardless of the divided opinions, in practice Burmese refugees are economically 
integrated, as has already become clear in the former chapter. As there is no 
welfare system outside the camps, they need to work to survive, either in self-
employment, but more commonly in wage employment for Thai locals. Economic 
integration is the first step of integration and comes before any kind of cultural 
assimilation (Bulcha 1988: 149). It influences many relevant aspects of integration: 
“Promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of 
the host society, providing opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-
esteem and encouraging self-reliance” (Ager and Strang 2008: 170). Still, having a 
job does not imply that the refugees are in the same economic position as Thai 
locals. Most refugees are engaged in lower class, manual labour jobs, regardless of 
their education and skills (as was mentioned in the previous chapter). While 
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employment is thus an important factor in integration, it does not reduce 
inequalities between refugees and locals.  
 
5.1.3 Social integration 
 
“Social integration starts with the establishment of contacts between 
refugees and their hosts. It is through social interaction that barriers 
are removed and attitudes change.(...) Common interests are 
recognised and accommodations made only if interactions take place. 
Here accommodation refers to the mutual adjustment of groups that 
retain their own identity and interest” (Bulcha 1988: 174). 
Integration is thus a two-way process of adjustment. Contrary to the widespread 
economic integration though, refugees find it very hard to integrate socially and 
develop informal relationships with the Thai host population, one of the reasons 
for which is the widespread xenophobia. The feeling of being overwhelmed, in 
combination with the historical feud with the Burmans (see infra), led to a situation 
in which refugees are criminalised and made a scapegoat for societal problems 
(subjective conflict, without a material basis (Bulcha 1988: 189)). However, 
respondents in Bangkok (Burmese CBO workers and Thai academics alike) thought 
the relationship between Burmese and Thais was a lot better in the border area 
because of their constant economic exchanges, which was also my hypothesis. This 
idea proved incorrect though. Reality has changed. Even in mixed Thai-Burmese 
towns and villages in the borderland, refugees are likely to encounter xenophobic 
attitudes. When my rented bike got stolen in Mae Sot for example, the Thai owner 
said: “Yes, you have to be careful, there are so many poor Burmese people here. You 
can’t even leave any money on your table in the shop, because if you turn your 
back, it’s gone. (...) Some people even think I am Burmese. Why would they think 
that? Burmese people are much darker!”. This finding of racism, even in the border 
zones, was confirmed by many respondents and by a USCRI-ABAC study (2007). 
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This attitude is obviously problematic for the refugees’ integration: “The social 
structure of the receiving society and the attitudes of its members towards 
immigrants are variables that determine the speed, the direction and the level of 
socio-cultural integration” (Bulcha 1988: 90). 
Important additional explanations for this bad relationship are the limited 
meaningful contacts and the inability to speak each other’s language. Burmese 
refugees in Mae Sot for example have developed strategies as an answer to the 
existing restrictions that set them further apart from the host society, such as the 
living in separate areas and the foundation of separate schools. They usually only 
meet Thai people at work (in different positions), and when it is necessary to 
procure goods and services such as housing, electricity, water, food and 
transportation (Caouette et al. 2006: 57). And even then, extensive interaction is 
not possible because of language constraints. This lack of ‘meaningful contact’ 
(Hewstone and Schmid 2007) leads to a situation in which many Thai people are 
completely unaware of the reasons that Burmese people are fleeing their country, 
even when living in the neighbourhood of refugee camps. Therefore, speaking the 
same language is essential. Burmese people who do learn to speak Thai are usually 
in a much better position since they are able to explain their presence, enhance 
sympathy and negotiate harassment. Certainly refugees from the second 
generation tend to speak Thai, live more ‘Thai lives’, dress Thai (western) and blend 
in (acculturation). Whether or not this kind of assimilation is also internalised very 
much depends on the person concerned. While some people passed themselves of 
as Thai by wearing yellow t-shirts (colour of the Thai King) on Mondays and 
purchasing identity cards, they often simply did this as a protection strategy against 
harassment (instrumental adaptation). In that case, changes in habits, behaviour 
and lifestyle are simply introduced in order to satisfy basic physical and social 
needs. These people still feel Burmese and tended to be angry at co-nationals who 
denied being Burmese (as observed with one of my interpreters). Others stated 
that even though their parents were Burmese Karen, they felt more like Thai Karen. 
As there was no option to return to Burma and they had been living in Thailand all 
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their lives, they saw integration as the only option. There is thus no guarantee that 
the external assimilation automatically translates into an internalised feeling of 
being Thai (‘belonging’), even in the second generation, or in contrast, that 
everyone stays attached to the country of origin and develops a diasporic 
consciousness (Bakewell 2008b: 15). 
Apart from language skills and personal characteristics, history and ethnicity are 
important factors in this case when explaining the large differences within the 
refugee community in the ability to use and cultivate bridging capital. The struggle 
for autonomy of the ethnic Karen from Burma used to be supported by the Thai 
government, as the Karen army could act as a buffer against the ‘communist 
threat’. The connections are thus quite strong, and some of the Karen leaders have 
been living in Thailand for decades. In addition, these Karen are ethnically related 
to the Thai Karen, and have always had close relations, dating from before the 
international border existed (Toyota 2007). In contrast, Burman people are still 
loathed because of history: the former capital of Thailand, Ayuthaya, was 
destroyed by the Burman army in 1767 after a long line of mutual plunder and 
conquest, which resulted in a historical antipathy between the two people. As a 
result, Karen refugees find it much easier to increase their bridging social capital in 
the host country compared to Burmans. This finding that ethnicity is a very 
important factor for integration is not unique: “In the Third World, the remarkable 
receptivity provided to millions of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, to ethnic kin from 
Bulgaria in Turkey, to Ethiopians in the Sudan, (...) and to Mozambicans in Malawi 
has been facilitated by the ethnic and linguistic characteristics they share with their 
hosts. In this sense, the importance of affinity and shared group identity cannot be 
overstated. If a host community perceives the incoming refugee as ‘one of us’, then 
positive and generous conceptions of distributive justice will apply. The empirical 
evidence is overwhelming” (Loescher and Milner 2007: 20). Likewise, in this case, in 
villages and towns where people do speak the same language and share the same 
culture and ethnicity, prejudice tends to be a lot lower and integration is easier. 
There is usually spatial integration (live in between locals), or at least peaceful 
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cohabitation (settlement close to existing village and good relations) (terms coined 
by Van Damme (1999: 49-50)107). An indicator of this better integration is the level 
of intermarriage, which for the Karen is a common adaptation strategy. Marrying a 
Thai partner guarantees less harassment by police and avoids the risk of having 
stateless and disadvantaged children. This advantage can work both ways, as 
several Thai Karen partners mentioned in interviews how they were encouraged by 
family to look for wives or husbands in the refugee camp nearby (due to the lack of 
suitable partners in their own village), which signifies a recognition of the 
permanence of the refugees’ presence in those areas108. Furthermore, the shared 
ethnicity even facilitates the integration of non-Buddhist refugees. Christian Karen 
refugees in Nusipo village for example, successfully negotiated over land with the 
local Buddhist Karen population to build a church on the edge of the village. For 
special celebrations such as Christmas, all people in the village are invited, 
effectively avoiding tensions109
                                                             
107 For outsiders it is even impossible to distinguish between Thai Karen and Burmese Karen (similar to 
situation of Angolan refugees in Zambia (Bakewell 2004b: 31)). As a result, some denied being Burmese 
when my interpreter asked them if they were Burmese and claimed to be Thai Karen, because it seemed 
the most appropriate nationality in a situation that required guard. Others responded by saying they 
were simply ‘Karen’. 
. Social factors are thus very influential for refugee 
integration. Despite this better social integration in areas with co-ethnics, the 
Burmese do not totally blend in (Brees 2008c: 392). In all the villages studied, 
people knew exactly who was originally Thai and who was not, up to decades after 
arrival. In one case, a Karen man who arrived over 30 years ago and had a Thai 
identity card, was still paying THB 100 a year for a ‘receipt of illegal people who 
fled’. Another respondent waited until we were alone to say: “There is racism 
between Burmese and Thai Karen. But before, my ‘aunt’ was present and she is Thai 
Karen, so I didn’t dare to talk about it. They do look down on illegal people. I could 
not help to leave my country though, there is no peace there. But here they look 
down on me. Sometimes I feel so small, thus I really want to go back. If anything 
changes, I will return, but now I can’t” (Interview with married Karen refugee, 
November 21, 2007). 
108 This finding can be contrasted with the lack of intermarriage between refugees and hosts in Somalia, 
despite shared ethnicity and religion, whom both saw exile as a temporary phenomenon (Kibreab 1989: 
476). 
109 Focus group discussion with four Thai Karen people, Nusipo village, February 6, 2007. 
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While the potential of contact enlarges extensively when refugees speak the same 
language as the locals, class differences are still perceived, which means contact 
does not necessarily go up to the level of real friendship. Indeed, refugees and local 
hill tribe people are often seen as inferior by other Thais due to their lower living 
standard, which can partly be attributed to the process of nation-state building in 
Thailand since the beginning of the 20th Century (Toyota 2006). In this process, the 
‘typical Thai’ was taken to mean the Thais living in the lowland, working on 
irrigated land, speaking Thai and revering the Thai King. All the others who spoke 
different languages and lived in the hills were increasingly seen as non-Thai, and 
were classified as Khon Pa (‘wild people’) (Toyota 2006: 7). The Thai society 
became a homogeneous one, despite the presence of various ethnic minorities in 
the country. Such a non-pluralist society is less open for interaction and 
accommodation, and demands some uniformity of values and behaviour, which 
makes integration more difficult (Bulcha 1988: 175).  
There are thus levels of social integration of individuals. A continuum could be 
imagined with separation/segregation or marginalisation on the one end, de facto 
integration and simple friendliness/tolerance in the middle, and on the other end 
real integration or assimilation110
                                                             
110These terms and their definitions come from Berry’s acculturation model, as adapted in Kuhlman 
(1991: 5-6):     
 which entails ‘meaningful’ contact that can lead 
to readily usable bridging capital: “There is a distinction between social contact with 
local communities that reflects ‘friendliness’ (generally understood as a lack of 
conflict and sense of acceptance) and that which reflects more intensive 
involvement with the local people. It was the former, with its linkage to a sense of 
safety and security, that was most closely associated with positive judgments of 
‘quality of life’ by refugees. However, evidence suggests that the latter may be 
(a) Assimilation: submersion in the dominant society. Migrants become more or less indistinguishable 
from other members of their adopted society. 
(b) Integration: the group maintains its identity but interacts with the society as a whole. Host 
population and refugees live together in an acceptable way. 
(c) Marginalisation: when the group loses its own culture but does not become part of the dominant 
society. Their bridging capital permits them to neither live according to their own standards nor to the 
standards of the host country. 
(d) Separation: no relations with the dominant society, the group sticks to its own identity. The term 
‘segregation’ is used when this separation is imposed by other groups, as is the case for refugee camps.  
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crucial in bringing longer-term social and economic benefits to a community” (Ager 
and Strang 2008: 180). Meaningful contacts with the local population, or (real) 
social integration as I call it, is thus one of the essential factors to achieve 
sustainable local integration.  
 
5.1.4 Structural integration 
 
A further step towards durable local integration is structural integration. The 
structural dimension of integration can be defined as “the full participation of 
migrants in the central societal institutions (especially the educational system and 
the labour market)” (Snel et al. 2006: 299). Legal participation in the labour market 
is weak in this case though, due to the irregular and unpredictable ‘amnesty 
rounds’ for illegal workers and the prohibition of camp refugee work. Likewise, 
participation in the educational system outside camp was until recently prohibited 
for children of illegal parents. In addition to these two factors put forward by Snel 
et al., I argue that in this case, the legal status of a self-settled person is a very 
important element of the structural dimension of integration. There is quite some 
debate ongoing in refugee studies on whether a legal status is important for 
refugees. Whereas Kibreab (1989) and Jacobsen (2001) state that the legal status of 
refugees is significant because without that status even de facto integrated 
refugees remain vulnerable, Banki (2004) and Polzer (2008) disagree after having 
assessed that in various case studies and having found it had little effect. While 
seemingly contradictory, I agree with both. This is possible because I do not 
consider this legal dimension to be confined to refugee papers. On the contrary, 
refugee registration does not help in any way for safety outside camp or 
integration, as was found by Banki and Polzer. If ‘legal factors’ are however seen as 
to include other legal papers provided by the local or national government, they 
are influential. In this case, work permits and residence permits for foreign 
labourers for example are helpful, but unfortunately local police do not always 
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respect the rights attached to these permits and can request a bribe anyway. 
Moreover, these cards are only temporary. Therefore, (coloured) identity cards 
gain more weight in terms of structural integration. The possession of a Thai 
identity card is an important legal factor influencing integration, as this legal status 
greatly diminishes chances of harassment and arrest and improves opportunities 
for legal employment. In that case, the refugee comes close to the durable solution 
of local integration, even if holders of coloured identity cards do not have equal 
rights as ‘full’ Thai citizens have. This finding confirms Polzer’s (2008: 8) statement 
that “refugee protection can be seen as a by-product of successful integration 
processes, rather than integration being a result of refugee protection”. While she 
makes her statement for the case of South-Africa, where there are no camps, it 
holds for all cases where any self-settlement outside camps and integration is 
discouraged. 
 
5.1.5 Preference 
 
Lastly, one important factor still needs to be considered: preference. Indeed, the 
personal characteristics and preference of the refugee him/herself are equally 
important to structural factors when analysing refugee integration, just as they are 
for any livelihood strategy. The example given above on whether or not 
assimilation is also internalised already demonstrated this position, but the point 
can also be illustrated by the political activists’ refusal to integrate. Danièle Joly 
(2002) seeks to explain this phenomenon by contrasting Odyssean and Rubicon 
refugees: Odyssean refugees nurtured a collective project in their country of origin 
that they still support from abroad, while Rubicon refugees did not support such a 
project or abandoned it in exile. For Rubicon refugees, integration and even 
assimilation are possible. Odyssean refugees on the other hand, such as the 
Burmese political activists, are focused on return to their country of origin to 
continue their project, and therefore integration does not appeal to them: “The 
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ends (oriented toward the country of origin) and the means (interaction with the 
society of reception) are complementary. The actors (Odyssean refugees) do not 
mobilize to make a place for themselves in the reception society, but to restore or 
create it in the society of origin” (Joly 2002: 14). Their society of reference 
continues to be the society of origin, which demonstrates the importance of the 
cause of the flight for attitudes towards integration (which is a subject Kunz (1981) 
elaborates further on). Camp refugees may also refuse to integrate, and instead 
consistently stress their ‘refugee-ness’, because they derive their rights to rations 
and services from that status (Malkki 1995). Moreover, if the hope to return is very 
strong (without necessarily supporting a project), refugees may be unwilling to 
integrate as well (Fielden 2008: 3), and instead re-stress their roots.  
Social marginality or separation can thus occur both because the social system of 
the host country lacks the capacity or will to absorb them, but also because the 
newcomers lack the motivation and attitudes to participate in the host social 
system. 
 
5.1.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The livelihood and integration strategies may lead to assimilation, integration, 
marginalisation or separation. Any of these options can be found in the Burmese 
refugee population in Thailand. The conditions for integration are after all 
significantly different depending on region, urbanity and ethnicity as well as the 
assets and preferences of the refugee. Generally speaking, Burmese self-settled 
refugees in Thailand are on the way to intermediate refugee integration, even if 
they lack freedom of movement (Banki 2004: 2-3): 
o refugees are dispersed among the local population, 
o refugees participate in the local economy, 
o a few refugees have been able to obtain land, 
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o refugees are able to access local health facilities (albeit language issues 
remain), 
o refugee children can attend local schools. 
Wijbrandi (1990: 67) would call this a form of ‘subordinate integration’, as the 
living standards, rights, mobility and participation in decision making of most self-
settled refugees are inferior to that of the hosts. Moreover, there is limited social 
integration due to a lack of informal contact opportunities and shared language, as 
well as perceived class differences. Marginalisation or separation may also result 
from a lack of motivation from the side of the refugee or can be related to the 
social system in Thailand, since a homogeneous society requires a higher level of 
assimilation. Of course, there are exceptions to this picture, since people who are 
able to speak Thai and try to blend in, usually manage to establish more meaningful 
contacts and negotiate better outcomes. The level of social integration has thus 
certainly for self-settled refugees a strong influence on their livelihoods. Another 
exception to this general image are the Karen refugees in Karen hill tribe areas, as 
in addition to the factors above, they are socially networked in the host community 
and they are in a very similar socio-economic and political position as the local hill 
tribe hosts (relative component of refugee integration). The case of the Thai-Burma 
border thus confirms the importance of shared ethnicity, culture and language 
(social factors) for integration. Indeed, the people with the least variety in 
economic strategies, the rural self-settled refugees, have the highest potential to 
integrate successfully on the condition that they are ethnically related to the local 
population. Related to this social factor is the legal factor, the (coloured) identity 
cards. While some studies have questioned the importance of legal papers for 
integration, the bottom-up analysis in this case study on the contrary revealed that 
refugees themselves see non-refugee legal papers as the best protection outside 
camp, next to social capital. Other important factors influencing integration are 
security, geography of the border and size of the refugee population. Also location 
has an impact, as integration seemed to be easier in rural areas, where the self-
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settled refugees live scattered, ensuring less conflicts and less police raids than in 
areas with large concentrations of refugees.  
The evidence on the influence of temporal factors (arrival time and duration of 
refugee presence) is ambiguous, as they seem only important if related to security 
(camp consolidation after 1997-1998) and relative size (less hospitality and 
increased xenophobia as Burmese population in a certain area increases). Indeed, 
duration of refugee presence is not an influential factor in the attitude of the local 
population in areas with less refugees or with ethnically related refugees. 
Moreover, other case studies have found that assimilated younger refugee 
generations diminish locals’ xenophobia (Fielden 2008: 4), but this case provides 
mixed evidence in that regard. For example, the self-settled refugees who have 
been in Thailand a long time or were born in exile are indeed better integrated or 
even assimilated (Jampaklay and Entwisele 2005), yet their precarious legal status 
impedes getting access to land or skilled jobs, which also distresses locals who are 
afraid that these restrictions will make them violent: “There is a whole new 
generation of Burmese people growing up here, who have never been to Burma, 
who speak Thai. Security will worsen here, just like in France (2005 suburb riots, 
ed.). Nobody expected it there either. Crime is already very bad now. What will they 
do in the future? They have no land. We already have such big problems with the 
Malay Muslims in the south. We almost can’t handle so many different religions. 
Maybe it will become like in the south here”111
                                                             
111Interview at Mae Sot district office, September 28, 2007. 
. The conclusion thus remains that 
temporal factors are not the most significant factors of refugee integration in this 
case. Also economic factors - as defined by Banki- are not a good indicator of 
integration, as the vision upon Burmese labour is divided within the Thai 
population. However, Thailand’s need for foreign labour is certainly an important 
element of the explanation why so many Burmese workers are de facto tolerated 
on Thai soil. Lastly, political factors have not been powerful indicators of refugee 
integration either. Even if the Thai government has sought to extend (economic) 
relations with Naypyidaw, this had little effect on the large majority of the self-
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settled refugees, as they tend to be invisible and therefore less politically sensitive 
on a bilateral level. It did have a large impact on the small number of registered 
urban refugees (political activists mostly) who had to stop all visible activism on 
Thai soil and were ordered to move to the camps for protection (explained in 
Section 5.2.4). 
This case study demonstrates that refugee integration in case of a mass influx is 
vastly different than in the West. Numerous examples of spontaneous integration 
exist worldwide, in which case integrating refugees are often illegal populations 
with little rights or entitlements. One of those cases is Thailand. Despite the fact 
that Thailand only considers resettlement or eventual repatriation as feasible 
durable solutions, economic, social and structural local integration is ongoing. An 
informed debate on these different forms of integration with all the stakeholders is 
necessary, in contrast with the current view of migration to Thailand as a solely 
economic issue (Huguet and Punpuing 2005: 49). In view of the ongoing mass 
resettlement from the refugee camps, it needs to be discussed what will happen 
with the hundreds of thousands of residual caseloads, new arrivals and self-settled 
refugees. As Huguet and Punpuing (2005: 76) indicated in their state-of-the-art 
study on international migration in Thailand, there is a real need to assess what the 
possibilities are for permanent settlement. In cases where integration for 
subgroups of the refugee population is economically and socially feasible, a policy 
should be developed that surpasses warehousing and deportation for anyone 
outside the regulated camps. Currently this option is not yet explored in Thailand, 
neither by the state, and strikingly, nor by the UNHCR, who are completely silent 
on the issue. Policy options in this regard will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
5.2 Refugees and transnationalism on the Thai-Burmese 
border112
 
 
                                                             
112 A shortened version of this chapter will appear in Oxford journal ‘Global Networks’ (Brees 2009c). 
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Transnational activities can occur in various forms. They can be directed by 
institutions or corporate capitalism (‘from above’, globalisation), or ‘from below’, if 
the agency lies with common people whose activities span two or more nation 
states (Portes et al. 1999: 221; Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 1). This study is concerned 
with the latter form and defines transnationalism as follows: “The processes by 
which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes 
transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that 
cross geographic, cultural, and political borders” (Basch et al., quoted in Wahlbeck 
2002: 223). A transnational community is thus a community whose ties cross 
international borders, including both the people in exile and their families in the 
country of origin. Whereas the term ‘diaspora’ signifies the experience of forced 
migration and the social, cultural and political formations resulting from that, the 
term ‘transnational communities’ is broader: “It is a more inclusive notion, which 
embraces diaspora, but also populations that are contiguous rather than scattered 
and may straddle just one border” (Van Hear 1998: 6). Both concepts point to the 
multiple and simultaneous ways that people belong and incorporate in ‘home’ and 
‘host’ countries (Cheran 2006: 4).  
While transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, globalisation and the new 
technologies of transport and communication have changed patterns of migration 
and possibilities to develop strong connections with the country and people left 
behind. A scheme developed by Nicholas Van Hear (2003: 4) visualises these 
connections between refugees, which he sees as flows and exchanges of money 
and information in and between the different domains of the refugee diaspora: 
Figure 3: Transnational flows 
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Source: Van Hear (2003: 4) 
 
There has been an increasing amount of research on transnationalism and 
remittances, but several gaps remain. Studies on transnationalism tend to focus on 
connections between migrants or refugees in the West and their (developing) 
countries of origin (e.g. Landolt et al. 1999; Al-Ali et al. 2001; Freeman 2002; 
Wahlbeck 2002; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Datta et al. 2006; Portes 2007; Kleist 2008). 
In contrast, the concept has hardly been applied in research into non-Western 
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settings: “This is a reflection of the geographical bias of the literature on 
transnationalism which concentrates on the receiving context of North America, 
and to a lesser extent Western Europe, to the virtual exclusion of communities in 
the rest of the world” (Collyer 2006: 95). In particular, little research has been 
conducted on transnationalism from below in countries from the South that 
receive large refugee populations (exceptions are e.g. Lubkemann 2000a; Stigter 
and Monsutti 2005; Horst 2006c; Young 2006).  
There seems to be a biased idea of refugees in situations of mass influx as 
‘defenceless victims’ (Pupavac 2006: 1), as depoliticised subjects who lack the 
capacity to sustain themselves, let alone support others. However, this does not 
correspond with the reality. Refugees often need to take care of themselves and 
kin in other areas or countries. Having said that, of course the context is 
substantially different for refugees who flee as part of a mass movement to 
neighbouring countries, than for recognised Convention refugees in the West. The 
former often lack a secure legal status, there is usually no welfare system for either 
locals or refugees, they are still in close proximity to their country of origin, etc. 
These differences are bound to have an influence on transnational activities, but 
they do not exclude the possibility of transnationalism. It is thus essential to 
examine whether and which kind of connections exist between refugees in the 
South and their country of origin as well as third countries, to reveal to what extent 
they are transnational actors. In this paper, attention will consequently be directed 
at individual cross-border linkages and experiences, based on interviews with 
refugees. The case study of Burmese refugees in Thailand will clearly demonstrate 
that refugees that are part of a mass influx in the South can engage extensively 
with their co-nationals in all the domains of the refugee diaspora. These 
transnational activities include sending remittances- which is usually the only 
matter looked into when studies have a primary focus on South-South connections- 
but also political, social and cultural transnational activities. It is thus argued here 
that transnationalism needs to be conceived in a more encompassing sense, not 
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only geographically, but also thematically, including economic, political, social and 
cultural links, in order to obtain a holistic vision of the phenomenon.  
Regarding transnational political practices, several points will be disputed. First of 
all, while scholarly attention for refugee activists in situations of mass influx usually 
goes towards their level of militarisation (‘refugee warriors’) or the way conflict is 
spread due to the proliferation of arms, combatants and ideologies (e.g. Durieux 
2000; Lischer 2000; Terry 2002; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), this  study will make 
clear that there are many other ways in which these refugees can be 
transnationally active on a political level. In fact, those ‘other’, indirect, ways may 
be much more common, yet this phenomenon is only rarely looked into in cases of 
mass refugee influx. Moreover, this case will demonstrate that there are not 
necessarily connections between immigrant and homeland politics, in contrast to 
Adamson’s position (2002: 155): “The distinction that is commonly made between 
participation in a host state polity and practices directed towards transforming the 
home state is an artificial one”. While this may be true in cases where refugees are 
legally present, such as Convention refugees in the West, the case of Burmese 
refugees in Thailand will show that this finding cannot be generalised. As most are 
illegal or only have a temporary residence status, they are not a constituency to 
appease in Thailand. Therefore, I agree with Ostergaard-Nielsen’s position (2001) 
that political transnational activities should not be reduced to a function of the 
political opportunity structures (POS) of a receiving country. I would add though, 
that their existence does not depend on POS in the country of origin either. In cases 
of home country dictatorships, there is very little room for political involvement in 
any case, let alone an interest in engaging the diaspora and institutionalising 
relationships, which is a popular subject in transnationalism research (e.g. Levitt 
2001; Koser 2002; Torres 2006; Margheritis 2007). On the contrary, it is the lack of 
POS that is an incentive to remain politically active from a safe distance. 
Nonetheless, despite the absence of any fiat of either the home or host 
government, political transnational activities may exist, as the case of Burmese 
refugees will illustrate. Yet, the analysis will demonstrate that the type of (political 
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and other) transnational activities is influenced by the level of development and 
the policies of both countries. In the following sections, I present evidence to 
support these positions. 
 
5.2.1 Transnational engagement in the context of the Thai-Burmese 
border region 
 
Refugees rely on co-nationals for both practical and emotional support, as 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. Social bonds are also important for 
refugees because it enables them to share cultural practices and maintain familiar 
patterns of relationships, which makes them feel more ‘at home’ (Ager and Strang 
2008: 178). Connections and networks between Burmese people exist both within 
Thailand and across the border with Burma and the wider world, which the 
following table, based on interviews, demonstrates. 
Table 5: Family splitting technique 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid camp-Burma 29 19,0 20,1 20,1 
camp- Thailand 4 2,6 2,8 22,9 
camp- third country 4 2,6 2,8 25,7 
camp-Burma-Thai 
town 20 13,1 13,9 39,6 
camp-Burma-third 
country 8 5,2 5,6 45,1 
Thailand outside 
camp-Burma 46 30,1 31,9 77,1 
other 25 16,3 17,4 94,4 
none- whole family 
here 8 5,2 5,6 100,0 
Total 144 94,1 100,0   
Missing 99 9 5,9     
Total 153 100,0     
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Answers given to the question ‘Is your whole family here, or are there still 
members in other places in Thailand, Burma or a third country?’, were categorised. 
The family-splitting technique is thus clearly a fact. These networks are intended to 
receive but also to provide support, to kin and friends in Thailand as well as in 
Burma: “For many refugees, developing a self-reliant livelihood incorporates the 
responsibility to take care of relevant others in different locations. These networks 
of responsibility link refugees in camps to those in urban areas and in the home 
country; as well as linking regional refugees with members of the wider diaspora” 
(Horst 2006a: 12). The discussion of economic transnationalism will clearly 
demonstrate this position. 
The fact that these cross-border networks have been formed should not come as a 
surprise, given the presence of many conditions that encourage transnationalism 
(Lubkemann 2000b). The prolonged armed conflict and the conditions of pervasive 
insecurity in Burma have encouraged strategies of risk diversification, such as 
migrating abroad. Certainly Thailand is a popular destination which has historically 
promoted connections across the Thai-Burma border. Even if at several places the 
international boundary is only a river or mountain range, crossing the border 
provides protection and opportunities: “The ethnic villagers might not have seen 
the borders when these were initially established between the states, but they have 
learned to see, and utilize, these today” (Dean 2007: 197). In addition, more 
recently, refugees in Thailand have formed worldwide networks, which was only 
possible because of the greater access to technology, greater economic resources, 
and improved human capital acquired through training on Thai soil.  
However, by no means all refugees are transnational. There are structural 
inequalities within refugee groups that influence whether someone will become 
transnational. All demographic variables, such as age, gender, religion and class 
have an impact. Next to these elements that can be found in cases worldwide, 
ethnicity is a particularly important factor in this case. As was mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the Karen are ethnically related to the Thai Karen and have 
always had close relationships, both due to century-old trading and market 
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patterns as well as political reasons. As a result, Karen refugees have a stronger 
transnational network to fall back upon than Burmese people from other 
ethnicities. Furthermore, apart from this differential historical relationship, there 
are also personal, social, religious and political frictions within the diaspora, which 
influence livelihoods and transnationalism (Al-Ali 2002; Banki 2006a).  
On top of these features, personal skills and assets matter, as well as, again, 
preference. Some refugees may have the capacity but not the desire to become 
transnational. After all, the relationship between stayees, refugees in neighbouring 
countries and resettled refugees may not be good: “There are many suspicions and 
prejudices between them, related to the fact that those who remain in their country 
feel betrayed by those who left, and those who left feel that the ‘stayees’ are guilty 
of the partiality in war time. There are numerous examples of the problematic 
relationship between refugees and stayees, which in many ways resembles the 
relationship between migrants and non-migrants in general” (Horst 2006c: 211). 
Others are very much motivated to become transnational. Researchers have 
detected many motives: from a desire for transformation, contestation and 
political change, to nostalgia, prestige or status enhancement (ensure that ‘there is 
a way back’), social pressure, pure altruism (care, guilt feeling), pure self-interest 
(wish to inherit, preserve control of certain assets) or economic motives (provide 
income insurance for each other, repay loans or investments) (De Haan 1999; Al-Ali 
and Koser 2002; Guarnizo 2003; Akuei 2004; Lindley 2008). These diverse motives 
also imply that transnationalism is not always liberating and empowering for the 
individual concerned (e.g. in case of family or group pressure). 
In the following sections, the different types of economic, social, cultural and 
political transnationalism on the Thai-Burmese border will be discussed 
successively, with ethnic distinctions only being made where necessary. However, 
this does not imply that all the refugees are necessarily active in at least one of 
these transnational activities, as the discussion above has demonstrated. The goal 
is to examine the wide variety of transnational activities encountered in the field, 
but quantitative research based on a large representative sample will need to verify 
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whether the proportion of Burmese refugees that engage in transnational activities 
and have transnational identities is large enough to call them ‘a transnational 
community’. Moreover, due to the focus on Tak province, a lot, though not all, of 
the transnational activities found are in between Karen people. As Hannerz (cited 
in Horst 2002: 2) notes, there is always a trade-off in transnational research 
between intensity and dispersion. Other research will need to verify whether the 
activities found are similar in other settings in Thailand, which preliminary contacts 
seem to confirm. 
 
5.2.2 Economic transnational activities 
 
Financial remittances are generally defined as: “that portion of a migrant’s earnings 
sent from the migration destination to the place of origin” (Nyberg-Sorensen 2004: 
4). Although remittances can also be sent in kind, the term ‘remittances’ usually 
refers to monetary transfers only. There is also some discussion on whether there 
needs to be an exchange of ownership to be able to use the term ‘remittances’. 
Whereas Asian Development Bank states that migrants who personally bring back 
the money they have earned are not considered as remitting persons (ADB 
2006:19), Nyberg- Sorensen (2004: 6) does consider these personal transfers as 
part of the overall remittances. In this study, the second view will be followed since 
it is money earned abroad with the purpose of sustaining family or friends’ 
livelihoods, no matter how it has been transferred. It is important to study 
remittances as they are more stable than private capital flows and less volatile to 
changing economic cycles. The stability of remittances arises from the fact that 
senders are unlikely to be affected by the same shocks as recipients because they 
are in other parts of the country or region or overseas (Savage and Harvey 2007: 9). 
Remittances sent to developing countries in 2000 were estimated at over US$ 72 
billion, which at that time already represented a large proportion of the world’s 
financial flows, substantially more than global official development assistance 
(ODA) and more than half of foreign direct investment flows to these countries 
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(Gammeltoft 2002; Nyberg-Sorensen 2004: 3). In 2007, registered remittances rose 
to no less than US$ 240 billion, partly also because of the surfacing of informal 
remittances and because of the depreciation of the USD (de Haas et al. 2009: 25). 
But as many remittances are still transferred through informal channels, their 
actual amount and importance is even higher. 
While sending remittances is not the original reason for refugees to leave their 
country, once they have found new venues for income generation, they often do 
start remitting, certainly if their family left behind asks for it: “In trying to meet 
their responsibilities, refugees cannot help but to become economic actors, for they  
not only have to address their own livelihood needs, but also the needs of those 
they have left behind in the homeland. (...) Refugees therefore cannot help being 
economic migrants- a charge laid by many critics of immigration” (Van Hear 2007: 
5). Even though refugee migration is thus not undertaken to diversify a household’s 
income, it may nevertheless have that effect (Lindley 2008: 6). The Burmese 
refugees in Thailand are no exception to this picture. Those who manage to 
establish contact with the family left behind and have a relatively stable- but 
necessarily legal- source of income, are frequently found to remit money113
“We only have enough money to support my husband’s family. 
Whenever someone from his family comes to visit us, we try to 
give them some money to take back, so they can buy food with 
it. But now I can’t work since I need to take care of the baby. 
. The 
regularity of income thus influences the capacity of mutual help networks 
(Gonzalez De Rocha 2007), which explains why not all refugees who have 
established contact also send remittances.  
                                                             
113For more information on the several factors that generally influence remittance behaviour, check e.g. 
Nyberg-Sorensen (2004: 19) and Lindley (2006; 2007a; 2008). Lindley (2006:24) argues for example that 
not only the material parameters of the senders have an influence on remittance sending, but also the 
ones from the recipients: “Migrant’s income level, household composition in the UK, and the income, 
location, and security situation of the recipient, and whether they receive help from other family 
members, can also shape financial transfers”. 
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It’s very hard. I would love to contact my friend who moved to 
Sweden. Maybe she can help me by sending some money”114
Another important variable are social expectations, since mostly unmarried self-
settled refugees are expected to send remittances to their parents and to a lesser 
extent to siblings. By sending remittances, refugees have thus found a way to take 
care of their parents without being physically present, living up to the obligations 
of this collective culture (Lindley 2007b: 14). However, how the money is actually 
used remains uncertain. The remittance senders thought the money was used for 
consumption/survival and house needs, but they mentioned how they had little 
control over actual uses by family members. As Lindley (2006: 22) argues, this 
uncertainty does not really fit with the idea of ‘the New Economics of Labour 
Migration’ (NELM) that these financial transfers are a rational ‘transnational 
household livelihood strategy’. 
.  
The remittance system has no special name. It is an informal system, as it is not 
under government control, operates outside formal banking systems and mainline 
money transfer businesses (at least from Thailand to Burma), and it arranges 
transfers between people who know or are related to each other (Hansen 2004; 
Blackwell and Seddon, cited in Pieke et al. 2005: 18). Informal systems are usually 
trust-based, effective, inexpensive, speedy and accessible (Maimbo 2004) 115
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
114 Interview with Burmese refugee. Mae Sot, November 23, 2006. 
115 For more information on informal remittance systems in other case studies, see Pieke et al. (2005) 
‘Synthesis study. A part of the report on informal remittance systems in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries’. 
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Figure 4: Remittance flows 
 
 
 
Patterns of remittance sending are explained in the scheme above. In my sample, 
the bulk of the remittances were hand-carried into Burma, by family or friends. 
Both in-kind- transfers and hand carry of large amounts of remittances remain 
tricky though, due to the insecurity and the numerous checkpoints inside Burma. 
Other people therefore hired professionals, who are simply called ‘carriers’ or 
‘middlemen’. These can be based on either side of the border but are always of 
Burmese origin. Once inside Burma, the money can be transferred further by hand-
carry, but a few people also mentioned transfer by bank in Myawaddy (Burmese 
border town), which is risky: “It is dangerous because if somebody receives a lot of 
money, the government will try to find out why that is, so we have to be careful. If 
we use the banks, we can only send small amounts, that is ok, but large amounts 
draw attention” (Interview with carrier, Mae Sot market, January 8, 2007). 
Another, safer, possibility is value transfer of remittances, without letting the 
money physically cross the border (hundi system). In that case, the collector in 
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Thailand calls his counterpart in Burma, often closely related family, who gives the 
amount due to the recipient. Once the remittances have arrived, it is possible that 
they are shared between extended family members, which explains the extra 
arrow of ‘recipients’ to ‘recipients’ in the scheme.  
The benefits for the carriers are the profits from the exchange rate and a service 
fee, ranging from 5 to 10%, and occasionally as high as 20 %. This percentage can 
be paid by the sender or shared by sender and receiver (Mekong Migration 
Network and Asian Migrant Centre 2005: 122). The account between the collector 
and his counterpart is settled in goods or through near-monetary commodities 
such as gold, precious stones or (sometimes) contraband such as narcotics (Turnell 
et al. 2008: 8). While the hundi-system was also used by people in my sample, the 
majority of the remittances were hand-carried into Burma, which is very likely an 
effect of the closeness of Tak province to the border. In contrast, the large survey 
by Turnell et al. (2008: 13) found that the hundi system was used twice as often as 
any other method, as it is the quickest method for people located further away 
from the border. It is also supposedly safer, but even the hundi system can lead to 
deceit though, as real remittance companies are not yet established. Carriers tend 
to work independently from each other, which leads to an enormous 
fragmentation of the carrier market, and to an inadequate spread of information 
regarding the reputation of the different carriers, which seems to have resulted in 
abuses in the past: “Why are you trying to find carriers? Do you need to transfer 
money? Do not go there, they will cheat you. Be careful!”116
Estimates on these informal transfers from Thailand to Burma vary greatly. Huguet 
and Punpuing (2005: 46) consider THB 5310 million per year (US$ 155.3 million as 
at January 12, 2009) a conservative estimate of remittances, while Turnell et al. 
. Alternatives to the 
informal remittance system are non- existent however, given the fact that the 
banking systems in Thailand and Burma are not compatible, and that sanctions and 
consumer boycotts have prevented Western Union or other money transfer 
agencies from establishing seats in the country.  
                                                             
116 Reaction of Burmese refugee on Mae Sot market, when my interpreter was cautiously sounding 
people out on where to find carriers. Mae Sot, January 8, 2007. 
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(2008: 11) suggest an amount of around US$ 300 million annually. However, these 
estimates need to be refined, as they are calculated by multiplying the average 
amount sent in the sample with the estimated number of Burmese people in 
Thailand (bottom-up approach, as recommended in Pieke et al. 2005: 13). Yet, the 
exact number of Burmese in Thailand is unknown, and I found that not everyone is 
able or expected to send money.  
Refugees can of course also receive remittances themselves. Due to the 
resettlement of a limited number of refugees (mainly political activists) to third 
countries in the past, remittances are reaching family members in Thailand through 
bank accounts of Thai locals117
“A refugee knew me from my work in camp, so he asked me if I could 
act as a middleman. His resettled family in Canada sent money to my 
bank account. I made the withdrawal, faxed the receipt to Canada 
and gave the refugee the money. So it does happen through the bank, 
but not necessarily through a specialised remittance agency”.  
, for a small fee, or through fellow refugees with id 
cards: 
(Interview with NGO staff member, Mae Sot, June 29, 2006) 
 The money can then be spent in Thailand or be transferred further into Burma. At 
the time of the field research, the number of refugee recipients was still limited 
though. But as the resettlement programmes are at full speed since the end of 
2006 (totalling up to 55.000 by September 2008), I expect the importance of 
remittances for the livelihoods of the remaining refugees to rise substantially in the 
future.  
Apart from financial remittances, there are other forms of transnational economic 
activities (Nyberg-Sorensen 2004: 29), of which community aid (discussed in the 
next section, as the social goal is more important than profit-making) and business 
investments are of importance in South-South connections. Transnational 
economic entrepreneurs invest in businesses in the homeland (Guarnizo 2003) or in 
                                                             
117 Interview with son of phone shop owner, Nu Poh camp, November 26, 2007. 
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cross-border businesses, as they have the benefit of knowledge of both economies 
and societies along the border. In the course of my research, I met with money 
changers and remittance carriers, but also for example with farmers, growing corn 
and chillies on their fields inside Burma but selling the harvest to large buyers in 
Thailand. In addition, some people crossed every day to sell and buy products, as 
the century-old five-day market system includes villages on both sides of the 
border (see also Dean 2007: 193). I also found anecdotal evidence of cross-border 
businesses in weaving wool, fabric, teak wood, medicine, wild animals (tigers, 
elephants, monkeys)118
Financial remittances and investments are only one part of broader networks of 
engagement and solidarity between refugees and their homes though. The next 
section will  discuss the exchange of skills and knowledge, community engagement 
and cultural transnationalism. 
, drugs, human trafficking, etc. However, large-scale cross-
border businesses are in the hands of Thai, rebel- and junta-related businessmen, 
as the refugees’ illegal or camp status prevents them from engaging officially in 
economic trade. Furthermore, none of my respondents was currently investing in 
businesses in the homeland, as the war and poor economy in Burma unsurprisingly 
discourage investments, and also because they tend to be too poor to invest.  
 
5.2.3 Socio-cultural transnational engagement  
Individual social remittances 
 “We can see the importance of global communications technologies 
in maintaining connections across space, but they also play an 
important role in maintaining (or changing, ed.)  identities and 
community through film distribution, home videos, letters, phone 
calls, religious and human rights resources, both written and 
audiovisual”.  
                                                             
118 Interview with NGO staff member, Mae Sot, November 29, 2006. See also Taramon and Lawi Went 
(2008). 
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(Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 1998: 22) 
Refugees change due to life in exile and in turn can affect changes in their country 
of origin. Levitt (1998: 930) argues that the degree to which migrants/refugees’ 
interpretative frame is altered depends on the amount of contact they have with 
the host population. She insists that more contact will result into greater exposure 
to the different features of the host society, more reflection on existing practices 
and therefore greater potential for incorporating new routines. While this is 
correct, I would argue that living in exile can influence and change refugees’ minds 
due to various factors, not just contact with the host population. While camp 
refugees have less contact with the host population than self-settled refugees, they 
are exposed to several factors which together largely increase the likelihood of 
changing camp refugees’ interpretative frame119
1) the presence of numerous UN agencies and international NGOs in the 
refugee camps, 
:  
2) the schooling and training offered in camp (e.g. ICT), or sometimes 
through internships outside camp 
3) the increased exposure to global discourses on e.g. human rights and 
women rights,  
4) the concentration of different ethnic groups in small closed spaces  
and 5) the increased emphasis on refugee identity and Karen identity.  
These factors are likely to affect camp refugees more strongly in the construction 
of their own identities and ideas of the world and of their place in it, than contact 
with Thai local people will. Both camp refugees and self-settled refugees are also 
affected by the easier access in Thailand to global flows of images, ideas and news 
(political and other, such as the English football league which is very popular)120
                                                             
119 I would like to thank Marc Vanderstouwe for bringing this point to my attention. 
. 
120 A lot has been written on this subject by Sandra Dudley, who investigates for example the influence 
of global images on the Karenni in the camps, and how the consumption of these modern elements 
stands in stark contrast with the marginality they encounter as refugees in Thailand (Dudley 2002). A 
related aspect of her research is how a self-determination movement’s ideology, objectives and 
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These flows influence in particular the youth: “As more objects, images and 
knowledge are consumed, so more is desired, and so grows the realization of being 
a part of a wider community. Becoming refugees and coming to the camps has 
hastened and intensified this process for all, but perhaps particularly for young 
people” (Dudley 2002: 171). 
For the self-settled refugees who do not speak the local language, meaningful 
contact with the host population is minimal, which ensures that they are ‘recipient 
observers’: “They did not actively explore their new world because the structure of 
their lives did not bring them close enough to it. Instead, they took in new ideas and 
practices by observing the world around them, listening to how others described it, 
or learning about it by reading the newspaper or watching television” (Levitt 1998: 
931). People who are better integrated can either be instrumental adapters (re-
adjust reference frames for pragmatic reasons) or purposeful innovators (creatively 
combine several aspects).  
These new ideas and points of view can then be transferred to others. By keeping 
contact with their family members left behind, migrants and refugees are potent 
agents of change. Through letters, emails, blogs, phone, fax or holiday visits, they 
exchange ideas, practices and emotions- a phenomenon called ‘social remittances’ 
(Levitt 1998). They can transfer new values and beliefs, such as norms for 
interpersonal behaviour, standards of age and gender appropriateness, norms 
about the role of clergy and politicians etc. This exchange has the potential to 
influence social hierarchies and fixed mindsets in the home community, thus 
transnational activities on a household level can have political consequences. For 
example, the increased responsibility of refugee women in Thailand due to access 
to remunerated labour and the gender awareness raising activities in the Thai 
refugee camps can lead to a transfer of these ideas to family members at home, 
and as such to a growing concern for female participation in domestic decisions 
and political matters in Burma. In general, it is unpredictable whether social 
remittances will have a positive or a negative effect: “There is nothing to guarantee 
                                                                                                                                               
resources are influenced by economic, political and social connections between its people, the diaspora 
and the wider world, but also by cultural links (Dudley 2002). 
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that what is learned in the host society is constructive or that it will have a positive 
effect on communities of origin. Factors increasing social remittance effect are 
‘ethics blind’" (Levitt 1998: 44). Moreover, not all elements of the life in exile will be 
transferred home (e.g. negative experiences tend to be kept silent about), nor will 
receivers adopt all elements; both senders and receivers employ filters. 
Next to ideas and norms, practices can be transferred as well, such as the new 
sewing, weaving and construction techniques that the Burmese learned in 
Thailand. If they travel home for a visit or return more permanently in the future, 
they can transfer these skills to their kin. Theoretically, refugees can also spread 
new fashions from Thailand when travelling home, such as western clothing. 
However, people tend to change and dress in traditional Burmese clothing if they 
temporarily return121
Most refugees do not travel home though, but simply try to track their family down 
and establish contact, which for the Burmese is already a difficult prerequisite for 
social remittances. The reason is the lack of communication facilities inside Burma, 
certainly in active conflict areas, and in several of the Thai refugee camps: 
. The reason for this is that they are both afraid of their kin’s 
reaction, as the Burmese culture is quite conservative (on women’s clothing in 
particular), and of the authorities. The latter are more likely to be suspicious of 
people dressed in western clothing because it shows that the person has been 
living outside Burma for a while, and could thus have had contact with activists or 
carry remittances that can be skimmed off. Therefore, there is apparently no 
spread of Thai (clothing) fashion. 
 “ I would love to contact my family, but we have a large 
communication problem here. There are no phones in the camp. We 
can phone in the Thai villages nearby, but then we can be arrested by 
the police. And the Thai vendor knows we don’t have another choice 
than his shop, so it is very expensive. He doesn’t even let us receive 
calls anymore.” 122
                                                             
121 Email communication with Stephen Hull, KHRG, February 19, 2009. 
 
122 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae Ra Ma Luang camp, January 22, 2007. 
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For the ones who do manage to track family down, contact is primarily based on 
oral messages or phone calls. Another conceivable way of contacting, sending 
letters, is less frequently used than expected, because letters are considered 
potentially dangerous for recipients123
 
 and secondly, because of the lack of an 
efficient posting system in Burma, which ensures that they are already out-of-date 
on arrival. The refugee elite on the other hand also has access to the internet, but 
this is only used for contact with kin and friends in the wider diaspora, as internet 
use is very limited inside Burma. On internet sites and blogs (e.g. Burmanet, Burma 
Bloggers Network, Irrawaddy etc.), publications are assembled, information (and 
rumours) are exchanged, and (political) discussions are held, constituting what 
Horst calls ‘transnational dialogues’: “Far from being ‘virtual’, computer- mediated 
communication is yet another means of social contact between people at a distance 
from each other. It enables the direct involvement of members of a diaspora in each 
other’s lives”( Horst 2006b: 53). Next to communication over the internet, there 
have also been formal attempts to develop more face-to-face contacts between 
Thai-based refugees and the wider diaspora. On 25 January 1999 for example, a 
‘Seminar on Karen National Unity’ was organised (Sang Kook 2001: 91). Obviously, 
these kinds of seminars have as much a political as a social purpose. 
Community engagement 
Case studies on relatively large groups of migrants often point to their engagement 
in development projects. Migrants can set up specific development projects in their 
home community or they support local initiatives financially, by sending collective 
remittances: “This collective endeavour (...) is motivated not by personal familial 
obligations alone, but rather by a combination of socio-cultural and political 
factors, including migrants’ identity and sense of solidarity with their place of origin 
(local nationalism or regionalism), reciprocity with the homeland, and often an 
eagerness to gain status and recognition in the place of origin” (Guarnizo 2003: 
                                                             
123 Refugees can be seen by the junta as Karen rebel- sympathizers and thus traitors. Therefore refugees 
are afraid that a letter coming from inside camp would jeopardise their family (all post is opened in 
Burma). 
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677).  This social engagement can be orchestrated in a very informal manner, by 
donating on an ad hoc basis if a refugee travels home for a visit. But so-called 
‘home associations’124
Burmese refugees have not established formal home associations, as their troubled 
relationship with the Burmese junta and their illegal status inside Thailand severely 
restrict this possibility. However, there are multiple forms of community 
engagement, which tend to be organised along ethnic lines. In Tak province, the 
Karen transnational network is the strongest one. Karen Youth Organisation for 
example collects money (from foreign donors and NGOs but also  from refugees) 
for activities inside Thailand, as well as for the building of churches and schools 
inside Burma. One of the strategies used is the selling of ceremonial calendars to 
refugees (THB 50 per calendar), to evoke loyalty of the ethnic group and to 
maintain an emotional homeland connection (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002: 193). The 
downside of collective remittances is that people in this collective culture feel a 
great obligation to donate, which led a villager to say: “In the whole village there 
are about 300 households…Well no, actually there are more households but we put 
only 300 on the list because we get so many demands for donations to camp and 
Burma and not everybody can pay this money every time. So we have to lie”
 and ‘diaspora associations’ exist as well, in which formal 
links between the hometown/region/country and the diaspora movement are 
acknowledged.  
125
                                                             
124  While transnationalism scholars usually talk about ‘Home Town Associations’ (HTAs), I agree with 
Mercer et al.’s point (2009) that the ‘home’ place where an association refers to might as well be a 
district, province or entire country. Therefore ‘home association’ is deemed a more appropriate term- 
even if not unproblematic either since it is debatable what ‘home’ is for e.g. Burmese refugees who 
grew up in Thailand but follow their parents in being transnationally active.  
. In 
times of crises, collections usually increase. After the passing of the tsunami in 
December 2004 and of cyclone Nargis in May 2007 for example, support networks 
were set up by Mon, Karen and Burman refugees in Thailand and by the wider 
diaspora to help the affected people (see also Naik et al. 2007: 50-51; Jordt 2008). 
This finding confirms Guarnizo et al.’s point (2003: 1238) that transnationalism is 
For further information on processes influencing home town associations, see: Waldinger, R., et al. 
(2008) ‘Conflict and contestation in the cross-border community: hometown associations reassessed’, or  
Mercer et al. (2009) ‘Unsettling connections: transnational networks, development and African home 
associations’. 
125 Interview with a Karen refugee in a rural village around Mae Sot, November 25, 2006. 
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sensitive to changing contextual conditions. A small core group stays strongly 
involved in the home country, while a much larger rim of people only become 
active at special junctures such as highly contested elections or natural disasters. 
Of course, the social transnational activities are not limited to financial donations. 
A diaspora can plea to the host government to allow new refugees in, like the 
Action Network for Migrants did after the passing of Nargis (Slip 2008). 
Furthermore, diaspora CBOs give training in a large diversity of subjects, such as 
health and outreach work, midwifery, education, community leadership, 
journalism, photography, ICT, environmental issues etc. These trainings are 
accessible for people on both sides of the border. During many of these courses, 
participants are also taught about the human rights discourse and how to 
document human rights abuses. This has led to an encompassing approach of all 
Burmese ethnic minority issues, both in the diaspora and inside the country, in 
terms of human rights. 
A different form of community engagement is the cross-border humanitarian 
assistance to the displaced people inside eastern Burma. As direct humanitarian aid 
from inside the country is severely restricted because the junta blocks access to the 
active conflict zones, these people are dependent on cross-border relief aid, which 
in Karen State is delivered by Karen diaspora CBOs126: “Self-interest aside, many of 
these organizations feel that they are well-positioned to provide such aid because of 
their experience carrying out other cross-border activities, their sensitivity to 
Burmese cultural practices, and their ability to work directly with local populations 
rather than through the SPDC” (Maclean 2004: 342).  In the IDP camps, Karen 
Organisation for Relief and Development (KORD) and Committee for Internally 
Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) provide food aid, shelter and health care, while 
Karen Teacher Working Group (KTWG) provides education127
                                                             
126 Similarly, the Shan Relief and Development Committee has organised support to IDPs in Shan State 
(Fink 2008: 458). 
. In-kind transfers such 
as clothes, books and school materials also occur. IDPs in dispersed hiding sites are 
supported as well, through primary health care (Backpack doctors attached to 
127 Interview with Gilbert, Head of KORD, Mae Sariang, July 5, 2006. 
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Karen-run Mae Tao clinic) and cash transfers; these cash transfers are considered a 
flexible way to prop up livelihoods and ‘jungle markets’, which came into existence 
due to enforced restrictions on mobility. The impact of this kind of community 
engagement is thus very real, and can only be accomplished because diaspora 
CBOs align with international NGOs and donors, who were lobbied at different 
levels, making this life-saving cross-border assistance a transnational matter. Even 
this kind of diaspora engagement  is deemed illegal by the Burmese junta though 
and only tacitly approved by the RTG128
 
, thus it is surrounded by secrecy and 
danger. 
Cultural transnationalism 
Within Thailand, diaspora organisations organise cultural activities to maintain the 
link with their home country and to keep in touch with each other (social event 
function). Even if these cultural activities take place within the host country, many 
have a home country focus, which is why they are nonetheless seen as 
transnational activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 625). Burmese art expositions regularly 
occur (e.g. in the Borderline shop in Mae Sot) and so do sports competitions, which 
are still similar to Burma with a focus on cane ball, boxing and soccer. Also 
traditional festivals, national holidays and ceremonies with music and dancing are 
still celebrated, both inside and outside camp. These rituals enable the refugees to 
recover a past, and imagine a future if and when they return. Dudley (2000) 
describes for example the celebration of the Dyi-kuw (literally: sticky rice) festival in 
a Karenni camp, which serves to anticipate a good rice harvest, despite the fact 
that refugees do not have land nor permission to grow paddy in Thailand. The 
tradition is thus kept alive in spite of the changed circumstances. Moreover, various 
elements that traditionally were part of the festival could not be performed 
because no one had the knowledge to set them up, such as the chicken bone 
divination or a bamboo rocket launch. Still, even if certain elements may change 
                                                             
128 Fink (2008: 459-460) argues that the reason why the RTG allows these activities to continue, as long 
as they are not publicized, is that they see them as preventing more people from crossing into Thailand 
as refugees. 
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due to (prolonged) exile, celebrating these festivals helps to maintain group 
boundaries and cultural identity (Bulcha 1988: 205), and provides some sense of 
continuity with the past. Other rituals are on the verge of political and cultural 
transnationalism. For example, an A-Nyeint performance was organised at a 
Burmese temple in Mae Sot to celebrate the full moon, but at the same time the 
performance was full of political satire, particularly criticising the 2008 referendum 
and proposed 2010 elections in Burma. This kind of event is very popular 
(thousands of people attended the ceremony) but not tolerated in Burma129
A more economic spin-off of the refugees’ presence is their need for Burmese 
consumer items (e.g. betelnut, cheroots, Burmese slippers, tanaka, etc.), which 
generates specific businesses. Because these items re-focus the attention on their 
descent, Landolt et al. (1999: 298) see them as cultural enterprises promoting 
national identity, while being in the economic field. 
.  
An activity that is at once social, cultural, economic and political, is providing the 
world with information on what is happening in the country, as the junta- run 
newspapers are notoriously unreliable. Ventures that produce mass media such as 
news papers, magazines and radio, can be a form of economic transnationalism if 
they make a living out of it (which is not often the case on this border), but they are 
also cultural as people’s attention is re-focused on Burma. Moreover, it is a social 
practice, as there is a genuine need to inform people about the problems 
encountered both inside the country and in host countries. But lastly, this 
information control also has a far-reaching political effect, which is why it is one of 
the themes discussed in the next section.  
 
5.2.4 Political transnational engagement 
 
Political transnational engagement can occur in various ways. The home country 
can be targeted in a ‘direct’ way, by supporting rebel movements, but it is also 
                                                             
129 Email communication with CBO staff member in Mae Sot, October 28, 2008. 
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possible to try influencing the country of origin in an indirect way, by turning 
attention to the political institutions of host countries and (supra)regional bodies 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002). Both types will be discussed as they are utilised in the 
Burmese diaspora, but the indirect activities to confront the power holders are 
certainly more widespread.  
 
Direct political transnationalism 
The junta and its allies are actively fought against by insurgents, such as the armies 
of the KNU and the KNPP.  Similar to other conflict situations, the struggle is funded 
by illegal activities (smuggling) across the border, voluntary donations and forced 
taxes.  
While the large majority of the refugees are not involved in the rebellion itself, they 
may play a role in it by providing moral support and physical support in the form of 
money, information and safe refuge for the soldiers involved (Terry 2002; Collinson 
2003; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). A diaspora movement can indeed be a crucial 
factor in the establishment and the maintenance of an armed resistance 
movement, as is (was) the case for the Tamil (Van Hear 2002: 220) and the 
Ethiopian, Somali and Darfur rebellion (Horst 2007). In this case however, the rebel 
movements were much stronger in the past, before there was a sizeable diaspora, 
and it is not clear to what extent the current diaspora contributes to the military 
struggle. Also the level of practical support to political opposition groups inside the 
country is difficult to appraise but seems very limited. 
Direct confrontation can also occur through military tactics. Although many 
activists inside and outside the country are involved in underground activities, most 
of them refrain from violent measures, whatever the junta may claim. Occasionally 
bombs do explode in the larger cities in Burma. The responsibility for these 
bombings are sometimes claimed by a group called ‘the Vigorous Burmese Student 
Warriors’ (VBSW), but it is unclear where these are based and who supports them; 
there are even rumours that they have not been active since the ‘99 embassy raid 
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(see infra) but have been re-invented by the junta (Phanida 2008), to create a 
permanent enemy. There is no evidence of any diaspora involvement in these 
bombings. 
 
Indirect political transnationalism 
“The cause of Burmese democracy flutters consistently on the 
margins of high- level attention, with dedicated albums of U2 and 
R.E.M., PM Tony Blair personally lending his name to a boycott of 
tourism in Burma, and US Secretary Condoleezza Rice styling the 
country as an ‘outpost of tyranny’”. 
(Thant Myint U, quoted in South 2008: 112) 
As there is no freedom of speech or political organisation inside Burma, the safest 
possibility to reveal the abuses and human rights violations inside the country is to 
flee. This is the largest visible contribution of the diaspora: providing information 
and keeping the issue on the international agenda. Burmese activists are based all 
over the world. To name but a few: Open Society Institute-Burma Project (USA), 
Altsean (Thailand), Burma Campaign UK, Euro-Burma Office (Belgium), Christian 
Solidarity Worldwide etc. But the bulk of the information is assembled by diaspora 
organisations such as Burma Issues, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), Shan 
Human Rights Foundation and Irrawaddy, based in Thailand, close to the border or 
further inland in Chiang Mai and Bangkok. This is not surprising as Thailand is host 
to the largest Burmese community in exile, with easier access to inside information. 
Once they have crossed the border into Thailand, Burmese activists are outside the 
coercive and juridical powers of the homeland, which supposedly makes speaking 
out on the abuses and needs easier: “Political diaspora movements are a 
repositioning of the politics of the homeland to the territories of host countries 
where more political space exists for oppositional politics in the hope of opening up 
or even transforming homeland political systems” (Smith in: Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 
xiv). However, in contrast to Smith’s position, there is no guarantee that the host 
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country will officially allow political activities, which may affect its bilateral 
relations. In Thailand, Burmese activists face a difficult choice. They can receive 
protection in the refugee camps, but these are located in remote areas, whereas in 
cities from where international political activism is possible, they are put on equal 
foot as illegal migrants and run the risk of arrest and deportation:  
“I was already involved in the students organisation, but I only 
became a political activist here in Thailand. We give human rights 
and environmental trainings, do research and spread information on 
the problematic situation of the Pa-O. My base was in Chiang Mai, 
but about a year ago I came to Nu Poh camp. I want to continue my 
education in the USA, so I can help my people better. I am tired of the 
deportations and too afraid to go back to Burma. All members of 
political organisations fear those things here”.  
(Interview with Pa-o refugee in Nu Po camp, November 27, 2007)  
While political activism may initially lead to refugee recognition, for the RTG a 
refugee status and political transnational activities are not compatible, thus the 
relationship between a legal status as a refugee (which is supposed to lead to more 
freedoms) and political advocacy is not necessarily positive. Regardless of this lack 
of open political space, the political diaspora is very active in Thailand. 
The political entrepreneurs challenge the junta’s discourse and legitimacy in 
various ways: through opposition music, cartoons, comedy, reports, etc. (Brooten 
2003: 231-233).  
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Challenging the junta’s 7-point Road Map to Democracy 
 
Copyright: Harn Lay 
Numerous articles highlight the human rights abuses committed inside the country, 
which are published on the Worldwide Web in a matter of a few days or even 
hours after the events (as seen during the 2007 ‘Saffron uprising’). Information 
networks between activists in Burma and in the diaspora are thus well established. 
The internet has as such created a new dimension to political activism in a situation 
of heavily controlled traditional media inside the country (Chodhury 2008). Of 
course, the information provided in these articles and on websites often has a dual 
purpose, such as legitimising certain forms of opposition in the target state, in casu 
the rebellion/freedom fighting and the Western sanctions. Whether or not the 
support for this battle and the lobbying for sanctions contributes to a prolonging of 
the conflict is subject for another discussion. The point is that many of these 
organisations have a clear goal, which is legitimate but does not always lead to 
objectivity: “Those investigating forced migration in Burma generally hold strong 
views regarding the promotion of socio-political change in the country. These 
agendas have determined (…) the reality ‘uncovered’ by research” (South 2007a: 4). 
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For example, because of the close connections between several of the reporting 
groups and the rebels, very little is said about the abuses committed by the rebels 
themselves. The exiled media also acknowledge this as a difficulty:  
“In general I think that there should be some criticism, but it’s very 
difficult for us to criticize the (opposition, ed.) movement. (...) Thing is 
that we have to rely on the opposition sources. And Burmese 
opposition is not ready to be criticized. (...) It’s a dilemma to criticize 
the movement when the SPDC is so much worse. Change will come 
but slowly. It’s the system, the practice, for the especially ethnic 
resistance, they have conducted an armed struggle for the last 50 
years. They also have a very authoritarian structure, rather than a 
democratic structure. They have some election system, but in the 
daily management there is really an authoritarian structure. (...) So it 
will be very difficult for the media. Most of the people (...) have been 
under military dictatorship for more than forty years, so many people 
have no experience in democratic environment and free media”. 
(exiled journalist, quoted in Strand 2002: 55) 
Despite these shortcomings and limitations, the diaspora is a key source of 
information on what is happening in Burma thus they are central to our 
understanding of Burmese politics (Maclean 2004: 327).130
Using these numerous accounts and reports, lobbyists try to simultaneously create 
pressures from below and from above (Adamson 2002). High-level advocacy occurs 
both in host countries and with supranational bodies to raise international 
awareness, thereby hoping to increase pressure for change. Within Thailand, the 
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the National 
Coalition of the Union of Burma (NCUB) and Alternative Asean Network on Burma 
are the most powerful players of the Burma-lobby. While the NCGUB has its main 
  
                                                             
130 Therefore, in addition to the interviews, I have followed up on what is written on various diaspora 
websites, using the internet as an additional site for data collection of this widely spread and mobile 
community, as recommended by Horst (2006c: 213). 
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seat in the USA, they are also active in Thailand, where they distribute reports on 
their political vision and organise conferences. But it is clear that the lobbying and 
networking is on- going on a global scale, and that the Thai government is not the 
most important body in the lobbying strategy. After all, Thailand and other 
countries in the region have strong (economic) ties with the junta and are often not 
exactly models of democracy either. Therefore, they are not very responsive to the 
plight of Burmese activists. At the regional level, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Myanmar Caucus is the most important body for advocacy efforts. This association 
regularly discusses the situation in Burma and is more responsive to the issue than 
ASEAN itself, given the latter’s ‘non-interference in internal matters’. Regardless of 
their work though, little has changed in ASEAN members’ attitude through-out the 
last decade. The lobbying has often been more successful in countries in the West 
and with supranational actors, such as the United Nations and the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. In the West, activists take part in seminars 
and panel discussions (institutional participation), and they try to find 
spokespersons in political parties, such as Senator Mitch McConnell in the USA or 
MEP Glenys Kinnock in the European parliament. Even in areas without sizeable 
Burmese populations has the Burmese cause received attention of lawmakers.  The 
state of Massachusetts for example has passed a bill in order to impose sanctions 
on companies investing in Burma. Danitz and Strobel (quoted in Dudley 2003: 21) 
attribute this kind of success to the internet: “It illustrates how the internet can be 
used to create geographically dispersed networks for non-violent action, even when 
there is no locally concentrated constituency”. 
Working within host country institutions, which is an often used strategy of 
diasporas (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002), is a tactic which does not yet occur in this 
case. Within Thailand, Burmese activists are illegal and thus not able to vote or to 
work their way into government institutions. In other host countries on the other 
hand, Burmese refugees are not numerous enough to be a domestic political 
factor. They might become so on a local level though, if current levels of 
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resettlement are guided towards particular localities in the resettlement 
countries131
Other groups feel that formal channels do not allow enough space, and turn to 
contentious politics instead: strategies to confront and challenge the elite, such as 
mass demonstrations, civil disobedience and political violence (Adamson 2002). 
The opportunities for contentious politics are very limited inside Burma because of 
extensive junta control and the fear of massive use of force if necessary. Civil 
disobedience does occur locally, but is not always very visible (see e.g. KHRG 2008). 
Because of the restrictions, contentious political activities are increasingly 
transnational, such as the protests in front of Burmese embassies all over the 
world, or the large-scale petitions for the release of political prisoners. Also in 
Thailand there are protests. For example, large numbers of Burmese people in Mae 
Sot demonstrated their support to the Saffron uprising in September 2007. They 
walked in a silent march to the official border crossing and burned candles, while 
making sure not to cause any trouble that would trigger Thai police interventions 
(as most are illegal). At a more institutionalised level, confrontational politics have 
been taken up to the point of the formation of a government-in-exile, the NCGUB. 
However, due to internal disagreements within the political diaspora, another 
forum, the NCUB, announced in January 2009 that they would start their own 
government-in-exile, making it even less clear who speaks for which group of 
people (DVB 2009). This event is a contemporary height of strong tensions and 
fault lines within the opposition, with numerous personal vendettas and political 
issues surrounding the formation of each group that are impossible to untangle:  
. 
“The proliferation of too many political parties and organizations has 
become a trend in recent decades, not only inside the country but in 
the exiled community as well, often weakening the overall movement. 
Many groups are simply names, with no worthwhile activities. In the 
activist community, there’s a joke that if two Burmese people meet, 
                                                             
131 There is indeed already a growing visibility of the Karen situation in particular, due to the formation 
of Karen organisations in the USA by resettled refugees, which may in time lead to more political 
attention for this refugee group. 
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they will form three groups. First, each person forms his own group 
and then they both form a coalition group. It’s a joke, but it captures 
a shameful truth. The pro-democracy movement lacks the discipline 
for unity and power” (Kyaw Zaw Moe 2008). 
 
In addition to these peaceful contentious politics, there have been violent actions 
on Thai soil by small groups called the Vigorous Burmese Students Warriors (VBSW) 
and God’s Army. When the VBSW held 89 people hostage in the Burmese embassy 
in Bangkok in 1999, their goal was to demand the release of all political prisoners in 
Burma. The Thai government reacted calmly and provided them with a safe 
passage out of the country (BBC 1999). This safe exit severely angered the Burmese 
junta. It caused a major bilateral crisis and the border was closed for months. In 
contrast, when God’s Army, an armed opposition splinter group, seized a Thai 
hospital in Ratchaburi in January 2000 to stop the Thai shelling of their area, 
Thailand responded with force, by invading the hospital and killing all the gunmen 
(Brooten 2003: 317-322). That event raised Thai public and government concerns 
about homeland security threats posed by the Burmese activists and insurgents on 
Thai soil. Furthermore, with the coming into office of Prime Minister Shinawatra in 
2001, the Thai foreign policy became increasingly economically oriented, and given 
the extensive natural resources of its neighbour, the Thai government wanted to 
revive the relations with Rangoon. Consequently, there was a crack-down on all 
Burmese activists in Thailand. All registered urban refugees, including many 
activists, were ordered to move to the refugee camps, ending all protection outside 
the camps. The reason for this pressure was that no visible activism is possible 
inside the remote camps, and there would thus be less fear of embarrassment of 
the Thai government. In addition, offices of diaspora organisations working on 
democracy or human rights were monitored and raided: “Increasing numbers of 
Burmese are being arrested on immigration charges following peaceful actions such 
as labour strikes, protests, hunger fasts, overseas speaking tours, and other political 
activities” (HRW 2004: 31-32). This was very difficult to protest against officially 
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due to the illegal status of many of these organisations and their members. In 
practice though, there is constant negotiation (and bribery) at the local level.  
Thailand has in fact a dubious role in the Burmese political environment. While 
they are in favour of good relations with the junta now, they in the past supported 
the Karen rebellion. The KNU has acted as a buffer against the communist parties in 
Thailand and Burma, and in return the KNU got easier access to Thailand (Lang 
2002: 137-154). This active support diminished at the end of the 1980s though, 
when the communist party of Thailand imploded, and even more so after 1995, 
when the tatmadaw gained control over the largest part of the border area and 
peace became more profitable for economic reasons. Still, even through-out the 
1990s, relations were still very close and intelligence information continued to be 
shared between the Thai military and the KNU. However, this situation has 
suddenly changed in 2009, at least publicly. As the KNU has consistently lost 
strength the last decade due to internal splits and loss of territory, they became 
less relevant to Thailand. Therefore, senior military leaders of the KNU were 
pressured to leave the Thai territory by February 25 (Irrawaddy 2009; CCSDPT 
February 25, 2009, internal document). It remains to be seen whether this will 
really be followed up at the local level and what impact this will have on 
transnational activities. What is clear, is that diaspora activities are shaped and 
mediated by host state institutions (including the army) and government priorities, 
and in this case the Burma lobby was weakened due to the change in government 
and the political violence of splinter groups. 
 
5.2.5 Concluding remarks: Refugees in the South as transnational actors 
 
Research by Engbersen et al. (2007) in Europe has found that refugees were active 
in all types of transnationalism except professional economic activities. This case 
study has demonstrated that the same is true for refugees in situations of mass 
influx in the South: they can certainly be transnational actors, in many domains 
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which include but are not limited to remittances. Moreover, in contrast with Al-Ali 
et al. (2001) and Guarnizo et al. (2003), this research shows that forced migrants 
can be transnational actors even in the absence of durable integration or stability, 
or a decision not to return to their country of origin. Burmese refugees’ home 
country is not yet in a post-conflict state, and  their capabilities are severely 
hampered in principle: no secure legal status, no freedom of movement etc. Both 
their capacity and desire (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 627-631) are thus supposedly strained 
on the economic, political and social level. However, many Burmese people are 
motivated to support their family, community and/or country, and therefore they 
do find creative ways to be transnationally active. This case study has 
demonstrated that refugees in situations of mass influx in the South can be 
engaged in economic, social, cultural and political transnational activities, 
regardless of the strains on their capabilities. What is more, these activities 
instigated by refugees can even be regular and require constant personal 
involvement, as is the case for the Burmese collective social and political 
transnationalism; both of these factors are considered as a good basis to describe 
an activity as a form of ‘narrow (or strong, ed.) transnationalism’ (Itzigsohn et al. 
1999: 323). In addition, while my argument is that a secure legal status in the host 
country is not a precondition for transnationalism, Banki’s research among 
Burmese refugees in Japan (2006a) has found that getting a legal status may 
actually diminish transnationalism, if political activism was only seen as a means to 
get that status or if that status leads to jealousy and rejection by non-recognised 
co-nationals in the network. A legal status is thus not a decisive variable in the 
existence of transnationalism, but it does have an influence on the level of 
formality of transnationalism. 
While refugees are frequently seen as passive victims, this study found that many 
are transnationally active on an economic level. In contrast to many previous 
studies (Dick 2002; Horst 2002, 2008; Wu 2006; Suleri and Savage in Savage and 
Harvey 2007; Lindley 2007a), questions on remittances were incorporated in all 
livelihoods interviews, instead of selecting on the dependent variable, namely 
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remittance recipients. Only that way can the importance of remittances for a 
certain population be verified. It was revealed that there were much more 
remittance senders in this case than recipients (28.7% in contrast to 11.9% 
recipients), next to a large amount of refugees who were not involved in 
remittances patterns at all. While this balance may in time be affected due to the 
current resettlement programme, it demonstrates that the influence of 
remittances on refugees’ livelihoods should not be overstated, or in fact, that it 
may be more common that remittances are important for refugee livelihoods in the 
negative sense, because refugees are responsible for (and thus burdened with) the 
livelihoods of kin who are not currently with them. In this case, certainly unmarried 
self-settled refugees often needed to share their wages with family members in 
Thailand and/or Burma. Such a family-splitting technique is used to diversify 
income and is developed as an adaptation strategy to both past and present 
vulnerability, which is a finding that is in agreement with  previous research of e.g. 
McDowell and De Haan (1997), Fog Olwig and Nyberg-Sorensen (2002) and Horst 
(2006a). Investment in cross-border businesses or businesses in the homeland is 
not widespread though, which also confirms findings in other cases of forced 
migration and protracted conflict (Lindley 2007a; Engbersen et al. 2007).  
Furthermore, also on a collective level, refugees may feel responsible for others. As 
international organisations cannot reach the Karen IDP populations, small groups of 
refugees have organised themselves in (politically- connected) CBOs to provide 
much-needed health care and goods. These and the other types of community 
engagement found demonstrate that refugees may organise support to 
communities across the border, despite their own precarious position in Thailand. 
In addition, this case confirms previous findings that a small core group remains 
transnationally active throughout the year, while a much larger group only does so 
at special junctures, such as a natural disaster.  
Political activities are likewise reserved for a small minority of the refugees. While 
scholarly attention for refugee activists in situations of mass influx usually goes to 
refugee warriors, this study makes clear that non-violent political transnationalism 
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may be the more common variant. Through indirect political transnational 
activities,  Burmese refugees try to influence the public opinion and politicians 
worldwide, with varying success. POS in host or home government are thus not 
essential for political transnationalism. Even if there are many fault lines in the 
opposition within the country and in the diaspora, the importance of the diaspora 
to work towards regime change should not be taken lightly, neither should their 
influence in case there ever should occur a regime change.  
 Refugees’ agency should thus not be underestimated, but it should simultaneously 
be acknowledged that transnational activities are by no means ‘un-touched’ by 
nation-states. Nation-states have the power to shape migration and transnational 
practices (Al-Ali and Koser 2002), and in this case both the country of origin and the 
host country exert influence over the type of transnationalism. The authoritarian 
regime in Burma and the ongoing civil war have an effect on transnational 
activities. Formalised links of the diaspora with the Burmese junta are neither 
possible nor desired, and professional economic activities are not widespread due 
to the disastrous economic and/or war situation in the home areas of the refugees, 
as well as the lack of a legal status of the refugees. Individual economic and social 
remittances are hampered by the lack of proper telecommunication and banking 
systems in the country of origin, while community engagement is clandestine since 
disapproved by the junta. The host country on the other hand has proven quite 
influential for the form of political transnationalism, due to its crackdown on 
(illegal) activist urban refugees and diaspora organisations, and lately on rebel 
organisations, pushing them increasingly underground. Moreover, Burmese 
refugees’ status impedes their participation in Thai political parties and they do not 
receive any positive political attention in Thailand, thus there are no links between 
immigrant and homeland politics, in contrast with cases where immigrants are 
legally present or even constitute a constituency (e.g. Kurds and Turks in Germany 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2002)). Organisations seeking to improve the conditions 
for the Burmese in Thailand are working completely separately from organisations 
that are directed towards homeland politics, partly because Thailand is officially 
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against transnational activism on its soil. It would thus be counterproductive for 
the organisations focused on better (economic) integration in Thailand to lobby 
simultaneously for change in Burma. Both the policies and the level of 
development of the country of origin and the host country are thus important in 
influencing the kind of transnational activities undertaken, and as such the impact 
of these activities. This finding also implies that policy interventions in either the 
home or host country have the ability to enhance transnationalism (Al-Ali et al. 
2001: 626)132
To some extent there are thus differences in transnational activities between 
migrants in the West and refugees in situations of mass influx in the South. 
However, I would argue that the legal status of the person or diaspora organisation 
concerned, as well as the country of origin and the host country  have an influence 
on the type of transnationalism in a way the label ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee’ does not.  
As argued above, Burmese people are leaving their country for a combination of 
economic and political reasons, which makes it very hard to distinguish between 
refugees and migrants (migration-asylum nexus). Most Burmese left Burma illegally 
and entered Thailand illegally. Institutionalised transnational links would thus be 
problematic for both refugees and illegal migrants. Moreover, most Burmese in 
exile, both inside and outside refugee camps, have a strong political focus on their 
home country that suffers under the military rule. While it is true that in most cases 
this does not result into active political transnationalism, that accounts for most of 
the migrants and the refugees; only a small section is politically active. Other 
, but only to some extent as long as broader political and economic 
conditions do not change (de Haas et al. 2009: 51). In sum, there is a potential for 
transnational agency of refugees, but the institutional context should not be 
ignored (Wahlbeck 2002: 232-234), neither should its influence be exaggerated 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001). 
                                                             
132 For example, Thailand is currently planning to set up a project to encourage remittance sending of 
registered migrants (Email conversation with staff of Thailand Development and Research Institute, 
October 2007), which will take the sector out of the clandestine sphere that currently surrounds it. The 
rationale behind the project is that the Thai government assumes that these remittances are the only 
means preventing the recipients to cross the border into Thailand as well. However, research has 
demonstrated that remittance sending in the short term actually may encourage migration, as it both 
enhances aspirations and means to leave (de Haas 2007). There is thus no guarantee that encouraging 
remittances will stem migration flows to Thailand. 
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people may leave for economic reasons and become politically active in the 
somewhat less restrictive climate in exile (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001: 266; Banki 
2006a: 43), requiring protection against refoulement and blurring any label 
attributed to them. As these features are probably not unique to Burma but rather 
to all cases of protracted conflict and totalitarianism, I argue that the concept of 
‘transnationalism’ should be conceived as a generic term including transnational 
activities from all migrants, regardless of the label attributed to them. The 
advantage of transnational studies is that there is no longer an exclusive focus on 
the motivations for migration. Instead, it shifts the focus away to the connections 
of migrants with their relatives and community members in their homeland and 
across the wider diaspora (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 2; Horst 2006c: 207-209). 
Therefore, it would be counterproductive to stress the differences again in an 
approach that seeks to have a new perspective on mobility. 
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CHAPTER 6: REFUGEES AS AGENTS OF 
CHANGE 
 
 “People don’t actually get over experiences, especially profound 
ones; instead they incorporate them into their character and 
personality and respond to all subsequent experience from the 
perspective of the new self”.  
(Storti, quoted in Ghanem 2003: 53) 
The experience of fleeing and living in exile obviously has an impact on refugees. 
Refugees seek ways to adapt to life in the host country, by negotiating over housing 
and wage employment, connecting to other ethnic groups previously unknown, by 
creating community organisations and attracting donors etc. This kind of agency 
contributes to social change for the individual refugees involved as well as for the 
greater refugee community (Dryden-Peterson 2006: 390). These adapting 
strategies affect refugees in a way that cannot be ‘undone’. There is no return to 
the status quo. Many refugees on the Thai-Burma border have received relatively 
high standards of education and training compared to most people inside Burma. 
Moreover, they have learned various professions in Thailand, such as new 
construction techniques, brick making, solar panel repair, weaving, trading etc. If 
they ever return to Burma, it is unlikely that all of them will become farmers 
(again)133
                                                             
133 For example, research has demonstrated that return programmes that promote training and tools for 
the jobs that refugees held (or were believed to hold) before their flight, are bound to fail (Kibreab 
1999a). 
. In addition, a high percentage of Burma’s most educated and talented 
citizens have actually fled and now work for humanitarian, political and civil society 
organisations outside the country (Maclean 2004: 335). This is certainly the reality 
in Thailand as jobs with international NGOs are the only non-manual labour ones 
that educated refugees are allowed to perform. Their potential for rebuilding the 
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country is great, as they have the capacity to write project proposals, attract 
donors, know what confidentiality means etc., at a level that hardly exists inside 
the country134
Through the combination of transnational and integration strategies, the diaspora 
in Thailand strongly connects home and host country, as is the case with other 
refugee populations (see e.g. Kronenfeld 2008: 45). The extensive migration and 
displacement of the last two decades have not only fundamentally affected the 
social fabric and livelihoods of the refugees, but have also altered social and 
economic structures at both the sending and receiving end. The extent of these 
changes should not be exaggerated though: “The insight that people exercise their 
agency to move within constraining conditions also implies that the degree to which 
migrants are able to affect structural change in sending and receiving societies is 
real but at the same time fundamentally limited” (De Haas et al. 2009: 4). The 
Burmese refugee potential for transformation of the home and host region are the 
two topics successively discussed in this chapter. 
. But even before any return, refugees can affect their country of 
origin, despite the fact that they are not present on the ground. Through 
transnational activities, they can have a positive impact on the home country by 
contributing to peace building and development, or they can prolong the conflict 
(Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Van Hear 2003b; Horst 2007). Simultaneously, the 
refugees’ host environment is affected because of their presence, which makes this 
a two-tiered process of change.  
 
6.1. Burmese refugee transnationalism: What is the 
effect?135
 
 
An important segment of migration research is devoted to migration policy, the 
internal dynamics of migratory processes as well as the linkages between migration 
                                                             
134 Interview with Mael Raynaud, consultant, Mae Sot, December 10, 2007. 
135 This section is an extended version of the following paper: BREES, I. (2009b) ‘Burmese refugee 
transnationalism: what is the effect?’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian affairs, 2/2009: 23-46. 
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and development (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Nyberg-Sorensen 2007; de Haas 
2007; Naik et al. 2007; de Haas et al. 2009). In particular, there has been quite a 
debate the last few years on the impact of migration on the country of origin in 
terms of brain-drain or brain-gain, but also on how migrants contribute to 
development while being abroad. Most of these studies tend to focus on sending 
countries which are not or no longer in a state of armed conflict though. The ones 
that do look at conflict-affected countries often seek to assess the refugees’ role in 
perpetuating or exporting the conflict (Lischer 2000; Terry 2002; Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006). However, more recently, there has been an increasing interest in 
the way refugees can support development- or at least relief- in a crisis situation, 
particularly through studying remittances patterns (Sriskandarajah 2002; Van Hear 
2004; Fagen 2006; Young 2006; Lindley 2007a; Savage and Harvey 2007). This 
section will assess this subject for the Burmese refugees in Thailand, and will add 
elements concerning the impact of non-economic transnational activities. Many of 
the Burmese refugees will not return in the near future, if ever, but still have quite 
an influence on their country of origin: “By manipulating links with relatives and 
friends, despite physical distance, (forced) migrants and ‘stayees’ create a level of 
agency and choice that their politico-economic position might otherwise not have 
allowed” (Horst 2006c: 210). Burmese refugees in Thailand have established 
economic, social and political transnational activities to support their relatives and 
communities that stayed behind, as was discussed in the previous chapter. The 
focus of this section is on the impact of these transnational processes, but it is 
recognised that additional field work inside Burma would be beneficial to 
complement and refine insights gained on the Thai side of the border. It will be 
examined whether refugees’ transnational economic, social and political activities 
have an impact on stayee households, communities and the country in general, and 
if so, what the direction of that impact is. In addition, the reaction to these 
activities by different stakeholders, amongst which the sending government, will be 
discussed.  
 
R e f u g e e s  a s  a g e n t s  o f  c h a n g e | 210 
 
6.1.1 Financial remittances and their multiple effects 
 
“Burma will also be hit by the global economic crisis through its 
diaspora. Foreign labourers will be the first to be laid off, certainly in 
the export-oriented industries in Thailand. Huge problems are 
looming, as Burma cannot sustain the shock of losing all those 
remittances.”  
(Harn Yanghwe, Director of Euro-Burma Office, Burma conference, 
European Commission, Brussels, October 31, 2008) 
Although there has not been any research on remittances inside the country, based 
on comparison with other conflict-affected countries, it can reasonably be assumed 
that for the people who receive remittances, this is a very important source of 
income. The remittance senders in my sample thought the money was used for 
consumption and house necessities (as did senders in Turnell et al. 2008: 12)). 
Remittances are thus used in this context for survival or coping, leading to small 
improvements of life, but probably not leading to an accumulation of assets and 
real poverty reduction. In any case, the remittances sent give the recipient family a 
greater level of power and choice (Horst 2008). They can use it to survive in the 
economically marginal area or war zone or they can accumulate financial capital to 
migrate as well. While it is first and foremost the recipient that benefits from the 
remittances, his/her contacts may benefit indirectly as well. When the money is 
used for products and services or for alms to Buddhist monks136
                                                             
136 Every Burmese Buddhist man is required to become a monk at least once, but usually twice in his life. 
This tends to last from a few months up to a year, but poorer families may send their children for a 
longer time (Participant observation and informal conversations at inauguration ceremony at Inya Lake, 
Burma, December 2004). In addition, many of the Thai-based respondents who never had benefited 
from any education in Burma could nevertheless read and write because of the time spent in the 
monastery. These alms are thus serving both religious as well as poverty and illiteracy reducing goals. 
, it leads to a 
‘trickling down’ and positively affects villagers who do not have family members 
abroad (multiplier effect of remittances) (Taylor 1999; de Haas et al. 2009). 
Moreover, money can also deliberately be used to assist others, and as such for 
building up social capital (Horst 2008: 5). 
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The remittances are likely to have a positive effect on the recipient family, but 
there is some discussion amongst academics on the potential downsides of 
remittances. It is said that constantly sending remittances may create dependency 
among the recipients (Horst 2002: 5; Hansen 2004), but the question is which 
alternatives exist to remittances in this particular context, other than migrating as 
well. In addition, remittances are ‘blamed’ for satisfying individual needs, while not 
changing anything as regards structural problems in, for example, the education or 
health system (Levitt and Sorensen 2004: 7)137
                                                             
137 It has also often been stated that remittances can raise inequality, in particular if only the relatively 
well of can afford to migrate (e.g. Savage and Harvey 2007: 6). However, as the border with Thailand is 
very porous, I do not think this is the case for the border areas where most of the refugees come from. 
It could be the case that remittances raise inequality in more central areas of Burma though, , but even 
then this might be eased due to the trickling down effect. 
. Therefore, there has been quite 
some debate on how to ‘guide’ remittances towards productive investments, to the 
detriment of the consumptive use of remittances. However, Pieke et al. (2005: 10) 
challenge this discussion: “Informal remittances bring desperately needed relief 
from acute or chronic disaster. Such remittances thus complement international 
relief aid, making a vital contribution to development that is prior to – and every bit 
as important as – more structural economic changes needed for sustained 
economic growth”. Remittances are usually not earmarked for a particular purpose, 
but become part of the general household budget (Taylor 1999: 71-72) and are 
thus used for the most pressing needs in a given context. In this case, that context 
is a heavily underdeveloped country, part of which is locked into a protracted civil 
war. It is thus unrealistic to expect remittances to improve this disastrous macro-
economic situation all by themselves. Refugees’ private transfers cannot be 
expected to make up for the responsibilities of the SPDC and the international 
community in fighting poverty. The burden of remittance sending is already very 
high for the senders. Turnell et al. (2008: 11) have found that senders remit on 
average 38% of their annual disposable income, which is in the highest range found 
in studies worldwide. While this is obviously beneficial for the recipient household 
in question, the financial transfers can thus be to the detriment of the sender’s 
development of abilities: “Refugee and migrant households abroad have to balance 
the demands of their own livelihoods and futures (such as education of their 
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children), those in other destination and transit countries, and those left at home, or 
in neighbouring countries of first refuge. There is thus a portfolio of obligations 
(which might be termed ‘forced transnationalism’, Al-Ali 2002), as well as a 
portfolio of resources. That portfolio of obligations may become unsustainable and 
debilitating” (Van Hear 2004: 32). Transnational activities are therefore not 
necessarily beneficial for both sides of the link. Yet, as Horst states (2008: 7), at the 
same time, fulfilling family obligations is also a choice made. 
Household remittances can also have a positive cumulative impact on the 
homeland. As mentioned above, Huguet and Punpuing (2005: 46) estimate that 
around US$ 155.3 million is sent to Burma per year, while the survey by Turnell et 
al. (2008: 11) suggests that the real amount could actually be as high as US$ 300 
million annually. These estimates, which only account for the transfers from 
Thailand to Burma, exceed the total amount of ODA to Burma (US$ 144.7 million 
(UNDP 2008a)) and indicate the importance of remittances for a country that 
suffers under economic mismanagement and conflict. These remittance flows can 
lead to a rise in foreign exchange in the country and, as such, international financial 
institutions can come to see the country as creditworthy (Taylor 1999: 69; Guarnizo 
2003: 688; Fagen and Bump 2006: 4). Moreover, remittances can help ‘banking the 
unbanked’ as it enhances the chances of the recipients to receive loans, and as 
such generates a savings culture (Pieke et al. 2005: 30-31; Turnell et al. 2008: 5). In 
this case however, financial institutions are very weak and unreliable, and 
sanctions do not allow for international financial institutions to engage with Burma. 
Additionally, value transfer of remittances is often considered a safer and quicker 
option, and even if the money physically crosses the border, it tends to be changed 
into kyat first. After all, the junta does not allow the Burmese people to possess 
foreign currency. If this context were to change in the future, the impact of 
remittances on the overall economy could enhance substantially. 
Nevertheless, even in the current context, the potential of transnational economic 
practices is being increasingly recognised by the Burmese junta. The SPDC actively 
started to promote ‘migration for work’, for now mostly to Malaysia, Singapore and 
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the United Arab Emirates (Aung Thet Wine 2008). They would like to extend this 
system of institutionalised migration to Thailand, which is an idea that is in line 
with other regional projects that encourage economic transnationalism, such as the 
‘Special Economic Zones’ that are emerging along many Asian border zones. This 
confirms Margheritis’ point (2007: 101) that international arrangements affect 
sending countries’ transnational policies. However, until recently many logistic (in 
the eyes of the Thai government) and security problems (in the eyes of the people 
concerned) have hindered this institutionalised form of migration in practice (MAP 
2008; Lawi Weng 2008b). In the beginning of 2009 though, the RTG has announced 
that in February 2010 every migrant worker would need to go to the border to 
register legally with Burmese officials (‘the national verification process’), instead of 
the current registrations (Hseng Khio Fah 2009a; CCSDPT January 21, 2009, internal 
document). This signals a complete change of the present system, and it remains to 
be seen whether the employees concerned will cooperate with this new system, 
which could increase their insecurity and that of their family left behind – in 
addition to the taxes they will have to pay to the Burmese junta. Indeed, people 
who register with employment agencies have to reimburse a large part of their 
wages to the state in taxes (10%), which makes it an unattractive option. For the 
junta, these taxes on labour export are a lucrative source of income (‘remittance 
capturing’), as millions of Burmese people work abroad- in fact, the Burmese 
diaspora in Thailand is estimated to represent 11% of the Burmese labour work 
force (Lubeigt 2008: 168). At the same time, labour migration diminishes the 
potential of social, if not political demands, building up within society (Lubeigt 
2008: 181), which is why the junta (and many other emigration countries (De Haas 
et al. 2009: 34)) is not necessarily against it, as long as they profit from it. As the 
largest part of the Treasury is currently used for defence in Burma, it is doubtful 
whether the remittance capturing will benefit the development of the country. 
Moreover, even if remittances are not ‘captured’, a recent longitudinal study by 
Ahoure (mentioned in de Haas et al. 2009: 46) found that the impact of remittances 
was much less positive in countries with low scores on governance indicators (such 
as Burma) than in countries with better governance structures.  
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Another kind of transnational activities that can have an impact on conflict are the 
cross-border businesses of entrepreneurs. While I have not found evidence of 
large-scale cross-border businesses in the hands of refugees, as in any other 
conflict there are entrepreneurs who will act as ‘peace spoilers’: actors that prefer 
conflict over peace if peace would entail that large scale economic opportunities 
are lost. Certainly the enormous smuggling businesses in drugs, gems and timber 
are important in this regard. These transnational smuggling businesses operate 
through a myriad of actors such as local junta and rebel leaders, Thai or Burmese 
businessmen and police and immigration officers, with refugees sometimes 
performing some high-risk, low-profit manual labour jobs for small operations (see 
e.g. Gallasch 2001: 50). Also other actors may have a stake in maintaining the 
status quo: “During more than fifty years of (mostly) low-intensity armed conflict in 
Burma, insurgency has become a way of life for long-suffering villagers, for 
combatants on all sides and for the networks of traders, loggers, spies and aid 
workers that grew out of the war. Many of these groups have vested interests in 
maintaining conflict along the border” (South 2006).  
Overall, it can be said that the household remittance system is the least 
controversial transnational practice, as it does not challenge the security of either 
the country of origin or the host country. Transnational businesses are only 
combated if they are illegal, but are otherwise encouraged by both Burma and 
Thailand due to mutual benefits (see e.g. Lubeigt 2008: 165). 
 
6.1.2 The impact of social engagement 
 
Collective social remittances can have an impact on both development and conflict. 
The relief aid provided by different diaspora CBOs with transnational networks has 
an obvious positive and meaningful impact on IDPs in the eastern border zone. 
However, it is dangerous for the care providers involved as the junta sees their 
presence as illegal and too closely aligned with the KNU rebels- whose presence is 
required to provide security for the aid workers, hence this is a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy. For the CBOs, maintaining good relations with the ethnic armed 
organisations is thus necessary to maintain access to the areas where they work 
(Fink 2008: 459). While  this cross-border assistance (funded by foreign donors) to 
some extent reinforces the SPDC’s view that there is foreign interference in 
internal affairs138
In terms of assistance to development, there is some diaspora support for 
infrastructure, but large-scale development projects set up with diaspora funds and 
know-how are not possible in the current context of distrust and war. Still, 
development can also occur in a less visible, slower way. For example, the training 
courses bring about development on different levels. They not only increase the 
human capital of the persons concerned, some also have a direct impact on the 
community. In concreto, the health care-related training courses have significantly 
increased the capacity of the local health workers to improve the hygiene and 
medical conditions of their community in the absence of state-provided health 
care. Other trainings on the other hand, such as the journalist and photographer 
training, have a large indirect impact on the Burmese junta, as the exposition of 
human rights abuses and troop movements has multiplied along with these 
trainings. If these ideas on human rights, democracy and gender equality are 
gradually incorporated on individual and group levels, they can positively 
contribute towards peace building: “When the transnational dimension proofs to be 
vital to the advancement of a discourse on human rights and a critical debate on 
violence and repression, this can only be seen as a healthy development” (Horst 
2007: 8).  
, even the UN and ICRC have admitted that cross-border aid is the 
only way to support the extremely vulnerable Karen IDP communities as long as the 
SPDC does not change its mind concerning in-country- access. 
The fact that these diaspora groups manage to organise themselves at such a 
sophisticated level, offering services to their people on both sides of the border, 
communicating globally and receiving international funding, leads to a rise in their 
authority and legitimacy compared to ethnic and junta leaders inside Burma. Social 
                                                             
138 For more information on the military regime’s view of the world, see:  International Crisis Group 
(2001) ‘Myanmar: The military regime’s view of the world’. Asia Report n°28. Bangkok/Brussels: ICG. 
R e f u g e e s  a s  a g e n t s  o f  c h a n g e | 216 
 
transnational activities can thus lead to a shift in power relations and as such have 
political consequences. For example, the funding and distribution of aid by Karen 
CBOs called KORD, CIDKP and KRC, who all are closely related to the KNU, has 
political consequences: “The aid coming in from the NGOs helps to establish the 
refugee camps as power domains of the KNU. The distribution of aid via the arm of 
the KRC serves to perpetuate the idea among the Karen refugees that the KNU still 
cares for its people. In doing so, it produces and also reproduces the allegiance of 
the camp’s inhabitants” (Sang Kook 2001: 80). The same accounts for aid to IDPs. In 
contrast, ethnic leaders inside Burma lack both the international networks and the 
capacity that Thai-based organisations have, implying they are less present on the 
international scene, which ensures less funding for relief and development 
projects, and thus potentially less recognition by their population. 
In addition, cross-border aid can entail negative results for non-political 
stakeholders. For example, after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma in May 2008, all kinds of 
diaspora organisations tried to help the victims, including the ones usually working 
in Karen State. However, as these are closely associated with the KNU but were 
now working far outside their usual territory, with donor money that was not 
intended for cyclone victims, they jeopardised the humanitarian space of other aid 
workers in the affected delta zone. Despite good intentions, the close relationship 
between these transnational aid workers and rebels can thus be problematic, even 
more so in a context where it is possible for aid organisations to work legally. The 
impact of community engagement thus very much depends on the local context in 
the country of origin. 
 
6.1.3 Directly or indirectly challenging the junta: any effect? 
 
In general, it can be said that the potential of the political diaspora in contributing 
to both peace building and conflict is particularly great in this case study. The 
reason for this is the small margin for political contestation that activists inside the 
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country have enjoyed for several decades, which severely limited the capacity of 
their organisations to become performing political opposition parties that can 
challenge the junta. This does not imply that the diaspora organisations have 
achieved so much more tangible results, but they do have a larger network, more 
capacity and more freedom to speak out, which ensures they have more ‘voice’ 
than the opposition inside the country does (with the exception of Aung San Suu 
Kyi): “The ‘long-distance nationalist’ in exile from Burma has both little impact on 
what happens inside the nation and little price to pay for the possible effects of his 
or her actions. Nonetheless, making this point does not necessarily conflict with 
seeing the outside as an important part of the struggle too, or perhaps more 
accurately, occasionally a separate struggle” (Dudley 2003: 22).  
While there are dialogues and fierce debates in international panel sessions and 
over the internet, these usually occur in between elite members in exile. The 
‘inside’ hardly participates in this kind of debate, since the large majority have no 
access to the necessary technology139 and specialised education, knowledge of 
English or the liberty to speak one’s mind safely. They generally thus have hardly 
any contact with the political diaspora, with the exception of some diaspora 
journals that are smuggled in and radio emissions (one-way, not dialogue)140
                                                             
139 Even if a person has the skills to use a computer, importing, using or possessing a computer or a fax 
machine without prior government permission (and thus a ‘guarantee’ that a person is not prone to 
becoming politically active) can lead to a jail term of up to 15 years (Strand 2002: 32; Chodhury 2008: 8). 
The law also established hard measures against the establishment of computer networks without prior 
approval (Chodhury 2008: 8).The reason is that the regime realises very well that the opposition-in-exile 
uses the internet to spread information and to campaign. 
. Also 
non-elite refugees are restricted to these kinds of media. However, it is not 
because people are not able to use the internet themselves that the information 
does not trickle down through face-to-face conversations, telephone or other 
means. Even if the content is created by those who have computer access, the 
internet is more democratic than other forms of mass media: “The Internet can be 
seen as decentralized, participatory, unregulated, and egalitarian in operation 
compared to mass media such as newspapers, radio, or television where 
140 Well-known emissions are from Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB, Norway), Radio Free Asia (USA), 
Voice of America, and BBC Burmese Service, but also the KSNG radio from inside some refugee camps 
can be heard across the border. 
R e f u g e e s  a s  a g e n t s  o f  c h a n g e | 218 
 
communication is largely one way and consumers have very little opportunity to be 
producers of content (...) We can see the potential of the Internet to change politics, 
particularly through giving voice to the views of people who are not in authoritative 
positions” (Bernal 2006: 165). 
Do the transnational dialogues over the internet lead to rational discussions about 
alternatives to the current military rule and power sharing? No. What these 
internet blogs do offer, is a communicative space to exchange ideas, present 
unpopular perspectives and criticize the powerful, free from censorship and 
violence (Bernal 2006: 166). These debates are only possible because the diaspora 
is located outside Burma, but they are important, both for the participants and 
because the discussions are followed up by the junta. Some internet blogs even 
allow for discussions between the diaspora and representatives of the Burmese 
regime. The fact that this became possible “was a significant step toward a more 
polycentric, non-hierarchical system of communications among the Burmese” 
(Brooten 2003: 224-225), but it has not yet led to political changes. The following 
piece is an extract from a recent discussion on the Irrawaddy- website, following an 
article on the new trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. An American man named Yettaw had 
swum across Inya lake, uninvited, and illegally spent a day in her house, after which 
Suu Kyi was taken to court again (Aung Zaw 2009).  
(This discussion dates from before the end of the trial, which resulted into an 
extension of Suu Kyi’s house arrest.) 
Figure 5: Extract from a discussion on Irrawaddy-website 
 
Okkar Wrote: 27/05/2009  
 If you know the verdict already, why bother commenting on the ongoing 
trial? Enough with all this fuss already, she broke the law, she goes to jail... 
just like every other citizens of the world. We can't have one rule for 
politicians and one rule for the rest of the population. If Suu Kyi is her 
father's daughter, then that's the more reason for her to abide by the law 
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and accept punishment handed out to her for her mistake, just like every 
other criminal.  
Free Burma Wrote: 27/05/2009  
The SPDC junta was so blinded by the fortuitous opportunity provided by 
the Yettaw incident to extend Suu Kyi's detention that they did not see 
foresee the obvious. And that is this show trial farce has ended up further 
enhancing Suu Kyi's iconic reputation, influence and standing both in Burma 
and around the world while doing the exact opposite for the SPDC. I am sure 
the irony of this situation is not lost on many.  
Free Burma Wrote: 28/05/2009  
Dear Irrawaddy, 
Why do you usually post junta thugs' comments like Okkar? I know the 
ethics of journalism but at the same time a good editor's responsibility is 
defending readers' unhappiness by not posting nonsense articles or 
comments.  
We all know those are counter attacks in the internet sphere from the SPDC 
and feel you keep posting them unnecessarily. These are not good enough 
for laughs, instead those comments make readers really annoyed. 
Tom Tun Wrote: 28/05/2009  
Hey Okka, 
What is the purpose of law in a country? Is it to protect the public or is it just 
a threat to the common people just to hold power? Answer another 
question. Who is responsible for safeguarding Daw Suu’s compound? Why 
don't you charge the person who is responsible for compound security? 
Open your eye of hatred and look around. Another thought, you may be 
receiving Than Shwe’s left over bones from his plate. In that case I don't 
blame you for your loyalty to your master. Learn about real freedom and 
justice. Come out of that little hole that you guys are in. 
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Okkar Wrote: 28/05/2009 
Glad to see the hypocritical side of opposition supporters, who claimed to 
fight for freedom of speech and justice. All the postings show that there is 
greater conflict in the mindsets of opposition supporters. While they shout 
and scream for democracy, human rights and freedom of speech, expression 
all that non-sense, they contradict themselves by failing to appreciate the 
values of freedom and democracy, let alone embracing them.  
 
If you cannot practice what you preach, why bother preaching at all? If you 
can't stomach what you trying to sell to others, why bother even protesting 
about it at all? Isn't it time opposition supporters did a bit of soul searching? 
It is clear that this kind of open, critical discussion would not be possible inside 
Burma. 
Through the internet, participation in debates has widened by linking interlocutors 
who were otherwise unknown to one another, geographically dispersed and from 
different regional, ethnic and religious backgrounds (Bernal 2006: 174). The 
transnational dialogues have brought into being new public intellectuals and 
created a vibrant international lobbying community, which “changed or 
strengthened opinion in some Western governments and boardrooms and, to an 
extent, it has created its own reality. (…) It has also encouraged the further 
development of language, technological and political skills amongst Burmese 
exiles” (Dudley 2003: 29). After all, the more the internet became widely used by 
the Burmese community in the West, the more the diaspora in Thailand felt 
encouraged to improve its own IT-skills, leading to a steep increase in news-
coverage by the various ethnic minorities (Dudley 2003: 20). The reason for this is 
that the new media lead to stronger reactions of the diaspora than earlier forms of 
information dissemination, because of its immediacy and because it can transmit 
images which are perceived as more believable, as proven by Kaldor-Robinson in 
the case of former Yugoslavia (Lloyd et al. 2002: 135). It is hoped that these 
internet conversations and information sharing opportunities will create better 
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intergroup understanding (as is the case e.g. for the users of Burundinet (Kadende-
Kaiser and Kaiser, in Al-Sharmani 2006: 95)), but this does not yet seem to be the 
case for the Burmese diaspora. Of course, communication does not only occur 
through blogs, but also through teleconferences and email, which are very 
important for the political diaspora: “With one minister in Thailand, one in India, 
three in Washington, one in New York, two advisors living in Canada, one in 
Vancouver and one in Montreal, the Burmese government (in exile, the NCGUB, ed.) 
may be one of the world’s most ICT-dependent” (Strand 2002: 47). 
The problem with the diaspora struggle is that it tends to lead its own life, which 
sometimes results in confrontations with activists inside the country. A good 
example of this is the hyped 9/9/99 campaign, initiated by activists in exile, which 
led to increased tensions because the activists inside the country felt it put them in 
danger (Brooten 2003: 185-194). The effect in the country was thus negligible. In a 
sense, there are thus indeed separate struggles ongoing, but this does not mean 
that the political diaspora never influences the stayees: “Accounts have generally 
ignored the important role exile groups have played in shaping the viewpoints of 
the NLD, the SPDC, and other important international actors” (Maclean 2004: 326). 
This kind of effect is very difficult to pin-point though. 
The remainder of this section will highlight the impact of the political diaspora’ s 
struggle. The discussion of the political transnational activities in the previous 
chapter revealed that these activities are very diverse, and of course the impact 
very much depends on the kind of political activity undertaken, thus the direct-
indirect division is adopted in this section as well. 
 
The impact of direct political transnationalism 
The junta reacts very harshly to in-country contentious politics. Peaceful 
demonstrators or opposition members are frequently arrested, and the SPDC does 
not hesitate to use massive force to quell demonstrations, as was last seen in 
September 2007. Likewise, the rebel armies in the border areas are combated 
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forcefully with the ‘Four cuts strategy’. However, these counterinsurgency tactics 
disproportionally affect the civilian population. Hence, the Burmese are very much 
divided on which option is preferable: ‘fighting for the cause’ or ‘ceasefire for 
peace’: “Critics accused the hard-liners in Mae Sot of sacrificing the interests of 
Karen communities in the conflict zones for the sake of an increasingly elusive 
breakthrough at the national political level” (South 2008: 59). There is an intensive 
debate on whether or not ceasefire and subsequent return of the refugees would 
not be better for the ethnic minorities than the decades of conflict they have had 
to endure:  
 “We just want peace so we can go back! This is not our country. If 
there really is peace and monitoring of that peace by the 
international community, then we would go back!” (emotional 
remark by a participant in a focus group discussion, Mae La camp, 
December 21, 2006).  
“The Karen people in Myanmar have become very weary and fed up 
with the prolonged civil war and its consequences. (...) The Karen 
leaders in Myanmar have projected the idea of transferring ‘the 
armed struggle in the field’ to the ‘political struggle around the table” 
(Karen civil society leader from Rangoon, quoted in South 2008: 65). 
Inside Burma, there are other Karen organisations than the KNU that chose to 
‘return to the legal fold’ and engage with the junta to pursue greater economic and 
cultural autonomy (South 2007b: 65). But because the KNU is based in Thailand and 
has far greater access to international resources, they managed to gain recognition 
as the representatives of the estimated seven million Karen. In practice however, 
many Karen live inside the country, both close the border or in Rangoon and the 
delta zone, and do not necessarily recognise the leadership of the KNU 
(Thawnghmung 2008; South 2008). Regardless of whether they support the KNU’s 
military approach or not, the people in Karen state are strongly affected by the war 
situation, which is likely to endure as exiled hardliners were elected as the KNU 
R e f u g e e s  a s  a g e n t s  o f  c h a n g e | 223 
 
leadership in 2008141
 
. On the other hand, as long as the war continues, the KNU can 
provide vital protection by contributing to early warning systems for villages, 
notifying them in case tatmadaw attacks are imminent, and by providing safe 
passage through the mine-infested area for IDPs and people wanting to seek refuge 
in Thailand. Even the impact of direct political transnationalism is thus not black 
nor white, but rather in a grey zone. 
The impact of indirect political transnationalism 
Diaspora organisations provide information on the situation inside the country, and 
lobby to effect a strong response by the international community. Through their 
work, they can reveal problems that are neglected. For example, intensive 
information campaigns on a rat infestation in Chin State and the subsequent 
famine helped the UN to respond quickly to this particular situation: “We are very 
happy with the reports on the famine in Chin State from several of the organisations 
present here. Now the profile is raised and it is easier to get donor support. That will 
help us to get a better view on the situation and mobilise more resources” (Chris 
Kaye, WFP representative, Burma conference, European Commission, Brussels, 
October 29, 2008). Another possible positive effect was revealed through the work 
of KHRG: local military leaders may be responsive to a threat to reveal the abuses 
to exiled media: “They (the villagers) had to carry things for the SPDC and had to 
cut bamboo poles for them. (...) I warned them (the SPDC authorities) that ‘if you 
continue to order the villagers to do these things, the news (of forced labour 
demands) will spread out from BBC and VOA’. After that they reduced the forced 
labour” (villager in Papun district, cited in Hull 2008: 11). While this finding cannot 
be generalised, it does illustrate a possible effect of exiled media coverage. Fink 
(2008: 458) also mentions how the documentation of the widespread use of forced 
                                                             
141 The KNU does want a ceasefire, but wants peace on its own terms, which includes a political 
settlement for all the ethnic minority groups in the country, and as such a discussion on political 
devolution and federalism. This stance has impeded a ceasefire since the 1990s (Thawnghmung 2008). 
In contrast, Karen leaders with a ‘Union Karen perspective’ “do not see a fundamental contradiction 
between citizenship of a centrally governed state, and the pursuit of greater economic, social, cultural 
and linguistic autonomy” (South 2008: 65). 
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labour has led to growing pressure on the regime, and eventually to the opening of 
the ILO- office in Rangoon and a decrease in the use of forced labour, at least in the 
central areas of Burma. 
But the main goal of these transnational groups is of course to effect national 
political change, through international pressure. In spite of the intensive lobby 
work, nothing much has changed. Year after year the Burmese junta is condemned 
in high-level international meetings and sanctions have been proclaimed by the US 
and the EU, but these actions have not been able to reach any goal in the field, 
apart from challenging the legitimacy of the junta. The main reason for the 
inefficiency is the discord between the West and the East over tactics to influence 
the Burmese generals, namely sanctions or constructive engagement (Brees 
2007a). As the rule of the Burmese junta is accepted in the region, it is rather easy 
for them to ignore diaspora and Western calls for change- which is not to say that 
regional countries have so much more influence over the SPDC. 
Not only the international politicians, but also the Burmese people tend to be 
divided over the sanctions strategy. The sanctions imposed by the US have for 
example led to a massive loss of jobs in the garment sector in Burma. Another 
important aspect of these sanctions is the denial of assistance to the country by 
international financial institutions, and some diaspora groups lobby strongly to 
keep it that way (see e.g. Ethnic Community Development Forum 2008). In 
addition, advocacy organisations like Free Burma Coalition have successfully 
organised transnational coalitions with overseas solidarity organisations and NGOs 
involved in the movement for greater corporate responsibility, in order to affect 
private sector investment decisions (Maclean 2004: 337; Chodhury 2008: 10-11). 
Different tactics were used, such as consumer boycotts, stakeholder actions, etc. 
They attracted quite some media attention and tens of companies, such as Pepsi, 
Reebok, Levi-Strauss and Texaco, did indeed withdraw from Burma, again leading 
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to a loss of jobs142
The junta for its part, has responded to the influence of the diaspora lobby and the 
resulting tensions with the West by hiring US-based consultancy firms to improve 
their image (Smith 1998; Thornton 2006). In addition, they try to criminalise 
diaspora organisations and their counterparts. For example, they tried to exclude 
the ‘Free Trade Union of Burma’ from a meeting with the International Labour 
Organisation, by calling them ‘terrorists’:  
. Predictably, this leads to disputes as, once again, the people 
who stayed behind suffer from the consequences of these decisions. 
“Please allow me to reiterate our position regarding a matter which 
we strongly feel is of vital importance for Myanmar as well as for the 
image of the International Labour Organization. That is the 
participation of the members of Free Trade Union of Burma (FTUB) 
which the Ministry of Home Affairs of Myanmar has declared as 
terrorists. (...) In the light of intensified cooperation between 
Myanmar and the ILO, as evidenced by the emergence of a redress 
mechanism for forced labour victims, to allow the participation of 
elements involved in terrorist acts at the special sitting on Myanmar 
will in no way contribute to our worthy efforts to eliminate the 
practice of forced labour”.  
(Statement by U Hla Myint (ILO 2007)) 
However, the junta has little control on the extensive information flows from 
Burma-based informants to the diaspora or on criticism spread on the internet 
forums. In an attempt to get a better grip on these Web-based activities, the SPDC 
sent officials to India and China for training in the fight against cyber criminality, 
where they learned to intercept emails and detect their sources (Irrawaddy 2007). 
This has led to the creation of a special ‘Cyber Warfare Division’ within the secret 
police to track online activists (Chodhury 2008: 12). Multiple events in 2008 suggest 
                                                             
142 However, the loss of jobs is minimal in case of the capital-intensive oil and gas sector, which is the 
largest source of foreign exchange for the junta. Moreover, Western companies in those lucrative areas 
are quickly replaced by Asian companies, which brings new jobs, but which also raises questions on the 
efficiency of sanctions without the cooperation of Burma’s neighbours. 
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that this strategy has worked. Several of the large diaspora websites (e.g. Mizzima 
and Democratic Voice of Burma) were hit and crashed for days in July 2008 (South 
East Asian Press Alliance 2008) while the email box of Dr. Turnell from Macquarie 
University was flooded with thousands of emails on one day, right before the 2008 
Burma conference143
In contrast to these activities, the influence of indirect contentious politics is first 
and foremost felt by Thailand, which is host to over two million Burmese refugees 
and the largest political opposition movements. Therefore this will be discussed in 
Section 6.2. 
. It is thus very likely that critics of the regime will increasingly 
have to endure this kind of harassment in the future. Moreover, if the junta has the 
feeling that a situation is growing beyond its control, such as during the ‘Saffron 
Revolution’ on September 29, 2007, they can take the measure to shut down 
access to the internet and mobile phone system in the entire country as they 
control the only two providers (Chodhury 2008: 12-13). 
 
6.1.4 Concluding remarks: The influence of the diaspora on conflict, peace 
building and development in Burma 
 
Through transnational processes, refugees can act as agents of change, but the 
case of Burmese refugees in Thailand provides mixed evidence in this regard. The 
transnational activities do have an effect on the ‘stayees’, but the direction of the 
influence, positive or negative, is not clear-cut, and it seems too early to talk of real 
change. The impact of financial remittances on a household level is positive in 
terms of survival and income diversification, which is even more welcome given the 
low level of ODA to the country, certainly in active conflict areas. On the other 
hand, the significant out-migration is likely transforming the social fabric of 
households and communities ‘inside’144
                                                             
143 Personal conversation, Chicago, October 2, 2008. 
. However, as most of the migration to 
144 Certainly for this aspect, more research will be needed inside the country. Promisingly, a study on the 
impact of emigration on Arakan state has recently started (by a staff member of CNRS), which will 
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Thailand has been developed as an answer to life- and livelihoods- threatening 
conditions, the so-called ‘brain drain’ was inevitable. Moreover, the new manual 
labour and - for a minority- highly skilled practices learned in Thailand may change 
this brain-drain into a brain-gain if and when they return.  In the mean time, the 
remittances support the recipients inside Burma, and to some extent the wider 
community through multiplier effects, but these remittances cannot change the 
economic structural context by themselves. Collective social remittances for their 
part can be directly and indirectly positive, or have a negative (political) impact 
depending on the context. Also direct and indirect forms of political 
transnationalism engender strong debates between Burmese people in all the 
domains of the refugee diaspora. After all, the rebellion and the activities 
supported by hard-line activists in the diaspora have a negative contemporary 
impact on the stayees. Moreover, despite the lobbying achievements in terms of 
sanctions and Western company withdrawals, until now the political diaspora has 
not achieved more tangible influence on the political situation in Burma than the 
‘inside’ opposition has. The junta’s grip on power has not weakened the last 
decade. Currently, there is thus not yet much visible evidence of economic, social 
and political transformations through refugee transnational activities. However, as 
the country of origin and the host country influence the transnational activities, the 
impact of transnationalism might change quickly once the technological, political 
and war context alters, e.g. in terms of participation of stayees in transnational 
dialogues, impact of remittances on the overall economy, diaspora involvement in 
negotiations, etc. Furthermore, other transformations, such as knowledge of the 
human rights discourse or critical political discussions, may only slowly and in an 
immeasurable way change people’s hearts and minds: “Today, because of the 
awareness-raising activities conducted by community-based organizations and exile 
media groups, there are civilians in the ethnic states who understand that the 
tatmadaw (and other groups) have broken international humanitarian and human 
                                                                                                                                               
hopefully be followed by similar research in other areas of Burma. Even locally though, it might be very 
difficult to oppose positive and negative impacts of migration on socio-ethnic structures: “They are often 
two sides of the same coin, and some members of families and communities may be affected more 
positively or negatively than others” (de Haas et al. 2009: 35). 
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rights laws and that civilians should – in theory at least – have a right to challenge 
this. If political space opens up in the future, civilians may demand greater 
protections and an independent judiciary to take on such cases” (Fink 2008: 458).  
A diaspora can have also a constructive effect on peace building if they manage to 
reconcile and unite in exile, as was the case in the El Salvador diaspora (Horst 2007: 
6). However, ethnic fault lines are still very much present in smaller Burmese 
refugee communities such as the one in Japan (Banki 2006a) as well as in larger 
refugee communities such as in Thailand. Most exile organisations are actually still 
organised along ethnic lines, which tends to emphasize their differences rather 
than their common goals. Fink (2003: 3) describes how women’s groups on the 
border discussed the formation of an alliance, but many of the ethnic minority 
women groups initially found it problematic to include the Burmese Women’s 
Union because the latter accepted members of all ethnicities and therefore refused 
to only represent Burman women. This illustrates how ethnic tensions inside 
Burma are politicised, incorporated into daily lives and reproduced in exile. 
Moreover, the news coverage and advocacy of the ethnic minorities and the 
Burmans is still substantially different. While the Karen and other ethnic minorities 
tend to concentrate on social, economic and cultural rights, the Burmans focus on 
civil and political rights, which Brooten (2003) sees as a negative perpetuation of 
differences and inequities between Burmans and non-Burmans: “The consistent 
and repetitive nature of human rights abuse reporting has also worked to maintain 
stereotypes of non-Burmans as victims. In the public realm they remained invisible 
except as symbols of Burmese military oppression. While there were exceptions, the 
very fact that they were exceptional proves the rule - that the popular conception 
within the opposition was of the non-Burmans as lacking political skills” (Brooten 
2003: 202). In addition to ethnic differences, there are other forms of factionalism 
on the border, related to religion, personal (autocratic) motivations, competition 
for foreign funding etc. (see also Maclean 2004)145
                                                             
145 Related to the latter two factors is, for example, the split-up of aid to the IDP camps between CIDKP 
and KORD. When the number of IDPs exploded during the ‘97 offensive, KORD did not have the capacity 
to deliver aid to all the people, thus CIDKP was set up to attract additional funding and manpower 
.  
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On the other hand, there are also elements that improve inter-ethnic cooperation. 
The various trainings that are organised, for example, have tended to benefit young 
activists from various backgrounds, who are being trained to assume leadership 
positions in the future: “Their participation in civil society organizations has 
exposed them to a much wider range of educational and organizational models 
through training programs, often with their peers from other ethnic groups. These 
cross-cultural experiments in living and learning together are important in 
themselves, but they have also created new frames of reference that will aid the 
building of a peaceful and democratic Burma” (Maclean 2004: 336). In addition, the 
diaspora has also made official efforts to improve cooperation and understanding. 
A promising umbrella project, uniting political, civil and military groups inside the 
country and on the Thai side of the border, was set up in 1999: the National 
Reconciliation Program (NRP). It is very important to note that this initiative not 
only involves various armed factions, but also other groups that are affected by the 
SPDC’s rule, as this brings additional potential to develop a more sustainable peace 
(Collyer 2006: 99). The idea is to prepare the different groups to participate in the 
‘tripartite dialogue’146 between the SPDC, the NLD and the ethnic minorities, by 
facilitating and funding training as well as the set-up of inter-group coordination 
mechanisms147
                                                                                                                                               
(Interview with Director of KORD, Mae Sariang, July 5, 2006). However, now donors have less strict 
criteria and funding is secured, so it seemed logical to me that the two Karen diaspora organisations 
would merge again, as they were working with the same IDP population. However, the head of KORD 
was unwilling to even consider the idea or talk about pros and cons of such a merger, presumably 
because of established patronage networks: “Power and loyalty are highly personalized in Burmese 
society and the ability to distribute resources to members of one’s own organization and community is 
crucial for the maintenance of patron-client relationships and the position of elites in exile” (Maclean 
2004: 344). This personalised form of power partly explains why the Burmese typically form new groups 
rather joining established ones, but external funding has exacerbated this trend of political factionalism: 
“By funding almost all projects during their initial proposal period but then gradually reducing this 
funding in subsequent years, funding agencies had provided activists with an incentive to periodically 
start entirely new organizations to ensure at least continued funding, if not increased amounts” (Brooten 
2003: 337). 
. Since its inception, regular meetings have thus been held, both in 
Thailand and close to the border in Burma, in order to agree on common principles 
146 The reason that I have put this word between brackets is that I fully agree with Pedersen’s statement 
on this issue (2008: 65): “There is no such thing as a “third” party that can sit down at the table for 
‘tripartite talks’ as UN resolutions demand. Traditionally, different ethnic organizations have worked 
independently of — and often at cross-purposes with — each other. Although current trends and 
initiatives are more hopeful, the unity inherent in consensus on abstract ideals or general objectives 
should not be overestimated. The devil is in the details”. 
147 Interviews and email communications with Mael Raynaud, analyst for Euro-Burma office. 
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to govern Burma (across strategic divides148
These kinds of projects have a real potential to succeed, as the Burmese social and 
cultural environment allow for interaction across ethnic groups, which has largely 
spared Burma from communal violence (not from tensions), unlike similar 
situations in other countries (Thawnghmung 2008: 49). The ultimate solution is still 
seen as lying in the political arena. Therefore, if the NRP proves efficient to build 
mutual trust and cooperation, which initial results indicate, this inclusive 
mechanism could substantially enhance the diaspora’ s contribution to peace 
building. One could say that the Burmese diaspora has achieved ‘the flight 
forward’, as Durieux (2000: 8) calls it, by itself, by starting a multifaceted dialogue 
around peace issues, even without international facilitation, or rather, despite a 
lack of international recognition of that process. Indeed, since the NRP and other 
local initiatives lack the ‘voice’ that international lobbies do have, they tend to be 
ignored, not only by the Burmese junta, but also by important players such as the 
United Nations.  
) and to create the conditions necessary 
to safeguard them. In the third and last phase of the project (2008-2012), the NRP 
hopes to further deepen political consensus, develop human resources, as well as 
prepare for a democratic rule through reliable data gathering, grassroots 
empowerment, etc. A first symbol of success of the project was the establishment 
of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) in 2004, which unites representatives of 
various parties and ‘ethnic nationalities’ within the existing ethnic states. The 
organisation explicitly recognises the junta as a stakeholder, even agreeing on 
amnesty for past actions for anyone involved in peace talks, demonstrating a 
genuine interest in dialogue (ENC 2006).  
On the other hand, a diaspora can also prolong the conflict, by supporting rebel 
armies, or by holding on a to a strident, uncompromising rhetoric: “Unfortunately 
for Burma (...) the voices of exiled elites have often drowned out better-informed, 
                                                             
148 Pedersen (2008: 58) has aptly divided these strategies in four ideal types, depending on a) if they 
want to engage with Burma now or if they want to wait for political changes first, and b) on whether 
they work in an armed or non-violent way. This results into 4 types: (1) confrontation (rebel groups), (2) 
contestation (political parties), (3) accommodation (ceasefire groups), (4) avoidance (civil society 
groups, focusing on humanitarian issues and capacity building). 
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more nuanced and constructive views. In the zero-sum struggle for resources and 
perceived legitimacy, genuine ‘peace-making’ efforts have been sacrificed for 
political expediency” (South 2008: 110). One example of the diaspora impeding 
peace building is the planned ceasefire negotiations of the KNU with the junta in 
1994. This move was actively discouraged by the NCGUB, because they saw it as 
subversive of their own efforts to effect decisive international action against the 
Burmese generals. The KNU gave in to their wishes, to the detriment of the civilian 
population and themselves. Indeed, only a few months later, the KNU lost its 
Manerplaw headquarters, and most of its remaining territory. Recently, there have 
been renewed attempts by the RTG to mediate between the KNU and the SPDC, 
which the KNU is willing to accept, but other exiles fear: “Htay Aung, a Burmese 
researcher for the exile-based Network for Democracy and Development, said there 
would be a ‘gap’ between the KNU and Burmese opposition groups in exile if the 
KNU signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government. The Thai 
authorities were also likely to increase pressure on Burmese opposition groups and 
the democracy movement would be weakened if the KNU reached a ceasefire 
agreement with the Burmese regime, Htay Aung said” (Saw Yan Naing 2009). 
Hence, history could repeat itself. This kind of lobbying and the potential support 
to rebel movements are factors that lead authors like Adamson (2002), Collier 
(quoted in Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002: 26) and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) to 
say that the existence of a large diaspora increases the likelihood of (enduring) 
conflict in both countries of origin and host countries. 
There is thus no guarantee that a diaspora will play a positive role. The picture is 
likely to be mixed, as this and other case studies (e.g. Sri Lanka (Orjuela 2008) or 
Somaliland (Lindley 2007a)) have demonstrated. What is clear, is that they have a 
large potential to influence both peace building and conflict in their country of 
origin due to their capacity and networks: “The exiles on the outside could be said 
to be forming a new elite in comparison to those who remain inside (...) 
characterised by greater levels of access to education and technology, greater 
opportunities and skills to manipulate language and technology and greater 
R e f u g e e s  a s  a g e n t s  o f  c h a n g e | 232 
 
distance from the non-elite” (Dudley 2003: 23). However, at present, the role of 
refugees and diaspora organisations is not taken into account by international 
actors that try to influence the peace building and development process in Burma. 
Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations Special Envoy for Myanmar, has visited the 
country six times in 2008, but until now his efforts were fruitless (Aung Zaw 2008). 
Moreover, Gambari and the UN in general have focused solely on the conflict 
between the SPDC and the NLD, to the detriment of any (public?) engagement in 
peace building in the decades long civil war.  
“We are concerned that once again a United Nations envoy has 
visited Burma without also meeting with genuine representatives of 
Burma’s ethnic nationalities, such as the Karen National Union. (...) 
Ethnic people should not be sidelined in any future discussion on a 
national reconciliation process in Burma” (Statement by KNU on 
February 19, 2009, after another Gambari-trip to Burma, quoted in 
Wai Moe 2009). 
This is a void as the ethnic minority groups, their civil organisations and the 
ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups are surely important stakeholders on the road 
to peace building and the extensive negotiations this entails. While several of the 
political transnational activities discussed above are indeed geared towards a 
confrontation and a challenging of the junta, most Burmese political parties (inside 
the country and in exile) actually prefer to compromise by acknowledging the junta 
as a partner for dialogue that will play an important role in the country’s future. 
Even the hard-line civil society groups argue that the sanctions are merely a tool to 
be able to start negotiations, rather than to bring the generals down. The UN 
should thus include the political, civil and military diaspora leaders into the 
negotiations, regardless of whether the SPDC approves this, next to stakeholders 
inside the country. Initiatives like the NRP need to be acknowledged and 
supported, since this area could exactly be the best way in which the international 
community can encourage peace-building in Burma:“International actors must 
continue to advocate in the strongest way possible for government dialogue with 
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ethnic minority representatives, but direct mediation is unlikely to be a realistic 
option. Rather the most promising focus may be “down stream issues”: helping 
ethnic groups prepare for future negotiations and develop common ground, 
addressing specific rights violations, reconstructing war-torn communities and 
economies, and providing protection and humanitarian assistance for conflict-
affected populations. Ethnic minority organizations are engaged in all of these 
areas, but suffer from an acute lack of capacity and resources” (Pedersen 2008: 65). 
The current restricted focus on the NLD is unlikely to lead to sustainable peace as 
long as the other forms of conflict are ignored. 
This overview demonstrates that refugees’ contribution towards both conflict as 
well as peace building and development should not be underestimated, as they are 
bound to play a large role. One of the reasons that the role of refugees in 
development and peace building has not been considered (other than their 
potential as voters once they have returned), is the lack of information and 
research into this subject. This case study has demonstrated the various ways 
through which refugees can have an impact on their conflict-affected country of 
origin, but more research will be needed, both in cases of conflict and post-conflict, 
in order to fully grab refugees’ potential. 
 
 
 6.2. ‘Burden’ or ‘boon’? The impact of Burmese refugees 
on host country Thailand149
 
 
The most important reason that refugees are required to stay in camps is that host 
governments see them as potential threats. Also in the West refugees are 
increasingly regarded as a menace, certainly in the aftermath of 9/11, which led to 
the securitisation of migration and anxieties about ‘the other’. However, this 
                                                             
149 I would like to thank Renaud Egreteau for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this 
Section. 
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discourse holds more sense in developing countries neighbouring conflict areas, 
who have to deal with mass influxes of refugees on their territory. In those cases, 
refugees can indeed pose a security threat to the host country, for example if they 
attract attacks from across the border in which the local population is targeted as 
well or if they are mixed up with armed forces (e.g. mujahedin with Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan (Schmeidl 2002) or the Interahamwe with the Tutsi in Congo 
(Terry 2002)). Relief aid may be manipulated by former leaders to control their 
fellow refugees and finance their own insurgent activities, which can prolong the 
conflict in the country of origin. Moreover, refugee camps provide a ready ground 
for political radicalism, militancy and recruitment into rebel groups, as there are 
many bored young men in the camps (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). If any violent 
act is committed, there is often no adequate law enforcement system to punish 
these crimes, and since most camps are not entirely closed, the problems of crime, 
violence and militarisation leach out into the surrounding host community 
(Jacobsen 2000; 2002). 
This impact on security is the most pressing one, but the impact of the refugees’ 
presence also manifests itself on a political, economic and environmental level. The 
economy of a host country can be seriously affected by refugees. Large numbers of 
refugees who are in desperate need of cash are in a weak bargaining position. They 
have to accept lower wages and may thus have a detrimental effect on native 
employment and wages, damaging the more vulnerable members of the host 
community. This can result into rising tensions, as was recently the case in South-
Africa, where refugees/migrants from Zimbabwe were blamed (or rather 
scapegoated) for the declining economic conditions. However, as refugees are not 
spread equally across the territory of a country, local effects are particularly 
important. While in some areas the impact may be negative, in other areas the 
presence of refugees can be beneficial due to the material assets the refugees 
bring with them as well as their human capital and skills. Certainly if there 
previously was insufficient labour to enhance the scale of the economy, a refugee 
influx may represent a real ‘boon’ to the region (Kok 1989: 431). Also within one 
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region there may be quite some variation since some actors will benefit from the 
refugees’ presence and others will be negatively affected. These general findings 
can also be found in this particular case study.  
If it is estimated that there are two million Burmese refugees in Thailand, then 
Thailand has a refugee ratio of 1: 32 (refugee population to total population). It is 
thus to be expected that the refugee impact on Thailand is substantial, which will 
be analysed in the following sections150
 
. It will become clear that whereas the 
effect of the refugees on security and politics as well as on health to some extent 
presents a burden for Thailand, the impact of the refugees on the local and 
national economy is very much beneficial. This is an element that is ignored, 
certainly in this case, but also in many other situations of mass refugee influx, 
where host states are quick to divert all the attention towards the negative side of 
the refugee presence. 
6.2.1 Impact on security and politics 
 
The management of labour and forced migration into Thailand has been conceived 
through a national security lens, rather than one that also looks at economic and 
human securities (Rukumnuaykit 2009: iii). Burmese refugees and migrants, as well 
as other ‘non-Thais’ (Toyota 2006; 2007) are seen a threat to security, social order 
and public health.  
While there are certainly cases of crime committed by the Burmese in Thailand, 
such as theft and drugs trafficking, part of the problem lies in perception. Media 
reports tend to feed the discourse on ‘refugees as trouble makers’, enhancing 
xenophobic attitudes. Every time a Burmese person has committed an offense, this 
is highlighted in the newspapers, which reflects negatively on the entire Burmese 
refugee population. In addition, the view that Thailand is being ‘overwhelmed’ by 
foreigners is frequently repeated. These ideas are often reinforced by insensitive 
                                                             
150  This analysis will not be restricted to Tak province, unless indicated differently.  
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comments of politicians (Caouette et al. 2006: 56). The following quotes are 
extracts from interviews with respondents and in Thai newspapers which 
demonstrate this point: 
“Respondent: There was a burglary here recently. People who live 
across the street heard a noise. A person thought they were asleep 
and broke in. The neighbours then made noise and the Karen guy ran 
away. Interviewer: How do you know that it was not a Thai person? 
Respondent: I don’t know, it happened at night, and it was raining. I 
assume it was a Karen guy since they shave their heads. (...) If they 
commit a crime, they just flee across the border, so it is difficult to 
trace them. They have no cards, they are not under Thai law” 
(Interview with Thai shopkeeper, Mae Ramat, October 1, 2007). 
 “Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej said yesterday the navy is 
exploring a deserted island to place Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic 
minority group from Burma who illegally slipped into the country (…) 
‘To stop the influx, we have to keep them in a tough place. Those who 
are about to follow will have to know life here will be difficult in order 
that they won’t sneak in,’ he said” (Nauam 2008). 
“’Police have no information on the number of these migrant workers, 
their identity, or whereabouts’. He (deputy commander of Chiang Mai 
provincial police) advocated a special zone be set aside to 
accommodate migrant workers. ‘We're dealing with a time bomb. We 
must defuse it before it explodes into a greater problem,’ said Pol Col 
Dinai” (Fry 2009). 
“An influx of illegal Burmese migrant workers following the Songkran 
festival last month has triggered a security crackdown. (...) Col 
Thanongsak said illegal migrants jeopardise national security. Some 
may have slipped in to work but later joined criminal or narcotic 
gangs. (…) Some Burmese migrants choose to stay near the border in 
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Mae Sot district to develop their labour skills and save money before 
taking up jobs in other provinces. This is why the Thai population in 
some border villages is dwarfed by Burmese” (Kheunkaew 2009). 
This constant negative portrayal has a negative effect on the public opinion, which 
is indicated by a surprising finding of a study by USCRI and ABAC (2007): income 
and educational levels seemed consistently negatively correlated with progressive 
or liberal attitudes toward refugees. The more people read and look for 
information, the more negative their attitude towards the Burmese (even when 
explained what forced migration means)151
Another argument often stated about the impact of Burmese self-settled refugees 
on the region is that they spread diseases and overburden the local health system. 
A Thai camp commander even saw the ‘spreading of epidemics’ as the most 
important argument against self-settlement in a certain zone: “A designated zone 
of residence is a good idea. But refugees still need to be separated from Thai people 
somehow, since they need to be controlled by the Ministry of Health. We need to 
control for epidemics”
. In contrast, working class people and 
people with only high school diplomas were found to be more positively oriented 
towards refugees, whereas it is commonly assumed in literature that these groups 
will have more negative attitudes towards refugees because they are the ones 
competing with them for scarce resources (Chambers 1986; Salehyan and Gleditsch 
2006: 9).  
152
                                                             
151 Of course, by no means I want to imply that all educated Thais are racist. There are also Thai activist 
groups working towards better recognition and treatment of illegal and hill tribe people, or Thai 
organisations who work with Burmese victims of human trafficking and prostitution, as well as Thais 
who strongly react to the expulsion of boat refugees (see Section 6.2.3). But the overall trend, as felt by 
the refugees themselves and as expressed by Thai respondents in this and other more extensive 
research on this subject (USCRI and ABAC 2007), tends to be one of xenophobia. 
. Local leaders thus tend to see this ‘health impact’ as a 
security issue. To some extent, the Burmese population is indeed more prone to 
diseases than better-off locals, due to their flight and bad working and living 
conditions. However, the real problem lies in access to health care and treatment. 
While everyone is in theory allowed to access health centres on humanitarian 
grounds, in practice there are many difficulties. First of all, only registered foreign 
152 Interview with Akarapun Poonsiri, Mae La camp, October 1, 2007. 
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workers can benefit from the THB 30 health scheme, which is a system introduced 
by the Thaksin government in 2001 to improve access of poor people to hospitals. 
However, the family of registered workers and non-registered workers (as well as 
homeless Thais) are not included in this system. The doctors on duty thus have the 
choice to either ask the full cost of the treatment (which most cannot afford), not 
treat the patient, or treat the unregistered patient for free, in which case they pose 
a burden on the health system. Still, the enormous increase in the number of 
patients cannot be attributed to the refugees alone, since the introduction of the 
THB 30 health scheme led to an enormous rise in the number of patients 
throughout the country (Chandoevwit 2003: 30). Even if treatment were free 
though, the fact that this is an illegal population brings additional problems with it, 
as explained in Section 4.4. This kind of ‘health impact’ can thus only decrease if 
the policy concerning access to health care and treatment changes, and there are 
some signs that this is indeed occurring. The Thai Ministry of Health has for 
example developed a ‘migrant health strategy’, part of which is the idea to work 
with community health workers who can act as go-betweens and translators at the 
same time (Kerdmongkol and Suwanpanmani 2008).  
Whereas this issue featured much less in interviews with Thai respondents, the 
largest impact on the security, at least on the border, actually does not come from 
the refugees, but from the armed conflict inside Burma. In the past, the refugee 
camps have been attacked by the DKBA (see Section 3.3.1), during which several 
Thai people were killed as well. While these large-scale attacks have not occurred 
since 1998, occasionally the war still spills across the border. In 2001 for example, 
the dry season offensive of the Burmese army against Shan State Army-South 
spilled over into Thai territory, causing many people to flee their homes and Thai 
soldiers to shell the Burmese side of the border (Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002: 
113-114). More recently, there were again skirmishes between the KNU and the 
DKBA in the area neighbouring Umphang and Phop Phra district of Tak province. As 
a result, Padee village had to be evacuated since it was located just across the river 
from the battle (Saw Yan Naing 2008b). Thai soldiers and rangers had to be called 
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in to protect the evacuees and be present in case any troops would want to cross 
the border (Supamart Kasem 2008). The next clash in the same area occurred only 
shortly afterwards, in November-December 2008 (CCSDPT-meeting November 12, 
2008). Shells landed on both sides of the border, wounding several Thai people. 
While these skirmishes have resulted into an extensive control of the cross-border 
area by the DKBA, it is unlikely that their victory will be the end of the problems. On 
the contrary, the DKBA apparently wants to defeat the KNU in Thailand as well and 
has threatened ‘to take out Nu Poh camp’ (CCSDPT-meeting January 21, 2009, 
internal document). Therefore, the residents in Nu Poh camp were very worried 
and slept with their bags packed, in case they would need to run again. The security 
of both the refugees and the Thai locals in these border villages is thus 
continuously affected by the war inside Burma, partly because the refugee camps 
are not entirely humanitarian in character. Still, as was explained in Section 3.5.1, 
there is certainly not the refugee warrior phenomenon which occurred in the past 
on the Thai- Cambodian border or in for example Zaire. 
Next to the direct contentious politics, the impact of indirect contentious politics 
such as large demonstrations or political violence, is also foremost felt by Thailand. 
As a result of the violent actions in the Burmese embassy and the Ratchaburi 
hospital by armed Burmese opposition forces in 1999 and 2000, the bilateral 
relationship between Burma and Thailand deteriorated sharply (as explained in 
Section 5.2.3). After those events, and with the coming into office of Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, the RTG wanted to curb the Burmese opposition as much as 
possible. However, in 2003, large-scale demonstrations nonetheless occurred in 
front of the Burmese embassy in Bangkok, after the Depayin attack on Aung San 
Suu Kyi. Thaksin was clearly displeased and stated: “The Burmese are entitled to 
stage protests against their government in camps we provide. They can say what 
they want. But it is not right that they come to Bangkok and protest. We do not like 
any situation we cannot control” (as quoted in HRW 2004: 9). The spokesman of 
the foreign minister added: “They are not supposed to be able to engage in political 
activities that would affect relations with other countries. They are here as guests” 
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(quoted in HRW 2004: 20). Refugees, and certainly the political activists and 
insurgents among them, are thus a visible diplomatic liability to Bangkok. In fact, 
the fear that a costly humanitarian assistance programme would be needed and 
that the KNU would try to establish permanent logistical bases for the resistance in 
Thailand were arguments for the RTG to decide in 1984 against allowing Karen 
refugees to set up village-like camps, unlike the Tak governor had done (Lang 2002: 
85). In the end, this instruction of Bangkok was not strictly implemented, but it did 
signify the reluctance of the RTG to create a similar situation as with the 
Indochinese refugees. More recently, the arrival of hundreds of Rohingya (an 
ethnic minority group from west-Burma) and a new trial of Aung San Suu Kyi 
caused Thai Prime Minister Vejjajiva to say that the Burmese regime “remains a 
hideous blight” on the Asian map, to which the SPDC replied: “’It is global 
knowledge that [Thailand] provide fertile soils to Myanmar absconders, insurgent 
groups and anti-government political groups,’ adding that cessation of conflict in 
Burma ‘rests on the cooperation of the neighbouring other country’” (Smith and 
Wade 2009).  The presence of refugees, activists and rebels thus remains very 
sensitive in the bilateral relationship, despite the fact that Thailand is Burma’s 
largest trading partner. In practice though, at the local and more discreet level, 
there has always been a lot of space for negotiation, flexibility and accommodation, 
despite the official stance, as the presence of these opposition forces may also 
serve as a bargaining tool for Thailand as long as the political situation in Burma 
remains volatile (double policy for strategic reasons)153
Lastly, Burmese refugees could in theory also have an impact on internal politics in 
Thailand, as the Karen, Palaung, Akha, Lahu and Shan have an effect on the ethnic 
balance of the country. The Karen constitute 46% of the entire hill tribe population 
in Thailand (Huguet and Punpuing 2005: 63), and this percentage has increased due 
to the Karen refugee influx. In other cases, this has sometimes resulted in an 
increased confrontation of the state by previously oppressed minorities, or it 
. 
                                                             
153 This is not exceptional to this refugee situation. For example, Durieux (2000: 1) finds the same 
ambivalence in Tanzania: “Geo-political considerations also explain the government of Tanzania's 
greater tolerance towards the Burundian refugee caseload, and possibly a more ambivalent attitude 
towards the involvement of this caseload in ‘political’ activities”. 
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exacerbated pre-existing ethnic tensions. Van Damme (1999: 49) for example 
found that the arrival of Mandingo refugees from Liberia increased ethnic tensions 
with the forest tribes in Guinea. An example within Europe is Macedonia, since 
many observers predicted during the NATO action in Kosovo that the influx of 
ethnic Albanians in Macedonia could lead to a civil war between Slavs and 
Albanians (Lischer 2000: 4). In the case of Thailand however, I have not found any 
evidence that their presence has heightened the political demands of the 
disadvantaged hill tribe people in Thailand, which was confirmed by various 
contacts in Thailand. Also Sang Kook (2001: 72-73) concluded that there was no 
support for greater Karen autonomy in Thailand nor any kind of Pan-Karen 
nationalism. On the contrary, Toyota (2005) claims that the RTG is even less willing 
to grant full citizenship to hill tribe people and resolve their ambiguous status, as it 
could open the door to calls for recognition of the Burmese minorities. This is 
contradicted by NGO staff members though, who claim that the law and policy 
reforms they advocate for on behalf of refugees and migrants also benefit the 
undocumented hill tribe population154
In sum, the refugees indeed have an impact on the health, criminal and political 
situation in Thailand, but for the large majority of the refugees this is due to 
reasons outside of their control. Often the elements that negatively affect the Thai 
population have the same negative impact for the bulk of the refugees. Only a 
small section of the refugees is politically active or engaged in rebel or criminal 
activities. 
, so additional research will need to 
determine the impact of the refugee presence on the status of the hill tribe 
population. In any case, if there is an impact, it cannot be attributed to deliberate 
strategies of refugees or their organisations. 
 
 
 
                                                             
154 Email conversation with NGO staff member, based in Bangkok, June 16, 2009. 
R e f u g e e s  a s  a g e n t s  o f  c h a n g e | 242 
 
6.2.2 Environmental and economic impact155
 
  
Refugees can have a large influence on the local natural environment because of 
their need for housing and survival: “Deforestation occurs as refugees seek out 
firewood and sheltering materials, grazing land becomes denuded as refugees’ herd 
animals strain the carrying capacity of the range, water resources cannot support 
greatly increased utilization and become polluted and depleted, and there is 
garbage and other waste accumulation around refugee camps. In addition, 
refugees are seen as ‘exceptional resource degraders’ as a consequence of their 
poverty, short time horizons, lack of local environmental knowledge and 
traumatized psychological status” (Jacobsen 1997: 19). 
While it is frequently said that the initial refugee influx causes most environmental 
damage, due to unrestrained deforestation and harvesting of food (Jacobsen 1997: 
21) and because aid agencies are not yet efficiently organised during that first 
phase of the emergency, that was not the case in Thailand. The refugees trickled in 
over a large period of time and negotiated over land with the local population, with 
NGOs delivering minimal assistance. Only later on, when the security situation 
worsened and refugees were assembled in camps, did tensions concerning the 
environment arise. Village communities became urban centres as camps expanded 
from a maximum of 6,000 people to an average of 17,000 today (Thompson 2008: 
26). NGOs have thus incrementally increased the rations to diminish the 
detrimental effect on the environment, but most refugees still leave the camp to 
supplement these rations. They forage for bamboo shoots, beans, mushrooms, fire 
wood, leaves for the house roof, etc. This collection of common property resources 
(CPRs)156, as well as some criminal offences, have led to tensions with the local 
population157
                                                             
155 Parts of this section were previously published in BREES, I. (2008c) ‘Refugee business: Strategies of 
work on the Thai-Burma border’,  Journal of Refugee Studies 21 (3): 380-397. 
, which occasionally resulted into public actions by local villagers. In 
156 Common Property Resources (CPRs) are “the resources accessible to a whole community of a village 
and to which no individual has exclusive property rights. In the dry regions of India, they include village 
pastures, community forests, wastelands, common threshing grounds, waste dumping places, watershed 
drainages, village ponds, (...) rivers, etc.” (Jodha 1986: 1169). 
157 Interview with Akarapun Poonsiri, camp commander Mae La camp, October 1, 2007. 
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2006 for example, 500 Thai people from around Mae Sot wrote to the Mae Sot 
senator, asking to expel the refugees because they are degrading the 
environment158
In contrast to these tensions around the camps (particularly around Mae La), no 
such problems were recorded during this research between rural self-settled 
refugees and locals. This is not so surprising as various studies have proven that 
large camps are a far bigger burden on the environment than a dispersed 
population of self-settled refugees is (Kok 1989; Jacobsen 1997). Moreover, the 
patterns of settlement not only have a direct but also an indirect effect: they set 
the parameters of refugees’ interaction with the host community, implying that 
limited contact also limits the possible exchange of knowledge on local government 
regulations, local customary rights and collective arrangements concerning the use 
of CPRs (Jacobsen 1997: 26-30)
. As a form of compensation for this loss of territory and CPRs, 
particularly water, local communities receive benefits from the NGOs in the form of 
improved infrastructure, rice and non-food items. While the large refugee camps 
thus do have some impact on the environment, the tensions with the local 
population are usually more based on the use of CPRs, rather than on real 
environmental damage. This is not surprising as most refugees tend to come from 
areas with comparable types of forest, and are thus able to self-regulate their 
collection practices in a quite sustainable manner (Gallasch 2001: 35). In any case, 
the refugees’ environmental impact is minimal when compared to commercial 
agriculture, forestry production and RTG-enforced restrictions on customary land 
use and rotational cultivation (Gallasch 2001: 2). Like in many other cases, the 
perception that refugees are the cause of certain problems thus seems more 
important than the objective evidence. 
159
                                                             
158 Interview with Pornpimon Trichot, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, November 16, 2006. 
. Another way in which self-settled refugees can 
have an impact on their environment is through their need for housing, which 
certainly in urban areas can cause a surge in rental prices. However, local Thai 
159 This argument also implies that the length of time that refugees have been displaced is not 
necessarily consistent with the amount of environmental damage, as during a protracted refugee 
situation there have been more opportunities to develop sustainable environmental management 
systems (Black 1995: 4-5). 
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respondents denied there was any problem in this regard, which is confirmed by 
statistics that show how rental prices actually went down by 2.4% in the period 
2003-2006 in Tak province (NESDB 2007).  
Even if the refugees have some impact on the economic base of a region due to 
their use of natural resources, the largest impact of the Burmese on the Thai 
economy is their potential as labourers. The Thai economy experienced a 
substantial transformation because of the ever increasing presence of Burmese 
labour, on which large segments of the economy became dependent: “The 
‘miracle’ development in Thailand of the 1980-1990s could not have been achieved 
without the cheap labor provided by illegal foreign migrants from neighbouring 
countries” (Toyota 2005: 105). However, in the aftermath of the 1997 economic 
crisis, Burmese and other migrants were blamed for taking away Thai jobs, which 
resulted into large-scale deportations. After all, the estimated figure of 
undocumented workers in 1998 was equivalent to almost 70% of Thailand’s 
unemployment (Toyota 2006: 2). The effect was a steep increase in bankruptcies of 
companies along the border, since they were incapable of finding Thai 
replacements for the Burmese workers (Martin 2004). Similarly, large deportations 
from Pai district (close to Chiang Mai) in 2003 resulted in a shortage of labour in 
the agricultural and tourism sector (Vicary 2005: 58-60). These findings already 
indicate that the protective measures were ineffective and that there is no 
substantial evidence for the discourse that the Burmese people have a negative 
impact on the country compared to the added value they bring. This was recently 
confirmed by a study of the ILO, which found that the net economic effect of the 
Burmese refugees’ presence on Thailand is positive (Martin 2007). Burmese 
refugees make a significant contribution to the Thai economy, both directly in the 
form of low cost labour and indirectly, by enlarging the market for local suppliers 
and by attracting international aid. Many of these contributions have never been 
recognised, but are essential to understand the way that Thailand – like other host 
countries – not only encounters problems in dealing with an influx, but also 
substantially benefits from the refugees’ presence. The impact of the refugees on 
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the Thai economy in general as well as on the local political economy in the border 
region will be expounded in the following sections. 
 
Impact of refugee labour on the Thai economy 
The Thai economy is in desperate need of foreign labour, mostly in the labour-
intensive sectors. This is clear from the official request for 1,333,703 foreign 
workers by Thai employers in June 2006, of whom 1,051,577 were Burmese, the 
others being Laotians and Cambodians (MAP 2007). Many Burmese are employed 
in the textile and fishing industry as well as in agriculture, which coincides with 
important exports: textiles and footwear, fishery products, and rice and rubber. 
Certainly these sectors need cheap, foreign labour to retain their competitive 
position in the international market (Revenga 2006: 40-41), and the low prices of 
these products keep the national inflation rate low (Rukumnuaykit 2009: 6). In 
addition, Burmese people often work in the construction and the domestic sector, 
as well as in the tourism and catering industry. Martin (2007) calculated that, if 
migrants are as productive as Thai workers in each sector, their total contribution 
to output would be around US$ 11 billion, or 6.2% of Thailand’s GDP. If they were 
less productive (e.g. only 75% of Thai worker output), their contribution would still 
be in the order of five per cent of the GDP. 
This dependency on foreign labour is not likely to change any time soon as the 
fertility rate of Thailand is declining while the education of the younger generation 
is rising, which leads to a preference for skilled jobs. To increase the eagerness of 
Thai employees to work in labour-intensive sectors, more investments in 
technology would be needed, which is not likely to happen:  
“Investment in labor-saving technology as a means to reduce demand 
on unskilled labor does not appeal to most employers in the sectors 
where migrants work. In construction, Thailand already has a 
relatively high level of labor-saving technology, and the need remains 
for skills that cannot be performed by machines, such as welding and 
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laying cement. For smaller companies, the costs of introducing labor-
saving technologies are considered prohibitive. (...) In the face of a 
lack of strong incentives by the government, it can be expected that 
employers will delay as much as possible substituting machines for 
imported labor” (Caouette et al. 2006: 44-45). 
The RTG is not giving incentives to replace foreign labour by improved technology, 
on the contrary. The use of migrant workers is actively encouraged by the RTG as 
one of the incentives for economic decentralisation, which was necessary to 
diminish the over-concentration of development in and around Bangkok 
(Maneepong 2006). The idea was to promote export-oriented, multinational 
enterprises in border zones as key agents of industrial development. As such they 
would become regional growth poles and reduce local poverty. Therefore, labour-
intensive industries were encouraged to move to border towns with investments in 
infrastructure, soft loans, tax benefits, and the available migrant workers as a 
cheap labour force. Through registration systems, foreign labour could be hired 
officially, which does require quite some organisation and budget: “The Ministry of 
Labour devoted 124 million or 13 per cent of its 951 million baht budget for the 
fiscal year 2007 to the management of migrant workers” (Martin 2007: 6).  
In general, within their sector of employment, migrants are working in some of the 
least attractive jobs. These 3D jobs were previously filled by Thai workers. 
However, economic growth, the changing demography, the extension of basic 
education to secondary schools and subsequent changing preferences, together 
with the increasing availability of foreign labour facilitated the exit of Thais out of 
these jobs (Chantanavich 2007; Martin 2007). One could argue that the Burmese 
push unskilled Thais out of the market by accepting lower wages, but then this 
would be borne out by a rise in unemployment rates in areas with a large influx of 
refugees compared to areas with fewer refugees. Statistics demonstrate, however, 
that the unemployment rate in Tak province, where three of the camps are located 
and most of the refugees cross the border, stands at 1.3%, which is equal to the 
national unemployment rate (UNDP 2007). Vicary (2003b: 18) comes to a similar 
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conclusion: “Unemployment in Thailand is concentrated in young people with low 
levels of education, that is people with very similar characteristics to migrant 
workers. However, the provinces with the highest unemployment rates have the 
lowest and very small numbers of migrant workers”. Using statistical calculations, 
Bryant and Rukumnuyakhit (2007) also conclude that the foreign workers do not 
have a detrimental effect on the employment rates of Thais. However, their study 
did find that migrant workers depress wages by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. They 
attribute this ‘double effect’ to the fact that there is no enforced minimum wage 
and that Thai people cannot afford to withdraw from the work force. Martin (2007) 
disagrees with this conclusion though, saying that the wage effect very much 
depends on the elasticity of the labour curve of a certain sector, the possibility of 
additional, labour-saving investments and the particular geographical area. There 
might thus be a wage effect, but it will be very small, and it is easy to see that the 
revenues of this wage reduction do not go to the refugees but to the Thai 
employers. What is more, Rukhumnuaykit (2009: 11-12) argues that Thailand will 
actually need additional foreign labour in the future: “With an extremely low 
unemployment rate (about 1.4 per cent in 2007), and a relatively high labour force 
participation rate (70 per cent), Thailand is expected to encounter severe labour 
shortages in the near future (...) Initially, the migrant workers can help alleviate the 
labour shortage. However, if economic expansion continues, the gap between 
demand and supply of labour is expected to widen. Thus the pressure for effective 
management of migrant workers will intensify in the long run.”. 
Next to the refugees’ contribution in the form of low cost labour, the economy 
benefits substantially due to the extension of the market. Certainly the numerous 
self-settled refugees enlarge the market, by consuming local goods and generating 
a demand for so-called ‘spin-offs’ (Guarnizo 2003): Burmese products as well as 
communication and transport facilities, to keep in touch with their family in 
Thailand, Burma or the wider diaspora. Martin (2007: 14) calculated that a total of 
1.8 million foreign workers who would remit half of their money, would still 
increase the Thai GDP by US$ 2 billion. Furthermore, while refugee workers earn 
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too little to pay normal taxes (which would require a minimum wage of THB 8,300 
per month), they do pay VAT taxes on the goods and services they buy in Thailand 
as well as registration costs if they receive a work permit (THB 500 million in fiscal 
year 2006) (Martin 2007: 23-24). These fees are deducted from their wages, and 
come down to paying 8.3% of their wages to the Thai state in taxes. In addition, 
even camp refugees extend the local suppliers’ market as Thai goods can be sold at 
the gate (e.g. Mae La camp), or transported far into the camp with trucks (e.g. Mae 
Ra Ma Luang camp). In all the camps there are refugee businessmen who manage 
to strike deals with nearby bigger markets for wholesale quantities of food, which 
are later redistributed through little shops in camp (see Section 4.2). As their lack of 
legal identity cards blocks any access to financial capital from banks, they resort to 
informal ways of borrowing money to set up businesses, as poorer Thai people do. 
They borrow large amounts from Thai moneylenders to buy stock, only keeping 
minute profits for themselves.  
Regardless of the real impact of refugees on Thailand, Bangkok needs to reconcile 
conflicting demands of employers and other constituents, which results into 
contradictory policies on migration, labour, development and security (as explained 
in Section 3.3.2).  
 
Impact of refugees on the local political economy  
Another stakeholder in the labour context are the local powerholders. Provincial 
governors, district officers, army and camp commanders need to adapt the refugee 
and migration policy to local circumstances, in which access to work for illegal 
entrants is essential for both the Thai population and the Burmese refugees. Local 
and regional leaders realise the need for foreign workers in their area, not in the 
least because of their close links to powerful employer lobbies such as the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Thai Industries. As their members are 
large contributors to the local economy, the employer lobbies have considerable 
local media coverage and political influence. This phenomenon is widespread: “As 
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elsewhere, money plays a decisive role in Thai electoral politics, and individual 
business people are able to exert substantial indirect influence over state policy 
outside the formal channels of public-private sector consultation. (...) Political 
parties benefit significantly from donations given by businessmen engaged in 
lucrative clandestine trade with Burma, Laos and Cambodia” (Battersby 1999: 483). 
Politicians and businessmen are thus closely related, which implies that even 
unregistered refugee work is in practice tolerated. On the other hand, there are 
nonetheless arrests and deportations, as local government leaders want to be seen 
as complying to some extent with national rules, and since the RTA has a lot of 
influence concerning border and refugee matters and may decide to push refugees 
back. Usually, these deportations have little impact on the overall local economy 
though, unless they are as large scale as in 1998.  
The value of the Burmese refugees is very clear in Mae Sot, which has been 
transformed from a mere trading post into a sizeable industrial zone with a 
booming economy. This transformation can be attributed to several factors, 
amongst which is the presence of refugee workers. Other factors are the inclusion 
in the RTG’s border development scheme (Maneepong 2006; Lubeigt 2008), its 
location on the Asian Highway160
“I arrived in Mae Sot in 1973, and then Mae Sot was very small. 
Business was done through the KNLA territory, while there was much 
less activity in Myawaddy (Burmese border town in hands of SPDC, 
ed.). All business went through two Karen camps, located on both 
sides of the border, and a few big brokers would buy the goods. They 
would then sell these goods to us. Myawaddy started to grow only 
later on, when the KNLA lost territory and the authorities tried to stop 
 and the situation of the KNU/KNLA across the 
border:  
                                                             
160 The Asian Highway is a project which aims to promote the development of international road 
transport in the region. The project was initiated in ’59, but slowed down after 1975 (UNESCAP 2009). It 
has regained attention more recently, and in 2003 an intergovernmental agreement has been signed in 
Bangkok to continue the project. Currently, the network consists of 141,000 kilometres of standardised 
roadways crisscrossing 32 Asian countries. Many links are still missing though, due to lack of funding 
(US$ 18 billion short), and various other problems in different countries (e.g. insurgencies). 
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illegal trade. Now people are more free to travel, and there are many 
traders and less big businessmen. Now we only do like one or two 
lines, not like a department store that does everything as in earlier 
times”.  
(Interview with Ekasith Rassamisethi, trader in garment, Mae Sot, 
December  15, 2006) 
Of course, the growth of refugees in Thailand coincided with the loss of territory of 
the KNU, hence these factors are all connected. Certainly garment factories and 
agriculture flourish in Mae Sot, using Burmese labour while avoiding the problems 
of sanctions that would arise if they settled inside Burma. The case of Mae Sot 
proves Wilson’s point (1992) that an influx into formerly under-populated areas 
benefits the host country, if this area is under the control of the host government 
and if the infrastructure allows connection of the local/regional economy with the 
national economy. Local people admit that the manpower of the Burmese was 
essential to boost industry and agriculture: “There are simply not enough Thai 
workers in Mae Sot. Thai people are landlords, they want to do different jobs. If we 
didn’t have migrant workers, the Mae Sot economy would be destroyed. There are 
maybe 100 factories here, and nearly 100,000 migrant workers. If they all went 
back to their country, we would have a big problem”(Interview with local 
businessman, Mae Sot, October 3, 2007). 
 Local labour needs were filled, which led to local industry expansion and an 
expansion of the consumer base161
                                                             
161 Similar results were found by Nancy Eberhardt (2007, 2008) for the influx of Shan refugees in Mae 
Hong Son province. Their work as foreign labourers, together with an enormous push for rural 
development by the RTG, ensured a large transformation of the local economy. 
. However, these export-oriented sectors and 
the use of foreign labour promoted by Bangkok are not directly beneficial for the 
local population since there are limited linkages to the local economy (Maneepong 
2006). The decentralisation move has thus tended to benefit overall national 
competitiveness, but not necessarily the economic growth of the local indigenous 
economy. Nonetheless, in contrast to popular discourse, not only large factories 
benefit from the presence of the refugees. Local people in the border regions have 
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been hiring Burmese people for centuries, seasonally for agriculture or the whole 
year through in domestic work and the services industry such as laundry and 
cleaning. They can even contact the camp committee about the number of camp 
refugee workers that they need for farming or infrastructure projects. Moreover, 
the work of Burmese people as domestic servants helped the entry of Thai women 
into the labour market. Therefore locals do profit from the increased labour 
potential, even if this has little to do with the decentralisation move of Bangkok. 
While the direct contributions of the refugees in the form of labour are most 
important, the refugees ensure an indirect effect as well. The mere presence of the 
refugees generates benefits for the Thai people in the area, due to the way they 
attract international attention to regions that are normally lost to the public eye. 
The refugees attract aid agencies and their staff and resources, which is also 
important for the vulnerable local people in these border areas. In fact, the zones 
where the refugee camps are located are amongst the least developed in Thailand. 
Tak and Mae Hong Son provinces are the last two of 76 Thai provinces in the UNDP 
Human Achievement Index (UNDP 2007). This means that they score badly on 
poverty, health, education, housing, road system, transportation, etc. Therefore it 
is necessary that NGOs simultaneously relieve local people from the additional 
pressure caused by refugees, which is also required by the Thai MOI. Most NGOs 
thus have a 'Thai Community Support' component to their program, which is a 
budget allocated to development/relief projects in needy Thai communities in the 
areas surrounding the camps. For example, TBBC dedicated approximately THB 16 
million to Thai communities in 2006162, in the form of goods such as mosquito nets 
or blankets, as well as rice banks163
                                                             
162 Email communication with Justin Foster, Program Support Manager TBBC, March 22, 2007. 
.  In addition, roads in deplorable conditions are 
upgraded by international aid money, which opened up entire areas, locals now 
have access to the camp clinics, etc. Even the Thai authorities themselves receive 
supplies from NGOs such as food, office supplies and building materials, to fulfil 
their job if that job is somehow related to the refugees. Of course, these supplies 
need to be purchased from Thai businessmen- sometimes local businesses, 
163 Interview with David Curmi, Field Coordinator TBBC, Mae Sariang, January 19, 2007. 
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sometimes companies in other areas of Thailand if local suppliers cannot provide 
the quantities needed. To give an idea, the TBBC, which is the largest NGO on this 
border in terms of operations, paid approximately THB 831 million (US$ 24.3 
million as at January 2009) to Thai suppliers in 2006164
Local law enforcement personnel also have a stake in the refugees’ presence: 
“Government officials, especially police, exploit the situation, demanding tea money 
both from business establishments and from legal as well as illegal alien workers. 
Some of them even facilitate or undertake human trafficking themselves” (Asia 
Research Centre for Migration, as cited in Martin 2004: 36). The refugees’ illegality 
and subsequent vulnerability indeed bolsters corruption, which is an (again 
unintended) negative transformation of the local economy. Refugees have to pay 
bribes to police, the military, border patrols, immigration officers and others. 
Bribes vary from a few hundred to thousands of baht, putting refugees deeply in 
debt to anyone who paid for them. In addition, employers pay ‘tea money’ to be 
left alone. Contrary to what one would assume, the dusty border town of Mae Sot 
is thus a very popular station for policemen, as it is well known to be a lucrative 
posting.  
. In addition, these NGOs 
provide jobs for local staff and spend a lot of money in the country on office 
supplies, work visas, transport, property rentals, and more. The local population 
thus clearly benefits due to the extension of the consumer market by both camp 
and self-settled refugees and humanitarian agencies. As Crisp (2003: 9) argues: 
“Refugees can certainly have a disruptive effect on host communities, especially in 
the early days of an influx. In the longer term, however, the presence of refugees 
and humanitarian agencies would appear to have a catalytic impact on local trade, 
business, transport and agricultural production”.  
 If refugees were not accepted anymore, these large sources of income would 
disappear, hence it would not be in the best interest of the local government to 
apply the national government rules on refugees and foreign labour too strictly, for 
both economic and political reasons. 
                                                             
164 Email communication with Justin Foster, Program Support Manager TBBC, March 22, 2007. 
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“You know, there is so much corruption. If the RTG wants us to play 
by the rules, they will lose millions of bath locally. They have a saying 
here: ‘a bird has two faces’. If I hear some official statement, I always 
want to hear it privately again before I believe it. Only then you really 
know what they will do. That is their other face…” (Interview with 
NGO staff member, Mae Sot, October 2007). 
 
6.2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Thai public attention is focused on the impact of Burmese refugees on local health 
and crime, as well as on the refugee camps’ impact on the environment. Over the 
years, dissatisfaction and xenophobia has increased in many circles. However, 
these feelings are fuelled by consistently negative media reports, false rumours of 
coalitions with secessionists in the southern provinces and a discourse on ‘refugees 
as trouble makers’ rather than the bare facts (subjective conflict). Nevertheless, the 
result is that the hospitality is decreasing steadily. In February 2009, the Thai army 
towed hundreds of Rohingya boat refugees back to international waters in boats 
without engine and left them there to wash ashore in another country or die 
(Bhaumik 2009; Jagan 2009; Brees 2009a)165. The national humanitarian (see e.g. 
People’s Empowerment Foundation 2009), civil society166
                                                             
165 This event demonstrated again how much influence the Thai military has on border and migration 
issues, and how little control the RTG has over the military. 
 and international outcry 
following this event led to a more cautious attitude of the newly installed Thai 
government. They promised to investigate the event, meanwhile inviting UNHCR to 
talk to the remaining Rohingya. However, as a result, over one thousand Thais 
started protesting in Ranong (Thai border town in the south of Thailand) to impede 
that the Rohingya would be given asylum, saying that these might join the uprising 
in the south of the country (Lawi Weng 2009a). Also the Thai government used the 
166 The new government faced this fairly popular backlash as their soft position towards the army’s 
actions was in contradiction to their claims to be the party of human rights (Email conversation with 
NGO staff member based in Bangkok, June 16, 2009). 
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subsequent media reports to reemphasise the ‘refugee burden’ they had to bear 
and to reiterate that their maximum capacity as refugee host was reached. They 
did not appreciate any comments on the event by international actors inside the 
country, which again points to the sensitivity of the theme of migration in Thailand 
and the fragility of UNHCR’s position in the country: 
“The Thai government on Wednesday chastised US actress Angelina 
Jolie and the United Nations refugee agency for commenting on boat 
people from Myanmar, whom the Thai army stands accused of 
abusing.(...) ‘Angelina was not focused on the Rohingya, but was 
visiting Myanmar refugee camps,’ said Virasakdi Futrakul, permanent 
secretary of the Thai foreign ministry. (...) ‘It was a coincidence that 
the Rohingya was a hot news issue at the time, therefore we must 
warn (UN refugee agency) UNHCR that they should not comment on 
this issue because they have no mandate on this issue.’” (AFP 2009). 
The treatment of the Rohingya influx was absolutely unacceptable, but it is correct 
that Thailand is already hosting a large Burmese population. Certainly when 
assessing the refugees’ impact on security and bilateral political relations, the 
picture is not rosy. The mere presence of the millions of Burmese as well as the 
direct and indirect contentious politics put Thailand in a difficult diplomatic 
position towards Burma- even if the activists’ and rebels’ presence is strategically 
interesting and therefore tolerated nonetheless. Moreover, the Thai border 
population is severely affected by the rebellion and counterinsurgency tactics 
across the border. Even if most refugees are not implicated in any way in these 
actions but rather are victims too, these problems are attributed to all refugees. 
There is also an impact of refugees on the local health and health system, but a 
change in policy to improve access to health care could make a lot of progress in 
this regard. 
While there are thus certainly problems due to the Burmese refugees’ presence, 
the largest impact of the refugees is actually on the national and local economy. 
The increasing presence of Burmese refugees has thoroughly transformed the Thai 
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economy. Entire sections, notably several export industries, became dependent on 
foreign labour. Burmese refugees positively contribute to the Thai economy, both 
directly by enlarging the labour force and indirectly through an extension of the 
market and by attracting foreign aid. In terms of the overall Thai economy, 
Burmese refugees are thus more of a ‘boon’ than a ‘burden’. Nevertheless, there 
may be differences in economic impact between provinces. For example, while 
several studies conclude that the foreign workers do not have a negative impact on 
Thai employment, the area around Bangkok might be an exception. In this area 
Burmese workers do compete for the same jobs with poor Thai nationals from the 
north-east of Thailand (Martin 2004). Also within provinces there can be regional 
differences, both on the economic and other levels. In Tak for example, the impact 
of the refugees’ presence is very different in the town of Mae Sot, where 
thousands of refugees are concentrated and outnumber the Thai population, than 
in the hill tribe rural areas, where they live intermingled with the local population. 
After all, the jobs carried out in these locations are very different, and so is their 
contact with the local population.  
Controlling the refugees and their impact on the hosting area has been a key policy 
concern of the Thai government. As a response to perceived and real threats, they 
have encamped UNHCR-registered refugees in various phases, occasionally 
registered parts of the self-settled refugees, and in some provinces even declared 
martial law to contain the Burmese in limited areas. However, what is clear from 
this study and research in other refugee situations, is that enforced encampment of 
refugees is usually not a solution to negative influences, in contrast to what states 
argue and hope for. 
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CHAPTER 7: WORKING TOWARDS 
DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
 
“If refugee situations were temporary and of short duration, it would 
make sense for assistance to be focused on repatriation. Refugees 
could be separated from their host society and provided for by 
international relief agencies in temporary camps, children educated in 
the curriculum of their home countries and their impact on the host 
country minimized. But by now we know better than to believe that 
civil wars and intra- state conflict will be of limited duration. (…) Yet 
aid operations and refugee policies continue to be built around the 
notion of temporariness and rapid repatriation”. 
Karen Jacobsen (2005: 107-108) 
 
The Burmese refugee situation is one of the most protracted in the world. While 
waiting for repatriation, these refugees have increasingly been warehoused in 
‘temporary shelters’. Only in 2005 was it recognised that this situation was unlikely 
to change any time soon, and resettlement programmes were established. While 
constituting an important method of burden- sharing, is resettlement the only 
solution conceivable in this case? And how long will the programme continue, 
given the number of new arrivals and increasing donor fatigue? What will happen 
with the numerous self-settled refugees? The purpose of this chapter is to look into 
the multiple options that could be advanced and assess their potential in this case.  
First the different elements of the Convention Plus initiative will be explained, as 
this UNHCR-led effort is one of the latest developments in the global thinking about 
refugee protection and durable solutions. Subsequently, the durable solution of 
local integration and the policy regarding local integration in cases worldwide will 
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be looked into, in order to deduce common elements of success. This is important, 
given the lack of attention this option has received, both generally and in Thailand. 
In the third section of this chapter, the different durable solutions will be assessed 
for this particular case study, culminating in a policy framework for Burmese 
refugees in Thailand. The focus will be on innovative and challenging ‘thinking 
outside the box’ in terms of policy options, rather than going into a detailed 
discussion of specific laws to amend or responsibilities to attribute to ministries 
and these more.  
 
7.1 Convention Plus 
 
Under the leadership of former High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers, UNHCR 
extensively reviewed the approach of protracted refugee situations. While the 
1951 Refugee Convention remains the foundation of refugee protection, UNHCR 
felt that there was a need to build on the Convention “to clarify the apportioning of 
responsibilities and to promote a better sharing of responsibilities by states” 
(UNHCR 2003a: 3). The process started with the ‘Global Consultations on Refugee 
Protection’, which culminated in 2002 in an ‘Agenda for Protection’, and this 
eventually led to ‘Convention Plus’ (Betts and Durieux 2007: 512). The idea was to 
ensure more effective, consistent and therefore more predictable and reliable 
responses to mass influxes of refugees (UNHCR 2003b: 2; Durieux 2005: 90). This 
would be achieved by developing ‘special agreements’ in three areas that were felt 
to be inadequately covered in the global refugee regime, namely: the strategic use 
of resettlement programmes, irregular secondary movements and targeted 
development assistance (TDA) at RHAs. These general agreements would then be 
applied in specific contexts, where they would lead to a better sharing of 
responsibilities/burdens between states in terms of refugee protection and durable 
solutions (Betts and Durieux 2007: 510). 
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While UNHCR recognises that the solution to protracted refugee situations lies in 
the political arena, they are convinced that, in the mean time, development is the 
facilitating element of any durable solution (UNHCR 2003b: 3). To that purpose, a 
‘Framework for Durable Solutions’ was developed, consisting of three elements:  
o Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) 
o Development through Local Integration (DLI) 
o Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs) 
The classic three durable solutions, repatriation, local integration and resettlement, 
are thus revived, in a manner that recognises the relationship between forced 
migration, development and conflict (Castles et al. 2005: 95).  Both repatriation and 
local integration will be supported with development aid, and the strategic use of 
resettlement will be encouraged.  
Pending these durable solutions, DAR needs to ensure burden-sharing, as well as 
improved self-reliance and quality of life of both the refugees and the host 
communities. After all, in 1997-2001, developing countries hosted some 66% of the 
population of concern to UNHCR, thus it is essential to include the host population 
into the programmes in order to avoid tensions (UNHCR 2003b: 6). The fact that 
programmes would target both locals and refugees would encourage support from 
bilateral and multilateral development agencies and would help in convincing host 
states to improve refugee rights and protection: “Simply calling on states to respect 
international law and to show solidarity with refugees is unlikely to prove very 
effective, particularly at a time when the world's more prosperous states are closing 
their doors to asylum seekers. Instead, we must demonstrate that the economy and 
security of refugee-hosting countries will both be strengthened by means of 
measures that provide displaced populations with a peaceful and productive life in 
exile” (Crisp 2003: 29). If refugee rights (e.g. access to the labour market) would be 
improved, it would decrease the strain of long term refugee camps on 
humanitarian budgets, which is important to convince donors in contributing to the 
project. Other incentives for donor commitment are the finding (or rather 
hypothesis) that enhancing protection in the area of origin and ensuring timely 
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access to durable solutions can diminish irregular secondary migration to the 
North, as well as reduce potential for (terrorist) radicalisation of a camp population 
(Betts and Durieux 2007: 522-524). From the refugees’ point of view, DAR can 
enhance the sustainability of any of the durable solutions: “A refugee who has led a 
productive and meaningful life in exile is much more likely to have the 
resourcefulness, capacity and confidence necessary to successfully embark on a new 
stage of life” (Castles et al. 2005: 96).  In sum, the idea is to have a refugee regime 
based on ‘common but differentiated responsibility- sharing’ (Betts 2009: 11), 
which would lead to gains for all stakeholders167
Regrettably, by the end of the Convention Plus initiative in November 2005, it had 
become clear that many of the initial aims had not been reached, an important 
reason for which was the polarisation of the debate concerning the TDA and the 
irregular secondary movement along North-South lines (Betts and Durieux 2007: 
514). Certainly the coupling of the search for durable solutions to speedier asylum 
processing and the introduction of ‘safe third country’ rules received quite some 
critique from various angles (Castles et al. 2005: 95). However, the Head of the 
Convention Plus Unit, Jean-François Durieux, argued that these elements had to be 
included because when seeking to facilitate the sharing of responsibilities, it is not 
only about protection of refugees and asylum-seekers, but also about the  
identification of refugees and the processing of their claims (Durieux 2005: 90). In 
any case, of all these subjects discussed during the Convention Plus initiative, the 
Framework for Durable Solutions is of greatest interest to this study. In particular, 
the two most often cited ‘success cases’ that served as a source of inspiration for 
this framework and that were used to convince states of the TDA-approach will be 
analysed in detail in the next section, namely the Zambia Initiative and Uganda’s 
Self-Reliance Strategy. This will be followed by a discussion of other case studies of 
.  
                                                             
167 Many of these ideas are not entirely new, but are an important renewed effort of UNHCR to use 
lessons of past practice regarding refugee self-reliance and durable solutions for contemporary 
circumstances. Notably the Indochinese Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) and the International 
Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), which built on issue-linkage to convince host 
states and donors to support the project, were important sources of inspiration for Convention Plus 
(Betts 2006a). 
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local integration, all of which will serve to inform the framework developed for the 
case of Burmese refugees in Thailand. 
 
7.2. The promotion of local integration as a durable 
solution 
 
Of all the durable solutions, local integration has been promoted least at the official 
level in cases of mass refugee influx. Rhetorically, it has always been a guiding 
principle of refugee programmes, as it is firmly rooted in international refugee law 
due to its mention in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Local integration is an essential 
durable solution, as repatriation is often a distant option in cases of protracted 
conflict, and resettlement is unattainable for the great majority of the refugees. 
However, in practice it is hardly ever promoted, as the host government is usually 
against this option. Why is that?: 
 “because earlier efforts to promote local settlement and self-reliance 
in Africa’s rural refugee settlements had achieved very limited results; 
because refugees were increasingly regarded as an economic and 
environmental burden on the countries which hosted them; because 
African countries with large refugee populations felt that the burden 
they had accepted was not being adequately shared by the world’s 
more prosperous states; because many refugee-hosting countries in 
Africa had declining economies, growing populations and were 
themselves affected by conflict, instability; because refugees came to 
be regarded (especially after the Great Lakes crisis) as a threat to 
local, national and even regional security, especially in situations 
where they were mixed with armed and criminal elements; and 
because the post-cold war democratisation process in some African 
states meant that politicians had an interest in mobilizing electoral 
support on the basis of xenophobic and anti-refugee sentiments” 
(Crisp 2003: 3-4).   
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Other important reasons are the assumption that refugees will repatriate faster if 
they do not get the permission to freely settle, and because donors are not 
interested in long term integration programmes which make refugees less visible 
(Fielden 2008: 3). Moreover, this option may be hard to accept by refugees who 
are focused on return. As a result, a hierarchy of solutions has come into existence, 
with voluntary repatriation as the favoured option and encampment in the mean 
time. 
Nonetheless, it is common knowledge that most refugees do not live in refugee 
camps, but self-settle instead. This usually entails that they are not eligible for 
protection and/or assistance. As a result, self-settled refugees need to find their 
own ways to cope with the (often) rights-restraining context, and will integrate to a 
certain extent to achieve better livelihood outcomes. A full process of integration 
involves economic, social and structural integration, of which legal integration is a 
part. Only when these different forms of integration are fulfilled, has a durable 
solution been reached for a particular refugee. Is there a role in this story for 
UNHCR? Is it überhaupt possible to promote local integration, or has local 
integration only worked in cases where it occurred spontaneously? Are there 
common features in situations where local integration of refugees was successful? 
This section will seek to answer these questions. 
The two most recent examples which have frequently been mentioned as success 
cases of policy-led integration are Uganda and Zambia. The first project serves as 
an example of the Convention Plus-mechanism of DAR, the second of DLI.  In these 
cases, the host government and UNHCR tried to match the needs of the refugees 
and the impoverished local population, and development partners were involved in 
the project. 
Uganda’s Self Reliance Strategy (SRS) was designed in 1999 by the Ugandan 
government and UNHCR, and focused on the districts of Adjumani, Arua and Moyo. 
The idea was to diminish parallel services and move from relief to development 
(Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004). Instead, local services would be improved and 
made accessible for Sudanese refugees. The area was considered a good test case, 
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as refugees and hosts shared ethnicity, culture and language and many local hosts 
had previously been refugees as well, thus there was a sense of reciprocity 
(Jacobsen 2005: 74). On an economic level, refugees would learn to support 
themselves within agricultural settlements with minimal external support (Kaiser 
2006). Assistance would thus gradually be phased out as communities became 
increasingly independent (Hovil 2002: 5). The refugees were supposed to be self-
reliant by 2003. 
In Zambia, a policy was designed in 2002 to facilitate local integration of refugees, 
by focusing on the development of both locals as well as Angolan refugees inside 
and outside camps. The project came to be known as ‘the Zambia Initiative’.  The 
goal of the project was to simultaneously enhance poverty reduction, as well as 
empowerment and self-reliance/integration (terms used interchangeably) of 
refugees pending durable solutions (UNHCR 2002b). The priorities of development 
were set by the communities themselves on agriculture, health, education and 
infrastructure.  The initiative would be supported by flexible funding of various 
donors, allowing contributors to select the elements to fund which aligned most 
with their priorities and interests (Betts 2005: 10). 
Clearly, both approaches are trying to bridge the relief-to-development gap and 
enhance burden-sharing. They are focused on integration, going from a basic form 
of economic integration (DAR), to a supposedly full process of integration (which is 
what DLI stands for). The means to convince the host government to achieve this 
goal is through an improvement of local development, as this equally benefits the 
local population. By targeting development aid at a RHA, it would be possible for 
the local and national government to see the refugees as contributors to 
development, instead of destabilising burdens that need to be kept in closed 
camps. However, both approaches contend with substantial shortcomings. While 
the Kiryandongo settlement in Uganda is often mentioned as a successful case of 
the SRS-approach (see e.g. UNHCR 2006a: box 6.1; De Vriese 2006: 8), Kaiser (2006: 
616-617) disagrees, stating that this has little to do with the SRS-policy, but rather 
with the fertile soil of this settlement and its better location, in a safe area, close to 
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a main trading centre.  The contrast with some other settlements in terms of 
achieving self-reliance lies therefore not in policy, but in their unfavourable 
conditions such as soil erosion, irregular rainfall, lack of sustainable farming 
practices and physical insecurity. As a result of the increasing soil erosion in several 
of the settlements (Hovil 2007: 600), which occurred simultaneously with the 
removal from assistance rolls, many refugees were actually more destitute after 
their so-called ‘self-reliance’. The SRS was thus more about combating dependency 
through cutting rations, than about creating the appropriate conditions for refugee 
self-reliance (CASA consulting, cited in Meyer 2006: 14) or ensuring refugee 
involvement and representation in the political space of development planning 
(Meyer 2006: 9). Another problem was that the project did not go beyond an 
integration of services, and had to cope with a lack of funding (Betts 2006b: 512), 
while previous experiences have shown that increasing refugee self-reliance 
initially requires additional financial inputs. Therefore, everyone who was able to 
leave the SRS-settlements did so: “The fact that those refugees with access to any 
form of external capital tend to leave them, is not a promising indicator of the 
development capacity of settlements. The fact that these people are then no longer 
counted as refugees hints that developmental success by refugees is welcome not 
on any terms, but only within the parameters set by the settlement system” (Kaiser 
2006: 618).  
Also the Zambia project is not as successful as often portrayed (e.g. in De Vriese 
2006: 15-16). After all, the local leaders in the Western province actually preferred 
repatriation of refugees (Fielden 2008: 11-12), and this feeling was clearly shared 
by the refugees themselves who repatriated en masse in 2002 (UNHCR 2006a: box 
6.1.). But even the residual caseloads  were then still considered too numerous by 
the host government to stay permanently (Fielden 2008: 12). Therefore, I tend to 
disagree with calling the Zambia Initiative an example of the DLI approach, as 
analysts usually do (see e.g. UNHCR 2006a; Jacobsen 2005: 101). After all, the DLI 
approach is supposed to work in countries where the state is in favour of gradual 
integration of refugees and thus of granting them progressively the Convention 
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rights, leading to permanent residence rights, and perhaps ultimately citizenship 
(UNHCR 2003b: 19). As these elements are not present within the Zambia initiative, 
I tend to see this case as an example of DAR, not of DLI. Moreover, the Initiative 
model was very much top-down, which led a group of refugee experts to agree that 
whatever self-sufficiency had been achieved, was through the agency of refugees, 
rather than the DAR/DLI-approach (Betts 2006b: 512).  
Of course, the integration of services and improving infrastructure in RHAs, which 
did occur in both cases, are important elements of local integration, as functional 
issues such as access to education and health services are essential for refugees. 
But integration of individuals requires a lot more than a technical integration of 
services, namely an economic, social and legal process (Crisp 2004: 1). There is an 
inherent contradiction in trying to achieve local integration of individuals, while 
keeping them physically segregated in settlements or camps (Uganda): “The goals 
of local integration (...) and local settlement are often incompatible. In the former 
the objective is to create a conducive atmosphere which could pave the way to 
integration (permanent solution), while in the latter case the objective is to 
segregate so that refugees do not become members of the host society” (Kibreab 
1989: 470). However, neither of the two host governments really considered local 
integration of refugees a durable solution. They regarded it as an intermediary 
option. Therefore, the problem may simply be that these approaches were called 
frameworks to achieve refugee integration, while they are actually about increasing 
self-reliance pending other solutions, without meanwhile increasing tensions with 
the local population. But even in improving self-reliance of refugees, initiatives 
would need to deal with the security and the legal status of refugees as well as 
discuss refugee rights, since spaces for the exercise of agency are central to 
achieving self-reliance (Jacobsen 2005: 76; Horst 2006a:19; Polzer, quoted in Meyer 
2006: 27). Without those basics, it is quite impossible for refugees to be self-reliant 
in a sustainable way. Trying to improve refugees’ self-reliance by denying them 
freedom of movement (both cases) is paradoxical: “First, the principal self-
protection strategy available to poor and marginal populations in situations of 
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insecurity is mobility. (...) Second, if the ultimate objective is the socioeconomic 
development of refugee communities and their Ugandan hosts, it makes little sense 
to deny them access to a range of economic activities” (Kaiser 2005: 361). Without 
addressing the structural constraints of at least economic integration of refugees, 
these approaches only pay lip service to refugee integration.  If refugees would be 
able to travel, live and work freely (perhaps within a certain Zone that has sufficient 
economic opportunities), while the DAR-initiative would lead to improved 
infrastructure and services, both the locals and the refugees would benefit. These 
ideas are the basics of Jacobsen’s ‘Designated Zone of Residence’ (Jacobsen 2005: 
91-108)168
In contrast to these much-published and discussed cases, Serbia is a less well-
known, yet a more successful example of the DLI- and DAR- approach in case of a 
mass influx (over 275.000 refugees). The government of Serbia included refugees in 
their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, there is joint planning with UNHCR and 
development agencies, and perhaps even more importantly: the legal pre-
conditions for local integration are very favourable, since refugees have the right to 
land, employment, services, freedom of movement, opportunity to apply for 
citizenship etc. (Tournée 2004). Therefore, the DLI- approach has a real potential to 
succeed in this case. Only in some areas with a non-Serb local population was 
repatriation preferred over integration, in which case the refugees’ self-reliance 
and regional development were supported with a DAR-approach. 
, which the SRS and the Zambia Initiative do not attain yet. Still, as 
projects in which the host government and UNHCR worked together to support the 
livelihoods of refugees and locals, while trying to link relief and development, both 
projects set important precedents.  
                                                             
168 The idea is to allow freedom of movement and access to work and services for refugees in a certain 
Zone, through the provision of documentation, while travel beyond this zone would be possible with 
permission. The refugees would have their economic and social rights assured, while at the same time 
the services of the host country would be improved for both refugees and the host communities in the 
Zone, leading to development of the RHA. Restricting residence to a certain Zone was deemed necessary 
by Jacobsen because of the political reality in many host countries today, who increasingly want to 
restrict refugees and asylum-seekers and control them. At the same time, a designated zone can be to 
the benefit of the refugees, as there will be ‘protection by presence’ of the aid agencies and UN 
organisations, who can keep an eye on their security and identify special needs. 
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There have also been other projects and policies which supported refugee self-
reliance and/or integration but were not necessarily coupled with development aid 
(table 6). Examples vary from giving access to work while holding on to 
encampment, over allowing freedom of movement and giving permanent 
residence permits, until the granting of citizenship. Often the host government will 
treat different groups of refugees in various ways, depending on their number, the 
length of time they have been present in the host country, and the compatibility 
with the local population in terms of language, culture and ethnicity. Only the most 
favourable treatment is presented in the following table. 
Table 6: Policy supporting self-reliance and/or integration 
Sources: Kok 1989; Dick 2002; Kuhlman 2002; Banki 2004; Tournée 2004; Jacobsen 2005; 
Grabska 2006; Kaiser 2006; Betts 2006b; Fielden 2008. 
 
RIGHTS FOR REFUGEES COUNTRY 
Access to work Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Zambia 
Freedom of movement and access 
to work in certain zone 
Cote d’Ivoire  
Freedom of movement and access 
to work  
Sierra Leone, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Ghana, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Belize 
Temporary stay permit Mozambique 
Permanent residence Angola, Mexico, Turkmenistan, 
China 
Citizenship/naturalisation Guinea, Tanzania, Mexico, 
Kirgistan, Turkmenistan, India, 
Armenia, Serbia 
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More often than not however, integration occurs in the absence of any state policy 
on integration, or despite a policy that is against integration. Worldwide, there are 
numerous cases of unsupported self-settlement and de facto integration: Sudan 
(Bulcha 1988; Kok 1989), Guinea (Van Damme 1999: 38), Zambia (Bakewell 2000a), 
Uganda (Hovil 2002, 2007; Machiavello 2003; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004; 
Dryden-Peterson 2006), Côte d’Ivoire (Kuhlman 2002), Kenya (Banki 2004; 
Campbell 2006), Gabon (Fielden 2008: 7) and Thailand (Brees 2009d). These 
examples are just the tip of the iceberg. As Fielden (2008: 1) notes, “local 
integration is actually not a forgotten solution, but an undocumented one”.  
Is there a role then in this story for UNHCR? While UNHCR can be an important 
catalyst in improving the prospect of self-reliance and durable solutions, including 
local integration (e.g. at the time of CIREFCA (Betts 2006a)), this is not always the 
case. There have been interventions intended for refugee assistance which have 
constrained refugee rights, for example by enforcing encampment even if 
conditions were favourable to integration, or by creating tensions with locals due 
to the set-up of parallel services (Van Damme 1999; Verdirame 1999; Bakewell 
2001; Kuhlman 2002). A major reason for this is the tension between UNHCR’s core 
mandate, protection, and the requirements of an effective aid provision 
mechanism. This dual mandate can cause conflicting interests: “The management 
of aid demands targeting and possibly encampment, whereas the best protection 
for refugees may demand local settlement and different forms of aid delivery” 
(Bakewell 2001: 4). In cases where aid is only provided in refugee camps, self-
settled refugees often have no practical way to avail themselves of UNHCR’s 
protection. It is therefore not surprising that several studies have found that 
protection and assistance by UNHCR are not the most significant factors in refugee 
integration. In fact, in some cases it is the absence of state and international 
interventions that has been instrumental in facilitating refugee integration: “When 
refugees decide not to live in camps but rather to self-settle and integrate, they are 
often not only avoiding the specific structures of the camp setting, but just as much 
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the refugee label and concept itself and the involvement of external institutional 
actors in their lives” (Polzer 2008: 15). 
In the cases where integration was successful, supported or unsupported by the 
host government’s and UNHCR’s policy, there are some common features that can 
be distinguished. The most important determining factor is whether refugee 
integration is condoned at the local level, which is often related to the similarity of 
refugees with the local population in terms of ethnicity, language and culture. The 
evidence is overwhelming. Other important factors are the numbers of refugees 
present (smaller groups are more quickly allowed to stay), and the length of time 
they have been present. Certainly for residual caseloads with strong links to the 
host country, and cases where refugees are de facto integrated but only miss a 
legal status and residence rights, the potential for local integration exists (Crisp 
2003: 24). In addition, refugees may be welcomed if they bring particular skills that 
are useful for the host country, perform jobs which the local population neglects, 
move into areas where land is available, and if they attract resources to areas  
which are normally lost to the public eye. Put simply: if their presence brings 
economic potential. In these cases, refugees usually manage to negotiate access to 
work, housing and other essentials. This does not mean that the people concerned 
will embark on these negotiations as ‘refugees’. Certainly if the official policy or the 
local population is against integration, the refugee label is hindering and other 
identities will be used in order to obtain certain resources, documents or rights 
(Malkki 2005; Hovil 2007; Polzer 2008). In those cases, it is as Polzer (2008: 15) 
states about South-Africa: “In sum, those who were integrated officially were not 
integrated as refugees, and those who are integrating unofficially feel that their 
lives are better by not being recognised as refugees. Neither is therefore really 
‘refugee protection.’” Having said that, state and UNHCR policy can certainly ease 
the way for refugee self-reliance and integration, by seeking to lift both legal and 
non-legal barriers (e.g. xenophobia) that hamper refugees’ livelihoods and 
integration strategies. In convincing the host state to lift those barriers, DAR and 
DLI can play an important role. 
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7.3 What are the policy options for Burmese refugees in 
Thailand?: thinking out of the box169
 
 
Reviewing the history of Burmese refugee presence in Thailand, what is striking is 
the total lack of consideration of local integration as a durable solution, despite the 
large potential that exists in this case for local integration of a subgroup of the 
refugees. Only resettlement is currently officially promoted as an option. This was 
not always the case. For two decades, refugees, UN agencies, NGOs, host 
governments and donors were focused on repatriation. At a certain point in 2004, a 
‘gentleman’s ceasefire’ between the SPDC and the KNU even led UNHCR to start a 
pre-consultation phase for repatriation. In the same period, the UN also obtained 
green light to assist returning IDPs (Durieux and Dhanapala 2008: 14), thus the 
atmosphere was optimistic. However, the ceasefire broke down and fighting re-
erupted, alongside Burmese government re-shuffles which led to a decrease in 
humanitarian space all-over the country, effectively delaying the option of return 
once again. This episode was an eye-opener for many stakeholders involved, and 
happened to coincide with a need for the US to fill its global refugee resettlement 
quota, which they preferably did with ‘friendly’ (and largely non-Muslim) refugee 
populations. Therefore, the possibility of resettlement programmes was discussed. 
Initially, the RTG was reserved towards this durable solution, even if group 
resettlement constitutes an important and uncommon form of burden-sharing (less 
than 1% of the world’s official refugee population was resettled in the 1990s (Stein 
1997)). The reason for the hesitation was the fear that the prospect of 
resettlement to developed countries would be an incentive to trigger thousands of 
people to flow into Thailand, as has been the case in the past: “There is now a 
general agreement that the decision taken in 1979 to offer resettlement to the boat 
people arriving in South-East Asia acted as a ‘pull factor’, helping to create an 
unmanageable exodus of people (...) What began as an essential durable solution 
                                                             
169 I would like to thank Jean-François Durieux, Richard Horsey and Sally Thompson for the exchange of 
ideas and the insightful comments on earlier versions of this Section, but, of course, I take full 
responsibility for the content. 
W o r k i n g  t o w a r d s  d u r a b l e  s o l u t i o n s | 270 
 
for Indochinese became part of the problem, both by perpetuating an outflow of 
people in search of permanent exile and by hampering the search for other durable 
solutions, namely local settlement or voluntary repatriation” (Robinson 1998: 273-
274). In 2005, the RTG agreed nonetheless with the resettlement programmes, 
while simultaneously halting new PABs for asylum seekers in order to manage the 
potential pull factor. 
 
7.3.1. Resettlement 
 
The resettlement of Burmese refugees in Thailand to Western countries is the 
largest such programme in the world (UNHCR 2007d). By September 2008 55,852 
refugees had been resettled (IOM 2008), with another 20,000 foreseen for 2009. 
The main destination countries are the US (roughly two thirds of the group), 
Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian countries. This is a true group resettlement 
programme, as any registered camp refugee who expresses interest in going is 
likely to leave, unless they were militarily active in the past170
Resettlement is occurring at a large scale, and provides protection for the people 
involved. While many of the respondents realised that life would not be easy in the 
West either, they usually stated they were leaving camp nonetheless to improve 
the future of their children. Many reasoned that if their children would grow up 
safely in a third country (safe from both the Burmese army and the Thai police) and 
. Apart from this last 
category, anyone can be resettled, regardless of capabilities, education or age, and 
thus of ‘integration potential’ in the third country, which is a unique feature of this 
refugee situation. The factor ‘choice’ is lacking though, as there is no formal 
alternative solution. It is either resettlement or continued warehousing.  
                                                             
170 Problematically, even people who were forced to provide material support to the rebellion, were 
initially declined asylum by the U.S. Homeland Security Department: “The Patriot Act denies entry to 
anyone who has provided material support to a terrorist or armed rebel group, and it applies even if that 
support was coerced or if the aims of a group in question match those of American foreign policy” 
(Swarns 2006).  However, a waiver was signed by  Condoleezza Rice to waive the provisions of the U.S. 
anti-terror laws for the Burmese refugees, unless they were an active combatant or member of a rebel 
group. 
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get a proper education, they would be able to obtain a skilled job and live a more 
secure life.  
“I’m 44 years old. I arrived here in 1998 and have not left the camp 
since. I am a shopkeeper but even if we sell a lot, we cannot save any 
money. I applied for resettlement. I never want to return to Burma. 
Our house was burnt there, and I had to do forced labour, 
constructing the road. Now, I just want to go to the US. It is best for 
the children. There they can study, like other people”171
But indeed, settling in into a completely different culture is difficult
. 
172
While the resettlement programmes provide protection, more freedom and 
potentially a better future for the refugees concerned, the benefits can extend 
beyond the immediate circle of resettled individuals. After all, (former) refugees 
may start supporting kin or friends who are still in Thailand or in Burma, through 
financial remittances. On the other hand, the large scale resettlement programmes 
do pose some distinct problems for the people staying behind in Thailand. Firstly, 
asylum procedures for new arrivals were halted to manage the pull factor of the 
programme. And indeed, there is a large increase in new arrivals, certainly in Tak 
, and many 
Karen refugees find it hard to adapt to life in the West (Kawlah films 2007). Finding 
a secure, full-time job remains the number one concern for the resettled refugees 
(Dunford 2008: 1). Certainly people who had a relative power position in camp find 
it hard to obtain a satisfying job in the West and some would like to return to 
Thailand instead (Kawlah films 2007). On the other hand, regular contacts with two 
of my former interpreters suggest that young, relatively highly educated refugees 
from the camps, can prosper due to the security, freedom and opportunities they 
now enjoy. In-depth research in third countries will be needed to assess the level of 
success of Burmese refugees’ integration, in order to inform both aid agencies and 
refugees who are still indecisive on whether or not to leave the camps. 
                                                             
171 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae La camp, December 28, 2006. 
172 An eye-opening anthropological book that aptly describes the problems encountered by resettled 
Hmong refugees and their hosts in the U.S. is called: ‘The spirit catches you and you fall down’, by Anne 
Fadiman (1998). Another impressive book on a resettled ‘Lost Boy’ refugee from Sudan is  titled: ‘What 
is the what: the autobiography of Valentino Achack Deng’, by Dave Eggers (2006). 
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province, and fraud is occurring: identities on resettlement lists are bought with or 
without the ‘owner’s’ knowledge173
“I haven’t had any information lately on the ‘Pending Cases’ in our 
camp, like me. I don’t know how long it will take. Yesterday some guy 
from IOM told us that pending cases in Africa can take up to seven 
years before they finally get to the US. I am so hopeless. I am having a 
very hard time in camp. No one supports me and I don’t have a job. I 
do want a job but they don’t want to accept anyone who applied for 
third countries.  I don’t know what to do with my life in this camp. I 
want to die. What should I do?”
. The PABs have thus been postponed and most 
new arrivals cannot be supported with the current means of TBBC (only the most 
vulnerable ones are), both of which are to the detriment of the human security of 
genuine asylum-seekers. In addition, the mass resettlement jeopardises the 
management of the camps due to the brain drain (Banki and Lang 2007). After all, 
the day-to-day camp management has always been left in refugee hands, but due 
to the quick resettlement pace of numerous camp staff members, including 
teachers, medics and administrative personnel, new personnel cannot be trained 
quickly enough. Moreover, as with any other mass resettlement programmes, it 
leads to tensions within the community and within families. As mentioned above, 
these familial tensions are very hard in such a collective culture, leading to a rise of 
suicides in camp (CCSDPT December 17, 2008, internal document). Lastly, the 
resettlement process can take up quite some time, certainly for former urban 
refugees (see also UNHCR 2007e), which can lead to a complete focus on 
resettlement, depression and a lack of investment in the current life (a state of 
mind called ‘buufis’ in the case of Somali refugees (Horst 2006c)): 
174
Mass resettlement thus does pose problems for the refugees remaining in 
Thailand. This engenders an important question: what will happen with those 
refugees who are not able or willing to leave (residual caseloads) and with the self-
  
                                                             
173 Interview with a self-settled, connected, refugee in Tha Son Yang (November 14, 2007) and informal 
conversations with NGO staff members in Mae Sot. 
174 Email from a political refugee living in Nu Poh camp, November 1, 2008. 
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settled refugees? Before analysing other potential options, the wishes of the 
refugees themselves will be looked into. What would they prefer, if they had the 
choice? 
 
7.3.2 What do the refugees want? 
 
The following table is based on the respondents’ answers to the question “What do 
you think is the best solution for you or your family: return to Burma, resettlement 
or improving conditions here in Thailand?”. Refugees were encouraged to speak 
their mind and explain their preference.  
Table 7: Choice durable solution by settlement category 
 
    
settlement category 
Total 
self-settled 
refugees 
camp 
refugees 
Choice  
durable 
solution 
return/repatriation  37 13 50 
 55.2% 19.4% 37.3% 
stay here/local 
integration 
 24 15 39 
 35.8% 22.4% 29.1% 
resettlement  6 39 45 
 9.0% 58.2% 33.6% 
Total  67 67 134 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
There is an evident difference in the view on durable solutions depending on 
location, level of integration and level of political assets. Well- integrated refugees 
(who have strong social links with the host population) usually prefer local 
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integration, with the exception of those refugees who still own land in Burma. Self-
settled refugees who are only economically integrated on the other hand, prefer 
repatriation in case of peace or when they have accumulated enough financial 
capital to sustain their livelihoods in Burma. Camp refugees also have access to the 
official option of resettlement, which is why the great majority in camp prefers 
resettlement. There is a clear influence of political capital, or rather the lack of it: 
non-politically active and/or marginalised groups, such as the politically 
marginalised Muslims, are clearly in favour of resettlement. This phenomenon that 
outcast groups apply en masse is common in any resettlement programme (Horst 
2006c: 172-176). Also people who already have relatives or friends abroad are 
interested in leaving. On the other hand, 22% of the camp population indicated 
that they preferred to stay in Thailand, as they saw neither resettlement nor 
repatriation as an option. In addition, several of the camp respondents who had 
applied for resettlement (and are thus part of the 58.2%), stated that they would 
prefer to stay in Thailand if that were a formal alternative.  
“Yes, I applied for resettlement, but if we would be free to work, I 
would stay here. Now we can’t travel, can’t work and can’t go back to 
Karen State, since our homeland is infested with land mines. The 
Karen need a better life, but most of all we need freedom”175
 
. 
7.3.3 Repatriation 
 
“If they (the SPDC) declared peace today, we would not even have to 
wait for tomorrow, we would go back today” (KRC representative, 
quoted in Lang 2002: 192). 
Table 7 demonstrates that repatriation is still the preferred durable solution of 
refugees (37.3%), and that figure would be a lot higher if repatriation were a real 
option. Many refugees dream of a return to their former homeland and potential 
                                                             
175 Interview with Karen refugee, Mae La camp, December 27, 2006. 
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possessions, on the condition that they would have freedom and rights: right to 
work, right to travel, right to property, right to their own culture, etc. However, 
numerous testimonies indicate that the time is not ripe for repatriation to Karen 
State. Human Rights Watch, KHRG and many others have documented the 
continuous human rights abuses and increased militarisation since the beginning of 
2006. While according to analyst Ashley South (2007a) the ceasefire zones are 
slowly developing in a more positive direction, this is not yet the case for many 
other border areas. Certainly the widespread use of unmarked mines by both the 
tatmadaw and the insurgents in the contested zones will be an enormous barrier 
for large scale repatriation. Therefore, it will in the near future not be possible to 
return refugees to ‘a situation in which the causes of the flight have been 
removed’. Moreover, the SPDC will probably not cooperate with such a move: “It is 
unlikely that the Burmese regime will want to take back refugees until it has 
secured ceasefire surrenders (on its own terms) and/or complete control over the 
minority forces and their border territories. Because the aim of the government’s 
counterinsurgency strategy is to undermine and eliminate the civilian support base 
of the insurgents, it is unlikely that it will accept back people of whom it is 
suspicious” (Lang 2001: 7). However, vice-versa, the SPDC might be willing to 
accept people back who are not political activists, are not associated with an 
enemy group or do not live in the (shrinking) contested border zones (e.g. the 
Karen from the Delta zone), which is an option that should be explored.  
After all, some refugees may prefer to return even in the current political climate. 
There may be multiple and complex reasons why refugees feel like going back: “To 
name the most common ones, forced migrants return to their homeland to trace or 
join relatives, check the state of their property, re-bury a relative, make use of the 
skills they have acquired during exile (…), regain control of their land (…), 
participate in the elections of their country (…), take care of elderly parents, educate 
their children in their home country’s culture and values, or alternatively, because 
the conditions in exile are too harsh or dangerous (…). On a more personal and 
emotional level however, another significant reason to repatriate is the mere desire 
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to return ‘home’” (Ghanem 2003: 35). Looking at this particular case, while some 
refugees will return spontaneously for one or several of these reasons, others may 
be too afraid to jeopardise their refugee or migrant status by undertaking a 
precarious and costly journey home, without knowing what they will find in their 
former village or town (if they lack transnational connections). Others may be 
without any legal status in Thailand but simply fear going back because they can be 
penalised upon re-entry of their own country (see also Rukumnuaykit 2009: 5). As 
they are not officially allowed to stay, cannot go back and cannot afford to move 
on, they are what has in other cases been called ‘stranded migrants’ (Betts 2008: 
10). Even if in this thesis all Burmese in Thailand are called refugees, in terms of 
legal statuses they are very much a mixed migration group.  
If an agreement could be reached with the junta on return to non-war-zones, 
including guarantees on e.g. non-penalisation for re-entry, the recognition of new-
born children in exile and the requisition of nationality176
                                                             
176 This is a precondition that the junta was unwilling to meet in the past. They only wanted to accept 
refugees with Burmese ID cards (Lang 2001: 16), which is very problematic as many people have never 
had identity cards, or were born in camp and are therefore stateless. However, presenting this as an 
option only for those people of whom the regime is not suspicious might change this attitude. 
, return could become an 
option for a subgroup of interested individuals with various legal statuses. Such an 
agreement is essential for any kind of internationally-backed return. This option 
would complement the present process of migration regulation between Burma 
and Thailand, which is currently unidirectional (from Burma to Thailand). The only 
difference would be that migration back to Burma would be securely monitored by 
international agencies (UNHCR and IOM), as the conditions of repatriated Rohingya 
and Mon refugees are not very encouraging in terms of sustainability of return 
(discussed in Section 1.1). Moreover, there should be careful ‘do no harm’ 
assessments, as control of populations is a key strategic goal of the SPDC, so they 
have an interest in resettling returning refugees into particular areas. The return 
should be voluntary, and people returning should be fully informed about the 
conditions they will encounter. Even then however, it is still not certain whether 
the return will be sustainable on an economic level, if there is no economic 
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absorption capacity, so this option might need to be coupled with development 
programmes (4R’s approach).  
Even if the junta would agree to this option and it would be safe for interested 
individuals to return, there will always be refugees who consider neither 
repatriation nor resettlement as an option, but instead prefer to stay in Thailand. 
People seek a better future in holistic terms, thus their decision to stay, move 
elsewhere or return will depend upon short term, medium term and long term 
livelihood prospects, political status, their kin ties and social networks, as well as 
their identity and self-conception (Kronenfeld 2008: 45-46; Lindley 2008: 8). 
Therefore, the third durable solution needs to be assessed as well: local 
integration. 
 
7.3.4. Local integration 
 
 “I have been living here since I was three. If someone would compel 
me to go back to Burma now, I would kill myself. I have my own house 
and land here, my own work, I don’t have any reason to return, even 
if I still have family there”177
During the more than 20 years that refugees have been in Thailand, local 
integration has never been explored as a durable solution, neither by organisations 
present, nor by academics. This is a surprising finding, as many of the factors that 
have been discovered in success cases of local integration are present in this case 
for subgroups within the refugee population. In Tak province, Karen refugees in 
Karen hill tribe areas are a case in point (as has been analysed in Section 5.1), but 
due to their better level of integration, these refugees tend to be invisible for 
humanitarian agencies and policy makers. They have been able to integrate 
economically, socially, and sometimes even legally: “For such people, assuming 
there is a ‘refugee problem’ for which repatriation is the best solution may 
. 
                                                             
177 Interview with Ali, Karen refugee, Tha Son Yang, November  14, 2007. 
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undermine whatever progress they have made in rebuilding their lives” (Bakewell 
2004b: 41). From the viewpoint of policy makers, the obstacles to integration, 
which have been identified in other cases (Jacobsen 2001: 22-23), are not present 
for this subgroup: (1) these self-settled, dispersed refugees do not pose any threat 
to security, (2) they are not economic or environmental burdens, and do not tend 
to be seen as such in their host areas, (3) the local population is not against the 
permanent settlement of the refugees. Officially promoting local integration in 
these hill tribe areas is thus not likely to increase insecurity or cause instability, 
economic or social problems. On the contrary, if local integration would be 
supported by aid agencies (see infra), these RHAs would substantially benefit from 
the refugee presence.  
There is thus a real potential for the promotion of local integration for a subgroup 
of refugees, namely those that are integrating economically and socially in a way 
accepted by the local population. In casu, the Karen self-settled refugees would be 
an important group to consider, as well as the Shan refugees as the latter are 
officially not tolerated in the refugee camps because of their cultural compatibility 
with the Tai Yai in the north of Thailand178
While local integration is certainly not officially encouraged but on the contrary 
considered a very sensitive matter, some policy measures have been implemented 
that did lead to integration as a result. The large-scale registration exercises de 
facto represented economic integration of foreign labour, resulting in a temporary 
. Moreover, even if social factors were 
most influential for refugee integration in the area where I did research, there may 
be other areas in Thailand with longstanding de facto integrated Burmese 
communities who nonetheless lack shared ethnicity with the local population, so 
this option need not a priori be restricted to certain ethnicities. 
                                                             
178 Concerning the Shan, a local NGO staff member suggested that local integration or at least legal 
access to work would be a good possibility for the young and healthy. However, he insisted that the 
older or sick ones should be able to live in a refugee camp with a basic safety net in terms of protection, 
housing, food and health care, as the Shan are refugees too (Email conversation with staff member 
Burma Relief Centre, May 22, 2009). I on the other hand believe that giving them a legal status in 
Thailand would already improve their protection, even if not as ‘refugees’, and enhance their access to 
services, without necessarily encamping them. Camps are in the first place intended to provide an 
asylum space, rather than a social safety net. 
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residence status and access to services for the people concerned. Moreover, the 
children of Burmese migrants are allowed access to Thai schools, which is beneficial 
for their future integration: “Thailand has below-replacement fertility, and if it 
wants immigrants to add to its population and labour force, migrant children 
educated in Thai schools should be among the easiest foreigners to integrate” 
(Martin 2007: xiii). In addition, in January 2006, the Cabinet approved a project 
aimed at addressing the unresolved status of illegal people who arrived in Thailand 
prior to January 2005 (Kasem 2008). All village headmen were asked to make a list 
of ‘eligible villagers’, which included both hill tribe people and more recent arrivals 
(‘the house registration system’). In practice, the RTG thus knows that many 
ethnically related Burmese refugees have obtained coloured identity cards and 
does not necessarily oppose this practice if it is accepted locally. What is more, the 
RTG seems to regard this practice as a form of integration, for subgroups of the 
refugees at least. The Padaung people (another minority group from Burma) in 
Mae Hong Son province for example, are reportedly obliged to give up their 
coloured cards if they wish to register for refugee screening and possible 
resettlement (CCSDPT meeting June 11, 2008, internal document). It is unclear if 
this vision is general, or restricted to this particular population, living in a separate 
settlement. The UNHCR on the other hand continuously stresses that anyone 
registered as a refugee stays a refugee, regardless of where the person lives and 
which kind of papers he/she receives in a Thai village. The reason for that position 
is that the ‘long neck’ Padaung people are pressured by the authorities to give up 
their rights as refugees to resettlement, as they are economically important for the 
area as a tourist attraction (Harding 2008; USCRI 2009). As this may not be in the 
best interest of the people concerned, UNHCR wants to keep options to 
resettlement open to all refugees who are registered. They feel that refugees need 
to be able to make informed decisions, by having access to information about 
rights (such as freedom of movement), obligations and entitlements to services in 
the different options179
                                                             
179 Email conversation with Maria Corinna Miguel-Quicho, Senior Regional Protection Officer UNHCR 
Thailand, March 30, 2009. 
. Moreover, UNHCR considers coloured ID cards as 
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insufficient to fully guarantee the basic rights of the refugees in the country, on a 
level that could amount to local integration or lead to a cessation of refugee status. 
Still, the refugees see the obtainment of a coloured identity card as desirable, 
because it provides them with a legal status, residence permit and freedom to 
work, even if restricted to a certain zone. These cards thus de facto constitute 
protection outside camp, even if the holders are not integrated as ‘refugees’. Such 
cards might be the best option in a situation where even the ‘hill tribes’ are not 
considered ‘enough Thai’ to obtain full citizenship, thus the option to extend this 
legal process to other, otherwise fully integrated, refugees should be explored. One 
could, for example, work with different phases, whereby refugees would 
progressively be granted more rights. The first phase could start by providing 
temporary stay permits and work permits (as in the amnesty rounds for foreign 
labour). In the longer term, refugees would gradually, at a pre-determined pace, 
enjoy more rights with coloured identity cards. This way, the whole process would 
be controllable by the RTG. Moreover, the next generations might receive the 
possibility to get Thai citizenship, which happened in the past with the descendants 
of the Vietnamese, Kuomintang, Han Chinese and Burmese followers of U Nu180
 
.  
7.3.5 A segmented approach: Different durable solutions for subgroups of 
refugees 
 
“UNHCR must, in the words of its Statute, promote ‘the execution of 
any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to 
reduce the number requiring protection’. What does this mean in 
practice? UNHCR should take a detailed look at the composition of 
the different populations in protracted exile and decide what the best 
strategies for them are, sub-group by sub-group. Dealing with an 
entire population can be frustrating because, unless there is real 
                                                             
180 Interview with Songsit Charuparn, Legal Protection Officer, UNHCR Bangkok, July 12, 2006. 
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political change in the country of origin, progress is unlikely. 
Segmenting that population is more fruitful, for it entails separating it 
into sub-groups with different profiles and for whom different 
strategies might lead to improvements”.  
(Jamal 2008: 151) 
Given the protractedness of this refugee situation, it is time for Thailand and the 
international community to widen their view on durable solutions in this case. 
While resettlement is a durable solution for the individuals concerned, not all camp 
refugees will opt for resettlement, and self-settled refugees are excluded from the 
process. Therefore, the range of choices for refugees should be increased, without 
enforcing a particular option on anyone. Different durable solutions could be 
combined, to the benefit of all the stakeholders: the refugees, but also the local 
host population, Thailand, UNHCR, NGOs and donors. Next to the continuation of 
resettlement, return of interested individuals to non-war zones should be explored, 
as well as local integration in Thailand for locally accepted subgroups of self-settled 
refugees. However, even then there will still be people for whom neither of the 
options is feasible. For the residual group, which will still be large, the prospect of 
getting a coloured identity card and being obliged to stay in Thailand is not an 
attractive proposition. Therefore, measures could be taken to improve the 
conditions for these refugees’ self-reliance pending return, which will be less 
sensitive than durable local integration. It is a realistic option as self-settled 
refugees are necessarily self-reliant and so were most camp refugees along the 
border during the first ten years of their stay. In addition, increasing self-sufficiency 
of camp refugees has been discussed with the RTG in the past (2005/2006) and was 
approved by that particular government, thus NGOs have already tested various 
(pilot) programmes (Brees 2008b). However, until now, the attempts to improve 
camp refugee self-reliance have failed in Thailand because income-generation 
programmes and VT courses in camp cannot achieve much in the absence of any 
rights to utilize these skills after the training. Moreover, the political turmoil in 
Thailand has halted further progress in this respect. 
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A potentially more efficient method to achieve the goal of increased refugee self-
reliance is to convince the RTG to give this group the status of a migrant worker. 
This would give them access to work and services (if necessary restricted to a 
certain Designated Zone of Residence with sufficient economic opportunities), 
leading to economic integration until sustainable return to Burma would become 
possible. For the camp refugees, the work permit combined with the personal 
identity card they have recently received, would still have to rule out refoulement, 
constituting a “protection-compliant strategy for channelling certain categories of 
refugees into a labour migration stream” (Jamal 2008: 156). This idea of migratory 
regularisation of refugees may seem controversial in this case, but is not unrealistic 
as it has been successful and supported by UNHCR in other cases, amongst which 
Mozambican refugees in South-Africa and Zimbabwe (Feller 2005: 31), and Sierra 
Leonean and Liberian refugees in the ECOWAS region181
Next to camp refugees, self-settled refugees need a legal status as well, to ensure a 
basic legal safety, permission to work and access to local services. For self-settled 
refugees who are not able or willing to integrate, that legal status could also be a 
migrant worker status. This is unlikely to be controversial given that this population 
has economic potential and that very little Thai actors lose on an economic level 
due to their presence. Any legal status could moreover lead to an improved access 
to NGO programmes (in areas where local services are inadequate), since as long as 
this population is deemed ‘illegal’ by the Thai authorities, it is extremely difficult for 
NGOs to work with them in an openly and effectively manner:  
. As a former Thai Deputy 
Prime Minister indicated himself: “70 percent of the refugee humanitarian 
assistance is allocated for food and non-food items.(. . .) To still be feeding a forcibly 
dependent population after 15 years is tragic; it will be criminal if we are still 
feeding them after 15 more” (as cited in Women’s Commission 2006b: 2). In order 
to achieve this, the government needs to review its stance regarding camp refugee 
labour.  
                                                             
181 Email conversation with Jeff Crisp, Head of UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 
Geneva, August 2, 2009. 
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“The main factor that has prevented many of the NGOs to support 
self-settled clients with more than just food, is their illegal status. 
Money generated from seeds, livestock, businesses etc. is only 
successful for those with good relationships with local Thai 
employers, landowners and authorities. For the others, their dwellings 
are often destroyed by the police who would also take any money and 
possessions from the refugees while deporting them”182
 
.  
All three durable solutions and self-reliance pending return should thus be pursued 
simultaneously, depending on the characteristics of individuals and groups within 
the refugee population as well as their hosts. But why would Thailand agree to 
officially increasing the options for refugees? First of all, legalising the labour of 
both self-settled and camp refugees (in a more effective way than is currently the 
case) will increase the authorities’ control over the predominantly illegal foreign 
labour sector and diminish corruption. Moreover, Thai constituents will benefit as 
well, as it will diminish the employers’ risk of arrest and/or fines as well as losing 
trained staff through deportation. However, while employers are in favour of clear 
regularisations, they never register all their workers since the non-registered ones 
are in practice less protected by labour laws, which means the employers also 
benefit from this illegality. Incentives for them to reduce this practice would be 
dramatically increasing the risk of checks by the MOL to reduce the current 
widespread impunity and introducing a more efficient system of registrations as 
well as seasonal work permits where necessary (Brees 2008c: 393-394). 
Secondly, both the increased self-reliance and targeted local integration approach 
could lead to substantial benefits for the local population when coupled with 
development aid, based on the Convention Plus- ideas of DAR and DLI respectively. 
If refugees would be more self-sufficient as a result of legal access to work and 
freedom of movement (perhaps in a certain Zone), parallel services in the camps 
could be reduced (although still present to a certain level as a safety net), in favour 
                                                             
182 Email conversation with a staff member of a Mae Sot- based NGO, June 25,  2008. 
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of improving Thai services in the area in health, education and (micro-) finance. 
These services would be provided through the local community but be fully 
accessible to the camp and self-settled refugee populations. Even if Thailand has a 
higher level of development than most host countries in Africa, many of the 
provinces along the Thai-Burmese border are in fact amongst the least developed 
in the whole country (UNDP 2007), so in those areas improving services would 
clearly be to the advantage of Thai nationals as well. Regional development of the 
border area will also increase its stability, which is a key policy concern of the RTG. 
Both the economy and security of the RHAs will thus be strengthened by combining 
a rights-based approach for refugees with the concern for regional development, 
through the inclusion of refugees into the national and local development plans. To 
some extent, there might even be a possibility to build upon the expertise of an 
existing UNDP project in Mae Hong Son province. In this project, development aid 
is directed at Mae Hong Son because they are the poorest province in Thailand and 
home to very diverse populations, amongst which many displaced persons from 
Burma (UNDP 2008b). The project aims to improve livelihoods by enhancing 
income generation opportunities and access to services for all people in a 
community, regardless of legal status183
A third important factor in convincing the RTG, is that the self-reliance and local 
integration components are part of a larger and forward-looking framework. 
Resettlement to third countries is an ongoing component of the framework, and 
there is also an element of cooperation with the country of origin, if an agreement 
with the SPDC can be reached. In that case, migration back to Burma will be 
legalised and monitored, which is in Thailand’s and the returnees’ advantage. 
While initially this group of returnees might be small, it will set an important 
. Perhaps there are opportunities to 
transform this project by explicitly including a refugee/migrant rights’ component, 
as refugees make up a substantial proportion of the de facto population in Mae 
Hong Son province. 
                                                             
183 Email conversation with Anupam Bhatia, manager Mae Hong Son project, May 21, 2009. 
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precedent and a ready-to-use plan of operations for return if political or conflict 
conditions in Burma change.  
A last argument is that it needs to be recognised that migration into Thailand will 
continue for many years to come, thus there is a need for a more extensive policy 
framework that goes beyond warehousing and (unsustainable) deportation. 
Furthermore, the Burmese resettlement programme is the largest in its kind 
worldwide, but this kind of enormous burden-sharing will not last forever. Donor 
fatigue is already starting to set in, with the camps’ largest donor, European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), diminishing its aid from 2008 on, in the 
absence of any progress in the refugees’ situation over the last decade184. The 
framework proposed here has the potential to motivate donors, as it is more 
holistic in nature, going beyond long term care-and-maintenance and costly 
resettlement programmes. Moreover, while this wide approach will initially require 
more budget (additionality185
 
), in the longer term it will be cheaper than 
conventional assistance programmes aimed at meeting all the needs of refugees 
kept segregated in camps. Donor states can also target based on their own 
priorities, as DAR and DLI focus on bilateral initiatives, unlike the multilateral 
cooperation required at the time of the ICARA- process (Betts 2004: 14-16). 
Having said this, there are some caveats in this ambitious framework, many of 
which do not have straightforward solutions. The largest problem is that it needs to 
be backed by political will. The proposed framework has many benefits for 
Thailand, but the RTG might see any kind of easing up of restrictions as losing 
control. Thailand is always on its guard for options that improve the conditions for 
the refugees present as it may draw people to Thailand. However, the European 
Council on Refugee and Exiles (ECRE) argues that the right to work is exaggerated 
                                                             
184 Meeting with Jack Dunford (TBBC) and Art Carlson (IRC) at Human Rights Watch, Brussels, March 11, 
2009. 
185 This concept refers to allocating additional budgets to a certain country. After all, if development 
budgets previously intended for the host population are now re-allocated to both locals and refugees, 
local leaders will not be inclined to cooperate. It needs to be a vote winning strategy for host population 
politicians (Betts 2009: 13). 
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as a pull-factor for asylum-seekers: “Given the ease with which illegal migrants find 
work on the black market in both western and non-western countries, it is unlikely 
that those whose sole motivation is to find work would bother to make an asylum 
claim, thereby attracting the attention of authorities” (cited in Jacobsen 2005: 98). 
That element will thus not lead to a rise of people seeking UNHCR protection. 
Moreover, the push factors are far more important in this case, and the ongoing 
deportations do not deter Burmese people from crossing into Thailand. After all, it 
is general knowledge that the overall majority of deportees immediately cross back 
into Thailand (if they have the cash), thus the deportations are not effective and 
the practice engenders corruption on both sides of the border. The migration into 
Thailand cannot be halted. What the policy framework proposed here could 
achieve is make it less clandestine and more controlled. The RTG may also fear that 
the Burmese will not return if they become legally economically integrated, but 
that fear is unsubstantiated. Several researchers, amongst which Bakewell (2000a), 
Rutinwa (2002: 23) and Hovil (2007: 616), have found that self-settlement and self-
reliance do not necessarily lead to less repatriation, and also allow return to take 
place with a reduced negative impact. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of self-
settled Burmese have already been officially economically integrated in the past, 
due to the registration system. Regardless of these arguments though, there may 
still be little enthusiasm in Thailand to agree with the framework, as there are 
vested (economic and other) interests for local and national politicians, police and 
army leaders as well as for the KNU, political activists and emergency NGOs in 
keeping the status-quo, so there is a role here for the donor community to push for 
progress. 
Convincing Burma might proof difficult as well as it remains uncertain how 
interested they are in creating goodwill in ASEAN and the UN by cooperating, and if 
they can be convinced with the argument that allowing returnees in non-conflict 
zones might bring development aid to these areas (4R’s approach), as any foreign 
aid is considered sensitive. Also the inter-agency cooperation of UNHCR with 
development agencies such as UNDP and with migration organisations such as IOM 
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is not always smooth, but necessary to implement the DAR-, DLI- and careful 
repatriation approaches. Another problem is that promoting different durable 
solutions for subgroups of refugees may create or reinforce (ethnic) tensions within 
the refugee population. However, the idea is not to limit the current options, as 
resettlement stays available for any UNHCR-registered refugee. Instead, the 
options will be widened in a way that has the potential to succeed, namely by 
looking at the characteristics of both the refugees and the local population. It has 
been tested successfully in other mass influx cases, such as the Afghans in Pakistan 
(Loescher and Milner 2006: 12-13), thus there is no reason to assume that it would 
not work here. Still, separating the categories in practice may not be easy, also due 
to a lack of information on the majority of the self-settled refugees. In addition, 
there is the danger that promoting local integration for subgroups of self-settled 
refugees may ‘wake sleeping dogs’, as a UNHCR official pointed out. As the issue of 
integration is very sensitive in Thailand, trying to formalise the creative ways in 
which some refugees have managed to obtain coloured ID cards, may effectively 
close the door for everyone. Obviously, this should at all costs be avoided, thus it 
needs to be carefully assessed.  
By no means is a segmented approach like the one proposed here thus easy to 
implement. Many sensitivities and potential side effects need to be taken into 
account, and some parts of the framework will require quite some preparation. 
However, standing by and continuing the care-and-maintenance programmes while 
simultaneously ignoring the hundreds of thousands of self-settled refugees is not 
an option: “The price of extending this short term measure (camps, ed.) year after 
year is paid in terms of rights frustrated, capabilities deprived and expectations 
unmet. That these camps have come to embody the refugee experience, to 
represent the content of international protection for refugees, is grimly ironic, and 
demonstrates how desperately new approaches to responding to refugee situations 
are needed” (Jamal 2008: 146). The status quo presents a major moral dilemma, so 
there is an urgent need for change. On the other hand, a comprehensive, grand, 
political approach for all refugees, such as the Indochinese CPA in the past, is not 
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realistic for the Burmese refugees and thus unlikely to lead to timely progress. As 
Betts (2006a and 2006b) states, CPAs and programmes like CIREFCA require wide 
political, non-altruistic, interests for donors and the country of origin, both of which 
are lacking in this case. Such a political approach would only be possible if the 
context inside Burma would change, in which case it would require the support of 
the entire UN system, rather than only UNHCR and UNDP as in the framework 
proposed here. Currently, working towards durable solutions for subgroups of 
refugees and improving self-reliance of the residual group pending return has the 
best potential to lead to progress and can make the refugees’ presence even less of 
a ‘burden’ for Thailand than is the case today. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is widely accepted that the majority of the world’s refugees do not live in refugee 
camps but self-settle instead. UNHCR estimates that of the 31.7 million ‘persons of 
concern’ in 2007, only 12% were camp-based or settlement-based (Polzer and 
Hammond 2008: 420). In these spaces outside camp, the distinction between 
migrants and refugees is hard to make as their lives are very similar. Moreover, also 
the causes of (onward) migration are often mixed. Despite this general knowledge, 
the thinking in terms of categories is left aside only rarely. All too often, refugee 
researchers take over the simplified categories developed by bureaucracies 
(Bakewell 2007: 7-8), focusing on either ‘refugees in camp’ or ‘migrants outside 
camp’. This research has challenged that distinction by treating the migration-
asylum nexus as a given and considering the entire Burmese population in the area 
as its research population. As the aim of this study was to assemble a rich picture of 
livelihoods, integration and transnational strategies of the Burmese diaspora, it 
would have been detrimental to focus solely on either recognised refugees, or 
registered migrants, or political refugees, or any other category. When trying to 
understand how people adapt to life in exile, it is not necessary to label them. 
Moreover, they will deliberately split up anyway to diversify their livelihoods, or 
end up in different places and with different statuses due to particular social 
networks, human capital and coincidence, regardless of the causes of the flight and 
the label they should have been attributed based on international and host country 
regulations. Therefore, this study has tried to move away from such 
compartmentalised studies. Instead, a particular geographic context was selected, 
which presented the possibility to look into various populations in that area, 
compare them, see links in between them as well as between them and other 
locations further away. Only when the research findings had to be translated into 
policy recommendations in the last chapter of this book, the policy labels were 
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brought back in, in the sense that different policy options were proposed for 
people with different legal statuses. 
This research has gone into various debates and sought to fill some gaps, as little 
has been written on livelihoods of refugees in various settlement options within a 
single case, or on integration and transnationalism in cases of mass refugee influx. 
Refugee livelihoods were thus analysed by working and drawing on theory on three 
levels of analysis (Jacobsen 2006: 280). At the level of society, the livelihoods and 
integration strategies of refugees were revealed, what influences them, as well as 
what the outcome of these strategies was for the refugees themselves and for the 
local population. At the state level, the interface between the state and the 
refugees was explored by analysing Thailand’s refugee and foreign labour policy, 
and demonstrating how this influenced livelihoods of refugees. The law and 
policies of the host country and the way these were implemented and negotiated 
at the local level proved to be a connecting thread through the three themes, and 
were a key determinant in refugees’ vulnerability. Lastly, it was assessed in which 
way refugees in a situation of mass influx are transnational actors, how they 
connect the different domains of the refugee diaspora, and what the impact of 
these activities is on various stakeholders, which entails an analysis at the more 
global level. 
These subjects were investigated by studying the Burmese refugees in Thailand. 
Despite the protractedness of this refugee situation, little is known about this 
context. One of the reasons for that lack of information is the difficulty of working 
in this ‘sensible terrain’, due to both politico-bureaucratic and practical reasons, 
but this study has demonstrated that access can nonetheless be negotiated at the 
local level (see also Vogler 2007). Unlike most previous studies on the Burmese 
diaspora in Thailand, this study did not primarily look into the needs of this 
population or the human rights abuses they have had to endure. Instead, the focus 
was on bounded agency, on how, despite these restrictions, problems and traumas, 
refugees nonetheless manage to cope. This is an entirely different perspective, 
which had a large influence on the truth discovered. Perhaps unsurprisingly given 
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this focus, it was discovered that agency is ever present, as refugees in this case of 
mass influx are engaged in livelihoods, integration and transnational practices. Still, 
in all three themes, it repeatedly became clear that the institutional context had an 
important influence on opportunities and choices. This interaction between agency 
and structure was expected in the ‘livelihoods and integration framework’ 
developed for this research and was confirmed.  
A major observation of this thesis is that the settlement choice is very important 
for refugees’ livelihoods. It influences refugees’ assets, strategies, social and 
economic outcomes as well as desired outcomes (in terms of preferred durable 
solutions). Registration in camp ensures better food security, personal safety and 
access to services but at the same time more controlling power structures have to 
be taken into account and there is hardly any contact with the local population as 
long as one does not leave the camp. Self-settled refugees on the other hand are 
more in control of their everyday life and integrate in the host communities on 
various levels, but they are more vulnerable to shocks and lack sustainable access 
to services. Moreover, they tend to be (or are made) ‘invisible’ due to their 
illegality and subsequent lack of ‘voice’. In general, there is thus a clear trade-off in 
livelihood outcomes between the various settlement options, but in practice there 
is quite some heterogeneity within each group. Moreover, families may decide to 
use the ‘splitting technique’ to increase their human security, as such blurring 
policy labels. Regardless of legal status, all Burmese refugees are economic actors, 
combining various strategies, which provides evidence against the aid dependency 
syndrome of camp refugees. This does not imply that they do not need the rations 
to survive, but rather that they use their agency to improve that very basic level of 
survival in various ways. This study thus confirms previous research that 
contradicted the image of ‘the passive refugee’ (e.g. Kuhlman 1991; Wilson 1992; 
Dolan 1999; Hyndman 2000; De Vriese 2006). Even if the Thai policy forbids 
refugee labour and unregistered ‘migrant’ labour, this formal legal framework is 
circumvented by inventive strategies of the refugees themselves, as well as by Thai 
stakeholders such as the employers, local leaders and police. The high level of wage 
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labour found in this case study is substantially different than the predominance of 
self-employment usually encountered in refugee livelihoods studies, and can be 
attributed to the prosperity and the duality of the Thai economy, as well as the Thai 
population trends. Certainly at the economic level, the local population clearly 
benefits from the refugee presence, which casts a serious doubt upon the 
persistent claim that these refugees are merely burdens to their host country. 
Another point that was made is that studying livelihoods requires more than only 
looking into economic strategies, since refugees try to improve their resilience in a 
holistic way. In addition to these subsistence strategies, strategies to gain access to 
goods, services and property as well as protection and civic strategies need to be 
assessed. In Thailand, all strategies were developed as an answer to the specific 
socio-economic conditions of the border region, which resulted in changes in 
institutions such as gender roles. There seemed to be little continuity with past 
strategies, but more research inside Burma will be needed to extend the 
knowledge on this subject.  
An important asset in refugees’ livelihoods is social capital. Developing links with 
co-nationals or hosts serves as a risk-spreading strategy. Bridging capital with the 
host population was certainly for self-settled refugees important as a safeguard 
against shocks. After all, they need to engage with the host population and local 
power figures for every need they may have, due to the lack of protection and 
targeted assistance. Therefore, it was assessed under which conditions Burmese 
refugees and the local population mixed up, and what the outcome of that was for 
both parties. As the Thai government is against refugee integration – along with 
most governments who face mass refugee influxes on their territory (Crisp 2003) – 
it would have made little sense for this research to focus on functional indicators, 
which usually serves to evaluate a certain policy. Moreover, that kind of analysis 
neglects the social dynamics of integration. Instead, research was conducted in an 
area with a wide variety in population compositions (Tak province) in order to 
study potential processes of economic, social and structural integration. And in 
spite of the official policy that only considers resettlement and repatriation as 
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durable solutions, integration was indeed occurring at various levels, with the 
highest level found in rural Karen hill tribe areas. This illustrates that the national 
policy and UNHCR policy are less important factors in refugee integration than the 
attitude of the local population and local authorities, confirming previous research 
in Africa (for example Bulcha 1988; Wijbrandi 1990; Polzer 2008). The attitude of 
the local population was in turn determined mostly by the cultural compatibility of 
the refugees, and to a lesser extent by the economic potential of the refugees as 
well as the number of refugees relative to the local population. This is not to say 
that the national policy is not important in refugee integration at all, as it became 
clear that the legal status of self-settled refugees, and in particular the coloured 
identity cards, were very important elements in facilitating refugees’ lives. Thus 
unlike findings in other studies (Banki 2004; Grabska 2006; Polzer 2008), this legal 
factor was found to have a lot of influence on refugee livelihoods, even if it was 
completely unrelated to refugee recognition and the hindering refugee label. 
Instead, refugees were integrated on the basis of other identities, usually ethnicity, 
but this legal element did de facto constitute protection for the refugee involved. 
The majority of the refugees were only integrated at the economic level though, 
leading to a form of subordinate integration (Wijbrandi 1990: 67), meaning that 
their conditions were consistently worse than those of the local Thai population 
(relative aspect of integration).  
Next to bridging capital, links can also be maintained and developed with the ‘in-
group’, which is important during different stages of the flight (Horst 2006a: 11-12). 
Inside Thailand, connections are needed upon arrival to find housing, to more 
quickly improve subsistence strategies, to get in camp and survive there pending 
recognition as a refugee, to get a skilled job, etc. Bonding social capital is thus an 
important asset and variable that influences many aspects of refugees’ lives. It 
functions as a safety net and makes refugees feel more at home while being in 
exile. However, this safety net and social gatherings can be strongly affected by the 
illegal status of the members in exile, as well as by restrictions imposed on spatial 
movement (e.g. due to the imposition of martial law). Moreover, while bonding 
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capital is essential for refugees, it can also have downsides (see e.g. Portes 1998). 
For example, strong ‘elite’ bonding capital leads to the exclusion of outsiders. This 
was proven in this case by the disconnection found between household 
educational attainment and actual livelihood outcome, which was related to the 
importance of ethnic political and family connections (nepotism) to get access to 
the limited amount of skilled jobs with international NGOs.  
Bonding social capital is not restricted within state boundaries though. There is a 
growing consensus that the lives of (forced) migrants cannot be understood by 
focusing exclusively on their activities within the host state (Engbersen et al. 2007: 
2). Therefore, not only the causes of migration and movements of people, but also 
the connections between the different diaspora domains need to be looked into 
(Nyberg-Sorensen 2004: 5). This study has thus investigated transnational patterns 
and found that refugees in a situation of mass influx can certainly be transnational 
actors, even if their capabilities (capacity and desire) are strained in principle. This 
study has thus challenged the idea of transnationalism research in the West that 
durable integration and stability at both the individual and national level are 
necessary for individuals to be transnational actors (Al-Ali et al. 2001; Guarnizo et 
al. 2003; Portes 2007). Burmese refugees maintain not only economic but also 
social, cultural and political transnational links, revealing a larger gamut of activities 
than the usual research focus on either remittance recipients or armed political 
links with the country of origin. Nonetheless, also in the study of transnationalism 
did the influence of the structural context on the type of activities become clear, 
which led to the argument that not the label migrant or refugee is important for 
the kind of transnational activities, but the legal status of the person, as well as the 
policies and level of development of the host country and the country of origin. 
Another important finding was that the importance of remittances for the 
livelihoods of refugee communities should not be overstated. There were more 
remittance senders than remittance recipients in this case, demonstrating that also 
refugees in neighbouring (developing) countries can be responsible for and carry 
G e n e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n s | 295 
 
the burden of the livelihoods of kin who are not currently with them – instead of 
only refugees in the West. 
Through transnational and integration strategies, refugees can act as agents of 
change and transform economic, social and even political structures at the sending 
and receiving end. The Burmese refugee presence in Thailand has led to a 
transformation of the economy since large segments became dependent on foreign 
labour. Moreover, their presence had a social effect in some areas, namely where 
the local population felt ‘overwhelmed’ and developed xenophobic sentiments as a 
result. Also the bilateral relations of the host country were affected due to the 
large Burmese population present and particularly because of the activists and 
rebels among them, but in practice Thailand’s stance regarding these contentious 
politics is rather dubious. Certainly at the local level, there is a lot of space for 
negotiation, despite the fact that the security of both the local population and the 
refugee camps are strongly affected by the war across the border. Lastly, the 
refugees also have some impact on crime, health and the environment, but not on 
the level they are blamed for, which commonly happens in situations of mass influx 
( see e.g. Kok 1989: 424-425). 
A related ‘hot’ debate of the last few years is how migrants can contribute to the 
development of their home country while being abroad, and how these positive 
impacts can be supported or steered by state policy. Certainly remittances are seen 
as having a lot of potential for development, up to the level of becoming the new 
‘development mantra’. While a lot of side notes can be made to mitigate this 
euphoria in all cases, the situation is certainly different for conflict-affected 
countries. This case has again illustrated that the development potential of 
remittances is fundamentally limited if the macro-economic and political conditions 
are not favourable, which is usually the case in conflict-affected, weak or failed 
states. While the remittances are beneficial for the recipients inside Burma as it 
enhances their choices (Horst 2008) and potentially positively affects the other 
members of the community through multiplier effects (Taylor 1999), remittances 
are not capable of improving the poor economic status of the country by 
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themselves. Another difference with non-conflict-affected countries is that 
refugees cannot only support relief or development, but can also ‘contribute’ to 
conflict, for example by supporting a rebellion, or promoting sanctions that 
negatively affect the stayees. These activities also occur within the Burmese 
diaspora, which leads to extensive debates and conflicts. Refugees thus by no 
means need to return to their country to influence its developments. However, 
while the increased capacity and networks of the Burmese diaspora has bestowed 
them with a large potential to influence peace building, development and conflict, 
there is currently not yet much visible evidence of real economic, social and 
political transformations through refugee transnationalism. This might change 
quickly when the technological, political and conflict context alters though. 
Moreover, there have been attempts by the diaspora to find common ground 
across the multiple and deep divides that exist, through shared meetings, various 
trainings and projects such as the NRP. Such initiatives may only slowly and in an 
imperceptible way lead to positive results.  
Refugee transnationalism is thus a factor to take into account when trying to 
influence peace building or when analysing conflict patterns, but currently the 
subject is still understudied. It would be interesting if the findings of this study 
would be compared with other case studies, to verify whether the large spectrum 
of activities found is special to this case, to protracted refugee situations in general 
or rather to all diasporas. Once the patterns of activities have become clear, the 
impact of refugees in situations of mass influx on their (former) home country 
could be better assessed, certainly if combined with research inside the country of 
origin. In addition, little is known about the interplay between transnationalism 
and integration in protracted refugee situations. Currently those studies are usually 
carried out in Western-Europe, where the findings in question tend to challenge 
the xenophobic sentiment that integration of migrants and enduring connections 
with their country of origin cannot be combined. By researching the topic in a 
situation of mass influx, insights can be refined. Moreover, such a study would 
present the possibility to assess Van Hear’s (2003a: 14-15) question whether 
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transnationalism might be considered in itself as an ‘enduring’ if not a ‘durable’ 
solution to displacement. In addition, I would like to reiterate Bakewell’s call for 
research outside of policy categories and agendas if the subject allows it, which can 
lead to a fuller understanding of how refugees actually cope with life in exile, 
across policy labels and settlement options. 
Also for the case of Burmese refugees in Thailand, additional research will be 
needed to refine insights found, by assessing the various subjects in other 
geographical areas. It would be particularly interesting to do research in large 
urban centres, to distract elements of similarity and difference, and as such get a 
more complete picture of Burmese refugees’ lives in Thailand. More longitudinal 
research would also be beneficial, to track livelihood changes over time, within one 
generation, but also across different generations, as socialisation in Thailand may 
lead to very different chances, perspectives and responses of the second 
generation of refugees. After all, there is no reason to assume that everyone will 
develop a diasporic consciousness, or on the contrary develop a ‘feeling of 
belonging’ to Thailand. A combination of integration and transnationalism is a third 
likely option, thus the level of transnational identity of refugees needs to be 
assessed. In addition, inside Burma, the impact of migration patterns and 
transnationalism could be examined, as well as the livelihood strategies of people 
prone to displacement, in order to evaluate in detail the level of adaptation and 
continuity that their strategies have undergone in Thailand. All of these subjects 
would be considered very sensitive though, thus this will not be an easy task. 
Lastly, research in third countries would complement the findings on 
transnationalism and integration from the side of resettled individuals, whose role 
in stayee and Thai-based refugee livelihoods will undoubtedly increase in the 
following years. There are thus quite a few questions and issues that remain 
unanswered after this research, which is related to both the difficult working 
terrain, as well as the broad setup of this research around three large themes. In 
hindsight, it might have been better to focus on just one specific aspect of the 
framework, but on the other hand, all these issues are connected, so there is a 
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need to properly understand the ‘bigger picture’ first. I tried to be as all-inclusive as 
possible when carrying out this research in order to get a rich picture of the agency 
of Burmese refugees in the remote border regions of Thailand, in the absence of 
substantial previous academic research on livelihoods, integration and 
transnationalism in this context, which I hope has been provided. Still, if this 
research were to be followed up, investigating one specific element of the 
framework in detail would be useful. 
At the more practical level, various policy options were suggested for the Burmese 
population in Thailand, based on the insights of this study and the Convention Plus-
ideas. A policy framework was developed in which a segmented approach was 
considered the best option in this refugee situation, while admitting that this is not 
a substitute for politically engaging to resolve the refugee-producing conditions in 
the country of origin. Segmenting the population into subgroups who can benefit 
from different durable solutions has the best potential to lead to progress in the 
current context. Next to continuing resettlement for the camp refugees, the 
options of careful return of interested individuals with various legal statuses needs 
to be explored, as well as durable local integration for otherwise fully integrated 
groups of refugees. For the residual caseloads, the main goal is to increase self-
reliance. Rather than further providing food aid or income generation and VT 
programmes that lead to skills that cannot be utilised afterwards, increasing the 
refugees’ self-reliance and living standard can best be achieved when they are 
‘enabled’ to better support themselves: “(There is, ed.) a paradox whereby most 
refugees do indeed survive despite the provision of inadequate rations. In fact, the 
situations in which refugees suffer most dramatically tend not to be those where 
less than average aid is provided, but those when their own survival strategies have 
been curtailed” (Wilson 1992: 226). Put differently, the focus needs to be on 
enhancing the refugees’ space for agency through the advancement of refugee 
rights, which will allow this population a certain level of dignity, security and self-
reliance pending return. This will require a legalisation by the host government of, 
at least, economic integration, if necessary restricted to a designated zone of 
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residence (Jacobsen 2005). A potential method to achieve this goal is by 
regularising the residual group as migrant workers, in a more efficient and 
predictable way than is currently the case.  
The widespread existence of protracted refugee situations all over the world 
demonstrates the limits of an international refugee regime that favours 
repatriation to ‘a situation in which the causes of the flight have been removed’. 
Local integration and resettlement thus need to be revived, but are in practice 
frequently opposed by, respectively, the host government and developed 
countries. The classic three durable solutions that are based on citizenship thus 
often appear insufficient to lead to timely progress, severely affecting refugees’ 
livelihoods. As James Hathaway, a well-known academic in refugee law, says: “A 
legal regime which is in truth fundamentally oriented to the promotion of 
autonomy of refugees has been ‘pathologized’ to focus instead on finding cures to 
refugeehood. A regime which was actually established to guarantee refugees’ lives 
in dignity until and unless either the cause of their flight is firmly eradicated or the 
refugee himself or herself chooses to pursue some alternative solution to their 
disfranchisement has now become a regime which labours nearly single-mindedly 
to design and implement top-down solutions which ‘fix the refugee problem’” 
(Hathaway 2006: 3; emphasis in original). While durable solutions are important, 
more innovative alternatives are needed in cases of protracted exile that take into 
account refugees’ ever present agency and therefore allow de facto integration in 
that (often ever extending) intermediate period in which a durable solution has not 
yet been reached. Certainly in those cases, the focus needs to be as much on 
refugee solutions as on solutions to refugeehood (Hathaway 2006). The most 
important element that can influence refugees’ livelihoods is legalising access to 
the labour market, which is a factor that can complement or even enhance the 
level of protection. By combining the application of TDA with novel approaches 
such as a protection-compliant form of migratory regularisation of refugees in 
protracted refugee situations, refugees, host populations and donors all stand to 
gain. In convincing host states to improve refugee rights and include refugees into 
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development plans, additionality is essential: “The great reluctance of host 
governments such as Uganda to adopt policies that could promote self-reliance of 
refugees lies in the perceived lack of economic viability of this possibility. (…) In a 
country of extreme poverty and lack of infrastructure and in which the development 
budget accounts for 52 percent of the operating budget, the possibility of losing 
international aid to refugees through an integrated approach is perhaps a risk not 
worth taking” (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004: 34-35). In the absence of 
additionality and adequate burden-sharing, host governments will not be inclined 
to change their refugee policies. Carving out the political space in both North and 
South for improved burden-sharing and renewing ‘fourth’ options is one of the 
major challenges of the international refugee regime in the following decade. 
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ANNEX A: Questionnaire regular 
 
My name is Inge, and I am a student from the University of Ghent, Belgium. I am 
interested in how you make your life here, and how you stay in contact with family 
members who are not living with you at present. I cannot pay you, but you can see 
this as an opportunity to talk about your problems and about what you think would 
be a good solution for them. There are no right or wrong answers, you can say 
anything you want and what you say will be used for this research only. It will be 
kept confidential, so you don’t even need to say your name if you don’t want to. If 
during the interview you want to leave, then you are free to do so. All your answers 
will be helpful in trying to understand the needs and experiences of people from 
Burma living in Thailand. 
 
Questions 
Identity and causes of flight 
o Sex, Age, Ethnicity, Religion: 
o How many people are there in your family? 
o Why did you leave Burma? Did you experience any violence yourself, or did your 
close family? 
o Did your family come with you when you fled? Did you bring your belongings with 
you? 
o When did you arrive in Thailand?  
o Why did you come to this place in particular (and not in camp/outside camp)?  
o Do you have any legal papers? 
o Are all Burmese living in Thailand refugees? Who are refugees for you and who are 
not?  
 
Financial capital  
o Do you have a job?  
(in camp) How do you supplement your rations? Do you need to ask permission or 
consult someone to do your job? 
Does your wife/husband have a job? 
o Do you have the same job the whole year, or does it change with the season? 
o What is the most difficult period/season in the year for your family? 
o If you have a bad month and you can’t buy enough food, what would you do?  
o Do you have other sources of income? 
 
Social capital 
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o If you have a problem, who would you go to?  
o Are you a member of an organisation (political, sports, church…)? 
o (in camp) Are there any tensions in the camp between different groups of people?  
o (outside camp) Do you know many people in this town/village? 
o (outside camp) Do you sometimes go out together, or organise activities together? 
Can everybody go to these activities or are they organised for a particular group? 
o (outside camp) Do you have a community leader? 
o (outside camp) Are there any problems with Thai people? 
 
o Is your whole family here, or are some of them outside/inside the camp, or still in 
Burma or in a third country (which one)?  
 
Social remittances 
o Do you still have contact with family members left behind in Burma? And with your 
family in third countries? 
(If answer is no, go to financial remittances, part II) 
o How do you contact them?  
o Do you travel back to visit your family sometimes? 
o If you go back, do you tell them anything about what’s happening outside (and 
inside) Burma? Or maybe teach them skills that you have learnt here in training or 
school? 
 
Financial Remittances 
o Do you try to support your family in Burma by sending money? What do they use 
the money for? 
o Have you been sending this money to them since you arrived here?  
o How do you send the money? 
 
o Do many people in this community send money?  
o Do you sometimes send money together, for example to build a school in Karen 
State? 
o Apart from money, is anything in kind being sent? (clothes, medicine, books…)  
 
o If a family member of yours leaves for a third country, do you feel that they should 
help you?  
o Do many people in this community receive money from family members abroad?  
o Do you yourself ever receive money? Do you need to share that money? 
 
Natural capital  
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o Do you : 
- grow any vegetables  
- have any animals,  
- collect forest resources  
- (outside camp) have any land? 
 
Physical capital 
o (personal items) 
o (outside camp) Do you have access to health services? 
o What infrastructure do you have access to and use: 
- water 
- electricity 
- access to information/communication 
Human capital 
o How many years have you been to school? And your husband/wife? 
o Can you read and write? 
o Which language(s) do you speak? 
o Do you know anything about the rights that you have as a refugee? If yes, who told 
you about these?  
o (outside camp) Since your arrival, have you received help from any organisation? If 
yes, which one and which help? 
 
Last questions 
o (in camp) What is the biggest problem about living here in the camp? 
o (outside camp) What is the biggest problem about living here in Thailand? 
o How can your life here in Thailand be improved (by you, your family, the camp 
committee, the NGOs, the RTG)? 
o What do you yourself think is the best solution for you or your family: return to 
Burma, resettlement or improving conditions here in Thailand? 
 
 
At the end of the household interview: is there anything else you would like to talk 
about or that you would like to know about me/Belgium? 
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ANNEX B: Questionnaire political 
refugees186
 
 
Identity and causes of flight 
o Sex, Age, Ethnicity, Religion: 
o How many people are there in your family? 
o Why did you leave Burma? Did you experience any violence yourself, or did 
your close family? 
o Did your family come with you when you fled? 
o When did you arrive in Thailand?  
o Where did you live before coming to camp? And when did you arrive in camp?  
 
Life in exile 
o Why did you decide to come to camp?  
o How is life here, compared to outside camp? 
o When you lived outside camp, did you have many contacts with people who 
were not politically active?  
o Did you have contact with Thai people, have Thai friends? Did you try to blend 
in into Thai society?  
o Did you have any legal papers?  
o Were you harassed by the police?  
 
o Which specific problems do you activists have here in camp? Are there any 
tensions with the other camp people? Do you receive any special treatment? 
o How do you supplement your rations? 
o Who do you go to if you have a problem? 
o Who are the powerful people in this camp? 
 
Transnational activities 
o Are you a member of an organisation or party? Which work does that 
organisation do?  
o Do they only work in Thailand or also in Burma or other countries?  
o Did you work for that organisation before coming to camp? Can you still do that 
work now? How do you keep in contact with the world outside camp? 
o How do you keep in touch with what is going on in Burma? Are there 
sometimes public discussions or workshops on the recent events?  
o Is the Burma lobby in Thailand strong? Who are the most important players?  
                                                             
186 This questionnaire was only used as a basis for the interviews with political refugees in Nu Poh camp. 
All interviews with political refugees were in practice in-depth interviews and discussions. 
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o Do you sometimes go back to Burma? To visit family or for work?  
o Do you have contact with your family? Do you try to support them? 
o In other refugee situations you can see that people put money together to 
develop their hometowns. Is that happening here? Are there organisations 
transferring money for development projects?  
 
Future 
o What is the best durable solution for you personally: return, stay here in 
Thailand or resettlement?  
 
Is there anything else you would like to talk about? 
  
| xlvi 
 
ANNEX C: The selected camps 
 
Source: TBBC, Camp locations, http://www.tbbc.org/camps/camps.htm, consulted : August 
1, 2009. (literal quotation) 
Mae La camp 
Mae La is also known as ‘Beh Klaw’ in Karen, which means ‘cotton field’ due to the 
agricultural activities for which Karen leaders first negotiated permission for 
refugees to cross into the area in 1984. 
Location: Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province 
Distance from Border: about 8 kms 
Distance from Mae Sot: 57 kms / approx. 1 hour driving time  
Area about 1,150 rai (4 km2)  
Accessibility: Car – good, all-year-round access  
 
History 
The camp was originally established following the fall of the KNU base at the Thai 
village of Mae La on the border in 1984 with a population of 1,100. Shortly 
afterwards, due to security concerns, it was moved to the site where Zone C 
currently lies. After the fall of Manerplaw in January 1995, a number of camps were 
attacked in cross-border raids and the Thai authorities began to consolidate camps 
to improve security; Mae La was designated as the main consolidation camp in the 
area. 
In April 1995, Mae La increased in size from 6,969 to 13,195 due to the closure of 
five camps to the north – Mae Ta Waw, Mae Salit, Mae Plu So, Kler Kho and Kamaw 
Lay Kho – and the move of Huay Heng later in October of the same year. Over the 
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following year, the camp doubled in size again to 26,629 as those lost in the move 
came back into the camp. 
In March 1997, some people were relocated here following the closure of Huai 
Bone camp (aka Don Pa Kiang) and again in February 1998 when Shoklo camp was 
closed. 
Mae La is considered as a centre of studies for refugees, so the current population 
includes several thousand students who come to study in the camp (some from 
other camps but mostly from Burma). They are registered only as temporary 
inhabitants. 
The camp was attacked in 1997 by DKBA troops with support from Burma Army 
units. There have been no incursions since then, but a mortar shell landed in 
Section A5 in March 1998. Every dry season, this area is quite tense with concerns 
relating to camp security – threats of armed attack and/or attempts to burn the 
camp. 
The area of Karen State lying opposite Mae La camp is very rural with no large 
settlements or infrastructure. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) maintains 
its 7th Brigade Headquarters nearby, and there are several Burma Army and 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army outposts in the area. 
 
Nu Poh camp 
Nu Po is also commonly spelt Noh Hpo, and means “small lake” in Karen. 
Location: Umphang District, Tak Province 
Distance from Border: 8 kms  
Distance from Mae Sot: 232 kms / approx. 6 hours driving time  
Distance from Umphang: 68 kms / approx. 1½ hours driving time  
Area: about 400 rai (640,000 m2) 
Accessibility:   all-year-round access;  
 
History 
This camp was set up in March 1997 after a major offensive during which the 
Burma Army took control of Duplaya District in Karen State. It was established to 
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consolidate the existing refugee populations of Meteroke and Baw Ner Hta camps 
(both were set up in 1992 and had populations of 4,595 and 2,078 respectively) and 
to house new arrivals fleeing from the current offensive. 
In late 1997, groups of new arrivals came into two areas outside the camp Ta Per 
Poo (2,221) and Nong Luang (771), where they received food and medical support 
from the NGOs before they were allowed to move into the camp. 
In March 2005, approximately 800 Persons of Concern (PoC) from the Mae Sot area 
were transferred to the camp as part of the RTG’s policy to relocate all PoCs in 
urban areas to the border camps. 
 
Mae Ra Ma Luang camp 
Mae Ra Ma Luang is also known as Mae Ra Mu or Mae Ra Mu Klo in Karen. 
Location: Sob Moei District, Mae Hong Son Province 
Distance from Border: about 4 kms  
Distance from Mae Sariang: via Mae Sam Laep: kms / 3-8 hours driving 
time depending on conditions via Sob Moei: 
kms / 3-6 hours driving time depending on 
conditions  
Area : about 800 rai (320,000 m2) 
Accessibility: Car: all-year-round access; 4WD and chains 
required in the rainy season; Boat: access 
from Mae Saam Laep  
 
History 
Mae Ra Ma Luang lies opposite Manerplaw – the old headquarters of the Karen 
resistance, and home to many of the pro-democracy groups that fled crackdowns 
following the demonstrations throughout Burma in 1988. This area is now occupied 
by Burma Army and DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) troops, but there is 
little fighting or military operations in this specific part of the borderlands.  
Mae Ra Ma Luang was first set up in February 1995, following the fall of 
Manerplaw. Initially, a large number of the people living in areas around 
Manerplaw fled to Mae Taw La village on the Thai side. Upon agreement with Thai 
authorities and local landowners, they were soon allowed to relocate to the 
present site. People from Mae Po Hta camp, which was also deserted following the 
Burma Army’s capture of the area were initially relocated to Huai Haeng, but 
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gradually moved to the present site by November 1995. The initial population of 
Mae Ra Ma Luang was about 4,000. However, in February/March 1998 during the 
consolidation of the Salween camps to the north, there was a further influx of 
about 2,300 refugees who did not want to relocate to the consolidated camps of 
Ban Sala and Mae Khong Kha (since relocated to Mae La Oon). The camp extended 
southwards to accommodate these new residents to where the Mae Ra Ma Luang 
river flows into the larger Mae Yuam. This new part of the camp became Section 7, 
and straddles the provincial boundary between Mae Hong Son and Tak provinces. 
In March 1995, Section 1 of the camp was attacked by Burma Army and DKBA 
troops, but since this time there have been no further security incidents. 
   
| l 
 
ANNEX D: Profile of the respondents 
 
Settlement category 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid self-settled 
refugees 81 52,9 52,9 52,9 
  camp refugees 72 47,1 47,1 100,0 
  Total 153 100,0 100,0   
 
 
Gender 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Male 71 46,4 46,4 46,4 
Female 82 53,6 53,6 100,0 
Total 153 100,0 100,0   
 
 
Age 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid - 20 6 3,9 4,1 4,1 
20-29 38 24,8 25,9 29,9 
30-39 51 33,3 34,7 64,6 
40-49 32 20,9 21,8 86,4 
50+ 20 13,1 13,6 100,0 
Total 147 96,1 100,0   
Missing 99 6 3,9     
Total 153 100,0     
 
 
Religion 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Christian 57 37,3 37,5 37,5 
Buddhist 74 48,4 48,7 86,2 
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Muslim 20 13,1 13,2 99,3 
other 1 ,7 ,7 100,0 
Total 152 99,3 100,0   
Missing 99 1 ,7     
Total 153 100,0     
 
 
Ethnicity 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid S’ghaw Karen 76 49,7 49,7 49,7 
Pwo Karen 24 15,7 15,7 65,4 
Burman 21 13,7 13,7 79,1 
Muslim 17 11,1 11,1 90,2 
other 15 9,8 9,8 100,0 
Total 153 100,0 100,0   
 
 
Education (in standards) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid none 36 23,5 29,0 29,0 
  Grade 1 3 2,0 2,4 31,5 
  Grade 2 12 7,8 9,7 41,1 
  Grade 3 4 2,6 3,2 44,4 
  Grade 4 8 5,2 6,5 50,8 
  Grade 5 8 5,2 6,5 57,3 
  Grade 6 6 3,9 4,8 62,1 
  Grade 7 8 5,2 6,5 68,5 
  Grade8 11 7,2 8,9 77,4 
  Grade9 4 2,6 3,2 80,6 
  Grade 10 10 6,5 8,1 88,7 
  Post-
10/university 14 9,2 11,3 100,0 
  Total 124 81,0 100,0   
Missing 99 29 19,0     
Total 153 100,0     
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Number of family members in house 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 8 5,2 5,6 5,6 
2 11 7,2 7,6 13,2 
3 17 11,1 11,8 25,0 
4 27 17,6 18,8 43,8 
5 23 15,0 16,0 59,7 
6 20 13,1 13,9 73,6 
7 20 13,1 13,9 87,5 
8 9 5,9 6,3 93,8 
9 2 1,3 1,4 95,1 
10 3 2,0 2,1 97,2 
11 1 ,7 ,7 97,9 
12 2 1,3 1,4 99,3 
14 1 ,7 ,7 100,0 
Total 144 94,1 100,0   
Missing 99 9 5,9     
Total 153 100,0     
 
 
Period of arrival in Thailand 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid before 1988 26 17,0 17,3 17,3 
  period 1988-1994 25 16,3 16,7 34,0 
  period 1995-2000 54 35,3 36,0 70,0 
  after 2000 45 29,4 30,0 100,0 
  Total 150 98,0 100,0   
Missing 999 3 2,0     
Total 153 100,0     
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Job main income winner * settlement category 
 
    settlement category Total 
    
self-settled 
refugees 
camp 
refugees 
self-settled 
refugees 
Job main 
income 
winner 
unemployed  
3 6 9 
     
3,8% 8,5% 6,0% 
  farming  19 13 32 
     
23,8% 18,3% 21,2% 
  construction work  15 0 15 
     
18,8% ,0% 9,9% 
  petty trade  4 4 8 
     
5,0% 5,6% 5,3% 
  job with 
NGO/CBO/camp 
function 
 
9 13 22 
     
11,3% 18,3% 14,6% 
  student  1 0 1 
     
1,3% ,0% ,7% 
  shopkeeper  6 13 19 
     
7,5% 18,3% 12,6% 
  domestic work  3 1 4 
     
3,8% 1,4% 2,6% 
  weaving  0 6 6 
     
,0% 8,5% 4,0% 
  sewing  7 1 8 
     
8,8% 1,4% 5,3% 
  restaurant/hotel  7 0 7 
     
8,8% ,0% 4,6% 
  other  5 8 13 
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6,3% 11,3% 8,6% 
  taken care of by 
family 
 1 6 7 
     
1,3% 8,5% 4,6% 
Total  80 71 151 
   
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
